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FOREWORD
This book, by Dr. R. Craig Nation, was written to address the
need for a comprehensive history of the Balkan wars provoked by
the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991. These wars, and
the instability that they have provoked, became preoccupations
for international security management through the 1990s. After an
initial phase of distancing and hesitation, Balkan conflict drew the
United States and its most important European allies into an openended commitment to peace enforcement, conflict management,
and peace-building in the region, importantly supported by the
U.S. Army. These efforts are still underway, and significant tensions
and potential flashpoints remain in place within former Yugoslavia
and the entire Southeastern European area. The lessons learned
from the new Balkan wars, and the successes and failures of U.S.
and international engagement, provide a significant foundation for
future efforts to manage intractable regional conflict.
Dr. Nation’s work has been supported by a research grant
provided by the U.S. Army War College, and is published under the
auspices of the Strategic Studies Institute. The Army War College’s
primary mission is to prepare new generations of strategic leaders to
assume positions of responsibility within the U.S. armed forces and
civilian arms of the national security system. That mission includes
a serious confrontation with the most pressing security issues of
our time, to include the nature of contemporary armed conflict
and the changing nature of war itself. The Balkan conflict of the
1990s, as a case study in state failure and medium intensity warfare,
international conflict management and intervention, and U.S.
military engagement, provides an excellent framework for asking
basic questions about the dynamic of international security at the
dawn of a new millennium. War in the Balkans, 1991-2002 is intended
to provide a foundation for addressing such questions by surveying
events in both contemporary and larger historical perspectives and
posing preliminary conclusions concerning their larger meaning.
There will, regretfully, be other situations comparable in broad
outline to the violent decline and fall of socialist Yugoslavia. The
policies of the international community in the Yugoslav imbroglio
have been criticized widely as ineffective. However, in the end, after
years of futility, the conflict could be contained only by a significant
international military intervention spearheaded by the United
v

States, and a long-term, multilateral commitment to post-conflict
peace-building. Few would wish to pose the outcome as a model to
be emulated, but it should be a case from which we can learn.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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PREFACE
Armed conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia between
1991 and 2001 claimed over 200,000 lives, gave rise to atrocities
unseen in Europe since the Second World War, and left behind
a terrible legacy of physical ruin and psychological devastation.
Unfolding against the background of the end of cold war bipolarity,
the new Balkan wars sounded a discordant counterpoint to efforts
to construct a more harmonious European order, were a major
embarrassment for the international institutions deemed responsible
for conflict management, and became a preoccupation for the
powers concerned with restoring regional stability. After more than
a decade of intermittent hostilities the conflict has been contained,
but only as a result of significant external interventions and the
establishment of a series of de facto international protectorates,
patrolled by UN, NATO, and EU sponsored peacekeepers with
open-ended mandates.
The 1990s saw numerous regional conflicts—Haiti, Colombia,
Tajikistan, the Caucasus, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
the Middle East, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sierre Leone, Congo—
that were comparable to or, in some cases, more destructive than
the Balkan war. Few of these contests have received anything like
the intense scrutiny devoted to the Balkans, for reasons good and
bad. The Balkans is a part of Europe, and therefore more accessible
to scrutiny by the international media, and engagement by external
powers, than conflicts waged in less developed and approachable
regions. The atrocities committed in the Balkans were no more or
less lamentable than those carried out in parallel conflicts in Africa,
Latin America, or Asia, but they were prominently displayed and
extensively discussed on televised news reports. The resulting
impact on elite and public opinion made the Balkan conflict
politically compelling—it was a war that could not be ignored. The
Balkans has been an object of international political competition for
centuries, and many of the great European and Eurasian powers
have long-standing interests in the region. Once the stasis of the
cold war system was broken, traditional perceptions of interest were
quick to reemerge, perhaps to the surprise of the contending parties
themselves. From the outset, therefore, the Balkan war was shaped
by great power intervention—whether in support of local allies,
vii
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Figure 1. Map of the Balkan Region.

in the name of conflict resolution, or with an eye to the long-term
benefits to be derived from geopolitical realignment in what was
still regarded as a strategically relevant world region. The Balkan
conflict was a part of the generic phenomenon of post-communist
transition in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole, a dynamic with
major implications for international relations.1 It has likewise, and
correctly, been perceived as a kind of testing ground for international
conflict management efforts in the post-cold war era.
The Balkan war also posed world order concerns. The root cause
of the conflict was the destruction of the multinational Yugoslav
federation as a result of the rise of an intolerant and exclusionary
nationalism among its constituent nations. How can the explosive
demands of a politics of identity be contained in a world where
the ideal of the ethnically pure nation-state is largely a myth, and
agendas for self-determination retain a tremendous destructive
potential? The collapse of Yugoslavia gave rise to political violence
that local actors proved incapable of managing. What, if anything,
is the responsibility of the international community faced with
the chaos engendered by failed states and regional instability, and
what international institutions are best adapted to confront such
responsibilities?2 The Balkan conflict provided familiar examples
of the ethical challenges posed by modern war—lack of restraint in
poorly controlled civil conflicts with a powerful ethnic or civilizational
component, systematic violence against non-combatants elevated to
the status of a strategy for waging war, and the moral and legal
dilemmas of effective intervention in cases where the great powers
are not in accord and clear cut choices between “good guys and bad
guys” are simply not available. Does the premise of humanitarian
intervention justify preemptive action in such cases, even without
a mandate from valid international instances? Has international
humanitarian law evolved to the point where standards of conduct
can effectively be enforced by vested supranational authorities, and
should such standards be imposed upon intervening parties as well?
The economic consequences of armed conflict in the impoverished
Balkans, for the belligerents themselves and for their immediate
neighbors, have been particularly heavy. How can an agenda for
peace building, including reconciliation and economic recovery, be
forwarded in historically marginalized areas that confront a large
and widening developmental gap? Such questions are not unique
to the region under consideration, but the ways in which they
ix

are addressed in the Balkan case will set precedents with global
reverberations.
The Balkan conflict has become the subject of a small library
of journalistic reflection and scholarly analysis. The present study
is nonetheless one of only a few recent interpretations that seek to
look at the war as a whole.3 It rests upon several basic assumptions
about the nature of the conflict and the way in which it should be
interpreted.
First, the war is considered as a single, protracted contest with a
consistent strategic logic—the redistribution of peoples and terrain
within the collapsing Yugoslav federation. Though it was always a
contested country, Yugoslavia had for many years served as a source
of stability in the Balkans by providing a framework for positive
cohabitation between diverse ethnic groups and an alternative
to self-destructive nationalism.4 From the prelude in Slovenia in
1991, through the more destructive conflicts in Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina, and Kosovo between 1992 and 1999, to the epilogue
in Macedonia in 2000-2001, what I prefer to call the War of Yugoslav
Succession has been about efforts to assert sovereignty over territory
in the absence of any kind of agreement concerning how the
collapsing federation might have been reorganized, or disassembled,
short of a resort to force. Slobodan Milošević has been singled out for
special censure for his blatant manipulation of Serbian nationalism
in order to secure a hold on power, and willingness to resort to blood
and iron in order to carve a greater Serbia from the body of former
Yugoslavia, but Milošević was only one of a generation of post-Tito
leaders who opted to play the nationalist card in their respective
republics in despite of the interests of the peoples of Yugoslavia as a
whole. Though waged in the name of competing sovereignties, the
War of Yugoslav Succession was essentially a civil war, with fellow
citizens set at one another’s throats at the behest of ruthless and
unprincipled leaders engaged in a struggle for power and dominion.
It has truly been a war without victors.
Second, although fighting was contained within the territory
of the former Yugoslav federation, the impact of the conflict was
not. The war had a significant regional dimension, both within the
southeastern European region of which Yugoslavia was for so long
an integral part, and in Europe as a whole. The War of Yugoslav
Succession created a crisis of regional order, and gave rise to what
might be described as a new Eastern Question, with the Balkans
x

once again transformed into a zone of chronic instability. It was
also a crisis of European order, the first major armed conflict on
the continent since 1945 including abuses that most believed
would “never again” be allowed to occur, and a challenge for
which institutional Europe was painfully unprepared. America’s
belated involvement was in many ways a product of residual cold
war dynamics that institutionalized European dependency upon
U.S. leadership, as well as Europe’s own chronic division and
ineffectiveness as an international actor. At the present juncture
precipitous U.S. disengagement would not be a positive option,
but in the long-term the Balkan crisis will only be resolved when
the American role is reduced, and a more self-confident and unified
Europe embraces the region, and its problems, as its own.5 This study
makes frequent reference to European perspectives on the conflict,
which is portrayed as in essence a European dilemma demanding
European solutions.
Third, the international dimension of the war is considered to
be essential. The end of the cold war system from 1989 onward
seemed to open up new prospects for great power activism, and the
Yugoslav disaster provided a convenient opportunity to test long
dormant mechanisms for international crisis management. From
the first days of combat operations in Slovenia, the activist role of
the international community contributed importantly to shaping
outcomes. Even had a will to intervene not been so clearly manifest,
the dynamic of the conflict itself made some degree of international
engagement an imperative. The option to “let them fight it out
among themselves” was never quite as attractive in practice as some
have perceived it to be in retrospect. The incapacity of local actors
to resolve their differences short of a resort to arms was revealed
early on, and the conflict posed numerous issues with larger
significance, including the integrity of Europe, the future of the UN
and UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations, the viability of NATO,
relations with the new Russian Federation, the role of militant Islam
and relations between the West and the Islamic world, and the postcold war responsibilities of the American superpower. Much was at
stake, and the elevation during the conflict of provincial backwaters
such as Vukovar, Knin, Srebrenica, or Račak to the status of focal
points for international diplomacy was not incongruous. This
study examines the dynamic of international conflict management,
analyzes the international community’s successes and failures, and
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attempts to specify lessons learned.
Finally, although the present work is not intended as a military
history, considerable attention is directed toward the specifically
military and strategic dimensions of the conflict.6 The particular
complexity of strategic rivalry within former Yugoslavia, with its
overlapping nationalities, historically conditioned ethnic rivalries,
and multiple adversaries, has led analysts towards an unavoidable
concentration upon sorting out ethnographic detail. But the War
of Yugoslav Succession was also an armed conflict of a specific
type, perhaps best characterized by General Wesley Clark with the
ambiguous designation “modern war.”7
The ideologically charged division that defined so many of the
regional conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s, driven forward by guerrilla
organizations with varying kinds of Marxist-Leninist inspiration,
and therefore neatly subsumable within the global logic of the Cold
War, had by 1989 become a thing of the past. Whether the War of
Yugoslav Succession is best characterized as an “ethnic” conflict
generated by intolerant nationalism, or as a campaign inspired by
unprincipled opportunists for a division of spoils in the wake of
state failure, it posed entirely new kinds of challenges.8 As a medium
intensity conflict, fought out in an economically troubled and
politically marginalized area, between belligerents whose military
capacity did not allow them to become strategically significant actors,
the issues at stake were no longer self-evidently vital from a great
power standpoint. In theater, the incapacity of hastily assembled,
sometimes ill-disciplined, often poorly motivated, and nearly always
inadequately equipped local forces to impose strategic decision was
a recipe for military stalemate. Traditional UN peacekeeping proved
inadequate to the demands of a conflict where only robust peace
enforcement measures promised results, but the motivation (in the
case of the U.S.) and the means (in the case of Europe) for decisive
intervention was lacking. Though some degree of great power
involvement was inevitable, the extent of engagement that was
appropriate, and specifically the relevance of military intervention,
quickly became hotly contested issues, and have remained so. For
the United States, as the only world power with truly global power
projection capacity, and for the NATO alliance, Europe’s only
militarily competent security forum, the strategic dilemma posed by
the Balkan conflict was considerable. NATO could not simply ignore
the Balkans, but like other European and Euro-Atlantic institutions
xii

it was “woefully unprepared” for post-cold war problems, and
its tentative engagement and preference for partial or symbolic
measures designed to contain the fighting at low risk proved no
more effective than UN peacekeeping.9 In the end, it was only when
the international community’s inability to bring an end to the conflict
came to be seen as politically damaging in Washington that an
agenda for decisive military action was prepared. The issues posed
by these events are significant, and they are by no means limited to
the case of former Yugoslavia. Employing military means to manage
regional conflict in the chaotic circumstances of the 21st century is
likely to be a recurrent security problem for some time to come.
The Balkans is often described as a grim backwater, a “no man’s
land of world politics” in the words of a post-World War II study
“foredoomed to conflict springing from heterogeneity.”10 The
stereotype is false, but it has been distressingly influential in shaping
perceptions of the Balkan conflict and its origin. By encouraging
pessimism about prospects for recovery, it may also make it more
difficult to sustain commitments to post conflict peace building. This
book seeks to refute simplistic “ancient hatreds” explanations by
looking carefully at the sources and dynamics of the Balkan conflict
in all of its dimensions. Chapter One attempts to define the Balkans
as a region and specify the kinds of historical trends that led to its
marginalization in the modern period. Chapter Two looks at the
evolution of the region during Eric Hobsbawm’s short twentieth
century, with special emphasis upon the strengths and weaknesses
of the Yugoslav idea and post-World War II projects for an enlarged
Balkan federation. Chapter Three turns to the long crisis of Yugoslav
federalism following the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, culminating
with the wars of secession in Slovenia and Croatia. Chapters Four
and Five analyze the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo
with an eye to the problematic nature of the resolutions imposed
by international intervention. The sixth chapter steps outside the
confines of former Yugoslavia to focus on Greek-Turkish relations
and the Cyprus question, regarded as particularly significant pieces
of the Balkan regional puzzle, and as critical issues in any longterm program for recasting regional order. In Chapter Seven the
aftermath of the conflicts of the 1990s is examined, with an analysis
of the flare up of ethnic violence in Macedonia during 2000-2001
added to the mix. Though this is essentially a political history
arranged as a chronological narrative, I attempt to place the conflict
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in the broadest possible context, with attention drawn to historical,
cultural, political, and strategic variables. This is, I would assert,
the most appropriate way to come to terms with the war’s specific
character and historical weight.
The Research and Publications Board of the U.S. Army War
College provided a generous Temporal Research Grant allowing time
off from teaching responsibilities in order for me to concentrate on
the research and writing that made this work possible. I particularly
thank the former Commandant of the College, General Robert
Scales, and Director of the Department of National Security and
Strategy, Colonel Joseph Cerami, for their support for scholarship
as an integral part of senior military education and the discipline
of strategic studies. The Institute for National Security Studies of
the U.S. Air Force offered additional support for fieldwork in the
region. I am indebted to Stefano Bianchini and my colleagues in
the Europe and the Balkans International Network and Center
for East Central European and Balkan Studies at the University of
Bologna, with whom I struggled to understand Balkan issues during
the entire duration of the war, and from whose insights I have
benefited immeasurably whether or not I have agreed with them.
Special thanks are due to my colleagues Colonels Alan Stolberg and
Raymond Millen, for their careful and expert commentary on an
earlier version of the manuscript. The conclusions offered in the book
do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the Department
of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. They
represent a personal attempt to make sense of a great contemporary
tragedy.
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CHAPTER 1
THE BALKAN REGION IN WORLD POLITICS
On Board the Orient Express.
It has become common to use the term Balkan as a synonym for
backwardness and bigotry. The most widely read and influential
account of the region written during the 1990s portrays it as a
repository of sadism and violence, haunted by the “ghosts” of
implacable enmity.1 A prominent European diplomat, embittered
by the failure of peacemaking efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, speaks
with disdain of the subject of his mediation as “a culture of violence
within a crossroads civilization.”2 Even the Turkish novelist Nedim
Gürsel, a friend of the region whose family originates from Ottoman
Üsküb (Skopje), laments that hatred between peoples condemned to
coexist has become “the destiny of the Balkans.”3
Such atavisms could be dismissed as Orientalist fantasies were it
not for two inconvenient facts.4 First, the perception of the Balkans
as a region torn by violence and ethnic strife has an objective
foundation. From the emergence of the first national liberation
movements among the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire in
the early 19th century, Southeastern Europe has been a chronically
unstable European sub-region.5
Clashes with the Ottomans
culminated in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, and in both 20th century
world wars the Balkans was a significant theater of operations. A
phase of equilibrium during the Cold War could not be sustained
after the collapse of communism, and the new Balkan war of the
1990s has been the only major European armed conflict since 1945
(with the partial exception of the Greek civil war of 1945-1947, really
a continuation of struggles born during the Second World War).
Second, even when they are exaggerated or inaccurate, perceptions
matter. The fact that the Balkans is widely viewed as an area of
ancient hatreds, irrespective of whatever real merit the argument
may have, has shaped, and continues to shape, the international
community’s approach toward the region and its problems.
What is the Balkans? The term itself, derived from Persian
through Turkish, originally referred to a high house or mountain.
It was incorporated into the phrase “Balkan Peninsula” by the
1

German geographer Johann August Zeune in 1808 to call attention
to the area’s mountainous terrain, but did not come into common
use until the mid-19th century. The pejorative connotation that the
designation Balkan has taken on has led to resistance to its use,
and in some ways the more neutral term “Southeastern Europe”
is a preferable alternative.6 The Balkans, however, is more than
just a peninsular extension of greater Europe. It is also a distinctive
physical and cultural zone possessed of what Maria Todorova calls
“historical and geographic concreteness.”7
Most histories of the modern Balkans begin with a definition
of the region based upon its physical characteristics. The Balkans
is constituted as a peninsula, bounded by the Adriatic and Ionian
Seas in the West, the Aegean Sea in the South, and the Black Sea
in the East, and its ports of call have been a focus for commercial
interaction since classical antiquity. Coastal areas and outlying
island groups, with a more cosmopolitan background and milder
Mediterranean climate, may be distinguished from inland regions,
which are predominantly mountainous, relatively isolated, and
subject to more severe continental weather patterns. Mountain
barriers paralleling the coastline and an absence of navigable rivers
cut the Balkan interior off from the sea. Unlike the Iberian and Italian
Peninsulas, divided from the European heartland by the Pyrenees
and the Alps, the Balkans opens to central Europe through the valley
of the Danube and across the Pannonian plain. Internally, the region
is fragmented by a series of mountain chains—the Julien Alps in the
north, the Dinaric and Pindus mountains stretching dorsally along
the peninsula’s western flank, the Carpathians in the northeast,
the Balkan mountains (the Haemus range of classical antiquity)
running east-west through the heart of Bulgaria, and the Rhodope
mountains paralleling them in the south beyond the valley of the
Maritsa River and falling away toward the Aegean. The lack of
well irrigated lowlands suitable for intensive agriculture has been
an impediment to population growth. Mountainous terrain has
encouraged cultural differentiation, and contributed to the failure of
attempts at integration.8
As an exposed and strategically important area without a
tradition of independent statehood, the Balkan Peninsula has served
as a shatterbelt and point of confrontation between neighboring
power complexes—one source, externally imposed, of the propensity
toward violence purported to be an indigenous trait.9 Sea, river, and
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overland lines of communication running adjacent to and across the
region traverse a handful of critical chokepoints, which have been
contested through the centuries. The route following the valley of
the Danube from Central Europe to Belgrade, and continuing via
the valley of the Morava to Niš, has always been a commercial
and military artery of fundamental importance. From Niš one may
proceed southward across the watershed into the valley of the Vardar
(Axios) leading to the Aegean port of Thessalonica, southwestward
across the pass of Thermopylae into Attica, or southeastward across
the Dragoman Pass to Sofia, into the valley of the Maritsa to Plovdiv
and Edirne, and beyond across the Thracian plain to Istanbul. There
is no natural corridor attaching the Adriatic to the Balkan interior,
though an east-west highway traversing the southern Balkans was
constructed by the Romans beginning in 146A.D. This Via Egnatia
was an extension, beyond the Adriatic, of the great Roman Via Appia
linking Rome to Brindisi. It wound from what is today the Albanian
port of Durrës across mountainous terrain through Elbassan, past
Lake Okhrid and Bitola, and on to Thessalonica. Contemporary
development projects feature efforts to recreate the Roman corridor
as a modern highway net. Both north-south and east-west arteries
cross the same critical strategic juncture in today’s Republic of
Macedonia.
Sea lines of communication through the Turkish Straits and the
Strait of Otranto, paralleling the Anatolian coastline including the
Dodecanese island group, and along the Albanian and Greek coasts,
have been a focus for strategic rivalry into modern times, and the
scene of a long list of famous naval encounters.10 Istanbul possesses a
fine natural harbor, and the Greek ports of Thessalonica and Piraeus
are friendly rivals as commercial ports in the eastern Mediterranean.
The northern Adriatic includes serviceable harbors in Trieste, Koper,
Rijeka, and Split, which have to some extent entered into competition
for commercial traffic linking the Adriatic with the central European
capitals of Vienna and Budapest. Further to the south, the port of
Kotor (on the Gulf of Kotor in Montenegro) is modern Serbia’s only
outlet to the sea. Albania possesses several suitable anchorages
which are however woefully inadequate in terms of infrastructure.
The breakup of modern Yugoslavia has made access to the Adriatic
an especially important issue for land-locked Serbia, Macedonia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Balkans geographic situation has made it an obligatory point
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of passage for migrants and invaders moving between Asia Minor
and Europe. Centuries of ebb and flow have left the region one of
the most diverse in the world, with distinct ethnic, linguistic, and
confessional groups often living intermingled or in close proximity.
The classic example of Balkan inter-culturality was once BosniaHerzegovina, where prior to the outbreak of war in 1992 only
two towns could claim a “pure” ethnic composition with a single
community representing more than 90 percent of the inhabitants,
none of the twenty-five largest districts possessed a dominant
community representing more than 50 percent of the population,
and the rate of intermarriage among communities exceeded 25
percent (40 percent in urban areas). Despite the ravages of “ethnic
cleansing” during the 1990s, the Balkans remains a repository of
distinctive cultures coexisting in close proximity. Managing and
organizing the region’s diverse human geography is a basic strategic
challenge.11
Accounts of national origin are controversial in the Balkans,
because they are often used to justify territorial claims. Several
Balkan peoples claim descent from the region’s earliest known
inhabitants, though the assertions are sometimes disputed on
scientific grounds, or by rival nationalities seeking to prove that “we
were here first.” The Albanians speak a distinctive Indo-European
language and may be the ancestors of the ancient Illyrians, an Iron
Age tribal community with roots in the area between the Morava
river valley and the Adriatic. The Illyrians shared the peninsula
with the Thracians, an Indo-European group that is believed to have
established an organized community north of the Danube in the 5th
century B.C. and may be the distant ancestors of today’s Vlachs,
a pastoral people scattered through Yugoslavia, Albanian, and
Greece, speaking a Latin dialect close to Romanian. The Romanians
themselves argue descent from the Dacians, a branch of the Thracian
tribe that was conquered for Rome by the Emperor Trajan in 106
A.D. and thereafter, according to Romanian national interpretations,
transformed by intermarriage into a “Romano-Dacian” amalgam.
The modern Greeks claim the heritage of the Hellenes of classical
antiquity.12 Slavic tribes began to migrate into the Balkans in the 6th
century, but centuries were required before modern distinctions
between various branches of the South Slavic family (Slovenian,
Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian, and Bulgarian) would evolve.
The Proto-Bulgarians who arrived in the southern Balkans in the
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seventh century were Turkic tribespeople that would eventually be
assimilated by the local Slavic majority. According to some accounts
the original Serbs and Croats may also have been marauding tribes
of Iranian origins who were gradually assimilated. Today’s Slavic
Muslim communities (the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
Pomaks of Bulgaria and Greece, the Torbeši and Čtaci of Macedonia,
the Goranci of Kosovo, and other groups) are the product of
conversion during the medieval period.13 These groups are also
sometimes characterized as national communities, though they
are distinguished from their neighbors by confessional orientation
rather than ethnicity or national origin.14
Modern ethnic communities are often fragmented by conflicting
national or sub-regional affiliations. Montenegrins have usually been
regarded as a branch of the Serb family, but there is considerable
local support for an independent identity. Albanians are split along
the line of the Shkumbi River into a Tosk community in the south
and a Gheg community in the north, distinguished by differences
in dialect and socio-economic structures. Slavic Macedonians live
within Macedonia proper, the Pirin Macedonia region of Bulgaria,
and northern Greece. Moldovans are virtual Romanians, but with
an independent state tradition and national identity. Numerous
minority communities with distinctive local identities also occupy
regional niches. The most widely dispersed is the Roma (Gypsy)
community, whose roots spread through the entire Balkan region.
The Balkan Roma have historically been targets for discrimination,
and their situation has in many ways disintegrated in the postcommunist period.15
The Balkans is commonly described as a point of intersection
between the world’s major monotheistic religions—Roman Catholic
and Eastern Orthodox branches of the Christian faith, Islam, and the
remnants of what were once significant Jewish communities in urban
centers such as Istanbul, Sarajevo, and Thessalonica. Slovenes and
Croats are predominantly Catholic, though Slovenia also contains a
Protestant minority, prominently represented by current president
Milan Kučan. In Serbia, Macedonia, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria
autocephalous branches of Eastern Orthodoxy predominate. Turkey
is a secular state, but the overwhelming majority of its citizens
(over 95 percent) profess Islam. Approximately 80 percent of the
Albanian population of the Balkans is Islamic, but there is also a
Catholic minority in the mountainous north of Albania proper, and
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an Orthodox minority in the south and central areas. The Muslims
of Bosnia-Herzegovina represent the area’s largest Slavic Muslim
community, and were granted the status of constituent nation
by Titoist Yugoslavia in 1961. Small Turkic communities are also
scattered throughout the southern Balkans.
Confessional division has been an important component of the
fighting that has traumatized former Yugoslavia since 1991. Some
analysts have attempted to interpret the conflict on the basis of Samuel
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis, according to which
strategic rivalry beyond cold war bipolarity will be focused along
the “faultlines” dividing distinctive civilizational zones essentially
defined by confessional orientation.16 Huntington’s thesis has been
widely criticized, both for its tendency to transform differences
between civilizations into absolute and unbridgeable barriers, and
for a proclivity to impose fixed and arbitrary geographical contours
onto what are actually complex patterns of cultural interaction. In
the Balkans, organized religion has been one factor among many
promoting conflict, but it has also served as a force for empathy
and mutual understanding. In any case, religious diversity is an
important part of the region’s cultural specificity.17
The extent of the differences that define Balkan inter-culturality
should not be exaggerated. The South Slavic peoples speak closely
related and mutually comprehensible languages—more closely
related than the variety of Latin dialects spoken along the length
of the Italian Peninsula. The Croat, Serb, and Bosnian Muslim
communities are distinguished by little more than an inherited
or elected confessional orientation and patterns of subjective selfidentification.18 Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic affiliation cuts
across boundaries and provides space for the emergence of larger,
trans-national communities inspired by what are, or should be,
profoundly humane belief systems. Outside the region’s Slavic
areas, Greeks, Turks, Romanians, and (perhaps to a lesser extent)
Albanians have established state traditions. Managing diversity in
the region must be considered a challenge, but it is certainly not
an impossible one. From the perspective of political geography the
Balkans may be defined as an integral part of greater Europe, but
also as a relatively autonomous sub-region with a clear geographical
outline, a distinct historical background, and a specific cultural
ambience. The conflicts of the past decade have focused attention on
the region’s many problems. Its accomplishments and potential are
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also worthy of note.
Traditional accounts emphasize the strategic importance of
the Balkans as a land-bridge between the European, Asian, and
African continents, and as an apple of discord within the European
balance of power system. In classic geostrategic terms, many of
the region’s assets have declined in salience. Modern means of
communication make a capacity to transit the region less vital
than once was the case. Critical strategic resources are not at stake.
The region’s national economies are weak, and their attraction as
potential markets is limited. No local power, with the exception of
Turkey, is in a position to generate strategically relevant military
forces, and engagement in the region by external actors no longer
threatens to disrupt continental or global balances. The Balkans
remains strategically relevant nonetheless. As a part of Europe,
instability in the region will inevitably affect great power relations.
The Turkish straits and entire eastern Mediterranean region have
gained new relevance as the terminus for potential east-west
pipeline routes carrying oil and natural gas resources from the
Caspian oil hub onto international markets.19 The fallout that could
result from open-ended civilizational rivalry along Balkan fault lines
is potentially quite great. And the sixty mile wide Strait of Otranto
between Albania and Puglia has become sensitive as a conduit for
criminal trafficking and boat people seeking a point of entry into the
European Union.
The famous Orient Express train line, inaugurated in the latter
decades of the 19th century to link western European capitals
with Istanbul, was christened with reference both to its terminus
and itinerary. Since the term Balkan came into common usage,
the region has been viewed as a transition zone spanning “an
accepted fundamental difference between Orient and Occident.”20
The distinctiveness of the Balkans as a European sub-region
is without a doubt a product of cultural affiliations and social
norms derived from involvement in both the central European
and Ottoman experiences. But East and West are not mutually
exclusive categories. Real historical interaction along the so-called
faultlines that traverse the region has been at least as much defined
by reciprocal influence and convergence as it has by confrontation
and hostility.21 Moreover, such perceptions risk undervaluing the
extent to which the Balkans represents an entity in its own right, “a
unity embedded in European civilization, quite different from the
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culture of central Europe or that of the west of the continent, but a
unity characterized by a homogenous civilization despite the rifts
occasioned by cultural, religious, historical, or political differences.”22
Efforts to deconstruct the Balkans on the basis of false and offensive
civilizational distinctions, or to co-opt it as a peripheral extension of
the “real” Europe, have been at the foundation of the violence of the
past decade. Effective conflict management and post-conflict peace
building must eventually return to projects for regional integration
based upon shared affinities and a common legacy.
The World of Light.
In Homer’s account of the Phoenician origins of Europe, Zeus,
disguised as a swimming bull, abducts Europa, the daughter of
the King of Tyre, and carries her off to the island of Crete where
she bears him a son, King Minos.23 The legend calls attention to the
Asian sources of Greek civilization of the classical age, for which the
eastern Mediterranean provided the setting. Indo-European peoples,
some of whom were speaking a variant of the Greek language,
are believed to have migrated into the area at the end of the third
millennium B.C. From the beginning of the second millennium,
the Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations of Crete and the Greek
mainland initiated a civilizational tradition that was distinct from
those that had preceded it in the Fertile Crescent and Egypt.24 Doric
colonization in the northern Aegean and Adriatic areas began in the
8th and 7th centuries B.C., leading to the cultural flowering of the
classical Greek polis (city-state) in 5th century Athens. These are the
foundations of what has come to be called Western Civilization.
In 336-323 B.C. Alexander of Macedon (“the Great”) swept aside
the remnants of the Greek city-state system and used the Balkans as a
base for a campaign of conquest that penetrated into the heart of Asia.
In the course of the 2nd century Macedon fell in turn to the expanding
power of Rome, which gradually transformed the Balkans into a
series of Roman provinces. The Romans subjugated the Greek world
strategically, absorbed it politically, and derived great economic
advantage from control of the trade routes leading eastward to
the Black Sea. They also adopted the region’s indigenous culture,
the Hellenistic civilization of the Greek East. Hellenism, grounded
in the social and political legacy of classical Greek civilization but
also a living tradition that absorbed new influences and continued
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to evolve over centuries, became an early source of differentiation
between East and West.25
The Hellenistic world was gradually absorbed into the Eastern
Roman Empire, focused on the city of Constantinople, with its
unparalleled strategic situation on a promontory at the confluence
of the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara. Constantinople was
inaugurated on 11 May 330, on the site of the ancient fortress town
of Byzantion, and christened in honor of the emperor Constantine
as “New Rome which is Constantinople.” The formal division of
the Roman Empire into western and eastern branches occurred at
the conclusion of the reign of Emperor Theodosius Flavius in 395.
After the sack of the Eternal City and the abdication of Romulus
Augustulus in 476, the title of emperor in the West was allowed to
lapse. For nearly a thousand years, however, to the arrival of the
conquering Ottomans in 1453, a succession of Roman emperors
exercised autocratic power in the Byzantine polity that would carry
the legacy of Roman law and civilization through the European
Middle Ages. Greek in language, Roman in administration, Christian
in spirit, influenced by significant borrowings from the Orient, the
Eastern Empire became increasingly self-aware and self-contained
as Roman power in the west ebbed away.
For centuries the northern frontier of the Byzantine Empire was
approximately drawn at the line of the Danube. The northern Balkan
region was a frontier zone, where indigenous tribal communities
sometimes managed to assert independence from Byzantine
authority, but more often accepted various degrees of dependency
and subordination.26 The empire assimilated these communities
culturally. As a consequence the Byzantine experience became a
foundation for modern Balkan identity.
Politically, the empire was a theocracy whose ruler, the Basileus,
also stood at the head of the Eastern Church. It bequeathed a
tradition of autocratic governance and of Cæseropapism, a union of
secular and spiritual authority that would encourage the definition
of national identity on the basis of confessional orientation. Greek
became the language of commerce, administration, and culture, but
the empire was a vast complex that included a wide range of ethnic
and linguistic communities. Its citizens called themselves Romans
(Rômaioi), and were defined by allegiance to an ideal of civilization,
to the concept of the empire as an ecumenical whole beyond whose
boundaries stretched the world of barbarism. These flattering self9

images were not entirely false—up to the capture of Constantinople
by the marauding knights of the Fourth Crusade in 1204 the city was
the undisputed center of European civilization. Strategically, the
empire served as a defensive bastion for the idea of Europe against
invasion from the south and east. “Had the Saracens captured
Constantinople in the seventh century rather than the fifteenth,”
writes John Norwich, somewhat provocatively, “all Europe—and
America—might be Muslim today.”27 Economically, Byzantium was
a commercial civilization whose gold-based currency unit was the
basis for trade in the eastern Mediterranean for centuries.
Political autonomy, material prosperity, and strategic unity
became the foundation for cultural specificity, reflected above all
in the dominant role of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The empire
pursued a missionary vocation—the brothers Cyril and Methodius,
who set out from Thessalonica in the 9th century to bring a written
language and the message of the gospel to the Slavic tribes of Central
Europe and the Balkans, were dispatched as representatives of the
Emperor—and under its aegis Eastern Christianity became the faith
of a vast region stretching from the Balkans into the Russian plain
and the Caucasus. A formal schism between Eastern and Western
Churches occurred in 1054, but it was only a step along the way in a
long process of growing apart. Many of the differences between the
two communities were superficial. But the Eastern Church refused
to acknowledge the spiritual hegemony of the Papacy, and adhered
to the ideal of a Christian community governed by its bishops in
the tradition of the seven Ecumenical Councils of the early Church.
Orthodox spirituality, grounded in the unique beauty of the Eastern
liturgy and a vision of mystic union with the Holy Spirit, evolved in
a manner distinct from that of the Western Church.
Byzantium would eventually decline and fall, but the political
traditions of the empire, its contributions to social and cultural
development, and the integrative role of the Orthodox Church
left powerful legacies. Contemporary perceptions of the Balkans
as peripheral and backward must at least be conditioned by an
awareness of the tradition of which it is the heir. Steven Runciman’s
panegyric to Byzantine Constantinople as “the centre of the world of
light” against the foil of the European Dark Ages is exaggerated, but
not altogether devoid of sense.28
The mass migration of Slavic tribes into the Balkans during the
6th and 7th centuries corresponded to a phase of Byzantine weakness
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and loss of control. The Basileus Nicephoros I died in battle against
the proto-Bulgarian ruler Khan Krum in 811, establishing the First
Bulgarian Empire as a strategic rival on the empire’s northern
marches. The medieval Bulgarian state reached its high point under
tsar Simeon the Great (893-927), whose armies briefly threatened
Constantinople.29 But the tide turned, and with the defeat of the
Bulgars at the hands of Emperor Basil II (dubbed Bulgaroctonos, “the
Bulgar Slayer”) in 1018, the entire Balkan Peninsula was brought
under the direct control of Constantinople. George Ostrogorsky’s
classic History of the Byzantine State posits the reign of Basil II as
the empire’s apogee, “followed by a period of decline in which
in its foreign policy Byzantium lived on the prestige won in the
previous age and at home gave play to all the forces making for
disintegration.”30
One source of decline was intensified strategic pressure. By 1071
the Normans had conquered Bari, the last bastion of Byzantine
power in Italy, and in the same year the Selçuk Sultan Alparslan
defeated the Byzantine army of Romanus Diogenes at the Battle
of Manzikert, opening a route westward into Anatolia. In 1082 the
merchant city of Venice, still technically a subject of the empire,
established de facto independence by negotiating a Charter of
Privileges. Henceforward La Serennissima would be a dangerous
commercial and strategic rival. On 18 November 1094 at the Council
of Clermont, Pope Urban II opened the era of the Crusades, and the
First Crusade passed through the imperial outpost of Belgrade in
1096.31 In the following centuries a series of campaigns promoted by
the Western Church would undermine the empire commercially by
opening up alternative trade routes between the Arabic world and
the West, and bring a series of Frankish armies into the heartland of
the Byzantine realm. In 1204, urged on by the Doge of Venice, the
knights of the 4th Crusade seized Constantinople, vandalizing the
city’s artistic treasures and establishing a short-lived Latin Kingdom
of Constantinople from 1204-1261.
In the Balkan area external pressure and strategic overextension
allowed space for the rise of autonomous feudal principalities. The
Croatian kingdom of kings Tomislav (910-929), Krešimir IV (10581074), and Zvonimir (1075-1089) converted to Western Christianity
and secured limited autonomy by accepting a Pacta Conventa with
Hungary in 1102, subjugating Croatia to the crown of St. Stephen
in exchange for a degree of self-government under an indigenous
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prince or ban. In 1185 a local rebellion established Turnovo as
the capital of a second Bulgarian empire, which at the end of the
13th century briefly accepted the suzerainty of the expanding
Tatar empire of Batu Khan. In 1219 Stefan Nemanja (Saint Sava)
obtained autocephaly for the Serbian Orthodox Church, and laid
the foundation for the great Nemanja dynasty that would control
much of the southern Balkans at its culmination in the reign of
Stefan Dušan (1331-1355). In Wallachia and Moldavia independent
Romanian principalities emerged as the result of the merger of
smaller units under the princes Basarab (1310-1352) and Bogdan I
(1359-1365). A large Bosnian kingdom also saw the light during the
14th century, reaching its high water mark under Roman Tvrtko
(1353-1391), crowned in 1377 as the “king of the Serbs, Bosnians, and
Croats.” Despite the best efforts of twentieth century nationalists to
rewrite the past in service of the present by asserting a glorious and
unbroken national tradition stretching back into the Middle Ages,
these were medieval dynasties, not modern national states in any
sense of the term, bound together by allegiance to a ruling family
rather than ethnic, cultural, or linguistic affinity.32 The rise of such
kingdoms became a reflection of Byzantium’s decline. By 1425
the population of Constantinople had shrunk to barely more than
50,000, and its effective area of control been reduced to the Thracian
hinterland and several Aegean islands.
Under the Yoke.
The power that would eventually replace the failing empire
originated as one of the several Turkish tribes that had migrated
into Anatolia in the preceding centuries. There is a store of surviving
coins stamped with the name of the ruler Osman dating from the
1280s, about the time at which the Osmali Turks, or Ottomans,
moved into western Anatolia to escape subordination to the
Mongols descendents of Genghis Khan. By 1354 the Ottomans had
crossed the Straits into the Balkans and launched a campaign of
expansion inspired by the ideology of gazavat, or holy war. Without
the defensive barrier provided in earlier centuries by a potent
Byzantium, the feudal principalities of the late medieval Balkans
were in no position to hold out. In 1371 predominantly Slavic armies
were defeated by the Ottomans on the Maritsa, and in 1389 fought
to a standstill at the famous Battle of Kosovo Field outside modern
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Priština.33 The Kosovo battle was not the decisive and irreversible
defeat that Serbian legend would eventually make it out to be—it
was part of a process of advance and retreat that would, however,
lead inexorably toward the subordination of the Balkan region to
Ottoman rule.34 The process was already well advanced when Sultan
Mehmed Fatih (“the Conqueror”), after a seven-week siege, finally
breached the famous walls of Constantinople and subdued the city
on 24 May 1453.35 For most of the five subsequent centuries, up to the
collapse of Ottoman rule in Europe in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913,
the Balkans was ruled from the renamed capital of Istanbul as an
integral part of the Ottoman Empire.36
The Ottoman legacy is another pillar of modern Balkan
identity. In architecture, music, language, cuisine, and social mores
commonalities derived from the Ottoman centuries continue to
provide the elements of a distinctive cultural ambience that is
unmistakable, albeit not easily defined. The historical substance of
the Ottoman experience, and its significance for the peoples of the
Balkans themselves, however, are bitterly contested.37
For the varied Christian communities of the peninsula, the
judgment has always been clear—subordination to the Sublime
Porte meant centuries “under the yoke” (Under the Yoke is the
title of Bulgaria’s national novel by Ivan Vazov, recounting the
story of the 1876 uprising against Ottoman rule). As a direct
result of imposed foreign domination, it is argued, the flourishing
late medieval kingdoms of the peninsula were swept away and
the historical momentum of a normal state and nation building
process set backwards. The indigenous relationship with a greater
Europe that had characterized the medieval centuries was broken,
and replaced with alien cultural norms that would henceforward
impose separation. Ottoman hegemony is defined as consistently
exploitative, and as the source of a widening developmental gap.
“The Turk,” wrote the Bosnian novelist and Nobel Prize winner Ivo
Andrić in a passage fairly reflective of regional attitudes, “could
bring no cultural content or sense of higher historic mission, even to
those South Slavs who accepted Islam; for their Christian subjects,
their hegemony brutalized custom and meant a step to the rear in
every respect.”38
Such judgments were an inevitable response to perceptions of
imperial domination. They do little justice to the sophistication of
Ottoman institutions, or to the empire’s substantial achievements.
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Under Mehmet II (1451-1481) the empire had already emerged as
the dominant power in the eastern Mediterranean, with a political,
administrative, cultural, and socio-economic order well adapted to
the ethnic and religious diversity of Anatolia and the Balkans. The
Ottoman dynasty presided over an autocratic, patrimonial tributary
state with all power concentrated in the hands of the sultan and a
small group of advisors surrounding him. Islam was the religion of
state, but no effort was made to suppress the cosmopolitan character
of the empire’s population. Rather, the Ottomans adopted the socalled millet system, which granted the monotheistic Christian
(Armenian, Gregorian, Catholic, and Orthodox) and Jewish
subjects of the sultan, organized as self-governing confessional
communities, substantial religious freedom. In an age of religious
intolerance in the West, Mehmet II hosted the Orthodox Patriarchate
in his capital, conducted a formal correspondence with the Catholic
Pope, and invited the Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain and
Portugal after 1492 to resettle within the boundaries of his empire.
Confessional groups remained separate and distinct, but relations
between communities were generally respectful. Under Süleyman
the Magnificent (1520-1566) the empire created a sophisticated
legal code, maintained a splendid court, completed the conquest
of Hungary, and in 1526 briefly laid siege to Vienna, transforming
itself into an actor in the emerging European balance of power
system. At its height, the empire was an imposing reality and a
force for cohesion throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Dorothea
Gräfin Razumovsky, writing in the wake of the carnage of the 1990s,
speaks fairly of the “astonishing achievement of Ottoman statecraft,
which succeeded in maintaining peace and preserving the unity
of the conquered Balkan region, with its many national traditions,
languages, sects, and religions, over many centuries.”39
The reign of Süleyman the Magnificent was the empire’s
high point. Thereafter it entered into the long decline that would
eventually earn it the title, coined by tsar Nicholas I of Russia, of “the
sick person of Europe.” The Treaty of Zsitva-Torok, concluded with
the Habsburgs in 1606, brought an end to territorial acquisitions in
Europe. The second Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 was history
repeated as farce. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 had freed the
hands of the Habsburgs, who in 1683 swept aside the armies of
Kara Mustafa on the Kahlenberg and launched a campaign to roll
back Ottoman conquests. Led by famed commanders such as the
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Markgraf Wilhelm I of Baden (the “Türkenlouis”) and Prince Eugen
of Savoy, the Habsburgs pushed their boundary with the Ottoman
Empire southward, taking Ofen (modern Buda) in 1686, Belgrade
in 1687, and Niš in 1689. In the first decades of the 18th century the
Venetians seized control of the Peloponnesus and part of Attica (in
the process occasioning the destruction of the Athenian Parthenon,
which had survived from classical antiquity nearly intact). The most
dangerous long-term rival of the Sublime Porte would however be
the rising Russian Empire, which under Peter the Great (1682-1725)
pressed south toward the Black Sea, initiating a series of RussoTurkish military encounters that would extend up to the First World
War. In the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, the Treaty of Iaşi of
1792, and the Treaty of Bucharest of 1812 Russia took control of all
Ottoman lands along the northern littoral of the Black Sea including
the Crimea, shattering the Ottoman trade monopoly in the region
and earning formal recognition as the protector of the Orthodox
Christian subjects of the Porte.
The disintegrative effect of external pressure upon the integrity
of the Sublime Porte was accompanied by increasing domestic
instability. The Ottoman Empire had been maintained for centuries
with the help of a statist economic order that was strongly resistant
to change, strict autocratic governance that crushed individual
autonomy, and military expenditure that imposed a massive
burden on state finances. As the 19th century dawned the empire
had not succeeded in moving from a traditional agrarian economic
base toward manufacturing and industry. It remained in the grips
of a parochial and conservative state bureaucracy dedicated to
the preservation of privilege at all costs. It had not managed to
redefine the relationship between subject and ruler in such a way
as to allow for the consolidation of a modern nation-state on what
was becoming the western European model. Internationally and
domestically, the Ottoman Empire had entered into a spiral of retreat
and disintegration that it would not be able to reverse.
Ottoman decline was paralleled by western Europe’s “takeoff”
in the 16th and 17th centuries, including the gradual disappearance
of feudal patterns of natural economy, a revival of commerce, the
emergence of the early modern dynastic state, and the associated
cultural aspirations of Renaissance humanism. By the 17th century
an economically progressive European core had come into being,
cutting across the western edge of the continent from England to
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northern Italy. Beyond these dynamic regions stretched peripheral
areas that came to include much of eastern and Balkan Europe as
well as the Mediterranean and far northern littorals. The process
of differentiation between east and west in Europe had come full
circle, with the Mediterranean world that had once been the focus
of classical civilization now pressed to the margin of a dynamic
capitalist heartland covering the continent’s northwestern tier.
Differentiation had many facets. Economically, the east and south
was reduced to a position of dependency and underdevelopment,
reflected by the persistence of inefficient primary production and
the absence of dynamic urban complexes.40 Politically, the early
modern dynastic state was not able to strike roots in regions that
continued to be dominated by vast, centralized multinational
empires.41 Culturally, the Byzantine and Ottoman experiences came
to be seen as manifestations of a significant civilizational divide.42
The marginalization of Eastern Europe from the 17th century
onward encouraged the emergence of a perceptual gap, based upon
a prevalent Western image of the East as a constituting other. The
few enterprising travelers that penetrated these distant regions
brought back colorful accounts of “rude and barbarous kingdoms”
that reinforced a sense of apartness.43 Armed confrontations with
the Ottomans strengthened that perception by encouraging the
propagation of a vulgarized image of the “terrible Turk” as an
external threat.44 The result was an essentially stereotypical, but
widespread and compelling, representation of the East as the domain
of the baleful and bizarre—of vampires, boyars, brigands, beylerbeys and bashi-bazouks. A line between East and West was drawn
between Europe and the Balkans, and touted as a divide between two
sharply contrasting civilizational zones. “The Danube,” remarks the
British travel writer Sachervell Sitwell in a passage reflecting these
perceptions, “passes out of civilization into nothingness, towards
the Tatar steppe.”45
In the early Ottoman centuries, the empire maintained a kind of
prideful isolation that limited interaction with the external world.
When more intensive contact became unavoidable, the empire was
already well along the path of decline. The consignment of Europe’s
wild east to the periphery of the “real” Europe was in part a function
of that decline. Nonetheless, at the end of the Ottoman experience
the economic gap between Southeastern Europe and the most
developed western European states was considerably smaller than
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it is today. For the Balkans, the Ottoman experience was in many
ways a positive one. Islam would become an essential component
of the region’s identity. The policy of limited tolerance embodied
in the millet system allowed Muslim, Christian, and Jewish peoples
to cohabit without sacrificing communal identity. In 1910, on the
eve of the Balkan wars, only about half of the sultan’s subjects were
Muslims, with 41 percent representing various Orthodox Christian
communities, 6 percent Roman Catholic, and another 3 percent
composed of Nestorian, Druse, and Jewish minorities.46 These
were in large measure disaffected communities, however, which
by the dawn of the twentieth century had become committed to an
ideology of liberation that perceived the empire as a feudal remnant,
a zone of economic exploitation and backwardness, and a barrier to
independent national development. The new national movements
set out from a position of weakness, but they were eventually to
triumph.
The Eastern Question.
Ottoman weakness was the foundation for what would become
known in European diplomatic history as “the Eastern Question.”47
Posed as a question, this asked whom among the European
great powers would benefit from Ottoman vulnerability. Levron
Stavrianos identifies three related dimensions of the problem: (1)
The failure of reform movements to arrest and reverse the empire’s
long historical decline; (2) The rise of national consciousness and
national liberation movements among the Christian subjects of the
Sublime Porte; and (3) The repeated intervention of the European
great powers, concerned with the implications of Ottoman weakness
for the continental balance of power.48 The third point is of particular
importance—though rooted in a crisis of Ottoman institutions, the
Eastern Question was essentially a problem of international order.
Between the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the outbreak of the
First World War in 1914, the European state system experienced
something like a long peace, only partially disrupted by the Crimean
War in 1854-55 and the wars of German unification between 18661871. Through the mechanisms of the “Congress System” and
the principle of elite consensus upon which it rested, the five
acknowledged great powers (Great Britain, France, Austria/AustriaHungary, Prussia/Germany, and Russia) maintained a stable
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international order that was successful in warding off hegemonic
warfare on the scale of the Napoleonic period.49 Interstate rivalry
was not eliminated, however—it was pushed onto the periphery, as
colonial rivalry further abroad, and as a struggle for influence in the
neighboring Balkans.
Each of the great powers had some kind of stake in the Balkan
Peninsula. Russia was in the midst of a phase of imperial expansion
and was particularly interested in access to the Turkish Straits,
through which an increasing amount of its commercial traffic was
routed. It sought to pose as the protector of the Orthodox Christian
subjects of the Porte, partly as a calculated search for influence, but
also because the ideology of the “Third Rome” (which identified
Russia as the heir of Byzantium) had become an important
component of its international identity.50 Austria was determined to
resist Russian encroachment, and concerned lest restiveness among
the South Slav subjects of the Porte affect its own disgruntled Slavic
population (over 50 percent of the population of the Habsburg
empire at the time of its dissolution in 1918 were Slavs). Britain was
determined to maintain naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, and
concerned with Russian imperial pretensions. Throughout most
of the century France played the role of a non-status quo power,
seeking to redefine a system of European order originally conceived
to keep her hemmed in, and instability in the Balkans provided more
than enough opportunity to pursue that end. Of all the great powers,
Prussia (after 1871 Germany) was the least directly engaged (it was
the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck who in 1878 made the
famous remark that “For me all the Balkans are not worth the healthy
bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier”) but it had no choice but to
monitor the machinations of its rivals.51
Ottoman weakness was in part a product of institutional
stagnation. The early warrior sultans soon gave way to reclusive
monarchs cut off from affairs of state. The famed elite units of the
Ottoman army, the Janissaries, had by the end of the 18th century
become a parasitic hereditary caste attached to the imperial palace,
where they repeatedly intervened to destroy sultans whose policies
did not suit them. Sultan Mahmed II suppressed the Janissaries in
1826, but at this point military decline was far advanced. Ottoman
governance had always been light-handed. Most subject peoples
administered their own local affairs and had only occasional
interaction with representatives of the central authority. Eventually,
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however, the sultan became dependent upon administrative agents
as tax gatherers, and increasingly incapable of controlling them.
The successful revolt of the empire’s Egyptian provinces in the first
decades of the 19th century, led by the Albanian warlord Mehmet
Ali, and the simultaneous assertions of local autonomy by Osman
Pasvanoğlu in Vidin and Ali Pasha in Janina, were only particularly
dramatic examples of the inability of the empire to resist centrifugal
forces.52 External pressure was a constant, and as time went on the
empire was increasingly incapable of defending its far-flung frontiers.
The French Revolution, with its subversive messages of nationalism
and liberty, also reached out to the East with the conquest of Egypt
by Napoleon in 1798, the French occupation of the Ionian Islands
from 1807-1814, and the creation of the French-sponsored Illyrian
Provinces in Dalmatia from 1809-1814.
The most important source of instability within the empire was the
increasing restiveness of its Christian subjects. This restiveness had
many sources. Growing financial strain combined with aggressive
local tax gatherers imposed an ever-harsher burden on the raya (the
“flock,” or common people). The millet system did not eliminate all
forms of discrimination and attendant resentment. Christians and
Jews were not permitted to testify against Muslims in court or to bear
arms, marriage with Muslims was banned, and in lieu of military
service a heavy tax (the haradj) was imposed. Throughout the region
local tradition glorified resistance to the Ottoman authorities, often
by propagating a virtual cult of brigandage such as that carried on
by the Greek klefts or south Slavic hajduks. These bands of marauders
preyed off the inability of the empire to maintain law and order, but
they also took on the aura of primitive rebels and became “a symbol
of resistance to political and social oppression.”53 By the later part
of the 18th century an indigenous Balkan entrepreneurial caste had
also begun to make its appearance, better educated and with wider
horizons than their peasant forebears. The radical fringe of this
new mercantile elite would stand at the head of the varied national
liberation movements that were about to erupt.54
National uprisings in 1804 and 1815 in Serbia and 1821 in Greece
inaugurated an era of revolutionary nationalism that would continue
through most of the following century. Although the varied national
liberation movements bore the traces of their specific local and
regional situations, they also shared many common traits. All were
influenced by the romantic nationalism of the early 19th century,
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with its faith in Johann von Herder’s cultural nation and belief in the
unspoiled wellspring of popular culture. The imagined communities
that became the subject of nationalist passion were established on
mythic foundations, usually including the legends of a lost golden
age of national greatness, followed by centuries of martyrdom under
the yoke of oppression, Ottoman or otherwise.55 The Serbian Kosovo
cycle, an epic poem that laments the martyrdom of the Serbian
nation after its defeat at Kosovo Field, is a particularly sophisticated
rendition of this kind of myth, but it is by no means unique.56
Independence movements were usually the product of revolutionary
conspiracies that sought to provoke popular uprisings and use them
as vehicles to generate indigenous armed resistance and great power
intervention. The tactic was effective, but neat breaks were seldom
achieved. In most cases a struggle for independence was waged over
decades, producing harvests of martyrs, massacres, and betrayals
that would poison the air for generations to come.
The states that emerged from these confrontations were usually
the product of compromise negotiated above the heads of the new
national leaders by the European powers. Great power concern for
the hoary diplomatic premises of compensation and balance almost
guaranteed that all parties to the dispute would be unsatisfied—the
Porte frustrated by its inability to hold on to territories that it had
ruled for centuries, new national leaders determined to extend their
area of control, and the powers wary of the possibility for the division
of spoils to work to their disadvantage. The social structure of the
new states juxtaposed small administrative elites with vast peasant
populations living in the pre-modern environment of small villages
and towns. Politically, they were crafted on what was perceived
as the western European model, with a centralized state structure
housed in an expanding “modern” capital, and with nationalism as
an integrating (but also exclusionary) ruling ideology. Comparisons
with the 20th century experience of de-colonization are not exact,
but they are apt. The peoples of the region were judged to be too
immature for self-governance, and were usually provided with
monarchs drawn from the ruling families of the West, incongruously
parachuted in from Bavaria or the Rhineland to preside over the heirs
of Agamemnon and King Priam. These rulers were quick to adopt
the frustrated nationalism of their new compatriots. The Balkan’s
cultural complexity did not permit the creation of ethnically pure
national states, and the new regimes usually contained only a small
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part of the larger community that they aspired to represent. As a result
the agenda of independence was expressed as a host of revisionist
demands aimed at territorial expansion that would set the new
states at one another’s throats. The ideology of national liberation
is another of the pillars upon which modern Balkan identity rests,
but its impact has been almost uniformly negative. The problems
that have emerged from the attempt to impose modernization from
above through the instrument of a centralized state bureaucracy
inspired by an ideology of exclusionary nationalism, overseen by
the powers in a complex and poorly understood inter-cultural
environment, continue to plague the region to this day.
The Powder Keg.
The Eastern Question was also a font of war. The dynamic of
decline inside the Ottoman Empire occasioned increasing concern
in Vienna.57 All of the great powers were to some extent put off
by aggressive Russian support for national liberation movements
among the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte. Given the mix
of economic, cultural, and military interests that bound it to the
region, Russian engagement was inevitable, but in strategic terms it
was destabilizing. Consequent tensions would become an essential
cause of the First World War.58
As the 19th century dawned, Russia’s relations with the Orthodox
peoples of the Balkans were still undeveloped—only the Greeks
were meaningful economic partners, and St. Petersburg’s interests
in the region focused mainly on the Danubian principalities and the
Straits.59 Catherine the Great’s “Greek Project,” which envisioned
the expulsion of the Ottomans from Europe and the creation of a
new Byzantium under Russian protection with Constantinople as
its capital, never advanced beyond the status of a visionary ideal.60
When, after the rebellion of 1804, a Serbian delegation journeyed to
St. Petersburg for an audience with the tsar, the two nations had to
build their relationship from scratch. “We are setting forth down the
quiet Danube to find Russia,” wrote the legate of the Serbian leader
Karadjordje during the voyage, “about which we know nothing,
not even where she lies.”61 Mutual incomprehension would soon
dissolve, however, as Russia set out to use cultural affinity with the
Balkan Slavs to advance its own strategic agenda.
Russian-Serbian relations during the first Serbian uprising
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assumed what would become a familiar pattern of mutual sympathy
tempered by calculations of vested self-interest. Russia expressed
support for Serbian autonomy in a formal agreement with the
rebels, but assistance was limited by the desire to block a diplomatic
alignment between the Porte and Napoleonic France. This constraint
was removed after the Austerlitz campaign, when Sultan Selim
III opted for a rapprochement with Paris. In March 1806 Russian
forces occupied Kotor, and by the end of the year, the tsar and the
sultan were at war for the fifth time since 1711. During the war
the Serbian rebels fought as allies of Russia, but confronted by the
threat of a direct French invasion, St. Petersburg chose to negotiate a
compromise peace. The Treaty of Bucharest of May 1812 placed the
Russian-Ottoman border at the Prut River and engaged the Porte to
grant full autonomy to Serbia. But Russia’s withdrawal to confront
Napoleon’s Grand Armée left the Serbs exposed, and in July 1813
Karadjordje’s uprising was put down by force.62
Russia’s disengagement from the Balkans in 1812 was the
product of compelling circumstances, and with Napoleon in retreat
a forward posture in the region was resumed. Pressure on the Porte
to make good upon its commitments under the terms of the Treaty
of Bucharest became a leitmotif of policy from 1813 onward. The
second Serbian uprising of 1815, and the Greek uprising of 1821,
once again posed the problem of how to relate to insurrectionary
movements among the Orthodox subjects of the Porte. In Serbia,
after some initial military success and with Russian support, the new
national leader Miloš Obrenović concluded a compromise peace in
exchange for local autonomy. But the Greek insurrection sputtered
on and remained a source of tension in Russian-Ottoman relations.
In October 1826 Russia imposed the Akkerman Convention
upon a weakened Porte, obtaining an effective protectorate over
Serbia and the Danubian principalities Moldavia and Wallachia,
reconfirming Serbia’s autonomy, and securing a promise to restore
to Serbia six districts that had been confiscated in 1813 (the districts
increased Serbia’s area by over 30 percent). As negotiations over the
implementation of the agreement proceeded, however, in October
1827 the Ottoman fleet was destroyed at the Battle of Navarino by
a combined Russian, British, and French fleet. A nationalist reaction
led the Porte to denounce the Convention of Akkerman and declare
a “Holy War” against Russia, with hostilities commencing in April
1828.
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Russia took the initiative once the contest was joined, pushing its
armies southward into the Danubian principalities. Warned against
excessive ambition by its great power allies, St. Petersburg limited
its war aims to the reassertion of the Akkerman Convention. In the
Treaty of Adrianople of September 1829 the terms of the Convention
were dutifully confirmed, and the Treaty of London of February
1830 proceeded to establish the first independent Greek state of the
modern era, in a constricted territory including only about a quarter
of the Greek peoples of the Balkans, and with the seventeen year old
Prince Otto of Bavaria as the head of an imposed ruling dynasty.
Russia’s position was strengthened further by the revolt of Mehmet
Ali in the Ottoman Empire’s Middle Eastern provinces. In July 1833
the Porte accepted the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, a mutual assistance
pact with St. Petersburg that included a secret protocol in which the
Ottomans pledged to keep the Straits closed to foreign warships. In
the Hatt-i Sherif of November 1833, the Porte also acknowledged
Serbia in its borders of 1812 as a hereditary principality with full
internal autonomy.63 Greece was now independent, Serbia formally
autonomous, the Danubian principalities under Russian protection,
and tiny Montenegro effectively outside of Ottoman control within
its mountain fastness. The process of disintegration that would
eventually destroy the empire was well advanced, and Russia
appeared to be its principle beneficiary.
In fact, the tsar’s regime had no intention of exploiting Ottoman
weakness provocatively. In 1829 a special commission appointed
by tsar Nicholas I recommended that Russia’s Balkan policy
seek to preserve a weak Ottoman Empire as the best means for
achieving its goals in the region without alienating the powers and
risking isolation.64 Britain nonetheless viewed Russia’s position
as threatening, and was determined to reverse the trend toward
increasing Russian assertion. The opportunity came in the Crimean
War of 1853-1856, a conflict with obscure origins in a dispute between
St. Petersburg and Paris over access to holy sites in Jerusalem, but with
the underlying logic of braking Russian expansion in the south.65 In
July 1853 Russian forces reoccupied the Danubian principalities as a
means to place pressure on the Porte, but St. Petersburg immediately
found itself isolated. Austria refused to guarantee Russian forces
safe passage in the event of hostilities, while Britain and France
openly sided with the Porte, which declared war against Russia
on 4 October 1853. In August 1854 Russian forces withdrew from
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the principalities, but in September 1854 a British-French-Ottoman
expeditionary force landed on Russian territory on the Crimean
Peninsula. Denied naval access and lacking sufficient infrastructure
to mass forces in a distant southern theater of operations, Russia
was never able to dislodge them, despite months of fighting under
appalling conditions (the Crimean conflict claimed over 500,000
victims, about two-thirds of whom died as a result of epidemic
disease). The Peace of Paris on 30 March 1856 made clear the balance
of power considerations that had motivated the fighting. Russia was
forced to renounce special rights in the Danubian principalities,
which became autonomous under Ottoman suzerainty (this was the
effective birth of modern Romania). Navigation on the Danube was
placed under the control of a European commission. The Black Sea
was neutralized, which obligated Russia to dismantle all military
facilities along the littoral, and all parties agreed to respect the
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The outcome created a
state of affairs that St. Petersburg was determined to reverse.
In 1860 Mihailo Obrenović assumed the Serbian throne. Inspired
by the nationalist ideologies of Giuseppe Mazzini and Lajos Kossuth,
and urged on by the Serbian foreign minister Ilija Garašanin and
the Russian ambassador to the Porte Nikolai Ignat’ev, the new
monarch affiliated with an agenda for territorial expansion and
national liberation.66 In 1866-1867 a Balkan League was assembled
around Serbia (including military pacts with Montenegro and
Greece, a friendship pact with the Danubian Principalities, and
informal contacts with Bulgarian and Croatian nationalists) with
active Russian financial and military assistance. The goal was a
war of liberation waged against the Porte, but a change of heart by
Obrenović in the autumn of 1867 led to the fall of Garašanin, and in
June 1868 Mihailo himself was assassinated. The idea of a Balkan
pact inspired by Russia and committed to expelling the Ottomans
from Europe was set aside, but not abandoned. Meanwhile, St.
Petersburg continued to advance its pawns in other directions. The
creation in 1870, with Russian backing, of a Bulgarian exarchate
as an autocephalous national branch of the Orthodox community,
offered St. Petersburg an alternative base of support among the
South Slavs. Russia’s rapprochement with Austria-Hungary in the
Schönbrunn Convention of June 1873 created a new range of options,
permitting a sphere of influence arrangement that seemed to put
the Eastern Question on hold. The convention did not address the
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underlying sources of strategic rivalry, however, and the resulting
rapprochement proved to be nothing more than the calm before the
storm.
Popular uprisings against exploitative local administrators in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1875-1876 once again exposed
the critical weakness of the tottering edifice of Ottoman governance.
International outrage over the atrocities committed by Ottoman
irregulars in Bulgaria, which left over 12,000 dead, left the Porte
isolated internationally, and provoked declarations of war by Serbia
and Montenegro. Despite the better judgment of its diplomats,
Russia was pushed to join the fray by a wave of public sympathy
for the South Slavs. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, writes M. A.
Anderson, “represented the fullest practical expression ever given
in Russian foreign policy to the Panslav ideal.”67 On 28 April 1876
the Russian Panslav general M. G. Cherniaev arrived in Belgrade
together with some 5000 Russian volunteers to take command of the
Serbian army. His catastrophic defeat in the field at the hands of the
Ottomans virtually compelled Russia to opt for war. A major Russian
offensive was launched through the Principalities in the summer of
1876, but it was temporarily halted in the Balkan mountain passes at
the famous siege of Plevna.68 The Russians regrouped and overran
Ottoman resistance, but at high cost both in lives and to the tempo
of the campaign. By February 1878 Russian forces had reached the
village of San Stefano, some ten kilometers from Istanbul.69 On the
third of March the aggressive Panslav envoy Ignat’ev negotiated
the Treaty of San Stefano, which created an independent greater
Bulgaria, stretching from the Straits to the Adriatic and the Danube
to the Aegean, beholden to Aleksandr II the “Tsar Liberator” and
capable of serving as a basis for Russian leverage in the Balkans.
Russia had recovered from its defeat in the Crimea only too
well. The terms of San Stefano were quickly reversed by the powers,
fearful that a dependent greater Bulgaria would become an agent of
preponderant Russian influence. With her armies exposed south of
the Danube, an unreliable Austria blocking their line of retreat and a
British fleet in the Sea of Marmara threatening bombardment should
they move to occupy the Ottoman capital, Russia was not in a strong
strategic position despite its military exploits, and was virtually
forced to accept revisions. They were affected by the Congress
of Berlin, convened in June 1878 under the direction of Otto von
Bismarck in the capital of united Germany, which dismantled the
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edifice of San Stefano and balanced Russia’s more limited gains by
applying the premise of diplomatic compensation. Austria-Hungary
was permitted to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina (a majority of whose
population were Serbs at this date) and place military garrisons
in the Ottoman province known as the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, thus
positioning its armed forces between landlocked Serbia and its outlet
to the sea in Montenegro. Britain was rewarded with the island of
Cyprus. Vardar Macedonia, which had been an integral part of the
greater Bulgaria of San Stefano, was returned to the Porte. Russia
obtained Bessarabia and additional territories in the Transcaucasus,
recognition of full independence for Serbia, Montenegro, and
Romania (the latter was granted the Dobrudja in exchange for the
surrender of Bessarabia to Russia), autonomy for a rump Bulgaria
(divided into two parts, dubbed Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, with
varying degrees of subordination to the Porte), and the pledge of
a heavy war indemnity. It had nonetheless been humiliated by the
powers and forced to surrender the essential gains of a war in which
over 200,000 of its soldiers had given their lives. The result, for B. H.
Sumner, was “the temporary extinction of Russia’s panslav dream
and the nadir of Russian influence in the peninsula.”70
No single event has contributed more to the structure of regional
order in the modern Balkans than the Congress of Berlin. The
positive premise that inspired the congress was the assumption that
the Eastern Question was a problem for the Concert of Europe as a
whole that could only be resolved by consensus. But that premise
sat uncomfortably alongside an increasingly vicious strategic
rivalry that was driving Europe toward a general war. The terms
of settlement were satisfactory to no one. The Porte, which lost
a third of its territory and over 20 percent of its population, was
permanently destabilized by the outcome.71 Russia had triumphed
in the field, but its political aspirations were blocked. AustriaHungary remained paralyzed by fear of Slavic irredentism, of which
the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was more of a symptom than
a cure. Serbia was upset by the loss of Bosnia and by denial of access
to the sea. Bulgaria was preoccupied by the vision of San Stefano and
determined to assert full independence. By consigning Macedonia to
the Porte the diplomats at Berlin had created the modern Macedonian
Question, as well as stimulating yet another terrorist campaign of
national liberation.72 All of the newly independent Balkan national
states were unhappy with their borders and divided by territorial
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disputes. In 1885, when Bulgaria moved unilaterally to unify with
Eastern Rumelia, a brief war with Serbia was the result, in which
Bulgarian forces achieved a surprising and devastating victory.
Even the consignment of tiny Cyprus, with its peacefully coexisting
Greek and Turkish communities, to the great empire upon which
the sun never set would eventually prove to be the source of endless
problems.
The Congress of Berlin made no progress at all toward resolving
the core problems that would eventually transform the Eastern
Question into the root of the First World War. These were: (1) The
frustrated nationalism of the emerging Balkan national states; (2)
The critical weakness of the Porte; (3) Vienna’s concern for the
subversive effect of Slavic nationalism, judged a mortal threat to its
national integrity; (4) Russian ambitions in the Balkan region and
Austrian determination to thwart them; and (5) Austria’s close ties to
Germany as a pillar of the European balance of power. This volatile
mix was temporarily defused by the rapprochement negotiated by
Milan Obrenović with Austria-Hungary in January 1881, marking a
victory of the Austrophile faction in Belgrade, and by the decline of
Panslav enthusiasm in Russia, occasioned in part by St. Petersburg’s
disillusionment with its would be Balkan allies.73 But once again a
phase of rapprochement would prove to be short-lived. The brutal
assassination of the last Obrenović monarch in June 1903 brought the
Russophile Peter Karadjordjević to the throne in Belgrade. Coupled
with the political ascendancy of the Serbian Radical Party of Nikola
Pašić, the change of dynasties meant that Belgrade would once again
commit to a policy of expansion under Russian protection.74 Vienna’s
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, bitterly resented by
Serb national opinion, undermined any possibility of renewed
collaboration with the Habsburgs.75
From the autumn of 1909 the Russian envoy to Belgrade N. G.
Hartvig, “a Panslav of the old type” according to Andrew Rossos,
played a role in mobilizing the South Slavs comparable to that of
Ignat’ev during 1876-78.76 By 1912, with active Russian sponsorship,
a new Balkan League had been assembled uniting Serbia, Bulgaria,
Greece, and Montenegro with the goal of liberating the peninsula
from all remaining Ottoman control. After careful preparation, the
First Balkan War was launched preemptively in October 1912 with
a Montenegrin attack against Kotor. In political turmoil since the
triumph of the Young Turk movement in 1909, the failing Ottoman
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Empire was in no position to resist. After a series of defeats, the Porte
accepted the Treaty of London of May 1913, which pressed Ottoman
boundaries back across the Straits for the first time since the 14th
century. The Balkan national states had apparently triumphed across
the line, but the regional order that was emerging on the peninsula
remained hostage both to the whims of the great powers and to deeprooted local division. Vienna insisted on reinforcing its position in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. To block Serbian access to the Adriatic, and
with German and Italian support, it sponsored the creation of an
independent Albanian state (minus the predominantly Albanian
Serbian province of Kosovo). Greece was granted enosis (union)
with the island of Crete, but other predominantly Greek islands and
territories in the Aegean and Asia Minor remained outside its grasp.
Russia, which had played a key role in the genesis of the conflict,
proved incapable of constraining the ambitions of its allies. Within a
month of the Treaty of Bucharest, on 13 June 1913, Bulgaria launched
a surprise attack against Serbia to enforce its demands concerning
territorial allocations in Macedonia. Romania, Greece, and the Porte,
with shameless opportunism, quickly joined forces with Belgrade.
The Second Balkan War lasted less than a month and ended with
Bulgaria’s abject defeat. The result was confirmed by the Treaty of
Bucharest of August 1913, which returned Edirne (Adrianople) to
the Ottomans, gave Romania control over the southern Dobrudja,
and incorporated most of Macedonia into Serbia—all at Sofia’s
expense.77
The winners of the Balkan wars were scarcely more content than
the losers. All emerged from the fighting with unfulfilled national
objectives. The atrocities associated with these confrontations,
where the burning of villages and the systematic expulsion of entire
populations from contested areas became models for what would
later come to be known as ethnic cleansing, created a legacy of enmity
that would be difficult to eradicate.78 The Eastern Question had not
been laid to rest, only transformed into a new context where rivalry
among new national states took precedence over resistance to the
Porte. A certain kind of future for Europe’s troubled southeastern
marches had been unveiled, which future events would do more to
confirm than to deny.
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Conclusion: The Balkans on the Eve.
The European great powers had never come to terms over what
their preferred answer to the Eastern Question should be. Western
European perceptions of the region tended to swing between the
extremes of Phil Hellenic romanticism (notes of which reappeared
in William Gladstone’s famed pamphlet following the Bulgarian
massacres of 1876) and condescension for the benighted subjects of
“Turkey in Europe.” The essence of the Eastern Question, according
to one all too typical Victorian era account, was “the determination
of Europe to impose its civilization on uncivilized and half-civilized
nations.”79 Such attitudes did not promote a considered approach to
the long-term challenge of regional order (nor do they do so today).
The Balkan wars confirmed Ottoman decline, but did little to shape a
positive foundation for a new southeastern European state system.
Despite their grandiose pretensions, the new Balkan national
states were extremely fragile—“tiny, insecure polities, pale shadows
of the grand visions of resurrected empires whose prospect animated
Balkan revolutionaries.”80 All were relatively impoverished and in
consequence politically unstable. All were tormented by frustrated
national designs, by variants of the Greek megali idea (Great Idea)
seeking to unite all co-nationals within the borders of a single state
inspired by an ideology of integral nationalism. All were dependent
upon great power sponsorship to facilitate pursuit of their national
goals. The powers were anxious to manipulate dependency to their
own advantage, but overly sanguine about their ability to control
regional turmoil. Sensitive observers were well aware of the risks.
“The Balkan war has not only destroyed the old frontiers in the
Balkans,” wrote Leon Trotsky as a war correspondent on the Balkan
front in March 1913, “it has also lastingly disturbed the equilibrium
between the capitalist states of Europe.”81
The assassination of the Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand
during a state visit to Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serb nationalist
Gavrilo Princip on 28 June 1914 was the product of a frightful
combination of arrogance and incompetence. Ferdinand’s choice
of Vidovdan (St. Vitus’ Day), the anniversary of the Serbian defeat
at Kosovo Field and a sacred day for Serb nationalists, to review
the Habsburg soldiery in the contested city, was an unabashed
provocation. The decision to proceed, in the company of his wife
Sofia, with a motorcade through the heart of the Bosnian capital,
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in the face of woefully (if not criminally) inadequate security
procedures, permitted a desperate and amateurish assassination
plot, carried out by what Misha Glenny describes as “one of the
most disorganized and inexperienced squadrons of assassins
ever assembled,” to succeed beyond all imaginable expectations.82
European chancelleries originally regarded the assassination as a
domestic affair in a far-away province. Vienna’s decision to use
the event as the pretext for an admonitory punishment of Serbia,
which became the prelude to a general war, was made with most of
the continent’s leading diplomats away on vacation. The incapacity
to grasp the Eastern Question as an essential, rather than marginal
challenge, contributed importantly to the catastrophic outcome.
World War I began as a Third Balkan War, with an Austrian
declaration of war against Serbia and an artillery barrage across
the Sava into Belgrade. In this case, however, unlike the experience
of 1912-1913, great power equilibriums were perceived to be at
stake. The Austrian aggression set off a chain reaction that within
a matter of days had brought all of the European great powers into
the fray. At the end of August, following the early successes of his
offensive against France through Belgium and Lorraine, the German
commander in chief Helmuth von Moltke bravely claimed “in six
weeks this will all be over.”83 Never had a commander been more
mistaken. During the second week of September French and British
armies stopped the German advance on the Marne. In a matter of
weeks, a series of defensive lines had been extended from the Jura
Mountains to the English Channel, against which the mass armies
of the belligerent coalitions ground to a halt. The Western Front
had been born—the embodiment of a military stalemate that would
continue for four long years.
Throughout the long and bloody conflict the Balkan front
remained a significant theater of operations. Austria’s initial
“punishment” of Serbia soon degenerated into a travesty. After
capturing Belgrade, the Austrians were driven back by a Serbian
counterattack, and expelled beyond the Sava. In February and March
1915, a British-French expedition launched against Ottoman positions
on the Gallipoli Peninsula, with the intent of driving on Istanbul and
forcing the Turks from the war, turned into an embarrassing failure.
The demoralized survivors of the expedition were eventually
evacuated to Thessalonica, where a neutral but politically divided
Greece was pressured to accept them. Encouraged by the setback,
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and lured by promises of territorial gains, Bulgaria intervened on
behalf of the Central Powers during October. This intervention was
the final straw for the Serbian army, already weakened by the price
of its victories and ravaged by typhus, which now broke down under
combined pressure from north and south. Its disorganized remnant,
accompanied by the old King Peter traveling in an oxcart, withdrew
across the Albanian mountains to the sea, suffering cruelly at the
hands of the elements and of Albanian irregulars. A force of 40,000
Serb survivors was moved from the coast to the French-controlled
island of Corfu, and eventually to a newly constituted Thessalonica
front. Allied troubles in the theater were not yet at an end, however.
On 27 August 1916, attracted by secret treaty provisions promising
control over disputed territories and reassured by recent Russian
advances in Galicia, Romania joined the Entente. The gesture was
premature, and in December a German army led by the “Death’s
Head” General August von Mackenson marched into Bucharest.
The allied armies on the Thessalonica front remained intact, but
they were only called to action in the war’s final months. Against
the background of Germany’s impending collapse, and spearheaded
by Serbian units anxious to participate in the liberation of their
homeland, in September 1918 they began to fight their way north,
and in November occupied Belgrade.84
Interstate relations in the Balkan context during the Great War
mirrored the pre-war period, with the great powers seeking to
bend local actors to support their strategic aims, and the smaller
Balkan states opportunistically exploiting perceived windows of
opportunity to what they hoped would be their own advantage. The
Ottoman Empire, whose military hierarchy had close ties to imperial
Germany, allied with Berlin in September 1914. One month later
it was at war with the Russian Empire for one final time. Albania,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece originally declared neutrality, but
their desires to remain above the fray were not respected. In the secret
Pact of London negotiated by the entente powers on 26 April 1915 it
was agreed that in the event that Greece and Italy joined the Entente,
Albanian territories would be partitioned between them, leaving only
a small central zone as an autonomous Albanian province. Greece
was divided between a pro-German faction led by King Constantine
and a pro-Entente lobby led by the liberal politician Elefthérios
Venizélos, but in the spring of 1917 Constantine was forced into exile
by allied pressure. Russia and Serbia remained closely aligned up to
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the collapse of the tsarist regime in February 1917. In the first phase
of the conflict Russia provided considerable financial aid to Belgrade.
Faced with the collapse of Serbian resistance in the autumn of 1915,
it urged, in vain, a policy of emergency assistance upon the allies.85
The Russian representative to Belgrade Grigorii Trubetskoi was the
only representative of the international community to march with
the Serbian army during its withdrawal in 1916, and St. Petersburg
thereafter became a strong supporter for rebuilding the Serbian
army on Corfu and reopening a Balkan front.86
Wartime alignments also effected the postwar settlement. The
Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman Empires were all swept away by
the tidal wave of defeat. At the Versailles peace conference the Allies
accepted a diluted version of Woodrow Wilson’s premise of selfdetermination by sanctioning the creation of new national states,
but the weight of the commitment was diluted by the contrasting
assumption that to the victors belonged the spoils. Romania, Greece,
and Serbia (now the core of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes) emerged from the contest with their gains of the Balkan
wars confirmed or extended. Bulgaria, Albania, and the Turkish heir
of the Ottoman state inherited truncated territories and considerable
national frustration. Greece’s defeat at the hands of the new Turkish
Republic of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in the war of 1919-1923
reversed these fortunes in one theater, but did not alter the overall
picture.
The Great War had a decisive impact upon the political structure of
the Balkan Peninsula, but it did not transform the status of the region
as a whole in the larger spectrum of European or world politics. The
Balkans emerged from the Ottoman centuries as a culturally distinct,
economically and socially underdeveloped, politically immature, and
crisis prone European sub-region, with structural affinities with much
of the colonial world. The legacy of frustrated nationalism that was
a product of the lengthy and incomplete process of disentanglement
from Ottoman domination left the new Balkan national states weak,
subordinate, and strategically dependent. Failure to resolve the
Eastern Question consensually had transformed the region into the
famous “powder keg” that set off the First World War. None of these
underlying issues was resolved during the course of the war, and
they were only aggravated by the contested work of the Versailles
peacemakers. The Ottomans and the Habsburgs were gone, but the
Eastern Question had not disappeared along with them. Nearly a
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century later, its legacy is still being felt.
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CHAPTER 2
THE BALKANS IN THE SHORT 20th CENTURY
The Cordon Sanitaire.
The southeastern European regional order that emerged from the
First World War was highly unstable. All of the new nation states
carved from the wreckage of empire by the Versailles peacemakers
were required to deal with the challenges of weak institutions,
economic backwardness, unassimilated minorities and ethnic
tensions, and strategic exposure. The impact of the world depression
was particularly severe in an area whose economies remained
primarily agrarian. Political polarization and the rise of extremist
movements, including communist parties on the left and nationalist
parties on the right, was an inevitable consequence. In every country
in the region the resultant tensions would eventually be resolved by
some variant of royal or military dictatorship.
A brief phase of democratic governance in postwar Albania was
brought to an end by the Gheg tribal chieftain Ahmed Zogu, who
overthrew the parliamentary regime of Fan Noli in 1924 and was
crowned King Zog I in 1928.1 In the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes, the mortal wounding, on the floor of the national
parliament, of the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party Stjepan
Radić by the Serb nationalist Puniša Račić in June 1928 prompted
King Aleksandar to declare a royal dictatorship on January 6, 1929.2
Bulgaria experienced failed Agrarian and Communist insurrections
during 1918 and 1923, and in 1935, following a short-lived military
coup, King Boris III proclaimed personal rule.3 The Versailles Treaty
of Trianon nearly doubled Romania’s territory, but a troubled
interwar experience led through the rise of the fascistic Iron Guard
and its leader Cornelia Codreanu to the promulgation of a new
authoritarian constitution by King Carol II in 1938.4 In 1936 General
Ioannis Metaxas dissolved the Greek parliament and established
himself as dictator under the restored monarch of Giorgios II.5
Mustafa Kemal and his Republican People’s Party ruled Turkey as
an authoritarian one party state up to Kemal’s death in 1938, when
the presidency moved to his hand picked successor İsmet İnönü.6
The varied national experiences were not identical, but the political
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consequences of interwar development—failed democratization,
sharp social differentiation, ethnic tension, and an authoritarian
dérive—were remarkably similar.7
The region also confronted international challenges. From 1919
the Communist International (Comintern) adopted an assertive
Balkan policy linked to the great power aspirations of the Soviet
regime. After the war of 1919-1923, Greece and Turkey crafted a
rapprochement and shifted priorities to domestic transformation,
but relations with their Balkan neighbors remained tense. Bulgaria
maintained a revisionist orientation toward the existing regional
order, eventually leading Sofia toward closer relations with
Mussolini’s Italy. Once installed in power, Albania’s King Zog
chose to subordinate his country to the Mussolini regime almost
completely. With irredentist claims in Istria and Dalmatia, Italy posed
a constant threat to the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Hungary
and Austria also adopted revisionist postures, and in March 1921
Karl of Habsburg launched an abortive putsch in Budapest in hopes
to restore his thrown.
France and Britain took on the role of guarantors of the status
quo, and France in particular sought to contain the perceived threats
of Bolshevik subversion and German revanchism by constructing
a central European cordon sanitaire from Versailles’ new national
states.8 After 1921 the Quay d’Orsay became the most important
international sponsor of the so-called Little Entente, a mutual
assistance pact called into being at Czechoslovak initiative in 1920,
uniting Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania around an anticommunist and anti-revisionist agenda. The Little Entente was
complemented in Central Europe by a Polish-Romanian mutual
assistance pact, but Polish-Czechoslovak friction prevented its
extension to cover the entire Central European corridor between
Germany and the USSR.9 In February 1934, following Hitler’s rise to
power, a new Balkan Entente brought Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece
and Turkey together in an agreement to guarantee existing frontiers,
encouraged by the Soviet Union and with French sponsorship.10 But
the assassination of Yugoslavia’s King Aleksandar during a state
visit to Marseilles in 1934 weakened Belgrade’s commitment to
regional cooperation, and the Balkan Entente never evolved into an
initiative with teeth. When Romania and Yugoslavia stood aside in
1938 as Czechoslovakia was surrendered to Hitler, the death knell
of the Little Entente, and of Balkan cooperation under the aegis of
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the Western democracies, had sounded. The Balkan states would be
swept into war after 1939 as they had been after 1914—unprepared
militarily and divided amongst themselves, the willing or unwilling
accomplices of great power initiatives that they were powerless to
resist. “We are part of the general European mess,” as it was stoically
explained to the Slovene-American writer Louis Adamic during a
visit to Sarajevo in 1933, “we do not have the complete and final
decision as to our destiny. We are caught in the dynamics of the
international politics of the great powers.”11
The Yugoslav Idea.
The most innovative aspect of the postwar settlement in the
Balkans was the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes as a Balkan federation spanning the former Habsburg
and Ottoman empires. In 1929 the new state was re-christened
Yugoslavia (Land of the South Slavs). Despite a rocky initiation
marked by inter-ethnic friction, Yugoslavia survived the traumas of
depression and royal dictatorship, and in 1939 managed to initiate a
hopeful institutional reform.
The first Yugoslavia represented a long standing ideal of
assembling south Slavic nationalities in some kind of federative
association. During the 1830s the Croatian Ljudevit Gaj created the
Illyrian Movement as a forum to promote unity, using the classical
name Illyrian as a common denominator to connote the shared origin
and essential unity of the South Slavs.12 The movement flourished
in Croatia, and in 1850 Croat writers inspired by Gaj’s ideas joined
with Serb counterparts (including the famous linguist and humanist
Vuk Karadžić) in Vienna to produce a “Literary Agreement” that
attempted to define a single literary language common to both
Serb and Croat dialects on the basis of the assumption that “one
people should have one language.” After 1850 the Catholic Bishop
of Djakovo, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, carried Gaj’s project forward,
introducing the term Yugoslavism (jugoslavenstvo) to express the
common aspirations of all South Slavs. The road ahead would
not be easy, however. There was no consensus in place over the
forms that political cooperation might take, Serbia’s stature as an
independent state gave it options that the Croatian and Slovenian
national movements inside the Dual Monarchy did not possess,
and Yugoslavism remained an elite phenomenon without popular
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roots. Contacts between Serb and Croat supporters of Illyrianism
nonetheless continued through the second half of the century, and
from 1906-1918 a Croat-Serb coalition supportive of the Yugoslav idea
held a majority in the Croatian Diet (sabor).13 It required the crisis of
order provoked by the First World War, however, before purposeful
movement toward the creation of a south Slavic federation became
possible.
A Yugoslav Committee in exile inspired by the Yugoslav
idea was established in Paris on April 30, 1915, with a leadership
dominated by Croats and Slovenes, including Frano Supilo (who
would later resign in principled opposition to any agreement
surrendering Croat autonomy), Ante Trumbić, and the sculpture
Ivan Meštrović.14 Supilo was aware of the terms of the secret Treaty
of London of 1915 and feared eventual collusion between Serbian
Radical Party leader Nikola Pašić and the Entente at the Croats’ and
Slovenes’ expense. The Croats and Slovenes looked to association
as a means to strengthen their claim to independence from the
Habsburg regime, to resist irredentist claims on the part of Italy and
other neighbors, and to dilute potential Serbian overreaching. In the
wartime environment, beleaguered Serbia was ready to reciprocate.
In the so-called Niš Declaration of December 7, 1914, the Serbs
included the goal of a united Yugoslav state among their war aims.15
The Versailles peacemakers eventually sanctioned the Yugoslav
idea, but its genesis was a consequence of initiatives undertaken by
the south Slavic peoples themselves.
In a manifesto of May 1915, the Yugoslav Committee asserted
“the Jugoslavs form a single nation, alike by their identity of
language, by the unanswerable laws of geography and by their
national consciousness.”16 These were noble words, but they
offered little guidance concerning what kind of state a union of
South Slavs should become, and despite protestations of unity
differences between the three nationalities engaged in the effort
to create a common national framework remained strong. During
the summer of 1917 members of the Serbian government met with
leaders of the Yugoslav Committee on Corfu and agreed to the
creation of a common state. Most discussion at Corfu revolved
around a disagreement between the Serbian side, represented by the
patriarchal Pašić, which insisted upon the creation of a unitary state
under the Karadjordjević dynasty, and the Slovene and Croatian
side represented by Trumbić, which favored a looser federation
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that would allow for substantial cultural and political autonomy.
At Corfu a declaration favoring the Serbian position was adopted
asserting “that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are one people and must
form one monarchical state under the Karadjordjević dynasty.”17
After the Habsburg defeat a National Council of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes representing the south Slavic populations of the Habsburg
empire attempted to backtrack by requesting a looser, federative
association, but to no avail. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes declared into being on November 24, 1918 was a unitary
state under the Serbian royal dynasty, with Belgrade as its capital.
Serbian dominance would quickly become the Achilles Heel of
the south Slavic union. In retrospect, however, no alternative seems
to have been practicable. At the end of the war Slovenia and Croatia
were still attempting to extract themselves from the failing Dual
Monarchy. Slovene and Croat soldiers had fought with the armies
of the Central Powers from 1914-1918. Slovenia had no history of
independent statehood, and the Croats had to look back to the
Middle Ages to find something approximating full sovereignty.
Both confronted territorial challenges from neighboring Italy and
Austria that they were not in a position to resist left to their own
devices. Serbia, by way of contrast, was an established state with an
indigenous monarchy and a powerful army that could point to its
war record as a mark of special distinction. Given Serbia’s status as a
victorious belligerent, the only alternative to association would have
been the creation of a greater Serbia including significant non-Serb
minorities, bounded by weak and exposed Slovene and Croat ministates.18
The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia during the Second
World War, and again during the 1990s, has led many to conclude
that the Yugoslav idea was flawed from the start, an artificial attempt
to impose unity upon diverse peoples for whom the prerequisites for
statehood were lacking.19 Whatever merit the argument may have,
there was a powerful logic to association in 1918 that remains in
some measure valid to this day. No less than twenty distinct national
communities lived within what would become the Yugoslav space,
often inextricably intermingled. Under these circumstances shaping
“ethnically pure” nation states was not a realistic option. The GreekTurkish population transfer agreed to in the Treaty of Lausanne in
1923 (on the basis of which over 1.5 million people were forced to
leave their homes) is sometimes cited as a model for separation, but it
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was the product of a catastrophic war, was extraordinarily traumatic
in personal terms, and in the long term has not contributed to stable
Greek-Turkish relations. Association among the major south Slavic
nations addressed the dilemma of inter-culturality positively by
allowing for cohabitation in a multinational framework. It was
assumed that cultural affinity between Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs
was sufficiently strong to serve as a basis for nationhood, and during
the 1920s and 1930s sincere efforts were undertaken to promote
cultural unity.20 Federation also addressed the Serbian Question by
allowing the Serb population of the central Balkans to live together
within a common state. There was concern among the peacemakers
at Versailles that Balkan mini-states without a sufficient material
base would become pawns in the hands of rival powers, rekindling
the kind of strategic friction that had made the Eastern Question
so volatile in the pre-war years. A Yugoslav association provided
a more substantial foundation for regional order, as a barrier to
revisionist agendas and a component of a sustainable European
balance of power.
The Yugoslav ideal did not become a reality. An enlarged
regional market failed to generate prosperity—between 1918 and
1941 Yugoslavia’s anemic annual growth rate of 2 percent failed to
keep pace with demographic increases. During the 1930s Yugoslavs
were subjected to depression conditions, and the gap between
the new state and the more developed economies of the western
European core widened. Economic frustration became a foundation
for political discontent, often manifested as ethnic mobilization.
Politically, the Serb dominated monarchical regime that emerged
from the process of unification was formalized by the Saint Vitus Day
Constitution of 28 June 1921. From the outset, it confronted serious
domestic challenges. The most serious was that posed by Croatian
nationalism, primarily represented during the 1920s by Radić’s
Croatian Republican Peasant Party, which pressed for Croatian
autonomy inside a loose Yugoslav or expanded Balkan confederation.
Another source was the international communist movement. From
its founding in Belgrade in April 1919 the Community Party of
Yugoslavia (KPJ) assumed the Moscow line denouncing Yugoslavia
as a pawn in the hands of the Versailles powers, and urging the
creation of a Soviet republic. Between 1926 and 1935, the party’s left
wing championed the line of the Comintern’s 6th world congress
in 1928, condemning Yugoslavia as a “prison house of peoples.”21
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Branches of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
(VMRO) in the Vardar Macedonia region also proclaimed a policy
of armed struggle against the Yugoslav state. After 1929 the KPJ
focused its attention on the Macedonian question (the Comintern’s
1924 Vienna Manifesto was ground-breaking in recognizing a
distinct Macedonian nationality), conspiring with VMRO activists
who would eventually be involved, together with the Croatian
fascists of Ante Pavelić’s Ustaša movement, in the assassination of
King Aleksandar.22
The Radić assassination opened the door for royal dictatorship,
but no underlying problems were resolved. King Aleksandar
reconfirmed a commitment to the unitary state, dividing the country
into nine administrative regions (banovine) named after local rivers
(the Drava, Sava, Drina, Vrbas, Primorje, Zeta, Dunav, Morava, and
Vardar regions) with intentional disregard for ethnic boundaries.
Following the King’s assassination the young crown prince Petar
came to the thrown under the regency of Prince Pavle, but political
contestation only intensified. A concerted effort to resolve SerbCroat frictions resulted in the Sporazum (Agreement) of April 27,
1939, signed by Radić’s successor Vladko Maček and Prime Minister
Dragiša Cvetković, which came toward Croat national sensitivities
by creating a new banovina of Croatia, combining the old Sava and
Primorje districts plus the city and region of Dubrovnik, with greatly
expanded autonomy. The Sporazum was a step toward Serb-Croat
co-administration that resembled the Habsburg Ausgleich of 1867,
but it was contested politically and never fully implemented. The
agreement did not take into account the national complexity of the
entire Yugoslav space and was resented by Yugoslav nationalities
other than Serbs and Croats. It was nonetheless a step away from
uncontested Serbian hegemony that could have provided a context
for addressing the Yugoslav national question given time to evolve.
But no time was provided. The cumulative experience of the interwar
decades created considerable disillusionment with Yugoslavia, and
helped prepare the ground for the destructive ethnic mobilizations
that followed.
Upon the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939,
Belgrade declared neutrality. But the Balkan region as a whole, and
Yugoslavia in particular, were too important to remain outside the
fray. Nonferrous minerals derived from Yugoslavia were considered
critical to the German war effort, air corridors reaching to the
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German expeditionary force in northern Africa crossed the region,
and Berlin sought to maintain access to Thessalonica and the oil
resources of Romania and the Black Sea, and to protect them from
British bombing raids. With plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union
maturing in Berlin, Hitler was particularly concerned that the Balkan
region should remain outside the reach of potential enemies.23
Mussolini, who had long expressed the desire to transform the
Balkan region into an Italian sphere of influence, precipitated events
by launching an invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940. Had the
assault gone well Hitler would have been pleased, but it did not.
The Greek dictator Metaxas earned enduring fame by responding
to Rome’s demands for capitulation with the laconic response “no”
(okhi). The Greeks went on to reverse the Italian advance, and in late
1940 the first British units were disembarked in southern Greece to
bolster resistance.24
In view of the Italians’ frustration, Hitler determined to subdue
the region once and for all as a prelude to his assault upon the
USSR. In a matter of weeks Hungary and Romania were pressed
to join the Tripartite Pact (constituted when Italy joined the
Germany-Japan axis in September 1940) and to permit German
occupation of their territory. On March 1, 1941, threatened by a
German offensive and lured by promises of control over Macedonia,
Bulgaria granted German forces right of passage and joined the
Pact as well. Yugoslavia was pressured to follow suit, and on 25
March the Maček-Cvetković government agreed to accede to the
Pact in exchange for a secret pledge of control over Thessalonica
(which Berlin, inconveniently, had already secretly promised to
Bulgaria). A contemporary historian interprets this capitulation
as “a diplomatic triumph” for Belgrade insofar as it promised to
preserve Yugoslav neutrality at minimal cost (the granting of a right
of transport for war materials, but not troops, through Yugoslav
territory)—a retrospective evaluation that displays touching regard
for Hitler’s good will.25 It was not considered a triumph at the time
by the Western democracies struggling to block German expansion,
or by the citizens of Yugoslavia contemplating the prospect of
collusion with fascist aggression. Within days of the arrangement,
the Maček-Cvetković government was overthrown on behalf of the
new monarch King Petar II by popular mobilizations in the streets of
Belgrade, with demonstrators famously chanting bolje rat nego pakt
(better war than the pact) and bolje grob nego rob (better grave than
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slave).
The Belgrade putsch was noble, but it was also a spontaneous
and confused response to a desperate situation. Yugoslavia was
unprepared for war, and Hitler’s immediate reaction was to order
an all out assault. On April 6 Belgrade signed a treaty of friendship
with the USSR, but with Stalin engaged in his own desperate effort
to appease Berlin, and with Romania and Bulgaria pledging to block
any attempted Soviet incursion, no real help could be expected from
that quarter. At dawn on April 6 Belgrade was subjected to a massive
air attack leaving nearly 3000 dead in its wake. By April 10 German
forces had occupied Zagreb, on April 12, propelled by simultaneous
attacks from Bulgaria, Romania, and Austria, they entered Belgrade,
and by April 17 Yugoslavia had capitulated. With organized
resistance temporarily crushed the Italians went on to strengthen
their control over Albania and northern Epirus, while the German
Operation Maritsa pressed southward through the Greek mainland
and on to the island of Crete. The Balkans had been conquered at
a stroke, and the Wehrmacht given a free hand to launch Operation
Barbarossa, its fateful assault against the USSR.
Yugoslav resistance was unsuccessful, but it is unlikely that
appeasement would have spared the country the horrors of war any
more than it spared any other of Hitler’s sacrificial lambs. Despite
its manifold problems, and unlike so many other victims of German
aggression, Yugoslavia had marshaled the will to resist an ultimatum
from the Führer. The first Yugoslavia was not undermined from
within, as a result of uncontainable ethnic tension. It was subjugated
from without, by foreign invasion and occupation. It was only after
the country had been dismantled, its leadership dispersed, its armed
forces disbanded, and power placed in the hands of quislings, that
the descent to civil war could begin.
The Killing Fields.
During the Second World War the Balkans was a secondary
theater of operations. At the moment of Germany’s attack upon
the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the region appeared to be safely
under the control of the Axis. Turkey clung to a precarious neutrality.
Organized resistance in Greece was broken and the country suborned
to a combined German, Italian, and Bulgarian occupation.26 Albania
was an Italian protectorate. Bulgaria, under the calculating rule of
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King Boris III, and Romania, subjected to the dictatorship of General
Ion Antonescu, had allied with Germany. Yugoslavia was gone,
replaced by a number of dependent statelets held under the thumb
of Rome and Berlin. Eventually, the catastrophic impact of foreign
occupation would provoke the rise of resistance, but this would not
become a strategic factor until the Axis war effort had stumbled
elsewhere.
Foreign occupation was accompanied by an aggressive
redrawing of frontiers. Bulgaria, which had already received
the southern Dobrudja as a “gift” from Romania under German
auspices in September 1940, now took control of western Thrace,
Macedonia up to Lake Ohrid, and small parts of Kosovo and eastern
Serbia. In addition to ceding the southern Dobrudja, Romania
was forced to surrender Bessarabia and northern Bucovina to the
Soviet Union in June 1940, and northern Transylvania to Hungary
on the basis of the so-called Vienna Diktat of August 30. A greater
Albania was assembled under Italian occupation including most of
Kosovo and parts of Montenegro and western Macedonia. Rump
Montenegro was transformed into an Italian protectorate. The major
part of Yugoslav territory was annexed by neighboring states allied
with Berlin. What remained was placed under collaborationist
administrations watched over by occupation forces. Germany,
Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania all benefited by territorial
acquisitions. Parts of Slovenia were absorbed by Germany and Italy,
with the remainder constituted as a dependent Province of Ljubljana.
A rump Serbia, within boundaries that predated the Balkan wars,
was subjected to a German military command working through the
quisling regime of General Milan Nedić. Most ominously, a so-called
Independent State of Croatia including Croatia proper, Slavonia,
Srem, a small part of Dalmatia, and all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was
placed in the hands of Ante Pavelić and his Ustaša movement. The
Ustaša leadership had survived politically during the prior decade
as protégés of Mussolini, who maintained them as virtual prisoners
in guarded residences in Italy. They were now parachuted into
Zagreb with an unrepentant agenda for cultural assimilation and
ethnic cleansing.27
The territorial revisions engineered by the Axis lacked any
kind of principled foundation. Collaborators were purchased,
allies rewarded, and opponents punished on the basis of short
term expediency, with complete disregard for the consequences.
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Pavelić’s Independent State of Croatia, for example, encompassed
a population that was barely 50 percent Croat (30 percent of the
population were Serbs and 20 percent Bosnian Muslims). Berlin’s
goals were to prevent the region’s utilization as a theater for hostile
military operations, and to maintain access to strategic resources
such as those derived from Romania’s Ploesti oil fields. It had no
interest in exerting effort to create a sustainable regional order.
Balkan dependencies mortgaged their future by subordinating
themselves to great power strategic ends in exchange for territorial
acquisitions, a wager for which the notes would soon come due. The
German New Order in the Balkans was a house of cards defended by
force. When the power equation shifted, it was bound to collapse.
The leading force behind organized resistance in the Balkans,
and elsewhere in occupied Europe, was the pro-Soviet communist
movement. With their traditions of militancy, discipline, and
underground activity, communist parties were well prepared for
the demands of armed struggle. They drew inspiration from the
Soviet Union’s fight against the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and
operated on the basis of a coherent strategy for sustaining resistance,
and seizing and maintaining power at the moment of Germany’s
defeat. The Greek and Yugoslav Communist parties, in particular,
succeeded in mobilizing large-scale partisan resistance and placing
real military pressure on occupation forces. The outcomes of their
respective struggles, however, were strikingly diverse.
The Greek Communist Party (KKE) created a National Liberation
Front (EAM) in September 1941. By 1943 its armed wing, the Greek
National Liberation Army (ELAS), commanded over 60,000 fighters.
In 1944, however, encouraged by Moscow for whom positive relations
with its wartime allies remained all important, the leaders of ELAS
opted to subordinate their movement to British command. When
the Germans withdrew from Greece in November 1944, the British
were able to occupy Athens and establish an interim administration.
Accord quickly broke down, but in street fighting between ELAS and
British occupation forces during December (known as the “Second
Round” of the Greek civil war) the communists failed to press home
their advantage. Instead the KKE accepted the Varzika Agreement
of February 9, 1945, calling for the disarming of ELAS. The outcome
allowed a revival of right wing nationalist forces shielded by the
British occupation. Civil war between the KKE and nationalists
erupted in 1947, but by then Greek communism had lost any hope
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of affecting a quick march to power. The wild cards that decided
the outcome were the loyalty of the Greek communist leadership to
Stalin’s direction, the Soviet decision to prioritize ties to its wartime
allies, and the timely arrival of the British expeditionary force in
Athens, inspired by a commitment to maintain Greece as a British
sphere of influence in the eastern Mediterranean.28
In Yugoslavia, events moved in a different direction. Immediately
after its proclamation in April 1941 the Independent State of Croatia
and its Poglavnik (Supreme Leader) Pavelić launched a campaign
of genocide directed against non-Croat minorities including Serbs,
Jews, and Roma. On June 22, speaking in the town of Gospić,
Pavelić’s Minister of Education Mile Budak publicly declared that
one-third of Croatia’s nearly two million Serbs were to be deported,
one-third forced to convert to Roman Catholicism, and one-third
killed.29 The incidence of killing was particularly severe in the
ethnically mixed regions of the old military frontier zone (Vojna
Krajina) that had divided the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, and
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where wooden platforms were constructed
in the squares of occupied villages to which adult males were led,
while their families looked on, to have their throats cut. The Croat
and Bosnian Jewish community of about 36,000 was almost totally
destroyed. Over 200,000 Serbs were subjected to forced conversion
to Catholicism, justified on the specious ground that the Serbs
of Croatia were actually ethnic Croats who had been forcefully
converted to Orthodoxy in centuries past. The Bosnian Muslims
were declared to be “Croats of the Muslim Faith,” and thereby
spared extermination, but there were plenty of victims to go around.
The crimes of the Ustaša were colored by anti-Serb resentment
cultivated during the interwar decades, but their real source was the
fanatic desire to create an ethnically pure Croatia informed by the
pathological racial doctrine of European fascism. Genocidal violence
directed against the Jewish and Roma communities had nothing to
do with Serb-Croat rivalry. Indeed, Josip Frank, one of the most
outspoken Croat nationalists of the fin de siècle and father-in-law of
Ustaša leader Slavko Kvaternik, was a Jew.
The impact of these assaults upon future prospects for civilized
inter-communal relations in Yugoslavia and the Balkans was
disastrous.30 The Ustaša came to power in Croatia at the behest of
foreign occupiers without a significant popular base—less that 5
percent of the population affiliated with the movement prior to the
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war. But the crimes of the movement, and the patterns of resistance
that these crimes provoked, sowed the seeds of enduring intercommunal resentment.
Unadulterated terror drove all Yugoslav citizens of good will
into the arms of the opposition.31 Remnants of the defeated Royal
Yugoslav Army withdrew into isolated mountainous areas and
rallied around the leadership of Colonel Draža Mihailović to form
the Chetnik movement (the name derives from the term četa, an
armed band) with a greater Serbia nationalist ideology and ties to
the Yugoslav government in exile in London.32 Immediately upon
the fall of the state the KPJ and its leader Josip Broz (Tito) also
declared a strategy of armed resistance, based upon an ideology of
national liberation that sought to unite all of the Yugoslav peoples
in opposition to occupation. Over time the rivalry between Tito’s
Partisans and Mihailović’s Chetniks evolved into open civil war,
waged simultaneously with the struggle against occupation forces.
The barbarity of the Pavelić regime, the ideologically charged contest
between Serbian nationalism and communist internationalism
within the resistance, and the harshness of the German occupation
all contributed to making Yugoslavia one of the greatest victims,
calculating in war-related losses per capita, among the nations
engaged in the Second World War.
The Partisans’ victory was the result of many variables. Unlike
the Ustaša and the Chetniks, whose political appeal was limited
to Croats and Serbs respectively, the Titoists reached out to all
Yugoslav nationalities. The resort to genocide discredited Pavelić’s
movement, which in the end remained dependent upon the fortunes
of its German and Italian masters. Mihailović’s Chetniks were
tainted by the tactical choice of occasional collaboration with German
occupation forces, whether to defend Serb communities from
reprisals, or as a result of antipathy toward the Communists. The
Partisans were no angels, but they were disciplined and determined,
their forces sought to root themselves in local communities, and the
decision for resistance à outrance placed them on the side of history.
The class line associated with the communist movement appealed to
the impoverished young peasants who made up the bulk of recruits
(75 percent of the Partisan army was 23 or younger), and provided
a source of political affiliation capable of transcending narrow
nationalism. Success in the field won Tito’s movement international
recognition, and by the end of 1943, after the arrival of Fitzroy
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Maclean in Tito’s headquarters as a British military liaison officer in
September, London shifted its support from the Chetnik movement
to the Titoists, who in Churchill’s words “were killing Germans.”
Not least, ideological affinity with Stalin and Soviet communism
tied the Partisans to what would become the dominant force shaping
political outcomes in the post-war Balkans—the Soviet Red Army.
Troops drawn from the Soviet Third Ukrainian Front participated
alongside of Partisan units in the liberation of Belgrade in October
1944. Even more importantly, after having helped to secure the
Yugoslav capital Soviet forces passed on into Central Europe, leaving
Tito’s Partisans in control, a gesture of confidence from which other
occupied Balkan states were not able to benefit. From the outset, Tito
had aspired not only to win the war, but also to initiate a revolution.
With a triumphant Soviet Union in his corner the cause appeared to
be assured.
A Balkan Federation?
The defeat of the Axis meant the collapse of quisling and
occupation regimes, leaving a political vacuum which pro-Soviet
communist parties and pro-Western democratic forces both aspired
to fill. The Yalta bargain that established the contours of cold war
order in Europe was prefigured in the Balkans by an informal
arrangement concluded between Stalin and Churchill during a
meeting in Moscow in October 1944. The British Prime Minister
presented Stalin with a scheme for allocating influence according to
crude percentages. In Greece, the United States and Britain would
assume 90 percent “predominance,” leaving 10 percent influence
for the USSR. In Romania, the percentages were reversed. Hungary
and Yugoslavia were to be split 50-50, and Bulgaria 75-25 percent to
Soviet advantage. Stalin is reported to have approved the curious
agreement by checking the paper Churchill had sketched it on with
a blue pencil.33 The accord was a sphere of influence arrangement
according to which Churchill staked out a British claim to control
in Greece, while the Soviets were granted predominance in their
sensitive border areas. Once again the fate of the Balkan peoples was
being decided by collusion between the powers conducted behind
their backs.
Despite the intrusive role of their Soviet sponsor, the victorious
Balkan communist parties also sought to have their say. The
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discrediting of the pre-war establishments provided an opportunity
to recast regional order to promote development and reduce the
impact of self-destructive nationalism. During and immediately
after the war, this effort took the form of a Yugoslav-led campaign
to create a Balkan federation that would extend well beyond the
boundaries of Yugoslavia. The project was one of the most ambitious
attempts to recast the Balkans of the modern period. Had it been
even partially successful, many of today’s most intractable regional
dilemmas could have been considerably muted, if not altogether
eliminated.
The idea of a Balkan federation extends back for at least two
centuries. In the 19th century it became a goal of Balkan socialist
movements, and after 1919 was adopted by the Comintern, which
briefly sponsored a Communist Balkan Federation with its seat in
Moscow.34 During the first phase of World War II the Greek and
Yugoslav governments-in-exile, with British support, revived the
concept as a context for a postwar settlement. Little emerged from
their initiative, however, which in the understanding of the sponsors
was intended to create “a powerful guarantee against an eventual
Bolshevik danger from the Northeast,” and which was rejected by
the Soviet Union at the foreign ministers conference in Moscow
during October 1943.35
During 1943 and 1944 similar projects began to emerge from the
communist-led resistance movements. Paul Shoup speculates that
in approving a degree of autonomy for the Macedonian provincial
committee of the resistance in the autumn of 1942, Tito may already
have had in mind the goal of a broadened Yugoslav federation
including an enlarged Macedonia.36 In February 1943 Svetozar
Vukmanović-Tempo arrived in Macedonia as Tito’s prefect, where
he inspired the founding of an autonomous Macedonian Communist
Party and pushed for the creation of a Balkan General Staff to link
the region’s resistance movements. Tempo engineered a June 20,
1943, agreement, signed by representatives of the Yugoslav, Greek,
and Albanian Communist parties, pledging cooperation. A meeting
of July 12, 1943, on Greek territory committed to build a permanent
headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army of the Balkans as “the
military embryo of a future confederation.”37 At a session on October
16-18, 1943, the Politburo of the KPJ made the goal of a “South Slavic
Federation” a programmatic slogan, and in his report to the session
Milovan Djilas evoked a “federative union of the South Slavic peoples
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from Trieste to the Black Sea.”38 These ends would be pursued in the
months to come in formal and informal discussions between the
Yugoslav, Albanian, and Bulgarian Communist movements.
The issue of relations with the Albanians was sharpened by
Italy’s capitulation in October 1943. In a dispatch sent by the Central
Committee of the KPJ to the Second Corps headquarters of the
People’s Liberation Army of Albania in late January 1944, an option
for association based upon the Yugoslav model was outlined. The
dispatch urged the Albanians to “further popularize the possibility
of other Balkan peoples joining this federation, and the creation of
a strong and large Balkan state of equal peoples which would be a
major factor in Europe.”39 The status of Kosovo, however, remained
a point of dissension. The fourth congress of the KPJ in Dresden in
1928, in line with what was then the official line of the Comintern
supporting the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, had agreed to cede
Kosovo to Albania. The call for dismemberment was officially
abandoned with the shift to a popular front strategy in 1935, however,
and Tito made clear that in a postwar settlement any territorial
revisions at Yugoslavia’s expense would be out of the question. At
Jajce in November 1943 the Partisans supported a federal Yugoslavia
with the right of self-determination for constituent nations, but that
status was not accorded to the Albanian population, which was
described as a national minority. A conference of December 31, 1943January 2, 1944, at Bujana in Albanian territory, bringing together
representatives of the national liberation movements of Kosovo,
Sanjak, and Montenegro, contradicted these premises by asserting a
will to unite with Albania. The gesture was supported by Albanian
communist leader Enver Hoxha in a pamphlet, but rejected by Djilas
as “a politics of fait accompli.”40 The issue of association had been
posed, but the conditions for the kind of compromises necessary to
bring the project to fruition were not in place. The only hope for a
positive solution seemed to lie in some kind of federal arrangement
associating Kosovo with Albania inside an enlarged Yugoslavia.41
In September 1944 the Soviet Army entered Bulgaria and a
communist dominated regime under the so-called Fatherland Front
came to power. In the second week of September the Bulgarian
communist leader Georgi Dimitrov, from his wartime base in
Moscow, sent several radiograms to Tito urging cooperation
between the Yugoslav Partisans and the “new” Bulgarian army
(which up to a week before had been an army of occupation in
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Vardar Macedonia).42 From September 21-28, Tito was in Moscow,
where together with Dimitrov and upon Stalin’s urging he approved
a military cooperation agreement.43 During the return journey, on a
stopover in the Romanian city of Craiova, Tito met with Bulgarian
officials and signed a pledge to pursue a common struggle against
Germany.44
In early November 1944 the Yugoslavs brought dialogue with
the Bulgarians to a higher level by sending a project for federation
to Sofia by special courier. Between November and January an
intense discussion was pursued, in the course of which a number
of variants for association were exchanged.45 The Yugoslav side was
in general more avid, posing the goal of a “unitary federal state”
and suggesting the creation of a joint military command with Tito
as commander in chief. The intention was to unite the Bulgarian
and Yugoslav Macedonian regions (Pirin and Vardar Macedonia)
as a single federal entity, with the remainder of Bulgaria joining
the federation as a seventh republic, a “6+1” approach to federation
building (the Titoists having already decided to recast the new
Yugoslavia as a federation of six republics—Slovenia, Croatia,
Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia) that
would advantage the Yugoslavs and reduce Bulgaria by separating it
from Pirin Macedonia. The Bulgarian proposal emphasized the need
for gradualism, refused to consider a transfer of Pirin Macedonia,
and suggested a “1+1” approach in which Bulgaria and Yugoslavia
would federate as equal partners.46 Despite intensive negotiations,
these basic differences could not be resolved.
In discussions in Moscow with the Yugoslav leaders Edvard
Kardelj and Ivan Šubašić on November 22, 1944, Stalin approved
the Yugoslav variant, though he also proposed waiting before any
decisive action was taken in order to assess possible British and
American reactions.47 During talks with Dimitrov during December,
the Soviet dictator moved toward the Bulgarian approach,
recommending “a two-sided Government on a basis of equality,
something analogous to Austria-Hungary.”48 This inconsistency
can be explained in several ways. Stalin does not seem to have
been particularly committed to either variation of the project at
this point, and may simply have sought to cater to the interests of
his interlocutor of the moment. More likely, his concern with the
Yugoslav driven agenda for association was beginning to grow as
the implications of the project became clearer. For the time being, he
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preferred to hedge his bets.
On September 11-19, 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill met in
Quebec, where the British Prime Minister urged that greater priority
be given to military operations in the Balkans to block growing Soviet
influence. In October, Churchill’s “Percentage Pact” arrangement
with Stalin combined a strong play for dominance in Greece with the
curious designation of a 50/50 division of influence in Yugoslavia.
The Russian scholar L. Ia. Gibianskii interprets the British proposal
as an attempt to promote a political balance between Tito’s
Partisans and the pro-Western Yugoslav government-in-exile—and
Stalin’s willingness to acquiesce as another indication of the Soviet
leader’s eagerness to maintain privileged relations with his Big
Three partners, if need be at the expense of communist resistance
movements.49 London sought to resist Soviet incursion in the region,
including ambitious plans for union between emerging pro-Soviet
communist regimes. On December 4 a memorandum from British
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden conveyed London’s objection to any
kind of union between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to both Moscow and
Sofia. Fitzroy Maclean expressed similar reservations to the Titoists
in Belgrade.50
British intransigence placed Soviet great power interests at
stake. As a consequence the Kremlin backed away from aggressive
support for any kind of Balkan federation. During the April 11, 1945,
signing of a Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and
Mutual Assistance, Stalin threw cold water on the project, asserting
that further initiatives would have to wait for the end of hostilities.51
Formal dialogue between the Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians, which
had been the real motor of progress, was now broken off. Albania
had also been considered a candidate for association, but the Land
of the Eagles, with its long Adriatic coastline, was of considerable
strategic value, and Moscow may already have come to look askance
at the prospect of its absorption by a federative entity under effective
Yugoslav control.
The case of Greece was particularly complex. The KKE had
struggled to organize a movement of armed resistance without
guidelines from Moscow during most of the war.52 By the time that
contacts were reestablished, Moscow’s first priority had become to
defend its status within the wartime Grand Coalition. The Soviet
military mission that arrived at the headquarters of ELAS at the end
of June 1944 demanded respect for the Lebanon Charter of May 1944,
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calling for the creation of a unified government that the Communists
would not be in a position to control. During the fighting in Athens of
December 1944 Moscow remained passive, and Stalin subsequently
urged acceptance of the Varzika Agreement. Peter Stavrakis asserts
that Stalin clung to the hope of using the KKE as “a potential source
of political leverage in post-war Greece,” but agrees that in 1944-1945
the Kremlin sought to tame the KKE in accordance with its sphere of
influence bargain with London.53 All things considered the issue was
of secondary importance in the larger sweep of Soviet diplomacy.
C. M. Woodhouse describes Moscow’s policies as “indifferent
to Greece and ill-informed about the Balkans during most of the
occupation.”54
The Yugoslav Partisans had the strongest interest in federative
options. Association with Communist Albania would help to secure
the allegiance of the Albanian populations of Kosovo, Montenegro,
and Macedonia. The unification of the Macedonian Slavs within
a common state could set a precedent for Yugoslav territorial
revindication in the north, where a call for the unification of the
Slovenes implied territorial demands against Austria and Italy. But
the Titoists were possessed by a swelling sense of self-confidence,
and determined that issues such as the Macedonian Question could
only be resolved on Yugoslav terms. What Branco Petranović calls
Tito’s “megalomaniac” conception of federation became a barrier
in its own right.55 The combination of Western opposition and
Soviet reticence was decisive, however. In the end Stalin opted to
discourage a dynamic of association, direct the Yugoslav-Bulgarian
dialogue toward the minimal goal of a friendship treaty, and accept
the KKE’s defeat in Athens and the logic of the Varzika Agreement.
The Yalta conference of February 1945, which devoted very little
attention to the Balkan region, brought a first round of discussion
concerning federative options to an end.
The last word concerning Balkan union had not yet been spoken.
Between 1945 and 1947 the onset of the Cold War gave new impetus
to cooperation among the emerging Communist party states. The
Yugoslav-Bulgarian relationship once again became a key source of
dynamism. Collaboration during the final phase of the war, Yugoslav
material assistance to Bulgaria, pledges of diplomatic support in
postwar peace negotiations, and joint aid to the Greek partisans after
the outbreak of the “Third Round” of fighting in the Greek civil war
in the spring of 1946 all provided a foundation for cooperation. The
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culmination of these trends came with the visit of a Bulgarian state
delegation to Yugoslavia on July 27-August 3, 1947. Discussions
conducted at the Slovenian resort of Lake Bled resulted in a Treaty
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of “unlimited”
duration, and three accords covering economic cooperation,
reduction of customs barriers, and open borders.56 Although the
goal of federation was not mentioned, alarm bells rang in Western
capitals, as well as in Ankara and Athens. From the spring of 1946,
the Communist partisans were on the offensive in Greece. To many
observers, federation had now become a logical step in a drive for
Communist hegemony in the Balkans.57
Relations between the Balkan parties were more troubled than
those concerned for the spread of “monolithic” world communism
presumed. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had made no progress toward
resolving their dispute over the Macedonian Question.58 The KKE
was fighting for its life in the mountains of northern Greece. And
Stalin remained ambivalent at best about association between his
Balkan understudies. Moscow’s public response to the Lake Bled
accords was a telling silence. Behind the scenes the Soviet leadership
reacted strongly to what it perceived to be an independent initiative
undertaken without consultation. In a telegram to Tito and Dimitrov
immediately after the Lake Bled sessions Stalin criticized the results.
In discussions with Hoxha in Moscow during July 1947 he expressed
“dissatisfaction” with Yugoslavia’s overbearing role in Albania, and
during Dimitrov’s sojourn in Moscow for a health cure between
August and mid-November 1947 evoked “negative signals” from
the West concerning Yugoslav-Bulgarian cooperation.59
These concerns were aggravated by developments in YugoslavAlbanian relations. In the autumn of 1947 the head of the Albanian
State Planning Commission, Nako Spiru, committed suicide after
his expulsion from the Communist Party for protesting Tirana’s
concessions to Belgrade.60 With the situation within the Albanian
party unstable, and, in Djilas’s words, increasingly nervous that
“the Russians would get the jump on us and ‘grab’ Albania,” Tito
began to press for federative association. In January 1948, reacting
to what it portrayed as a possibility of Greek aggression, Belgrade
announced the intention of moving two Yugoslav divisions onto
Albanian territory. Informed by Tirana, Soviet Foreign Minister
Viacheslav Molotov fired off several critical telegrams to Tito and
Kardelj, in response to which the Yugoslavs opted to back down.61
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At the end of December 1946 Djilas, accompanied by a military
delegation, was called to Moscow for consultations with Stalin. The
military leaders emerged from the talks deeply disillusioned with
Soviet comportment.62 In his discussions with Djilas Stalin prodded
the Yugoslavs, claiming; “we have no special interest in Albania.
We agree that Yugoslavia should swallow Albania.”63 These cynical
remarks, probably calculated to draw out and expose an idealistic
communist militant, were being directly contradicted by Soviet
actions.
After his return from Moscow to Sofia in mid-November,
Dimitrov temporarily abandoned any public references to a
federative option. A dynamic of association nonetheless remained
alive. During his address upon the signing of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian
friendship treaty on November 27, 1947, Tito urged the creation of
a full customs union.64 Between November 1947 and January 1948,
Yugoslavia negotiated bilateral friendship treaties with Hungary
and Romania, and on his travels through Eastern Europe Tito
was greeted as a popular hero.65 On January 16 Bulgaria also
concluded a bilateral treaty with Romania that foresaw the creation
of a customs union. On January 18, 1948, at an impromptu press
conference conducted on a special train returning from Romania
after the signing ceremony, an expansive Dimitrov outlined the
goal of an Eastern European federation to include “Romania,
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary,
and Greece.” The interview appeared in the Bulgarian Communist
journal Rabotnichesko Delo on January 20, and immediately provoked
a wave of critical responses in the Western press.
On January 23 Pravda published a resume of the Dimitrov
interview without commentary. One day later, Stalin sent a telegram
to both Dimitrov and Tito that condemned the idea of federation
unambiguously.66 A Pravda editorial of January 28 brought the
dissonance into the open, insisting that the Soviet Union was not
opposed to federation in principle, but asserting that for the moment
such a goal was premature. The Yugoslav leadership offered no
official rejoinder. In deference to the Soviet criticism, a Bulgarian
Press Agency statement of January 29 repudiated both the Lake Bled
declaration and Dimitrov’s interview, pretending that “neither the
Prime Minister [Dimitrov] nor any other member of the Government
has thought or will be thinking about the formation of an eastern bloc
in any form whatsoever.”67 Despite the disclaimer, on 1 February
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Moscow summoned both the Bulgarian and the Yugoslav leadership
to the Kremlin for a settling of accounts.68
In retrospect it is clear that the ensuing summit, conducted on
the evening of February 10, 1948, marked a full stop for federative
projects in the Balkans in the postwar period.69 Molotov opened the
session with an attack on the independent comportment of Belgrade
and Sofia, and both he and Stalin blamed their “fraternal allies” for
complicating relations with the West, reiterating the “unacceptable”
character of international initiatives undertaken without prior
consultation with Moscow. Stalin was particularly annoyed by the
Dimitrov press conference, and addressed the Bulgarian leader
with shocking rudeness, likening his comportment to that of “an
old woman in the street who says to everyone whatever comes into
her head.”70 The Soviet leader rejected the kind of broad Balkan
federation that Dimitrov had evoked, and casually dismissed
the Communist cause in the Greek civil war as irretrievably lost.
Enigmatic to the end, Stalin nonetheless concluded by supporting a
Yugoslav-Bulgarian union, to which he noted that Albanian might
eventually be attached.
Immediately following the session of February 10 the Bulgarian
and Yugoslav representatives dutifully assembled to discuss
association, but the goal of a Balkan union was a lost cause. Both
parties agreed to a text drawn up by Molotov on February 11
obligating consultation in reaching foreign policy decisions. The
Yugoslavs were now wary of Soviet intentions, however, and
concerned with the potential for Bulgaria to play the role of a “Trojan
Horse” on behalf of Soviet priorities inside an enlarged south Slavic
union. A special session of the KPJ Politburo on March 1 followed Tito
in interpreting Stalin’s suggestion for union with Bulgaria as a form
of pressure on Yugoslavia, and agreed that under the circumstances
federation was no longer appropriate.71 Thoroughly intimidated
by Soviet resistance, the Bulgarians bowed to the priorities of their
sponsors in Moscow. Revelatory of the Soviets’ real intentions, the
Soviet-Bulgarian peace treaty signed on March 18 was accompanied
by a private pledge by Sofia to refuse a south Slavic federation with
Yugoslavia.72
Soviet comportment during the session of February 10 exposed
the imperial mentality that dominated the ruling circle in the
Kremlin. Stalin’s bullying treatment of Dimitrov was shameless. His
dismissive reference to the “naked illusion” of a Greek Communist
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victory, though not unrealistic, was cruel. Nor was consistency a
virtue. While accusing his Balkan lieutenants of provoking the West
with loose talk of association, Stalin had already launched a series of
provocations of his own. The creation of the Communist Information
Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947, and the confrontational
tone of Andrei Zhdanov’s keynote address, put the West on
warning. Within 10 days of the session of February 10, the coalition
government of Edvard Beneš in Prague was subverted with Soviet
connivance. In June 1948 the Berlin blockade was initiated. A Soviet
dominated regional sub-system was being created in Central and
Southeastern Europe whose essential logic was the reinforcement of
Soviet control. Ambitious agendas for regional association, such as
the project for a Balkan union as it had unfolded between 1943 and
1948, conflicted with rather than reinforced that logic.
The new communist leaders of several Balkan states had pursued
a serious dialogue about the prospect of union. John Lampe’s
characterization of the Balkan federation project as a “phony issue”
and “the Macedonian question in disguise” captures the frustrations
that plagued the project, but trivializes its intent.73 Wartime
dislocations had created the possibility for change, and local leaders
were committed to pursuing new directions. Though they did not
succeed in coming to terms, discussions were substantial and the
differences aired were not unbridgeable. In the end the project was
shattered less by regional disaccord than by the intervention of the
great powers. Britain and the Western allies were opposed to any
federative project with the potential to extend Soviet leverage in
Southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. Stalin may
have been intrigued by the possibility of Balkan union at an early
stage, but he moved away from the idea as the weight of Western
objections became clear. In 1944-45, rather than argue the point at the
expense of Soviet relations with its wartime allies, Stalin acquiesced
to London’s demand for a dominant role in Greece, and embraced
a regional sphere of influence arrangement with Churchill that
precluded association. By the time that the federative project had
revived in 1947, Tito’s Yugoslavia had emerged as a new source
of concern. Tito’s aspirations called into question the sovereignty
of Albania, considered by Moscow to be a useful strategic ally.
Belgrade’s support for the KKE in the third round of the Greek
civil war threatened to create “international complications” at
a moment when Moscow’s main priority had become to draw
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together a disciplined bloc as a defensive glacis against the West.
And Tito himself was a wild card, independent minded and with
considerable popular support. Meanwhile, Western policy was
oriented toward integrating Greece and Turkey into a consolidating
security community with an anti-Soviet orientation. Though Soviet
intervention was decisive in reversing the momentum of dialogue,
the fate of postwar projects for Balkan federation was sealed by the
triumph of the cold war system in Europe as a whole. In the decades
to come the dilemmas of regional order would be addressed in a
context of competitive bipolarity.
The Cold War in Miniature.
Following their clash over Balkan union, Tito and Stalin moved
rapidly toward a public break. Stalin took the initiative, convinced,
according to Nikita Khrushchev, that he had only to “shake his little
finger and Tito would disappear.”74 On March 18, 1948, all Soviet
military and civilian advisors to Yugoslavia were withdrawn, aid
programs were frozen, and a campaign to rally pro-Soviet sentiment
inside the KPJ against Tito was initiated. A special session of the
Yugoslav Central Committee on April 2 responded defiantly,
initiating a mass arrest of suspected pro-Soviet “Cominformists.”75
On June 28, 1949 (Vidovdan once again), the new Communist
Information Bureau issued a resolution that denounced Yugoslav
“deviationism,” and in July the 5th Congress of the KPJ consummated
the rift by organizing an impressive display of public defiance.76 This
was the first open split within the Soviet led international communist
movement, and a blow to the USSR’s international position that the
West was anxious to support. The Titoists were communists, but
they had become anti-Soviet communists. In the years to come, nonaligned Yugoslavia would be the beneficiary of a de facto strategic
guarantee from NATO as well as liberal U.S. and Western economic
assistance.
The break with Tito sparked a series of Soviet-style purge
trials elsewhere in Eastern Europe, designed to root out national
communists with the potential to follow in Tito’s footsteps, and to
reinforce Soviet control. The purges contributed to the consolidation
of the Soviet bloc, eventually to be institutionalized as an economic
union in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in
1949, and as a military pact in the Warsaw Treaty Organization in
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1955.77 Yugoslavia stood apart, an independent national communist
regime governed in an authoritarian manner but not subordinated
to Soviet direction. The ruling parties of Albania, Bulgaria, and
Romania, which had earlier contemplated association with
Yugoslavia in a Balkan federation, were coerced into the Soviet
glacis. Albania became the site of a Soviet naval facility, but during
the 1960s its maverick leader Enver Hoxha joined Communist
China in criticizing Soviet direction. In 1969, following the Soviet
occupation of Czechoslovakia, Tirana announced its withdrawal
from the Warsaw Pact.78 Greece and Turkey, which had been prime
subjects of the 1947 Truman Doctrine, emerged from the war closely
aligned with the West, and in 1952 joined the NATO alliance.79 The
result was a Balkan regional sub-system that reproduced the Cold
War in miniature, with Greece and Turkey representing NATO,
Bulgaria and Romania the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslavia and
Albania positioned as maverick national communist regimes whose
non-alignment helped preserve an approximate regional balance.
Although it was externally imposed and essentially artificial, the
mature cold war system provided for the longest unbroken period of
stable development in the modern history of the Balkan Peninsula.
The kind of external threats that had drawn the Balkans into the
twentieth century world wars receded. Territorial claims with
implications for East-West rivalry were muted, and chronic sources
of regional tension, such as the Macedonian and Kosovo issues,
were relegated to the back burner. With the threat index on low,
Balkan communist states had the luxury of developing relatively
autonomous international policies. Yugoslav non-alignment,
Albanian isolationism, and Romanian attempts to achieve greater
autonomy by developing a territorial defense policy independent of
the Warsaw Pact from the mid-1960s onward are diverse examples
of what might be called a regional trend. Greek-Turkish relations
soured with the rise of nationalist agitation on the island of Cyprus
beginning in the mid-1950s, but this was now a problem of Alliance
management that did not threaten to spill over into the region as
a whole. During the 1980s, a momentum of regional dialogue was
created that sought to define premises for cooperation across the
fault lines of the Cold War, culminating in the convening of foreign
ministers’ conferences bringing together representatives of all six
Balkan states in Belgrade during 1988 and Tirana during 1990.80 The
results of these consultations were modest—commercial interaction
67

and cultural orientation remained dominated by the logic of bloc
affiliation. But they represented a step in the direction of closer
regional cooperation.
Such initiatives were sorely needed. The Balkan states that
emerged from the Second World War remained overwhelmingly
rural in character. Modernization was a basic challenge on both
sides of the region’s “Iron Curtain,” and a dynamic of economic
cooperation and commercial exchange could have worked to
the advantage of all. Unfortunately, prior to the 1980s cold war
structures posed significant barriers to all but relatively superficial
forms of interaction.
The Western-oriented countries of the region benefited
dramatically from the rapid expansion of the capitalist world
economy during the postwar decades. At the end of the civil war
in 1949, approximately half the population of Greece still lived in
traditional rural communities. By the 1990s the proportion had
fallen to less than a third. Over 12 percent of the population left the
country in search of work opportunities in the decade of the 1970s
alone, but by the dawn of the 21st century, Greece was confronting
a wave of labor immigration (particularly from the former Soviet
Union and Albania). These trends were reflective of a fundamental
transformation that was bringing the country closer to the standards
of developed Europe. Similar changes occurred in Turkey, where
in 1950 only 18 percent of the population lived in towns with over
10,000 residents. Sixty-seven percent of Yugoslavia’s population
worked the land in 1948, over 40 percent had no formal schooling,
and an additional 46 percent had completed only a basic four-year
curriculum. Buoyed by international largesse, flexible public policy,
and open borders that allowed labor migration as an economic
safety valve and encouraged hard currency remittances, Yugoslav
growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s were among the highest in the
world. By 1980, only 20 percent of the population worked the land,
and the illiteracy rate had dropped below 10 percent.
Comparable, but less impressive trends were visible within the
Soviet-oriented states of the region. Bulgaria and Romania were
approximately 80 percent rural at the beginning of the Second
World War. Social norms were defined by traditional patriarchy,
and technological standards were low—only a small fraction of
villages had access to electricity. The Soviet extensive growth model
was a useful devise for development under the circumstances, and
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a process of industrialization and urbanization continued into the
1980s.The bizarre preoccupation with self-reliance that characterized
the long rule of Enver Hoxha made Albania the exception to every
rule, but even here education and broadened horizons made inroads
into traditional clan structures and social mores. It is doubtless true,
as the case of Greece seems to indicate, that modernization and
development would have proceeded more effectively absent the
authoritarian structures of communism—but in the postwar decades
these structures were firmly in place. Communism was the context
within which the shift away from patriarchal, semi-feudal, and
dependent patterns of social and economic organization occurred
in large parts of the Balkans, a fact that would make the transition
away from communist norms after 1989 particularly challenging.
In Turkey and Greece, traditions of authoritarian governance
were softened, but not altogether overcome. The Greek polity
remained polarized after the conclusion of the civil war in 1949.
In 1967 the probable victory of a left-wing coalition in scheduled
elections was preempted by a military coup led by a group of
junior officers including Colonels Georgios Papadopoulos and
Nikolaos Makarezos. The colonels’ regime remained in power
until 1974, but its ineffectiveness only served to discredit the
resort to authoritarianism. The junta collapsed in 1974 against the
background of the Cyprus crisis, and Greece has since sustained a
stable democratic order. Turkey moved away from the Kemalist
tradition of one party rule after 1945, but chronic political instability
provoked periods of military rule in 1960, 1971, and 1980, as well as
a “silent coup” to reverse the rise of political Islam in 1997. Turkey
can boast of democratic institutions and real political pluralism,
but the disproportionate role of the military in its political system,
the dilemma of political Islam in a self-styled secular state, and the
incapacity to integrate the large Kurdish minority remain barriers to
the realization of democratic norms.81
In the communist party states, the authoritarian legacy was
reinforced by the perpetuation of single party regimes under the
guidance of all-powerful despots.82 Tito exercised absolute power in
Yugoslavia from 1945 until his death in 1980, and became the subject
of an elaborate cult of personality.83 Enver Hoxha shifted from being
Tito’s protégé in the immediate postwar years, to a loyal Stalinist
in the 1950s, to an ally of Maoist China in the 1960s, but remained
Albania’s unchallengeable strongman throughout.84 Todor Zhivkov
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inherited power in Bulgaria from his predecessor Vŭlko Chervenkov
under the impetus of Khrushchev’s reforms in 1956, and clung to
office until forced to resign as the communist order crashed down
around his shoulders in 1990.85 In Romania, after the death of the
Stalinist leader Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej in 1965, power passed into
the hands of the young Nicolae Ceauşescu. After a brief flirtation
with reformism, Ceauşescu retreated into what may have been the
most oppressive of all the eastern European communist regimes,
brought to a violent end with his arrest and summary execution in
December 1989.86
Communist authoritarianism in the Balkans was not seriously
challenged from within. Economic growth and modernization,
the intimidation of dissent, and relative international stability
allowed the repressive regimes in power to achieve at least the
passive allegiance of a critical mass of citizens. Nationalism was
also used and manipulated by all of the ruling satraps as a means
for cementing support. Tito reacted to popular disaffection in
the late 1960s and early 1970s by granting greater autonomy
to Yugoslavia’s constituent nations. Hoxha justified his radical
isolationism as a means for preserving Albania’s unique national
essence. Ceauşescu distanced Romania from Soviet direction in the
foreign policy sphere during the 1960s as a sop to national feeling,
and the imposition of draconian austerity measures during the
1980s in an effort to eliminate Romania’s foreign debt had the goal
of reinforcing autonomy. Zhivkov’s campaign of forced assimilation
directed against Bulgaria’s Turkish minority during the 1980s was
likewise a demagogic effort to identify the regime with nationalist
opinion. Such measures were distasteful, but not altogether
ineffective. The cycles of popular mobilization and Soviet-led
repression that unfolded in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland
had no equivalent in Southeastern Europe. Balkan backwardness left
more room for extensive growth models to satisfy citizen demands,
authoritarian traditions had deeper roots, civil society remained less
developed, and frustrated nationalism was a wild card available
for manipulation when all else failed. Despite real achievements
in promoting economic growth and social equity, the authoritarian
regimes of the cold war Balkans would leave a heavy legacy once the
death knell of European communism had sounded.
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Yugoslavia Redux.
The most distinctive of the cold war communist regimes was
unquestionably Titoist Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav communists had
emerged triumphant from the civil war of 1941-45 in large measure
due to their commitment to represent all of the Yugoslav peoples,
and from the outset Tito’s government sought to avoid the errors of
the interwar regime by promoting a true multinational federation.
Tito’s wartime record gave him domestic legitimacy, and his defiance
of Stalin won widespread international admiration. With its central
location, impressive diversity, ideological affinities with Soviet-style
communist regimes, and close economic and strategic relations with
the West, Yugoslavia was a vital cold war actor.
Over time, the Yugoslav system became a close reflection of the
personal priorities of its leader. Although Tito was an eminently
practical ruler who left no significant theoretical legacy, it is
possible to speak of “Titoism” to characterize the unique qualities of
Yugoslavia’s socialist model.87 This was not a static model, but it did
present elements of continuity.88 In comparison with the unredeemed
or barely inflected Stalism of the Soviet bloc states, or of neighboring
Albania, Yugoslav communism was remarkably liberal and open.
As a model for sustainable social and economic development it was
nonetheless badly flawed. Was it fatally flawed? Many analysts have
placed the “wages of communism” alongside of “ancient hatreds”
as a means of explaining Yugoslavia’s anarchic disintegration in the
1990s—the anti-democratic essence of Titoism, it is argued, made it
impossible for the regime to develop defense mechanisms that could
sustain it once the protective shield of the party state and supreme
leader was withdrawn.89 There is obviously some truth to such
arguments, but it is a partial truth. Post-communist development
within a Yugoslav framework could have occurred had the right
choices been made. The fact that those choices were not made was
not preordained, either by the poisoned harvest of ethnic rivalry
or by the foibles of communist state systems.90 There was nothing
inexorable about Yugoslavia’s demise—it was an “avoidable
catastrophe.”91
From the outset, Titoism rested upon an unambiguous
commitment to the Yugoslav idea, embodied in the omnipresent
slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” (bratstvo i jedinstvo). Through the
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1950s, the 19th century aspiration to create a common Yugoslav
identity was favored. Thereafter, consociational relations between
Yugoslavia’s varied nations and national minorities received
greater emphasis. In retrospect, by opening the door to a stronger
affirmation of ethnic nationalism, the shift in direction may well
have been fatal.
The basis for Titoist national policy was the Soviet system of
titular nationalities, according to which officially recognized national
communities were granted a degree of autonomy within their “own”
territorial units, though subordinated to national institutions on the
federal level. A basic distinction was made between constituent
nations with the republican status and a formal right of secession,
and national minorities, defined as communities that were already
represented by a neighboring state, and therefore denied republican
status and a right to secede (the Magyars of Vojvodina and the
Kosovar Albanians were cases in point).92 Bosnia-Herzegovina
was an exception to the rule, insofar as it did not contain a single
dominant constituent nation or titular nationality. Though the
Bosnian Muslims were recognized as a constituent nation in 1961,
they did not represent a majority of the republic’s population. In
the case of Macedonia, a concerted effort was made to formalize
a Macedonian literary language that was distinct from Bulgarian
(the two languages are nearly identical), and to bolster a distinctive
Macedonian Slavic identity. The borders between republics were
in many cases identical to historical boundaries. In other cases,
such as the boundary between Serbia and Croatia in Slavonia, lines
were drawn according to approximate ethnic and geographical
divisions. Yugoslavia’s internal borders would become objects of
contestation during the 1990s, but they were established as a matter
of convenience, with the intent to unite rather than to divide.
The Serbs, representing 40 percent of the total Yugoslav
population and with a wide geographic distribution inside the
country, posed a special problem. Great Serbian chauvinism had
damaged the Yugoslav idea during the inter-war decades, and an
unspoken premise of Titoism was “a weak Serbia means a strong
Yugoslavia.” From the outset, Montenegro was set apart from Serbia
as a full-fledged republic. Serbia was also the only Yugoslav republic
to be internally sub-divided. In the north, a Vojvodina Autonomous
Province with its capital in the Danubian city of Novi Sad was
created to represent an area of great ethnic complexity including
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a large Magyar minority. In the south, a Kosovo Autonomous
Province was constituted to administer an historically disputed
area that included many of Serbia’s most important cultural shrines,
but also a population that was at least 80 percent Albanian. It was
further decided to deny the Serb populated areas in Croatia’s Krajina
and Slavonia regions a status analogous to that of the autonomous
provinces established inside Serbia. Diluting the critical mass of the
Serb population inside the Yugoslav federation was the unspoken
goal.
Even the most refined manipulation could not put feuding among
Yugoslav nationalities to rest. Prior to the crisis of the Yugoslav state
at the end of the 1980s, however, ethnic rivalry was a muted theme
in national life. The era of international political contestation of
the late 1960s and early 1970s gave rise to manifestations of ethnic
nationalism, but they focused on reform of Yugoslav institutions
rather than challenges to the Yugoslav idea, and were eventually
co-opted by a combination of repression and concession. Albanian
demonstrations in Kosovo and western Macedonia in November
1968, prompted by a sense of socio-economic discrimination and
focused on demands for special status were put down by force,
and public opinion was calmed by limited concessions—Kosovo
was granted the status of an autonomous province, display of the
Albanian flag with its red background and black double headed Eagle
was permitted as a national symbol, and a bi-lingual (Serbo-Croatian
and Albanian) University of Priština was chartered.93 A dispute over
funding and routing for inter-republican highways led to a brief flare
up of friction between Slovenia and the federal government in 1969,
revealing of emerging inter-republic rivalries but not a threat in its
own right.94 Most dramatically, cultural and social issues propelled
a reformist coalition to power in Zagreb in the late 1960s and
sparked a “mass movement” (masovni pokret, usually abbreviated as
maspok) demanding expanded cultural autonomy that some Western
observers dubbed the Croatian Spring. Anti-Yugoslav elements were
associated with the movement at the margin, but, like the Prague
Spring phenomenon in Alexander Dubček’s Czechoslovakia, it was
essentially a reformist current spearheaded by the leadership of the
Croatian League of Communists. The movement was suppressed
after Tito’s personal intervention in the course of 1971, leaving a
legacy of alienation.95 These incidents were important, but they
were exceptions to the rule. Yugoslavia’s commitment to the ethic of
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bratstvo i jedinstvo was profound, and appreciated by a clear majority
of citizens.
In the aftermath of victory in 1945, Tito and his lieutenants set out
to impose a mirror image of the Soviet system that they had learned
to admire as militants in the service of the Comintern. After the break
with Stalin in 1948, it became necessary to differentiate Yugoslavia
from a Soviet Union that had suddenly become a menacing rival.
From 1948 onward Titoism emerged as a variant of national
communism, aggressively patriotic and insistent that a strategy
for social change must be crafted in light of local circumstances.
In the context of the Cold War, many of Tito’s initiatives appeared
innovative, but they were often frustrated by the authoritarian context
within which Yugoslav experimentation was forced to unfold. From
1950 onward, under the direction of Kardelj, a commitment to the
concept of workers’ self-management became a pillar of a new
economic strategy intended to impose direction “from the bottom
up” and bring to life the old socialist ideals of workers’ control
and grass roots democracy.96 Yugoslav self-management evolved
constantly, but though self-management committees soon became
a fixture in every public enterprise, the system never came close to
achieving its more ambitious aspirations. Direction at the point of
production was never seriously forwarded as an alternative to the
pervasive role of the ruling party (after 1952 renamed the Yugoslav
League of Communists). The public challenge launched by Milovan
Djilas from 1954 onward, warning of the eventual consequences of
a communist monopoly of power and urging movement towards
broader political pluralism, was greeted with political ostracism
and a series of jail sentences.97 The liberal tendencies that coalesced
around the Croatian maspok in the early 1970s were squelched, and in
1972 Tito moved to oust a liberal faction arguing for democratization
within the Serbian League of Communists—a fateful gesture from
which many of the disasters of the 1990s would eventually spring.98
The cult of Tito was less foreboding than the Stalin cult in the USSR,
but no less totalitarian in its implications. And the logic of economic
liberalization was not followed consistently. Buoyed by generous
economic assistance from the United States in the 1950s, and the
World Bank and other international development funds thereafter,
Yugoslavia was able to maintain high rates of growth, a substantial
military sector, and aspirations to European living standards
without confronting the need for fundamental economic redirection.
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When it did turn to a more comprehensive reform program in 1966
implementation was piecemeal and half-hearted—through the 1970s
growth rates and living standards were maintained artificially by
borrowing. Even with all its flaws, however, the Yugoslav economic
model remained more attuned to the exigencies of the world market
than the economic systems of its communist neighbors, and more
sensitive to real citizen demands.
Internationally, Titoism rested upon a commitment to nonalignment as an alternative for developing states against the backdrop
of cold war bipolarity. Tito himself became one of the founders and
most outspoken champions of the nonaligned movement, for which
Yugoslavia was the only European affiliate. He reveled in the role
of a leading international personality, and used his personal stature
to give Yugoslavia a visibility and influence in world affairs that
was incommensurate with its real strategic weight. For critics, the
aspiration to stand at the head of the Third World regimes affiliated
with the non-aligned movement represented a form of overreaching
that only served to obscure Yugoslavia’s inevitable European
vocation. But international prestige helped the regime sustain itself
in the face of domestic critics, and was a source of national pride. It
also mirrored Yugoslavia’s careful balancing act, following a partial
rapprochement with Nikita Khrushchev’s USSR from 1955 onward,
between Western sponsors and the Soviet superpower.
Tito’s Yugoslavia was successful in promoting economic growth,
re-creating a shared political space after the terrible bloodletting of the
war years, and sustaining international independence and prestige
in the polarized climate of cold war Europe. The new Yugoslavia
continued to fulfill many of the functions for which the Yugoslav
idea had originally been conceived—to provide an alternative to
political fragmentation and conflict over territory in a region marked
by strong inter-culturality, promote development by maintaining an
integrated economic space, and prevent the manipulation of local
rivalries by external powers. It remained a fragile state nonetheless,
with a sharp developmental divide between north and south that
the best efforts of the regime could not succeed in closing, festering
ethnic tensions that were contained but not eliminated, and a
democratic deficit embodied by the dominating role of Tito himself.
In the wake of the suppression of political agitation in Croatia
and Serbia during 1971-72, Tito shifted back toward a policy of
concession by promulgating the new federalist constitution of 1974.
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This document, one of the longest constitutions in world history
and correspondingly complex, attempted to address the Yugoslav
national dilemma by delegating authority to the republic level, a
potentially dangerous devolution that presumed tight oversight
on the part of a League of Communists that was itself increasingly
fragmented along republic lines. Broadened autonomy for the
republics and autonomous provinces proved to be viable so long as
Tito himself was on hand to play the role of arbiter. In his absence, it
would prove to be a recipe for disaster.
Tito’s death in May 1980, after a protracted illness, initiated a long
crisis that would culminate a decade later with the state’s anarchic
collapse. The crisis had distinct and overlapping dimensions. By the
late 1970s the economic boom that had been so important a source of
stability had turned to bust. Endemic inefficiencies, the cumulative
burden of politically motivated concentration on heavy industry,
and adverse world market trends created shortfalls that were
increasingly met by borrowing. By 1980, external debt approached
$20 billion, or 5 percent of Gross Domestic Product, and debt service
had become a permanent drain on state revenues.
During the ensuing decade a sequence of ineffective plans for
“stabilization” failed to reverse a sharp and continuous economic
decline. In 1989 Yugoslav foreign debt remained near $17 billion, and
in December of that year the dinar (the national currency unit) fell
prey to hyperinflation.99 Tito’s 1974 constitution, with its exaggerated
federalism, also created a crisis of leadership. Tito himself, who had
served as president for life, was replaced by a collective presidency
with eight members representing each of Yugoslavia’s federal entities
(the six republics plus Vojvodina and Kosovo) rotating annually in
the position of chair. The arrangement was a good example of the
exaggerated sensitivity to ethnic balance that characterized the 1974
constitutional order, and a recipe for ineffectiveness—it is no surprise
that in the post-Tito years no national leader was able to emerge with
an agenda for positive change. In fact, the 1974 constitution created
a general crisis of federal institutions by concentrating power inside
the individual republics and provinces and creating a situation of
“republican autarky” that made the crafting of consensual national
policy virtually impossible. Yugoslavia also moved slowly toward
a crisis of legitimacy. From 1985 onward Mikhail Gorbachev was
working to promote détente between the Soviet Union and the West.
In the process he softened competitive bipolarity and undermined
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non-alignment as a third way alternative. Revival of the project for
European unification with the promulgation of the Single European
Act in 1987 raised concerns that Yugoslavism, with its undemocratic
essence, third world orientation, and assumptions of national
exceptionalism, would eventually become a barrier to integration
with Europe.
Not least, the crisis of European communism from 1989 directly
affected what had always been the most essential foundation
of Titoism—its affiliation with the international communist
movement’s world historical project for social transformation.
Despite its independence and individuality, Tito’s Yugoslavia was
first and foremost a personal dictatorship and a communist party
state built upon a rigid ideological foundation. Without Tito, and
the red star that lit his way, very little would remain to bind the
constituent parts of Aleksa Djilas’ “contested country” together.100
The Short 20th Century.
Eric Hobsbawm’s “short 20th century” begins with the
assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914,
and ends with the destruction of the Berlin Wall on the night of
November 10-11, 1989. For Hobsbawm, the defining event of the
century was the First World War, which shattered traditional sources
of cohesion, and gave birth to international communism as an antisystemic movement aimed at the subversion of the liberal world
order.101 The communist challenge eventually became embodied in
the interstate rivalry between the United States and the USSR that
we have come to call the Cold War. The collapse of international
communism, culminated by the implosion of the Soviet Union at the
end of 1991, brought a phase of world history to an end.
Past may be prologue, but more than a decade after the end of
the Cold War the nature of the new world order that is taking its
place remains unclear. The cold war system was competitive and
militarized, but it included shared assumptions about the nature
of strategic interaction and a significant cooperative dimension.102
The widespread perception of a “post-cold war disorder,” for which
the Balkan crisis of the 1990s may serve as an appropriate model,
emerges from the absence of such assumptions, and of the constraint
once imposed by competitive bipolarity. For sub-regional complexes
such as the Balkans, the Cold War offered a relatively stable strategic
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context, a sense of direction defined by international alignments,
the possibility for development under great power sponsorship,
and a framework for identity with ideological underpinnings that
looked beyond the narrow confines of blood and soil. For Greece
and Turkey, association with the Euro-Atlantic community became
a stimulus for development, and helped contain bilateral tensions.
Inside the Warsaw Pact, communism provided a functional context
for modernization, and imposed a kind of pax sovietica in areas still
divided by disputes over territory and identity. Yugoslavia was
respected and admired, and its flaws downplayed or overlooked,
precisely because it seemed to represent a viable third way that
avoided subservience to either of the antagonistic blocs. Though
often harsh and dictatorial, the cold war system in the Balkans
supplied a predictable context for domestic development, interstate
relations, and great power engagement.
The Balkan communist regime that would be most severely
affected by the end of the short twentieth century was Yugoslavia,
ironically the most liberal of them all. In retrospect this is not as
surprising as it might appear at first glance. Yugoslav communism
was an indigenous phenomenon, not imposed by an external
aggressor, and therefore more integral to the state’s identity and
cohesion, and less easily discarded, than was the case in neighboring
regimes. The relative success of Titoism made the collapse of the
Yugoslav development model that occurred during the 1980s all
the harder to bear. Given the challenges of ethnic complexity and
a recent history of inter-communal bloodletting, the Yugoslav
experiment was inherently at risk. And the strong international
sponsorship that had helped Tito to defy Stalin was no longer
forthcoming. During the cold war decades a violent disintegration
of the Yugoslav federation such as occurred during the 1990s would
not have been allowed. The superpowers had too much at stake
to permit an eruption of anarchic warfare in a critical theater, and
they possessed the will to prevent it. After 1989, with the Warsaw
Pact in tatters, Tito’s fragile federation lost much of its salience as a
strategic buffer, and as a positive example for neighboring regimes
still subject to Soviet control.
As the 1990s dawned the only realistic option for the postcommunist Balkan states seemed to be association with a triumphant
West. But the euphoria of the “end of history” was short-lived.103
The European powers, unprepared for the collapse of cold war
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structures, preoccupied with other issues, and unconvinced that
the game was worth the candle, were reluctant to engage the new
democratic states of the region unambiguously. Meanwhile, the
collapse of Yugoslavia, promoted by primitive nationalisms that
seemed to be very much rooted in history indeed, gave rise to a
series of local wars that plunged the entire region into a spiral of
decline, and left the international community at a loss to make sense
of the chaos. Against a backdrop of burning villages and ethnic
violence, long dormant images of the Balkans as a land beyond the
pale of civilization sprang back to life, the great powers struggled to
define their priorities in a secondary theater where vital interests did
not appear to be at stake, and the premises of a viable regional order
became more and more difficult to define.
Part of the reason for the difficulty was the implosion of the
instrument forged by the history of the 20th century to serve as the
keystone for political order in the multicultural Balkans—a south
Slavic federation. For all its flaws, Yugoslavia permitted civilized
cohabitation between its diverse peoples and allowed unresolved
national questions to be managed according to something other
than zero sum criteria. If the federation was a lost cause, and there
are grounds for arguing that in view of the new dynamics created by
the end of the Cold War it had at a minimum become dysfunctional,
it was urgently necessary to define alternative patterns of regional
order capable of addressing the dilemmas traditionally managed
by voluntary association. Easily stated in retrospect, the complex
circumstances surrounding Yugoslavia’s decline made this a
difficult conclusion to grasp and act upon when it counted. Faced
with dramatically altered circumstances and hosts of unknowns,
Yugoslavia’s citizenry and the international community should have
striven to preserve the federation at all costs as the only instrument
capable of providing a stable framework for transition toward new
patterns of interaction. Whether through neglect, disorientation, or
active support for new political forces bent upon sowing the wind
of nationalism, they did not do so, and would reap the whirlwind of
war.
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CHAPTER 3
THE STATE OF WAR:
SLOVENIA AND CROATIA, 1991-92
Battles and Quarrels.
Yugoslavia’s decline during the 1980s was transformed into
collapse due to the rise of opportunistic leaders in the republics, who
found in nationalism a new source of legitimization and were willing
to resort to ruthless measures to perpetuate power. The prototype of
this new breed of “ethnocrat” was Serbia’s Slobodan Milošević.1
Milošević was born in 1946 in the southern Serbian town of
Požarevac. His parents were Montenegrin by origin, father Svetozar
an Orthodox priest excommunicated by the Church for collaboration
with the communist authorities after the war, and mother Stanislava
a school director and party activist. Both parents would eventually
take their own lives, but Stanislava’s work with the League of
Communists seems to have oriented her children toward political
careers. Slobodan’s older brother Borislav rose to become Yugoslav
ambassador to Algeria, and his influence would prove useful in
forwarding his sibling’s ascent.2
Milošević’s marriage while a law student at the University of
Belgrade in the early 1960s to childhood sweetheart Mirjana (Mira)
Marković, brought him closer to the Yugoslav political elite. Mira
Marković’s mother was associated with the communist underground
in Belgrade during the war. In 1942, in a murky affair whose details
remain unclear, she was executed by the partisans after being accused
of revealing the names of comrades to the occupation authorities
under torture. Mira was raised by her grandparents, while her
estranged father went on to become the party chief of Serbia. It is
insistently rumored that her mother was Tito’s mistress, and that
Mira was his illegitimate daughter.3 Slobodan used such associations
to help launch a career of his own. He early on became the protégé of
the friend of his student years Ivan Stambulić, succeeding him during
the 1970s as director of the Technogaz conglomerate, chief of cabinet
for the mayor of Belgrade, and director of the Bank of Belgrade.
When Stambulić moved to the head of the League of Communists
of Serbia in 1984, Milošević was selected to occupy his vacated post
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as leader of the Belgrade League of Communists. Up to this point
there was nothing particular remarkable in the story of a young man
from the provinces made good--native talent, political connections,
and sponsorship by a well-placed member of the power elite were
typical roads to advancement for aspiring Yugoslav leaders.4
Milošević made his way to the top as a loyal servant of Stambolić,
a flamboyant bureaucrat who was nonetheless devoted to the
Yugoslav idea. His career took a turn in 1986, at a point when the crisis
of post-Tito Yugoslavia was well advanced and “the preconditions of
a revolutionary situation” were apparent.5 One manifestation of the
crisis was the rise of nationalist currents in Yugoslavia’s republics. In
both Slovenia and Croatia cultural leaders emphasized their Catholic
and Central European heritage and precarious situation “on the
edge of the Orthodox and Muslim abyss.”6 In Slovenia, the “New
Cultural Movements” of the 1980s challenged stale dogmas with a
provocative modernism that only partially disguised an emerging
sense of cultural superiority. Croatian nationalism was squelched
by the repression that followed the maspok of the early 1970s, but
during the 1980s it revived with support from the anti-Yugoslav
Croat Diaspora in Europe and North America. Franjo Tudjman, a
former Titoist general and party historian who had associated with
the Croatian national movement in the 1960s, was expelled from the
Yugoslav League of Communists in 1967, and eventually served
several terms in prison, was in touch with representatives of the
émigré community from the mid-1980s onward.7 In 1989 he founded
the Croatian Democratic Community (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica
— HDZ) as a forum for nationalist politics.8 Most ominously, due to
the critical mass and wide dispersion of the Serb population inside
Yugoslavia, where about three million of the eight million plus Serbs
in the federation lived outside of Serbia proper, a Serbian national
revival began to articulate resentments that under Tito were strictly
taboo.
A key event in the genesis of the new Serb nationalism was the
partial publication in 1986 of a Memorandum drawn up by the
Serbian Academy of Sciences describing a variety of grievances
concerning the lot of the Serbs inside Yugoslavia. The gray eminence
whose ideas inspired the document was the writer Dobrica Čosić,
a former partisan expelled from the League of Communists in 1968
for nationalist deviations, author of a series of novels tracing the
course of modern Serbian history through the trials and tribulations
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of the fictional Katić family, firmly convinced, in the words of his
hero Vukašin Katić, that the Yugoslav idea had been “the most
costly and tragic illusion ever pursued by the Serbian people.”9 The
Memorandum included the assertions that Serbia had consistently
sacrificed its own interests on behalf of ungrateful neighbors, and
was the victim of systematic discrimination, particularly due to
the loss of control over Vojvodina and Kosovo imposed by the
1974 constitution. The document made the explosive claim that the
ongoing exodus of the Serb minority from Kosovo was the result
of “genocide” in progress propelled by a “physical, moral, and
psychological reign of terror” that the federation was either unable
or unwilling to prevent. Extracts from the text were published in
the mass circulation Yugoslav daily Večernje Novosti in September
1986, probably in an attempt to discredit the argument by exposing
it to public scrutiny, and were widely discussed.10 Milošević
publicly rebuked the Memorandum as late as June 1987, describing
it as an expression of “the darkest nationalism.”11 In fact, the illstared initiative, subsequently characterized by Ivan Stambolić as
a “requiem for Yugoslavia,” offered precisely the kind of political
platform that he needed to catapult to power.12
The cathartic event in Milošević’s rise occurred on April 24, 1987,
when, during a visit to Kosovo on behalf of Stambolić, who at the
last moment sent his protégé in his stead, he stepped before a crowd
of angry Serbs protesting mistreatment at the hands of the local
Albanian police and intoned that “no one should dare to beat you”
(niko ne sme da vas bije).The apparently spontaneous admonition was
accompanied by an aggressive speech, in which the functionary
from Belgrade, while admonishing that “we must preserve
brotherhood and unity as the apple of our eye,” also evoked the
“injustice and humiliation” suffered by the Krajina Serbs.13 Widely
publicized, the remarks brought Milošević considerable popularity
inside Serbia, as well as opprobrium in the non-Serb republics. It is
still unclear at what point Milošević made a conscious decision to
play the nationalist card. Up to this date he had always presented
himself as an opponent of nationalist provocations, and may have
been sincerely surprised, as well as flattered and fascinated, by the
swell of public feeling that accompanied his initiative.14 In the event,
with this magical incantation the incongruous Sorcerer’s Apprentice
released the genie of Serb nationalism from the bottle where Tito had
kept it enclosed for several generations.
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The cameo appearance at Kosovo Polje won Milošević the
support of a critical mass of Serb public opinion, and he ruthlessly
pushed home his advantage, using nationalism to consolidate a
political base inside Serbia and then to expand it. The first step was
a consummate act of betrayal. Between June and December 1987,
Milošević engineered the ouster of his friend and sponsor Stambolić,
and took his place at the head of the League of Communists of
Serbia. Serbian nationalism was not yet a battle cry — Stambolić was
isolated and defeated politically in the back stabbing manner typical
of the old style communist cadre.15 But nationalism would become
the be all and end all in the months to come, as the new master of
Belgrade set out to ride the Serb wave to power in all of Yugoslavia.
The use of nationalism as a foundation for political legitimacy
required the cultivation of popular support. During the summer
of 1988 the preferred tactic for mobilization became a series of
“meetings of truth,” designed in the manner of religious revivals
to “restore dignity” to the purportedly downtrodden Serbs.
Encouraged by media support trumpeting the theme of national
renaissance, millions of citizens flocked to such meetings conducted
the length and breadth of Serbia. Nationalist agitation soon began
to have a political impact. On October 5, 1988, crowds gathered in
Novi Sad forced the resignation of the leadership of the Vojvodina
Autonomous Province, which was immediately replaced with
Milošević loyalists.16 On November 17 the leadership of the Kosovo
Autonomous Province was replaced after a similar protest.17 Two
days later, while strikers in Kosovo’s Trepča mining complex vainly
protested against the affront to provincial autonomy, over a million
supporters arrived for the “meeting of meetings” in Belgrade, where
Milošević boasted of Kosovo’s eternal attachment to the Serbian
motherland. In January 1989, again under the pressure of popular
mobilization, the leadership of the Republic of Montenegro was
forced to give way to Milošević supporters. These pretentiously
termed “anti-bureaucratic revolutions” (a Tito-era concept
originally intended to describe assaults against vested privilege)
had, with shocking suddenness, brought four of the eight positions
on the Yugoslav Federal Presidency under the control of one man,
creating a “Serb Bloc” that shattered Titoist equilibriums. Between
1987 and 1989 these initiatives were lent a gothic coloration with the
unprecedented public display, in a series of Orthodox monasteries,
of an open coffin containing the bones of the 14th century Kosovo
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martyr Prince Lazar. The culmination of this phase of ethnic
mobilization came with the great demonstration of Serb nationalism
convoked on Kosovo Field on Vidovdan, June 28, 1989, the 600th
anniversary of the legendary defeat. “Six centuries later,” intoned
Milošević to an adoring crowd from a high platform constructed
on the Gazimestan battle site, “again we are in battles and quarrels.
They are not yet armed battles, though such things should still not
be excluded.”18
Milošević had made himself the most powerful figure in
the country, “the first Yugoslav leader to realize that Tito was
dead,” as a contemporary witticism had it. What did he aspire
to accomplish? A May 1988 report published by the “Milošević
Commission” argued for a renewed Yugoslav federation that would
centralize authority, reestablish a national economic space, and
promote efficiency through the mechanism of the free market. The
agenda was respectable, but the coercive tactics that had brought
Milošević to power went far toward discrediting the Yugoslav idea
altogether, and his subsequent exercise of power demonstrated little
allegiance to the values that the Milošević Commission sought to
represent. Vidosav Stevanović characterizes Milošević’s ideology
as “Stalinism impregnated by Slavophilism and Orthodoxy,” an
apparent contradiction in terms that captures the confusion that still
reigns concerning the Serbian strong man’s long-term intentions.19
Unlike his Croatian counterpart Tudjman, an exalted authoritarian
nationalist, or Slovenian president Milan Kučan, a convinced
nationalist liberal, Milošević was not a man of principle, but a
political opportunist swept forward by a populist current unleashed
in the void created by the collapse of Titoist norms.20 Milošević was
more than happy to ride with the tide, but as events would prove,
his attempt to manipulate Serb nationalism amounted to seizing a
tiger by the tail.
The absence of liberal resistance was a striking feature of
Milošević’s ascendancy. Inside of Serbia, Tito’s purge of the Serbian
League of Communists in the early 1970s had destroyed the careers
of the most talented partisans of democratic reform, and the wave
of nationalism unleashed after 1989 temporarily precluded effective
opposition. On the federal level, the Bosnian Croat Ante Marković,
who replaced Branko Mikulić as federal prime minister in December
1988, was the only major figure to step forward with a Yugoslav
alternative to a politics of ethnic mobilization. Unfortunately, it
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was an alternative that could only offer a distraught citizenry,
traumatized by economic decline, even more blood, sweat, and
tears. In December 1989 the “Marković Plan” was initiated. Its first
goal was to stabilize the Yugoslav national currency (the dinar),
in the throes of hyperinflation, through the latest in a sequence of
International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity programs. Marković
hoped to use a strong dinar to encourage private initiative as a
motor of growth.21 In the course of 1990s he managed to achieve
some progress in bolstering the currency and improving investor
confidence.22 But the Marković Plan brought little short-term relief to
the public, which was now being lured by the sirens of nationalism
promising that outside the federation all would be well. Years of
neglect had led Yugoslavia toward a crisis for which IMF-inspired
structural adjustment offered no solution.23
As an aspiring national figure with a primary allegiance to the
Yugoslav idea, Marković was an exception to the rule. Since at
least 1974 the real power brokers inside the Yugoslav hierarchy
were regional leaders whose political associations lay almost
exclusively within their republic of origin. Serbia’s power play
frightened republic-level elites and weakened popular confidence
in Yugoslavia, creating an objective foundation for a resort to
nationalist demagoguery. It also created a window of opportunity
for nationalist extremists, brought back onto the political scene due
to the weakening of federal institutions and the crisis of European
communism from 1989 onward.
The Marković program might have had some chance to take off
in a Yugoslav context if it had been supported by a unified League
of Communists, promulgated by a strong state, and legitimized in
a national election. Such an outcome was within reach--opinion
polls suggest that well into 1990 a majority of Yugoslav citizens
maintained an allegiance to the federation. But the emerging
nationalist leaders of the feuding Yugoslav republics did not will it
to be so. Led by Serbia, the individual republics reacted to economic
austerity with a series of protectionist gestures and inflationary raids
on the national bank, undermining reform efforts and giving rise to
what one analyst describes as “a full fledged economic war.”24 At
the Fourteenth, and final Congress of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia at Belgrade’s Sava Center in January 1990 the Slovenian
delegation, followed by its Croatian counterpart, walked out in
protest against purported Serbian hegemonism. For all intents and
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purposes, the ruling party that had presided over the fortunes of
communist Yugoslavia since the origins of the state had ceased to
exist. With it disappeared any realistic chance for coordinating a
process of transition on the federal level. Paralyzed by republic-level
opposition and without the leadership of the League, the Yugoslav
federal government was not able to pass a single piece of legislation
in a span of eighteen months from late 1989 through 1991.
Yugoslavia’s fate was sealed by the inability of the federal power
structure to impose national elections as a first step toward political
pluralism. In lieu of a federal contest, targeted for December 1990 but
in fact never held, between April and December 1990 the individual
Yugoslav republics scheduled separate elections that in almost every
case confirmed nationalist leaderships committed to a break with the
past.
The Slovenian election of April 1990 pitted the Democratic
United Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS), a united front bringing
together six disparate parties (the Christian Democrats, Peasants’
Union, Democratic Alliance, Social Democrats, Liberal Democrats,
and Greens) around an anti-communist agenda, against Kučan’s
post-communist Party of Democratic Renewal. In a split decision,
DEMOS secured 55 percent support in parliamentary elections,
while Kučan, until recently a loyal communist apparatchik, won
the presidency by a 59-42 percent margin against the DEMOS
candidate Jože Pucnik. All parties to the contest rallied behind the
slogan “Europe, Now” and called for a restructuring of Yugoslavia
as a loose confederation of sovereign states. Subsequently, on July 2,
1990, Slovenia declared sovereignty within the federation. Through
the 1980s Slovenia had been a subversive force within Yugoslavia,
pressing consistently for anti-federal solutions on behalf of its own,
republican and nationalist priorities. The election of 1990 brought
this trend to a head.
One week later, elections in Croatia conducted according to
a double ballot that favored stronger parties in the first round,
gave Tudjman’s HDZ 205 of 356 parliamentary seats, an outcome
disproportionate to its real margin of popular votes (41.5 percent),
and more than sufficient to assert control of the republic’s political
future. The HDZ was in the process of consolidation, and Croatia
was not yet ready to pursue an agenda for separation, but Tudjman
made no secret of his allegiance to the “thousand year dream”
of national independence. He was also inspired by less edifying
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sentiments. On February 24, 1990, at the HDZ’s first public rally,
Tudjman stepped toward a rehabilitation of the genocidal regime of
Ante Pavelić, calling it “an expression of the historical aspirations of
the Croatian people.”25 At an electoral rally in Dubrava on March 17,
1990, the HDZ leader offered an astonishing personal observation:
“Thanks to God that my wife is neither a Jew nor a Serb.”26 Between
May and July 1990, his party revived many of the symbols of the
Ustaša period including the historical Croatian shield with its
red and white checkerboard (the šahovnica), promoted a bogus
historical revisionism that sought to downplay the crimes of the
Ustaša, instituted obligatory loyalty oaths for ethnic Serbs in public
positions, discouraged use of the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet and made
the Latin script obligatory in official documents and proceedings,
purged members of Croatia’s Serb minority (17 percent of the
population) from positions in state administration and local police
forces, and rewrote the Croatian constitution in such a way as to
demote Croatian Serbs from the status of a constituent nation to that
of a national minority.27
The measures emanating from Zagreb were bound to provoke
a reaction. By the spring of 1990 the Serb populations of Croatia
in the old Habsburg Military Frontier region amidst the arid karst
lands around the provincial center and rail junction of Knin (the
Kninska Krajina), organized locally but with the support of Belgrade,
had initiated a revolt against what was perceived as the prospect of
separation from Yugoslavia, establishing an ad hoc association of Serb
municipalities in May and beginning the construction of self-defense
militias.28 Hundreds of years of cohabitation had made the Serbs of
Krajina indistinguishable from their Croat neighbors in dialect,
appearance, and way of life. But they were Orthodox Christians for
whom the memory of the World War II massacres was still alive.
During July and August, in the aftermath of the Croatian Assembly’s
decision to refuse official status to the Cyrillic alphabet, a hastily
organized Serb referendum produced a nearly unanimous outcome
for loyalty to Yugoslavia, and a “ Serb Autonomous Province (later
Republic) of Krajina” (Srpska Autonomna Oblast Krajina-SAOK) was
declared into being under the political leadership of former dentist
Milan Babić, and military direction of the police inspector Milan
Martić. Only about a third of the 600,000 Croatian Serbs actually
resided inside Croatia’s former military frontier districts (Lika,
Slunj, Banija, and Kordun), which apart from their significance as a
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transportation corridor were of marginal economic importance. But
the political weight of the Krajina Serbs’ challenge to the new regime
in Zagreb, and to the legitimacy of inter-republican borders, was
substantial. Within months of Yugoslavia’s first-ever democratic
elections, a process of fragmentation had been launched that would
eventually consume the country as a whole.
It was not until July 29, 1990, in his native Bosnia-Herzegovina,
that Ante Marković announced the creation of an all-national political
party, dubbed the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia (Savez
Reformskih Snaga Jugoslavije), committed to contesting republican
elections beneath a Yugoslav banner. At this point the process of
ethnic mobilization had gone too far to reverse. During November
and December 1990 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia,
and Serbia-Montenegro all produced strong results for nationalist
factions, while Marković’s movement was marginalized.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović’s Muslim Party of
Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratska Akcija — SDA) won
34 percent of the vote, the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska
Demokratska Stranka — SDS) 30 percent, and the Bosnian branch of
the Croatian HDZ 18 percent. These parties were products of ethnic
mobilization, with mandates to represent the communal interests
of national communities. Marković’s Alliance of Reform Forces,
tragically in view of polling data that indicates that in June 1990
nearly 70 percent of Bosnians continued to support preservation of
the Yugoslav federation, received only 5.4 percent of the vote.29 The
vote distribution tallied with the proportionate weight of national
communities within Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, leading some
critics to describe the result as something closer to a census than an
electoral outcome.30 Both the SDS and the HDZ were for all intents
and purposes extensions of their mother parties inside Serbia and
Croatia proper. Izetbegović had authored a controversial Islamic
Declaration in the 1960s that posed the goal of attaching BosniaHerzegovina to a larger pan-Islamic political community, and had
been sentenced to several jail terms as a Muslim nationalist and
separatist.31 His SDA was challenged internally in September 1990
by the émigré businessman Adil Zulfikarpašić out of concern for the
movement’s implied Islamism, but Zulfikarpašić and his supporters
were expelled by an extraordinary SDA assembly by a 272-11 vote,
and the new Muslim Bosniak Organization which they created in
response did not rally meaningful support.32 Steven Burg and Paul
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Shoup underline the SDA’s “overtly Islamic and Muslim nationalist
orientation.”33
In the Macedonian elections the nationalist Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organization--Democratic Party for Macedonian
National Unity (IMRO--DPMNU) under Ljubčo Georgievski, which
took its name from the terrorist organization of the late Ottoman and
interwar period, won a plurality of 32 percent of the popular vote,
but ceded power to a moderate coalition led by the former Titoist
Kiro Gligorov. Aware of his republic’s fragility, Gligorov strove to
assemble a broad based coalition including representatives of the
large Albanian minority (23 percent of the population according to
the census of 1994). Macedonian nationalism remained an important
source of cohesion in the new Macedonia, however, and would soon
become a source of contention with neighboring states including
Greece, which feared the revival of territorial claims dating to the
era of the Balkan Wars. Milošević prepared the ground for Serbian
elections by promulgating a new constitution in July 1990 that
eliminated Vojvodina and Kosovo autonomy. On the basis of a fullblown demagogic populism, in December 1990 the Serbian Socialist
Party that Milošević had established on the ruins of the League of
Communists won 77 percent of the tally for the Serbian parliament,
while Milošević himself took the presidency with 66 percent of the
vote.34
With nationalist mobilizations proceeding apace and the League
of Communists hors de combat, only the Federal Presidency was in a
position to build a new basis for national unity. Reduced to a platform
for the articulation of conflicting agendas by republican leaderships
committed to go their own way, it failed miserably. When in May
1991 the Croat Stjepan (Stipe) Mesić came due to succeed Borisav
Jović as chair according to the annual rotation established by Tito,
opposition by the Serb bloc, justified by the assertion that Mesić
had publicly expressed his opposition to Yugoslavia, prevented
him from assuming his seat.35 On October 4, 1990, Slovenia and
Croatia released a plan, inspired by the recommendations of EC
councilors, to recast Yugoslavia along confederal lines, as a union
of sovereign states united by a customs union, a common market,
and perhaps a common currency, with some coordination in the
areas of foreign policy and diplomacy.36 The project was appealing,
but insincere—its real purpose was to win time while an agenda for
secession matured. From the spring of 1990 onward both of the western
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republics were illegally importing arms, and using what were still
nationally controlled media establishments to encourage support
for independence. A Slovenian referendum on independence
conducted in December 1990 won overwhelming support, and a
Croatian counterpart, held in May 1991 after fighting had already
erupted in Krajina and Slavonia, carried by more than 90 percent. On
March 8, 1991, the Slovenian parliament attempted an unadulterated
assertion of sovereignty by moving that military service in the
Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija--JNA) would
no longer be mandatory for Slovene citizens, and refusing to proceed
with the republic’s annual call-up.37 In the spring and summer of
1991, Macedonian president Gligorov and his Bosnian counterpart
Izetbegović, representing weak and ethnically divided republics
for whom the breakup of the Yugoslav federation represented a
dire threat, reintroduced a version of the Croat-Slovene program
calling for “asymmetrical federation” that would allow individual
republics to define their own degree of association with national
institutions.38 Tudjman and Milošević approved the proposal, but in
the certainty that it would never be implemented--Burg and Shoup
describe the entire episode as “political theater.”39 The terms of
the proposal remained imprecise, and it was rapidly overtaken by
events, precipitated above all by Slovenia’s rush to burn its bridges
and break irrevocably with the Yugoslav union.
If it had received the consistent support of republican leaders and
been unambiguously promulgated by the international community,
the project to reconfigure Yugoslavia as a loose or asymmetric
confederation could possibly have succeeded in preventing war.
Even allowing the separation of Slovenia and Croatia, some
arrangement for holding together the remaining four republics in a
rump Yugoslavia might have prevented the worst of the violence that
would follow. During 1990-1991, however, neither a will for peace
among republican leaders nor a serious commitment to preventive
diplomacy or conflict management among key international actors
was in place. The international community remained disengaged,
and the leaders of Yugoslavia’s six republics could not arrive at a
consensual position regarding their country’s future because they
did not want to.
Milošević, joined by his protégé Momir Bulatović of Montenegro,
was increasingly committed to support for the emerging Serb
entities inside Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This decision
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to prioritize the creation of a “greater Serbia” would eventually
be singled out as the root cause of the entire Yugoslav tragedy,
though in fact the unambiguous orientation of the western republics
toward secession left the Serbian leadership with little choice but to
see to its own interests. On March 16, 1991, as the crisis of federal
institutions climaxed, Milošević remarked on Belgrade television
that “Yugoslavia has entered into the final phase of its agony.”
In an address to Serb mayors on the same day he asserted that
Belgrade’s task was now “to defend the interests of our republic,
as well as the interests of the Serb people outside Serbia,” and
opined that “frontiers and states are in play, and it is always the
strong, never the weak, who determine borders.”40 Such statements
outlined a program, to accept the dismantlement of Yugoslavia and
use force to assemble an enlarged Serbia from the ruins. Ljubljana
and Zagreb viewed confederation as a kind of halfway house that
would buy them time to prepare for independence, and the Slovenes
in particular pushed hard to provoke a break as soon as possible.
Sarajevo and Skopje feared the breakup of Yugoslavia, but they were
not willing to accept incorporation in a rump state where the western
republics were not on hand to balance Serbia.41 All parties pursued
their goals through collusive bargaining, on the basis of confidences
that would sometimes be respected and sometimes betrayed. In a
memoir, the Slovene Janez Drnovšek notes that already in August
1990, at a moment when he was serving as chair of the Yugoslav
Federal Presidency, Milošević and Borisav Jović informed him that
Slovenia would be allowed to depart the federation peacefully
on the basis of a referendum.42 Milošević reiterated the message
to Kučan during a private meeting on January 24, 1991, with the
clarification that Serbia would not attempt to prevent Slovenian
separation (Slovenia contained a negligible Serb minority) in order
to concentrate on reassembling the Serb populations of Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.43 In March 1991, following the suppression of
student demonstrations in Belgrade, Milošević met with Tudjman in
Tito’s (and before him King Aleksandar’s) isolated hunting preserve
Karadjordjevo, midway between their respective capitals, and agreed
to support the dissolution of Yugoslavia and a partition of BosniaHerzegovina.44 The only thing that the former communist henchmen
could not agree upon was the territorial status of an independent
Croatia. Milošević was willing to grant Zagreb the right to secede,
but insisted that the Serb-dominated areas inside Croatia be granted
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a similar right. Serbian and Croatian delegations conducted three
secret sessions during April 1991 in a vain attempt to resolve these
differences.45
As for the international community, on the rare occasions when it
turned its attention to the Yugoslav crisis it failed to speak with one
voice. The United States and the European Community (EC) publicly
reiterated support for Yugoslav unity, and the EC offered support for
economic reform and promised fast track accession for a reformed
federation committed to maintain unity, but the message was neither
compelling nor consistent. During March 1991 the United States
went on record in opposition to secession and insisted that border
alterations should only result from “peaceful consensual means.” 46
Unfortunately, preoccupied with the conduct and aftermath of the
Gulf War and the impending dissolution of the USSR, and convinced
that vital interests were not really at stake, Washington did little to
give its admonitions the sense of urgency that was required. Several
European states (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Hungary, and the
Holy See among others) openly promoted secession, sometimes
pledging diplomatic support and arranging for illegal arms transfers
to prepare the way for independence. The “ambiguity and mixed
messages” emanating from international actors did nothing to
constrain the self-destructive egoism of Yugoslavia’s ethnocrats, or
to block a resort to arms.47
The way for Yugoslavia’s anarchic collapse was prepared by a
crisis of federal institutions, the nationalist dérive in key republics,
and tacit support for a policy of secession by influential international
actors. Collapse was precipitated by a sequence of local clashes that
provided a spur to the militarization of the contending republics.
Between May and September 1990 the Serb revolt in Krajina
established the precedent of de facto armed secession as a response to
ethnic mobilization, with local militia eventually reconstituted as the
SAOK-Territorial Defense Forces. In November 1990 Slovenia and
Croatia assumed control over the remnants (after federal efforts to
confiscate weapons stores in the spring of the year) of their republican
Territorial Defense Forces, and escalated illegal arms transfers
in order to build up combat readiness. In February 1991 the JNA
received an order from the Federal Presidency to disarm militias, but
made do with an ineffective compromise that failed to block Slovene
arms transfers and allowed Croatia to continue a force build up under
its special police battalions and reconstituted National Guard Corps
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(Zbor narodne garde). March 1991 also saw the deployment of JNA
forces in Belgrade to repress student led demonstrations protesting
against the policies of the Milošević regime — the first of many cases
where popular resistance to ethno-national mobilization would be
beaten down by force. Neglected by the international community,
without a ruling party, without a functioning executive, and with an
army in crisis incapable of responding to the defiant militarization
of secessionist republics, Yugoslavia was moving closer to Thomas
Hobbes’ depiction of anarchy, “the state of warre, and such a warre
as of every man against every manne.”48
The war of all against all began in April 1990 as the Krajina Serbs
took to constructing barricades to cut off access to Serb majority areas
or areas with significant Serb populations, and initiated a campaign
of harassment against Croat residents in the regions under their
control. The Serb revolt, romanticized as the balvan revolucjia (Tree
Trunk Revolution, after the tree limbs used to construct barricades),
was in part a spontaneous reaction to the provocations of the
Tudjman regime. It had an anachronistic and folkloric character,
led by local militias dressed in patriotic uniforms that evoked
Chetnik resistance during World War II. From the outset, however,
it was supported and manipulated by Belgrade in order to forward
an agenda for the extension of Serb-controlled territories outside
of Serbia proper. In the first months of the rebellion organized
resistance was concentrated within six communes in the vicinity of
Knin populated by consistent Serb majorities. In the months to come
it would expand, across southern Croatia through Kordun, Banija,
and Posavina, where Serb and Croat populations were in something
closer to a balance, and into the plains of Slavonia and Baranja on
the Hungarian border, where the Serbs were a clear minority. The
essence of the revolt was the attempt to assert control over terrain,
affected by the construction of roadblocks and barriers, defiance of
local authorities, or the dynamiting of symbols of sovereignty as
well as the homes of undesired “outsiders.”
A major escalation began in February 1991 when Serb militia
attempted to broaden their area of control by seizing a police station
and municipal building in the small town of Pakrac in western
Slavonia. This action was followed in late March by an attempt to
take control of the Plitvice national park complex, after the HDZ
had established a new police station with an all-Croatian staff in
the local town of Titova Korenica, provoking a firefight with the
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Croatian National Guard that resulted in the first combat fatalities of
Yugoslavia’s ethnic wars. The victims were Josip Jović, a 20-year old
Croatian policeman, and Rajko Vukadinović, a Serb butcher from
Titova Korencia who had joined the local militia — the first of tens of
thousands of normal citizens to be swept away in the battles to come.
The Krajina Serbs were not always the initiators in these encounters.
Extremists within the HDZ sought out confrontations as a means to
up the ante and make secession inevitable. In April, future Croatian
defense minister Gojko Šušak organized and participated in an
attack on the ethnically mixed but Serb controlled Slavonian village
of Borovo Selo, firing three shoulder-launched Armbrust missiles
into the town in an attempt to fan the flames of war.49 On May 1
a spontaneous effort by Croat policemen, undertaken during the
festivities attending a national holiday, to replace the Yugoslav flag
on display at the town hall with the šahovnica resulted in a firefight
wounding two, and on the next day a busload of Croatian policemen
seeking to reassert control ran headlong into an ambush, leaving 15
dead (12 Croats and 3 Serbs) and over 20 wounded. The mutilation
of the bodies of the Croat victims in a manner evocative of the
atrocities of World War II (ears and eyes cut out) made the incident
particularly provocative. In each case a stand off between local forces
was broken by the intervention of the JNA, which prevented Croatia
from reasserting control over disputed terrain by inter-positioning
forces, including heavy artillery, between the belligerents — a
pattern that would repeat itself frequently in the months to come.
The Yugoslav conflict had begun as a war of villages, and more
than 400 people would lose their lives in local incidents prior to the
outbreak of full-scale combat operations.
In this environment, pushed forward by Ljubljana’s inflexible
timetable, and indifferent to the implications of their actions for
the peoples of Yugoslavia as a whole, on 24 July 1991 Zagreb and
Slovenia announced their “disassociation” (razdruživanje) from
the Yugoslav federation.50 The term disassociation was preferred
to secession in order to make the point that from its origins the
Yugoslavia federation had been a voluntary union of peoples, but
the harshness and irrevocability of the gesture was hardly disguised.
On June 21, an 11th-hour visit to Belgrade by U.S. Secretary of State
James Baker, including eleven meetings with the entire spectrum
of Yugoslav leaders conducted in the space of a single day, sought
to ward off the fatal step. But Baker had arrived too late, and with
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too little of substance to offer, to make a difference. With Milošević
committed to an agenda for breaking the federation, nationalist
elites in the secessionist republics pressing for independence, and
the international community unwilling to weigh in, the break up of
Yugoslavia, and the tragic consequences that would come in its train,
although in principle avoidable, had become inevitable. For many
of the same reasons, a serious effort to guarantee that a process of
disassociation would go forward peacefully was never undertaken.
With the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia’s war of
villages would become a war of states.
The Slovene Drôle de Guerre.
Belgrade reacted to the Slovenian declaration of disassociation
and seizure of border crossings (including the erection of barriers
between Slovenia and Croatia) with what seems to have been
intended as a symbolic show of force. On June 26-27, 1991, units of
the Federal Army deployed from posts within Slovenia to reassert
control over the state border. They were in fact walking into a trap.
Aided by sympathizers inside the federal decision making
structure, Slovene leaders were fully aware of the Federal Army’s
contingency plans. Their strategy aimed to provoke a military
response in the conviction that it could be neutralized, and that
public reactions to the repression launched by federal forces would
reinforce the legitimacy of a declaration of independence. In this
regard, the seizure of border posts and dismantling of symbolic
representations of Yugoslav sovereignty were considered to be vital-Slovenian Defense Minister Janez Janša called it a “key step across
the Rubicon.”51 Between May 1990 and July 1991, Janša had built
up an independently commanded national militia with over 30,000
effectives.52 The prospect of standing up to a limited JNA disciplinary
action with these forces in hand was good. Moreover, Ljubljana was
being assured by friends inside the EC that in the event of a military
confrontation, European intervention in support of separation
would result.53 This scenario played out without a hitch.
First attempts to reassert control of the state border using units
drawn from JNA posts within Slovenia were thwarted by carefully
planned resistance. On June 27 federal forces began to move toward
contested border crossings, but immediately encountered blocking
positions and harassing attacks. When helicopters operating from
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the military airport at Cerklje were put in service to ferry federal
forces to border posts, the Slovenes upped the ante by shooting
down two unarmed JNA Gazelle helicopters over Ljubljana, the first
of which had a Slovene pilot and carried a shipment of bread for
beleaguered JNA barracks. James Gow and Cathie Carmichael assert
that the incident “defined the whole conflict,” timed as it was at the
moment when “images of destroyed helicopters could be beamed
across Europe in main evening news broadcasts.”54 Ljubljana’s
integrated military-media strategy, typical of modern war, was a
striking success. Despite initial setbacks, by the evening of June
27 federal forces, backed up by a small number of tanks supported
by tactical aviation, succeeded in regaining control of the disputed
border crossings, but also provided the international media with
images that could be pressed into the familiar mold of communist
brute force crushing gallant national resistance.55
By June 28, fighting had escalated across the republic, as battles
for border posts swayed to and fro, and Slovene defense forces
challenged federal units moving onto their territory and surrounded
and besieged federal garrisons. The JNA reacted with ineffective air
strikes. In the critical first days of the operation, the large majority
of the more than 25,000 federal soldiers deployed in the republic
remained on their posts, surrounded and held under fire by the
Slovene National Guard. From June 29 onward, ceasefire negotiations
slowed the momentum of conflict, but did little to aid federal forces
cut off from their command structure, lacking access to supplies,
and without any apparent game plan for proceeding once control
of state border crossings was reestablished. In the entire course of
the conflict, the JNA did not deploy more than 3,000 soldiers into
combat, against a Slovene militia force that outnumbered them ten
to one.
The measures undertaken by the JNA were well within the
prerogatives of a sovereign state. In the absence of Mesić, who
had not been able to assume the chair of the Federal Presidency
due to the opposition of the Serb bloc, responsibility devolved
upon federal Prime Minister Marković, who formally approved
a military incursion. Marković would subsequently backtrack,
arguing that the extent of military actions exceeded his instructions,
but it should be obvious that, in seeking to counter secession and
secure control of the state border, federal armed forces were acting
within their mandate. What proved decisive was the refusal of
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Yugoslav political authorities, true to the spirit of Milošević’s
January bargain with Kučan, to make preservation of Yugoslavia’s
integrity a priority. The JNA had a contingency plan to mobilize
its entire Fifth Military District against the Slovenes, a force that
Ljubljana would have been unable to resist.56 But the rump Federal
Presidency, dominated by the Milošević faction, refused to sanction
the army’s plea for action.57 Milošević himself instructed Yugoslav
Defense Minister Veljiko Kadijević on June 27 that the army’s job
was not to defend the Yugoslav border, but rather “the borders of
a future state.”58 By July 2, when Slovene attacks against contested
border posts resumed in force, most mobile JNA units had already
initiated a process of withdrawal, under fire, from Slovene territory.
Abandoned, the defenders of most of the contested border posts
negotiated surrenders. Belgrade’s strong man had kept his faith
with the Slovenes, though to no good end. Simultaneously, Croatia’s
Tudjman refused to honor an agreement to aid Slovenia in the event
that it should come under attack on the pretext, in the event quite
accurate, that Croatia was not prepared. The bizarre patterns of
betrayal that would become characteristic of the Yugoslav conflict
were already being manifested.
The confused fighting in Slovenia was cut short by international
mediation, inspired by a great deal of sympathy for the Slovene
national cause. The last combat operations, ambushes carried out
by Slovene forces against JNA units attempting to withdraw, were
conducted on July 4. Slovenia’s war of national liberation was
over in the space of 10 days. It took the modest toll, according to
official statistics, of thirteen Slovenes killed (eight military or police
and five civilians), eight international civilians (truck drivers who
refused to abandon their vehicles which had been commandeered
by the Slovenes to serve as barricades, and which were subsequently
attacked by Yugoslav aviation), and 44 JNA killed and 187 wounded.59
Over 1,700 JNA soldiers were also taken prisoner. The JNA victims
were mostly teenage conscripts killed in ambushes, who probably
never understood what it was that they had been asked to die for.
A rapid ceasefire was possible because neither party to the conflict
(Ljubljana and the Serb bloc that controlled the policies of the federal
government) really objected to the facts on the ground that Slovene
defiance had created.
The shock of armed conflict in Slovenia was particularly acute
for neighboring states, and both Italy and Austria immediately
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appealed for explanations through the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).60 Simultaneously, and in line with its
larger strategy of provoking intervention, the Slovenian government
requested diplomatic mediation on the part of the EC and CSCE.
The request was picked up by the European Council, in the midst of
a summit in Luxembourg as the crisis unfolded. The Council, with
CSCE approval, dispatched the EC’s “Troika” of foreign ministers
(the foreign ministers of the states holding the past, present,
and future presidency of the European Council), at the moment
composed of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy, as mediators.
The Troika arrived in Belgrade within days of the outbreak of
hostilities, and proceeded to craft a ceasefire agreement that was
nailed down, with the endorsement of all six Yugoslav republics and
the impotent Yugoslav Federal Presidency, on the Adriatic island of
Brioni on July 7.61
The Brioni agreement granted Slovenia control over its border
crossings and customs revenues — the symbolic issue over which
the conflict had technically been waged. JNA units in Slovenia
and Croatia were required to withdraw into their garrisons, and
Yugoslavia was threatened by EC sanctions should hostilities be
resumed. In exchange, the Slovenian blockade of federal army bases
was to be lifted, Slovenian territorial defense forces deactivated, and
captured JNA equipment returned (a pledge that the Slovenes never
honored). Both of the separatist republics were required to suspend
their declarations of disassociation for 3 months and to accept the
presence on their territory of an unarmed international observer
mission organized by the EC on behalf of the CSCE. The authority
of the Yugoslav Federal Presidency was reaffirmed, and on July 1
Mesić was finally confirmed as acting president.62 In the midst of
the negotiations the flamboyant Italian Foreign Minister Gianni
De Michaelis spoke incautiously of the EC’s success in “blocking
the spiral of conflict.”63 Regretfully, the European reaction that
De Michaelis encouraged, which as promised awarded Slovenia’s
provocations by underwriting its independence, ensured that the
spiral of conflict would continue to widen.
Although the EC had to threaten Ljubljana with economic penalties
in order to win its approval, the Brioni agreement granted Slovenia
an essential element of sovereignty by awarding it control of state
borders and the right to collect customs revenues. It neutralized the
JNA, which was the only force capable of reversing a declaration of
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independence, by confining it to garrison under threat of sanctions.
Brioni held the door open for a reconfirmation of disassociation after
a brief 3-month interval, and both Slovenia and Croatia punctually
affirmed their original declarations on October 8. Bent to the will
of Milošević, with Mesić casting the only opposing vote out of fear
of the consequences for Croatia, on July 18 the Yugoslav Federal
Presidency agreed to withdraw its military forces from the republic,
a process that was concluded by October 26. At this point Slovenia
had become an independent state in all but name.
These events established a destructive precedent. Yugoslavia
had been shattered without any arrangements in place for resolving
the manifold issues that its disappearance as a unified state was
bound to create. The instrumentality of violence as a means to
affect secession was confirmed. An attempt to shape international
attitudes toward the conflict by using stereotypes to manipulate
the media proved remarkably successful. The conniving satraps
that had inherited power in the Yugoslav republics were embraced
as international statesmen and essential interlocutors. A false
distinction between the “good Europeans and democrats” of
predominantly Catholic Slovenia and the “evil Byzantines and
communists” of predominately Orthodox Serbia was adopted as
an organizing premise for approaching Balkan affairs. Not least,
the ability of secessionist forces to use an appeal to the international
community as a mechanism for neutralizing the superior military
forces of their adversaries was clearly demonstrated. Given its
high degree of ethnic homogeneity, relative prosperity, and more
developed civil society, Slovenia was able to break free from the
Yugoslav federation with a minimum of domestic trauma.64 The
same would not be the case when the ethnically more complex,
economically more troubled, and politically less mature populations
of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina set out to follow the Slovene
example.
Za Dom Spremni: The War in Croatia.
The contract between Milošević and Kučan that had allowed
Slovenia’s secession to succeed could not be reproduced in the case
of Croatia. According to Milošević’s agenda, the geographically
concentrated Serb population inside Croatia had a right to secession
in order to retain its affiliation with the remainder of Yugoslavia. “I
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am in contact with our brothers in Knin and Bosnia,” he articulated
in the programmatic statement of March 16, “and they are under
enormous pressure. We will not at any price abandon our formula--a
popular referendum and application of the right of self-determination.
This is the only solution, the alternative is violence.”65 According to
the logic of Tudjman’s HDZ, defined within the tradition of Croatian
state rights, the Croatian national sanctuary was one and indivisible.
These were irreconcilable positions, and in the end they would be
regulated by force. In contrast to the brief armed confrontation in
Slovenia, where a resort to violence was limited by governments that
remained in contact and shared a mutual understanding about the
preferred outcome, fighting in Croatia expanded from the ground
up, driven forward by heightened passions and ill-controlled
paramilitary factions. The actions of Martić’s militia, the Martićevci,
(which together with other territorial defense forces would be
redesignated at the Serb Army of the Krajina [Srpska Vojska Krajine]
on March 19, 1992), aided by volunteer paramilitary units arrived
from Serbia proper, included systematic efforts to conquer territory
by driving out the indigenous Croat population, a process of čišćenje
terena (“purging of the terrain,” later known as ethnic cleansing)
that would soon become sadly familiar. Croatian forces responded
in kind, terrorizing the Serb minority, forcing thousands from their
homes as refugees or displaced persons, and eventually presiding
over massacres. Vile hate propaganda using the centrally controlled
mass medias of the communist era dredged up the worst atrocities of
the Second World War and created an atmosphere of paranoia that
was grist to the mill of extremists.66
The area controlled by the Krajina Serbs expanded rapidly into
the summer of 1991. The ability of Serb militias to seize and hold
territory was reinforced by the interventions of the JNA, aimed
in principle at imposing an end to hostilities by inter-positioning
between warring factions, but objectively supportive of the facts on
the ground created by local aggression. Despite the progressive loss
of control over strategically vital regions, Tudjman warded off calls
originally posed by Defense Minister Martin Špegelj (who resigned
at the end of June 1991 in protest against Zagreb’s refusal to move
against federal garrisons with the JNA engaged in Slovenia), and by
other hardliners in his entourage, for an assault on the JNA and all
out war. Concerned about Croatian unpreparedness, and convinced
that international sympathy was a key to success, he continued to
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hope that the expanding Croatian National Guard could contain
the Serb insurgency without resort to an attack upon federal forces.
In the spring of 1991 Croatia briefly attempted a blockade of JNA
garrisons in protest against the army’s pro-Serb bias, but in May the
Yugoslav Federal Presidency condemned and reversed the initiative.
Following the check in Slovenia during July 1991, however, columns
of JNA forces moved directly from the breakaway republic into
threatening positions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Defense
Minister Špegelj’s eventual replacement by the hardline former
émigré and leader of the “Herzegovinian faction” in Tudjman’s
entourage Gojko Šušak did nothing to reinforce negotiated options.
In August, confronting territorial losses and a swelling casualty
count, Zagreb presented the JNA with an ultimatum--either disarm
the Serb militias in Croatia immediately or face attack as an army of
occupation. With international assistance from Germany, Hungary,
and other sources, efforts to transform the Croatian National
Guard Corps and special units of the Ministry of the Interior into a
national army were accelerated, and on September 14 a campaign
of encirclement, including blockage of food and water supply,
was initiated against over 100 federal army garrisons on Croatian
territory. The action did not roll back the gains of the Krajina
Serbs, but it secured Croatia certain advantages, including a stock
of confiscated arms and valuable combat experience. The Central
Intelligence Agency’s military history of the conflict describes
the “battle of the barracks” as “one of the decisive actions of the
Croatian war.”67 The blockade also sparked fighting along a broad
front stretching the length of Croatia from the Adriatic port of
Dubrovnik in southern Dalmatia to Vukovar on the Danube in
the heart of Slavonia, as the JNA, supported by Serb paramilitary
units, instituted a plan to relieve the barracks by defeating Croatia
in detail. Zagreb responded in late September by creating a general
staff to control combat operations, under the command of former
Yugoslav Air Force General Anton Tus. The fighting in Croatia had
escalated in a matter of months from small-scale encounters between
local militias to a full-scale war.
The role of the JNA in the genesis of the Yugoslav conflict
remains contested. Analysts sympathetic to Slovene and Croatian
national aspirations, or committed to a pattern of explanation
that identifies the unique source of the Yugoslav problem as
Milošević’s agenda to construct a greater Serbia, tend to portray
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the army as a consistent source of support for Serb imperialism.68
These arguments cannot be dismissed out of hand. The Milošević
regime encouraged Serb separatist movements in both Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Collusion with the federal army was critical
to the ability of local militias to arm and prepare for battle, and the
JNA made no effort to restrain the depredations of paramilitary
forces such as those sponsored by the colorful mercenary from
the Serb Australian Diaspora “Kapetan Dragan” in Krajina, or the
“Chetniks” and “White Eagles” of the ultra-nationalist leader of the
Serbian Radical Party Vojislav Šešelj and “Tigers” of the gangster
warlord Željko Ražnatović (Arkan) in Slavonia.69 Unlike the case in
Slovenia, Milošević pushed the JNA into action in Croatia without
a mandate from Yugoslav federal instances, and used it under the
guise of peacekeeping to reinforce the autonomy of Serb controlled
regions.70
It is nonetheless incorrect to conflate the JNA leadership of
the spring of 1991 with what it would be become 1 year later,
after a series of purges, including the ouster of 170 generals, had
transformed it, root and branch, into a Serbian national force.
The high command at the outset of the conflict was what several
generations of indoctrination in Titoist Yugoslavia had prepared it
to be, a professionally competent and ethnically diverse group of
officers committed to the preservation of the Yugoslav idea. Tito had
repeatedly referred to the Yugoslav armed forces as the ultimate
guarantor of national unity, and in the confused circumstances of
1990-91 the JNA would have been acting within its prerogative had
it seized the initiative, declared a state of emergency as a pretext for
dismissing nationalist leaders in Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Belgrade,
and imposed federal elections and association between republics
on a new foundation.71 Pretexts for intervention were not lacking.
On January 25, 1991, a secretly filmed video was shown on national
television documenting the illegal arming of Croatian paramilitaries
in Slavonia. The video featured defense minister Špegelj, his back
to a hidden camera, instructing fellow officers on techniques for
murdering their Serb colleagues in the context of a national rising.
The “Špegelj Affair” created a sensation, but a majority of the Federal
Presidency refused to sanction a military response, and the army
balked at acting without a political mandate.72 Following the May
6, 1991, demonstrations protesting efforts to disarm the Croatian
territorial militia outside the Yugoslav naval headquarters in Split,
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during which a young Macedonian conscript was killed, Yugoslav
Defense Minister Kadijević spoke publicly of a “state of civil war,”
but his rhetoric was not backed up by action.73 The decision by
Milošević’s Serb bloc to veto the accession of Mesić as chair of the
Federal Presidency in May 1991 has also been represented as a
possible occasion for the declaration of a state of emergency and
military crackdown, which was not exploited for lack of political
support.74
The refusal of federal instances to use decisive force to defend
Yugoslavia’s integrity made possible the anarchic breakdown that
followed. Why did the JNA not intervene in defense of the Yugoslav
idea? Part of the answer is pure confusion. By the spring of 1991, with
the federation in the first stage of its death agony, a military command
whose entire worldview had been shaped inside the federal context
was challenged to find fixed points of orientation. Divided council
also played a role--as events progressed the JNA high command was
increasingly split between senior leaders with a Yugoslav orientation
and ambitious young officers, such as Colonel Ratko Mladić, Chief
of Staff of the JNA’s 9th (Knin) Corps during 1990, affiliated with
a Serb nationalist agenda. Kadijević made several visits to Moscow
in the first months of 1991 that are sometimes represented as
attempts to plot a military putsch with Soviet support. Whether
or not this was the case, any hopes for help from Soviet hardliners
were removed after the failure of the abortive August 1991 coup in
Moscow. Declining capacity played a potentially decisive role. Like
all federal institutions, the JNA had by 1991 entered into a phase of
dissolution, revealed by inadequate responses to mobilization, poor
discipline, and friction within the leadership. International pressure
may also have contributed. On January 17, U.S. Ambassador
William Zimmermann instructed Milošević confidant Jović that
although America supported Yugoslav unity, it would not tolerate
the use of force by the federal army in Slovenia and Croatia.75 The
EC offered the same contradictory council--simultaneous opposition
to secession and to the only effective means to combat secession--in
June 1991 on the eve of the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of
disassociation.76
The key factor, however, was probably the JNA’s essential
character, not only as a Yugoslav but also as a communist
military organization. Commanders weaned on a doctrine of
strict subordination to party leadership, and not willing to desert
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to secessionist national guards, could only look at Belgrade as
the embodiment of a national command authority. At the critical
juncture, between January and August 1991, Milošević was able
to establish credibility with some leadership figures as the only
Yugoslav politician rhetorically committed to preserving national
unity, and the privileges of the old Titoist establishment, by opposing
“fascist” national movements and liberal agitation in general.77 The
deployment of JNA tanks on the streets of Belgrade in March 1991 to
intimidate anti-Milošević demonstrators was telling in this regard.
This misreading of circumstances made the JNA the unwitting agent
of a political project that was not its own, but only briefly. Yugoslav
army officers suffered high casualties in the fighting in Croatia
during 1991. In January 1992, following the downing by Yugoslav
aviation of a UN observer mission helicopter in which four Italian
and one French crew members were killed, Kadijević tendered his
resignation, and during the next 2 months, 59 JNA generals were
cashiered. In April 1992, simultaneous with the declaration of a
new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the successor state of the
Titoist federation, the JNA, which had already surrendered most
of its communist symbols and heritage, was formally renamed
the Yugoslav Armed Forces (Vojska Jugoslavije — VJ). By May, the
officer corps had been purged of its remaining cadre of Yugoslav
orientation, meaningful continuity with the JNA was broken, and
the army that traced its origins to Tito’s partisans, and that had
been committed throughout its history to the ethic of Brotherhood
and Unity, was transformed into an instrument for the hegemonic
policies of Belgrade.78
Kadijević has argued that the original intent of the forces
under his command in Croatia was to isolate the republic, defeat
secessionist forces in detail, move against Zagreb, and restore the
federation’s territorial integrity.79 These plans were abandoned due
to the ongoing disintegration of the national armed forces (draft
resistance, desertions, and operational shortcomings all playing
a role), the refusal of Belgrade to act upon Kadijević’s call for
general mobilization, unexpectedly stiff Croatian resistance, and the
disguised war aims of the Milošević clique. Through August and
early September the JNA continued to provide de facto support to
Croatia’s Serb militia in its effort to seize territory and force out the
Croat population. From mid-September onward essential military
tasks included the extraction of personnel and heavy weapons from
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encircled garrisons and the attempt to carve a geographically unified
Serb area from the body of Croatia. These campaigns possessed a
rough strategic logic focused on securing control of areas with
significant Serb populations and regions allowing access to critical
choke points and transportation corridors. Key targets included
eastern and western Slavonia with their sizable Serb minorities and
openings onto the Danube, access to the Sava River paralleling the
now ironically named “Brotherhood and Unity” highway linking
Zagreb and Belgrade, and the Dalmatian littoral, including Zadar
and Split as well as the Prevlaka Peninsula south of the port of
Dubrovnik guarding the Serb outlet to the sea on the Gulf of Kotor in
Montenegro. Such regions were to be the bastions of what Kadijević
would call “a new Yugoslavia made up of the peoples who desired
to live together inside it,” an appropriate description of the muchreferenced rump Yugoslavia (krnja Jugoslavija) already rejected as
unacceptable by Sarajevo and Skopje.80
Croatian defense forces included the emerging national army
(National Guard Corps and Interior Ministry units) as well as
volunteer militia formations such as the ultra-nationalist Croatian
Defense Forces (Hrvatske Odbrambene Snage — HOS) led by
Dobroslav Paraga, the military wing of a reconstituted Croatian
Party of Right in the Ustaša tradition, with its Sieg Heil salute and
uniforms emblazoned with the slogan “Za Dom Spremni” (Ready
for the Homeland). By January 1992 the emerging Croatian Army
(Hrvatska Vojska-HV) numbered over 200,000, assisted by about
40,000 Interior Ministry and police forces, but was still basically a
light infantry force, with a rudimentary organization and without
access to significant heavy weaponry.81 The HV and associated
militia were able to slow down the advance of the federals and
extract a high price in casualties, but not to reverse the momentum
of a better-equipped and trained rival. By November 1991 federal
forces had established a naval blockade of Croatian ports, cleared
the majority of encircled garrisons, seized the Dalmatian hinterland
around Dubrovnik, and battled their way into Slavonia after ending
the siege of the Danubian town of Vukovar (which lasted from
August 26 through November 19) by reducing most of the baroque
city center to rubble with a protracted air, naval, and artillery
barrage.
In retrospect the battle of Vukovar appears to have been the
critical turning point of the campaign. The JNA’s original intention,
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after relieving the local barracks from encirclement, was to bypass
the city and move on toward Zagreb. Dogged resistance soon made
the city itself a symbol of Croat resolve, however, that in the opinion
of the JNA leadership had to be reduced at all costs. The costs
would be considerable. The Croat General Mile Dedaković (known
as “Hawk”) and his Chief of Staff Branko Borković had only about
2,500 lightly armed fighters on hand to defend the city against JNA
forces numbering in the tens of thousands, supported by armor,
heavy artillery, and tactical aviation. They used their resources
efficiently to construct an integrated defense system, including the
mining of approach corridors, extensive use of roving anti-tank
squads, well positioned sniper fire, heavily fortified defensive strong
points in critical sectors, and systematic counterattacks.82 The JNA’s
original attempts to push into this densely defended urban knot with
armored spearheads were an abject failure. Under the new command
of General Života Panić from late September onward, tactics were
adjusted to favor infantry led assaults supported by armor and
artillery and mortar fire, and advances were coordinated on multiple
lines of assault. These procedures finally allowed the Serbs to fight
their way into the ruined city center by mid-November, where illdisciplined units once again did their best to discredit their cause
by perpetrating massacres against cowed residents as they emerged
from hiding. Serb forces had taken Vukovar, but the protracted
campaign had completely disrupted the JNA’s time table for winning
the war, shattered whatever morale remained after the frustration in
Slovenia, and allowed Zagreb to economize forces for deployment in
other sectors. Upon the fall of the city Tudjman had Dedaković and
Borković arrested, after they had complained publicly about being
left in the lurch by the national command authority.83 Their exploits
in Vukovar were nonetheless absolutely critical to Croatia’s ability
to survive the JNA’s onslaught in the first months of all out war.
Even with its many operational deficiencies and increasingly
sharp manpower shortages, after the fall of Vukovar the JNA was
in a position to attempt a two-pronged advance on the Croatian
capital, launched from Vukovar through Osijek along the lines of
the Drava and Sava Rivers.84 Revealingly, no such attempt was made
— Milošević’s goal was not to reunite Yugoslavia by force, but to
secure control of areas with significant Serb populations and bind
them together within defensible confines. By linking up with the
Serb rebellion inside Croatia federal forces had come to the rescue
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of the Republic of Serb Krajina, established geographical continuity
between the Serb controlled areas inside Croatia and Serbia proper,
and opened corridors of access to the Adriatic and the Danube. Not
least, they had positioned themselves for the next major confrontation
to spin off from the collapse of Yugoslavia — a battle for control of
the Serb-dominated areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From November
onward, the first priority was to reinforce these gains.
During the autumn of 1991, media accounts of the war began
to be accompanied by maps of Croatia indicating the large Serb
occupied regions that would eventually include over one-third of
the national territory. Depicted graphically, the advances of the Serb
party appeared decisive, but they were nothing of the sort. Vukovar
may not have earned the reputation of the “Croatian Stalingrad,”
but its poorly armed defenders had stopped what had once been
Europe’s fourth largest army in its tracks for more than a month. By
the time that the city had been reduced on November 17, Zagreb was
probably beyond reach even had the Serbs aspired to take it — the
JNA offensive that defined the war’s first months culminated in
Slavonia. Efforts by the JNA’s 5th (Banja Luka) Corps to move north
from the Sava toward Virovitica on the Hungarian border in order
to secure control of both western and eastern Slavonia was checked
by Croatian resistance at the town of Pakrac. The Krajina Serbs
had secured control of significant territories, and expelled a large
part of the indigenous Croat population, but their positions were
not invulnerable. The JNA’s 9th (Knin) Corps, with Ratko Mladić
as Chief of Staff, was more successful in maneuvering against
Zadar and Šibenik on the Adriatic coast and severing north-south
communication by destroying the Maslenica bridge and piercing
coastal highways. By way of contrast, the JNA’s offensive against
Dubrovnik, launched from neighboring Montenegro in early October,
became a public relations fiasco, as ill-disciplined Montenegrin
reservists and militia units wrecked havoc in the Konavle region
and Croatia propagandized the brutality of artillery strikes against
the splendid renaissance city for all it was worth. In the end Serb
forces chose not to press home an attack, and quietly marched off
toward the Bosnian front after an agreement to demilitarize the
Prevlaka peninsula with UN monitoring was concluded in October
1992, with nothing to show for their adventures but loss of face. The
destruction of Vukovar was a much more terrible event, but the
impact of the indecisive siege of Dubrovnik was in some ways of
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greater significance. With its desultory shelling of the new port area
from the hills above the “Pearl of the Adriatic” Serbia had lost the
battle for world opinion in the unfolding Yugoslav drama, and lost
it irrevocably.85
By the end of November a front of sorts had stabilized running
along the boundaries of Serb-controlled areas in Slavonia, through
the Kordun and Banija regions south of Zagreb, and into the Serbpopulated Adriatic hinterland in Lika. Croatia had defended its
independence, but at a high price. Vital territories stood outside
of Zagreb’s control, approximately half of the country’s industrial
infrastructure had been incapacitated or destroyed, and interdiction
of the Zagreb-Split rail line running through Knin, and of transport
along the Adriatic littoral, cut the country in two. The interdiction of
the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, which Serb forces pierced at Okučani
in late August, blocked movement along a vital European transport
corridor. Croatian casualties, later estimated by President Tudjman
as over 10,000 killed and nearly 40,000 wounded, were high, and
one may presume, lacking reliable data, that Serb casualties were
comparable.86 Federal forces had accomplished their minimal
operational objectives, but to no good purpose. No government in
Zagreb would ever accept the loss of such vital national territories.87
By December weakened and demoralized federal forces were in
no condition to win the war decisively, as Kadijević had originally
hoped would be the case, by developing their offensive toward
Zagreb. Croatian defense forces could likewise not hope to reverse
losses by advancing into areas controlled by Serb militias backed up
by the firepower of the JNA. A military stalemate had been reached,
which finally provided a foundation for a lasting ceasefire.
The Hour of Europe.
The fighting in Croatia unfolded parallel to an ambitious, ECsponsored conflict management initiative. The failure of that initiative
cast discredit upon European aspirations to create a common foreign
and security policy, but it should be noted that the issues at stake
were not all that easy to sort out. Slovenia and Croatia justified their
separation from Yugoslavia on the basis of the principle of selfdetermination. Viewed from a less sympathetic perspective, their
actions amounted to little more than unilateral armed secession.
Belgrade’s desire to be acknowledged as the successor of the
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former Yugoslav federation was not respected by the international
community, but the rise of Serbian nationalism behind Milošević had
critically weakened if not altogether discredited the Yugoslav idea,
and Belgrade had repeatedly refused proposals for restructuring
the federation on a more decentralized model. Predominantly Serb
regions of Croatia (and later Bosnia-Herzegovina) insisted upon a
right of self-determination, while the Serbia to which they desired
to adhere refused any hint of self-determination to its Albanian
minority in Kosovo. In initiating its mediation effort, the EC had no
ground rules for working through these issues. It strode forward
to shoulder the burden of conflict management nonetheless. In the
wake of the Gulf War where Europe’s role as crisis manager had
been embarrassingly modest, and with the Soviet Union in a process
of dissolution, the United States calling for Europe to take the lead in
addressing what was perceived as essentially a European problem,
and the EC’s Maastricht summit on the calendar for December, the
Yugoslav crisis was widely represented as “a challenge wherein
the new political ambitions of the [European] Community would
be submitted to a real-life test.”88 In the oft-quoted, and no doubt
oft-regretted words of Luxembourg Foreign Minister and EC official
Jacques Poos, the “hour of Europe” had struck.89
During July and August, EC mediators, represented by a new
troika of foreign ministers from Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
Portugal, sought to pursue negotiations through the intermediary
of the rump Yugoslav Federal Presidency.90 On August 27,
the EC ministers announced the convening of an international
peace conference on Yugoslavia, conducted at The Hague from
September 7 through December 12 under the direction of Lord Peter
Carrington. Carrington’s goal was to restructure Yugoslavia as a
loose confederation of sovereign states, and his practical proposals
resembled the models for confederation put forward by Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia during the agony of
the federation in 1990, with the addition of special guarantees for
minority communities in regions where they constituted a majority
of the local population (such as the Serb regions inside Croatia).
Detailed arrangements would be worked out by three working
groups convened at The Hague to discuss future constitutional
arrangements, minority rights, and economic relations within the
Yugoslav space, assisted by an arbitration committee directed by the
respected French jurist Robert Badinter.91 This proposal, the most
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reasonable of all the peace projects to emerge in the decade-long
course of the Yugoslav conflict, was a nonstarter for all belligerents,
who maintained a commitment to maximal goals and had in effect
only begun to fight. Failure to achieve a negotiated arrangement
along the lines suggested by the Carrington Plan before the conflict
escalated beyond all control was, in the words of Florence Hartman,
a “fatal error.”92 Military advantage made Belgrade especially
reticent to offer concessions. In August, the Serb side opposed the
extension to Croatia of the European observer mission already
present in Slovenia. In early September it relented, but for unarmed
civilian observers only. In mid-September Milošević rejected a
proposal from Dutch Foreign Minister van der Brock calling for
the interpositioning of peacekeeping forces between the warring
factions. And on October 18 Serbia rejected an EC package balancing
a commitment to the integrity of internal borders with respect for
a right of self-determination including the creation of autonomous
regions for minorities, on the specious grounds that it implied the
end of the Yugoslav federation.93
Between July and December the EC brokered no less than
fourteen ceasefire agreements, all of which were violated virtually
before the ink was dry. As the level of violence intensified during
September and October, frustration over Europe’s inability to
reverse the momentum of war grew greater. Le Monde described
Europe’s powerlessness as “pathetic,” and the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung concluded that Europe’s “dress rehearsal for a common
foreign policy” had become “a debacle.”94 Such conclusions were
probably unfair. The lack of will to peace among the parties to
conflict virtually ensured that any mediation effort, at this stage,
would be an exercise in futility. But it remained the case that Europe
was badly divided. Among the major powers, Germany, supported
by Belgium, Denmark, and Austria, took a strong anti-Serb line and
insisted on the need to offer full diplomatic recognition to Slovenia
and Croatia in order to establish faits accomplis that Belgrade could
not hope to reverse. The Holy See also lent moral support to the
cause of independence for predominantly Catholic Slovenia and
Croatia.95 Great Britain, France, and Spain, fearful of the possible
impact of carte blanche support for a policy of secession upon
their own national minorities, and perhaps of expanding German
influence in central Europe as well, demurred. Something like the
division between Triple Entente and Triple Alliance seemed to have
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been reborn, with Italy straddling the fence, anxious to contain the
effects of a crisis in a neighboring region but also to remain aligned
with its European partners.96 As the Maastricht summit approached,
the desire to placate Bonn on the Yugoslav question in order to
ensure its compliance with the project for European monetary union
grew stronger, however, and Serb successes (and excesses) on the
battlefields encouraged sympathy for the embattled Croats. From
the beginning of December the EC was applying economic sanctions
uniquely against Serbia and Montenegro, and after the conclusion
of the Maastricht summit on December 10, the issue of diplomatic
recognition for the secessionist republics was pushed onto the
agenda.
On August 27 the EC’s Badinter Arbitration Commission took
on the task of developing ground rules for the deconstruction of the
Yugoslav federation. The Badinter Commission issued its findings
on November 29, clearing the way for secessions by describing
Yugoslavia as being “in the process of dissolution,” using the legal
premise, derived from the experience of de-colonization, of uti
possedetis juris to establish the legitimacy of internal, republican
boundaries as emerging inter-state borders, and calling upon the
federal units to submit requests for recognition in line with EC
guidelines.97 On January 11, 1992, the Commission announced its
decisions. Of the four applicants, only Slovenia and Macedonia were
determined to have fulfilled all criteria for recognition, while Croatia
was “provisionally” certified as meeting minimum standards.
Bosnia-Herzegovina was urged to conduct a referendum on
independence as a condition for eligibility.98 The rulings were legally
disputable, but at this point political motives had become decisive.
Bonn wanted recognition to be accorded to Slovenia and Croatia,
and so it would be. Macedonia, in deference to Greek protests
(including threats from Athens to veto EC initiatives should its will
be defied) was left in limbo. On December 16, 1991, the EC twelve
bowed to German pressure and agreed to recognize the secessionist
republics on January 15, 1992. Only 8 days later, on Christmas
Eve, Bonn embarrassed its allies by moving to recognize Slovenia
and Croatia unilaterally.99 The other EC members lamely followed
suit on January 15. The Maastricht summit had been brought to a
successful conclusion, but the pressures exerted by the Yugoslav
war were having a serious impact upon European cohesion.100
Germany’s decision to press for selective recognitions,
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aggressively pursued without regard for the larger consequences,
was out of character for a country that had prided itself on a
commitment to multilateralism and a diplomacy of moderation and
consensus.101 Since at least 1987, however, elite opinion in Germanic
Europe had been shaped by a virtual campaign of slander directed
against Serbs and Serbia, the historic enemy deemed responsible for
the debacle of German Balkan policy during both twentieth century
world wars. In the words of the influential Balkan correspondent
of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Johann Reissmüller, the
imperative of separation in former Yugoslavia was created by “the
Serbian leadership with its oriental understanding of justice and
governance,” and the existence of an unbridgeable gap between
“two entirely foreign cultures and civilizations, two clashing
conceptions of justice and property, of governance and freedom.”102
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, with family origins in the
Halle region of formerly communist East Germany, was committed
to the premise of self-determination that lay at the foundation of
German unification, but his calculation that recognition would serve
as an admonition to Belgrade and encourage an end to the fighting
was misplaced.103 Lord Carrington recognized immediately that
recognition without regulation of underlying issues would destroy
his fragile peace initiative, and protested loudly but in vain.104 The
inability of a single European power to muster opposition to Bonn’s
initiative, which was to prove disastrous in the short term, did not
speak highly of the EC’s readiness to assume a more significant
international role.105 Supporters of recognition continue to argue
that it was a necessary response to Serb aggression, an appropriate
application of the principle of self-determination, and a useful means
to mobilize the international community by internationalizing the
conflict. But a principle of self-determination was not consistently
applied, Germany’s Alleingang only served further to divide
international opinion, and Serbia was not coerced.
Attempts to explain Bonn’s haste rest upon a number of
contradictory hypotheses: aspirations to win advantage in an
emerging central European economic zone, to assert a more dynamic
foreign policy in the wake of unification, to make up for diplomatic
passivity during the Gulf War and assume a stronger leadership role
in Europe, to pursue a policy of revenge against an historic enemy,
to respond to domestic pressures emerging from Catholic, Bavarian,
and Croatian interest groups, or to stand up to destabilizing violence
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on Germany’s post-cold war eastern marches.106 Some combination of
these factors will have to serve — what matters are the consequences
of Bonn’s, and the EC’s, miscalculations. Slovenia and Croatia were
recognized as sovereign states, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia
sanctioned, without any provision being made to address the status
of Croatia’s Serb minority, the prospects of the other constituent
peoples of the Yugoslav federation, the legitimacy of federal
instances, or the consequences for the Balkan region of Yugoslavia’s
precipitous fragmentation. The decade of war that followed was at
least in part a consequence of these miscalculations.
Lack of results contributed to the gradual effacement of the
EC’s mediation role in favor of the United Nations. On September
25, 1991, in response to a request presented by Belgium, France,
and Great Britain, the UN declared an arms embargo against
all parties to the conflict. On October 8, Secretary General Javier
Pérez de Cuéllar designated former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance as his personal representative to the region, significant in
retrospect as a first step toward a more vigorous U.S. involvement
in the international conflict management effort. Led by Vance the
UN’s role expanding rapidly, and it was under UN auspices that a
fifteenth, and finally successful, ceasefire agreement was accepted by
the contending factions, signed by Croatian Defense Minister Šušak
and the JNA 5th Military District Commander General Andrija
Rašeta on January 2, 1992, and placed into effect on the following
day. The key to success, as already noted, was the emerging military
stalemate. The agreement imposed a ceasefire in place, and included
provisions for the monitoring of compliance by UN peacekeeping
troops. In February 1992 UN Resolution 743 sanctioned the
deployment of what would eventually become a 14,000 strong UN
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) involving more than thirty nations,
the second largest UN peacekeeping contingent ever assembled, in
four noncontiguous UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) inside Croatia
(eastern and western Slavonia and northern and southern Krajina
— known as sectors East, West, North, and South). The original
UNPROFOR headquarters, incongruously, was established in
Sarajevo, soon to become a theater of war in its own right. As
originally conceived, the ceasefire arrangement was supposed to
serve as a prelude to a comprehensive settlement to be worked out
at the Hague conference. In December, however, the Hague project
collapsed, and with the eruption of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
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1992 the UNPA arrangement and its peculiar “ink spot” distribution
of protected areas was frozen in place.
The UN mandate in Croatia was defined as a classic peacekeeping
mission assuming an in place ceasefire, consent of the warring
parties, neutrality between former belligerents, and limiting rules
of engagement confined to cases of self-defense.107 Essential tasks
included demilitarization, guarantees for the continued functioning
of local authorities (to include protection of exposed communities
and individuals,) monitoring the withdrawal of federal army and
irregular forces from Croatia, and facilitation of refugee return. In
line with these goals, JNA forces were withdrawn across the border
into neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a partial attempt was
made to disarm local Serb forces. Heavy weapons were placed into
UN supervised weapons storage sites, from where they would, in
many cases, be retrieved following the limited Croatian offensives
against the Krajina during 1993. Croatia consistently opposed
various aspects of the UN mission, refusing to conclude a proper
Status of Forces Agreement for 3 full years and harshly criticizing
UNPROFOR’s performance, but the arrangement worked to its longterm advantage. As had been the case in Slovenia under somewhat
different circumstances, with the withdrawal of the Federal Army,
the only organized force capable of resisting an eventual Croatian
reassertion of sovereignty had been removed from the game.
Zagreb was now in a position to shift the balance of power to its
advantage behind a UN shield, while leaving the ultimate status of
the disputed territories undetermined. The president of the newly
constituted Republic of Serb Krajina (created on December 19, 1991,
as the result of a merger between the Serb Autonomous Regions of
Baranja, Western Srem, Western Slavonia, and Krajina), Milan Babić
recognized the threat that the arrangement posed to his fragile and
exposed community immediately, but his opposition to the plan was
overridden by Milošević, upon whom all Serb communities outside
of Serbia proper remained ultimately dependent. During February
1992 Babić was unceremoniously cashiered on behalf of Milošević
loyalist Martić.108
Babić was foresightful. The UN-brokered ceasefire was fragile
from the start. Fronts remained intact, and sporadic shelling
continued through 1992 and 1993. In September 1993 Croat forces
launched an offensive with 6,000 troops against the so-called Medak
Pocket north of Zadar, aimed at retaking the Maslenica bridge,
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Zadar airport, and the Peruca hydroelectric power plant facility.
The offensive was successful in the short-term, allowing a brief
reopening of north-south traffic along the Adriatic littoral.109 A
ceasefire was renegotiated on March 29, 1994, but at this point the
balance of forces in the theater was turning against the Serbs. When
Croatia finally moved to reconquer the Krajina militarily in 1995,
with vastly improved means, it was able to push UN forces aside
and crush outgunned and demoralized Serb resistors, left in the
lurch by Belgrade, in a matter of days.110 Once again, intervention
by the international community aimed at conflict resolution would
become an objective foundation for the eventual victory of one of the
contending parties.
The Destruction of Yugoslavia: A Balance Sheet.
Yugoslavia’s disintegration was prepared by protracted economic
decline that left citizens with little confidence in the capacity of the
federation to address their basic needs. It was occasioned by the
decision of republican elites to use ethnic mobilization to reinforce
their hold on power. The ethnocrats prospered because of the
willingness of a critical mass (though rarely an absolute majority)
of citizens, politically disoriented and caught up in an atmosphere
of fear, to follow them blindly.111 In the most fundamental sense,
Yugoslavs had no one to blame for the disasters of the 1990s but
themselves.
The international community nonetheless was significantly
involved in the events that culminated in war, and it has been forced
to accept responsibility for managing the consequences. In retrospect,
it is clear that leading international actors were caught by surprise by
the Yugoslav conflict, and ill-prepared to deal with it. An effective
effort to hold the Yugoslav federation together needed to begin
well before the crisis of 1989-91. The Western powers did not make
such an effort, both because they did not consider the likelihood of
a breakdown of the federation to be particularly high, and because
they did not view Yugoslavia as sufficiently important to merit it.
Once fighting was underway, conflict management efforts were
plagued by misperceptions about the nature of the problem, a lack
of accord between would be mediators, scarcely disguised support
for Slovenian and Croatian independence on the part of important
European actors, a refusal to address the status of Serb minorities
126

outside Serbia proper, and serious errors of judgment. The West,
and the international community as represented by the UN, did not
cause the demise of Yugoslavia, but their policies only succeeded in
making a bad situation worse.
Misled by the discourse of Balkan marginality and caught up in
the euphoria of the “end of history” supposedly ushered in by the
collapse of communism, all of the great powers underestimated the
potential consequences of Yugoslavia’s collapse.112 “That Yugoslav
domestic chaos could give rise to one of the largest diplomatic crises
since 1945,” writes Marie-Janine Calic, “was an idea that virtually no
one took seriously in 1991.”113 More lucid evaluations of the situation
were available — the conclusions of a report by the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency leaked to the press on November 27, 1990, which
predicted the collapse of Yugoslavia within 18 months followed by
a bloody civil war, posed the nature of the problem with startling
accuracy — but it was ignored by political leaders for whom Balkan
affairs were simply not a high priority.114 Up to the spring of 1991,
by which time any attempt at preventive diplomacy was condemned
to be too little and too late, distracted by the drama of the Gulf War
and convinced that despite violent rhetoric the unruly Yugoslavs
would eventually come around to accept some form of pragmatic
cooperation, the leading world powers gave the crisis only cursory
attention.115
Once the magnitude of events began to sink in, mediation
efforts were plagued by a lack of accord over ends, ways, and
means. Despite the pledges made at Maastricht, Europe’s capacity
to function as an international actor was revealed as inadequate.
“The main lesson of the Yugoslav conflict,” concluded Jonathan
Eyal, “is that no coordinated European security policy exists, and
that there are no effective instruments for its future coordination.”116
The degree to which the Cold War had served to impose priorities
upon the European great powers was unappreciated, and the
reappearance of sharply contrasting national goals seems to have
come as a shock. Managing the Balkan conflict on the basis of
what one analyst calls “European Political Cooperation Plus” (ad
hoc consultations, diplomatic protests, economic sanctions, peace
monitoring, and traditional mediation) would have been difficult
under the best of circumstances.117 Without agreement between the
most important interested parties, it was bound to be an exercise
in futility. This was revealed in the debate over recognition, where
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some powers strove to preserve the unity of the federation while
others worked to sabotage it.
The unwillingness of the United States to take the lead in
crafting consensus was another factor working against the conflict
management effort. Washington’s engagement was vital to effective
Western policy, but U.S. foreign policy elites were uncertain about
where national priorities should lie in a post-cold war environment
that was still poorly understood.118 There were strong currents of
opinion that no vital U.S. interests were at stake in the region, that
the Europeans would never shoulder responsibility for managing
their own affairs unless forced to do so, and that “letting them
fight” until clear winners and losers emerged might be a better way
to recast regional equilibriums than a costly intervention.119 The
United States declined to provide strong direction for a coordinated
Western policy during the first phase of the crisis and, in fact, used
its influence to prevent decisive external engagement.
During the armed conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia the Soviet
Union was preoccupied by domestic affairs. Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev, caught up in a desperate effort to rescue the failing Soviet
ship of state, repeatedly asserted the need to maintain the integrity
of the Yugoslav federation, but his ability to influence events was
declining.120 The attempted coup of August 1991 was informed by
sympathy toward Serbia as Russia’s historic ally in the Balkans, but
it ended as a fiasco.121 The government of the independent Russian
Federation after January 1, 1992, under President Boris Yeltsin and
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, sought to align Russian Balkan
policy with that of the Western democracies. In May 1992 Kozyrev
visited all of the former Yugoslav republics, and signed accords
establishing full diplomatic relations with Slovenia and Croatia. He
also publicly asserted that responsibility for the conflict fell upon
the “national-communist” leadership in Belgrade.122 The Russian
Federation voted in favor of economic sanctions against Belgrade
on May 30, 1992, on July 10 it approved Yugoslavia’s exclusion from
the CSCE, and on September 22 supported UN Resolution No. 777
denying Belgrade the status of legal successor of Tito’s federation. As
relations between Yeltsin and his parliament began to disintegrate
from the summer of 1992 onward, however, the government’s
approach to the Yugoslav crisis became a source of discord. In a
series of contentious debates, the parliamentary opposition loudly
affirmed Russia’s traditional friendship with Serbia. “In Serbia
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and Montenegro,” ran one typically emotional intervention, “from
generation to generation the people have absorbed love and devotion
for Russia with their mother’s milk.”123 On June 26, 1992, the Russian
Parliament passed a resolution criticizing the government for
approving sanctions against Serbia, and called for their abrogation,
revealing basic divisions over Balkan policy.124 As a result of these
divisions, Russia was never securely part of the Western conflict
management effort in Yugoslavia. Indeed, the Russian opposition
gave valuable aid and encouragement to Serb nationalism.
The lack of institutions capable of responding to the demands
of the post-cold war security environment also helps to explain
the ineffectiveness of Western policy. The CSCE’s Paris Charter of
November 1990 provided an ambitious set of premises for a new
approach to the challenges of European security.125 But, required
to act by consensus and without an autonomous military arm, the
CSCE was not in a position to implement policy. After the fall of
the Berlin Wall, the organization swelled to include more than 50
members. It had become a “small European UN” weighed down by
a burden “that it will not be able to master soon.”126 A Vienna-based
CSCE Conflict Management Center created on the very eve of the
crisis was quickly overwhelmed by events. The Western European
Union (WEU) had only been revived as a security forum in 1984.
It lacked an integrated command structure, was inadequately
equipped with military assets, and possessed little political clout.
Even Europe’s premier security organization, and the only one with
the means to act effectively in a military capacity, was at a loss when
confronted with the Yugoslav imbroglio. At the outset of the crisis
NATO was taking the first tentative steps toward a post-cold war
identity. The Alliance was still fixed upon the traditional Article Five
mission of territorial defense and was reluctant to consider out of
area missions--a new NATO was on the drawing board, but it was
not yet in place. Primary responsibility for managing the Yugoslav
conflict therefore devolved, almost by default, upon the United
Nations. But UN peacekeeping capacity was already over-extended,
and the organization was not prepared to sponsor peace enforcement
missions. Unfortunately, once fighting had commenced, and in
the absence of a will to settlement among the belligerents, peace
enforcement was the only option that promised results.
A major barrier to effective action was the near total absence of a
principled foundation for peacemaking. The original justification for
129

recognizing Slovenia and Croatia was the right of self-determination,
but it was a dubious premise about which no one seemed to agree.127
The concept was coined by Woodrow Wilson as a means for
coordinating the selective dismantling of the defeated European
empires of World War I, but it has never been incorporated into the
code of international law. There is no consensus in place over what
the conditions that qualify any one of the more than 3,000 national
communities that can be identified worldwide for such a privilege
might be, or whether the principle of self-determination necessarily
implies a right to independence and national sovereignty. In
the case of Yugoslavia, the right of self-determination was often
invoked but never consistently applied. The denial of an option for
self-determination to the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia, the Croats of
Herzegovina, the Kosovar Albanians, and the Albanian population of
Macedonia lay at the root of much of the violence that accompanied
the country’s break-up. The sovereignty of the individual republics,
and of inherited republican borders, was often cited as a limitation
upon self-determination, but the most outspoken proponents of such
perspectives were usually those with the most to gain. Particularly in
Croatia, with a third of the national territory under occupation, there
was a strong tendency to assert that republican boundaries were
historically sanctioned, legal lines of division between sovereign
entities.128 In fact, however, administrative expediency accounted
for much of the logic of the Yugoslav republican boundaries drawn
up after the Second World War, which were never intended to serve
as state frontiers. There was some incongruity in an international
legal regime that sanctioned the dismemberment of Yugoslavia
itself, while simultaneously holding up its internal boundaries as
inviolable. “The country’s external borders were made of cotton, its
internal and regional frontiers of cement,” as one disillusioned critic
put it.129
The imperative of humanitarian intervention to defend helpless
victims and enforce standards of civilized conduct has also been
advanced as a justification for international engagement, but during
the early phases of the conflict when the most massive abuses
occurred the international community stood aside. The International
War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) did not
receive its statute under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter until May 1993.
At least a part of the motivation for its belated convocation was to
deflect criticism of Western passivity in the face of massive violence.
130

Moreover, it quickly became clear that all parties to the conflict were
in the business of using atrocity rumors instrumentally in order to
win the sympathy of a wider audience. Sorting out fact from fiction
in the volatile circumstances of armed conflict is never easy. In the
Yugoslav case, where efforts to demonize the enemy became a
strategy of war pursued by professional public relations firms such
as Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs, the challenge was particularly
severe.130
The entire peacemaking effort was plagued by ambivalence over
the role of force. A decisive intervention in the first stage of the conflict,
with the goal of blocking Serbian encroachment into neighboring
republics, perhaps could have nipped the crisis in the bud. But the
outcome of such a response was not preordained. If conducted with
inadequate forces and insufficient will, it could also have led to a
military stalemate and confronted Western decisionmakers with an
uncomfortable choice between escalation and withdrawal. In any
case, the leading Western powers made clear from the outset that no
such intervention would be forthcoming.131 Yugoslavia’s contending
factions were well aware of Western reluctance, and they shaped
their war plans accordingly. The major nations contributing to the
peacekeeping effort were reluctant to allow their forces to be used
decisively by commanders in the field. Such reluctance undermined
efforts to deter warring factions contemplating escalation.
The most serious flaw in the Western conflict management effort
was the absence of any kind of consistent vision for the region’s
future. Yugoslavia, at the heart of the southeastern European
subregion, had addressed the dilemma of cultural diversity by
sustaining a viable multinational federation. With the Yugoslav
idea discredited, what alternatives could be brought forward as a
basis for regional order? For both objective and subjective reasons,
the European ideal of the nation state was unequal to the task.
In the Balkans, intermingled national communities could not be
pressed into ethnically homogenous national units at acceptable
cost, and the legacy of enmity between peoples did not bode well
for exposed minorities inside newly minted bastions of national
chauvinism. Even if it could be accomplished consensually, political
fragmentation along national lines would work at counterpurposes
to economic development. The goal of “joining” the West, and
therefore diluting national peculiarities within a larger European or
Euro-Atlantic complex, was not a short-term solution. NATO and
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the EC were in no rush to bring the new democracies of southeastern
Europe in from the cold. A united and stable Yugoslavia might
have been well placed to move toward accession with Western
institutions in tandem with the more advanced Central European
states, but its ravaged successor states have been forced to surrender
such aspirations for the foreseeable future. Even Slovenia, the most
developed and stable of all the post-communist states, has been held
back by chaos in the region as a whole. In its first tentative approaches
to conflict management in former Yugoslavia, the Western powers
set a precedent that would haunt their efforts for years to come-reactive diplomacy focused on containment rather than cures, lack
of equitable standards, inadequate commitment in view of the extent
of the problem, and the absence of any kind of coherent end state as
a goal of policy.
Conclusion: The Beginning of a War without End.
Slovenia succeeded in fighting its way out of Yugoslavia at
relatively low cost because it enjoyed a high degree of domestic
consensus about the desirability of independence, did not have to
confront the dilemma of a secessionist movement on its national
territory, and did not threaten the agenda of Serbian national
consolidation that had become the core motivation of the Milošević
regime. The lack of a tradition of animosity between Slovenes
and Serbs made such an outcome easier to achieve--there were no
historical grievances to be resolved, and any residual Slovenian
allegiance to an experience of shared statehood was directed toward
a Yugoslav ideal that was no longer politically relevant. Though
Kučan and Milošević may not have plotted to “stage” a conflict in
order to make separation inevitable, neither envisioned their political
future within the framework of the federation. A clean break served
their purposes well.
None of these conditions applied to the relationship between
Croatia and Serbia. The consolidation of nationalist leaderships
in Zagreb and Belgrade had been accomplished with the help
of intensive media campaigns that sought to reinforce national
affiliation by propagating hatred and fear. “Ancient hatreds” were
not really at issue. The core themes of hate propaganda were derived
from living memory — the experience of civil war between 1941-45,
the real and pretended impositions of communist rule from 1945132

91, and the contemporary discourse of “Europe” which presumed
to place some peoples above others in a culturally determined
hierarchy of civility.132 The national agenda with which Milošević
had affiliated made a right to leave the Yugoslav federation
contingent upon a willingness to surrender control over minority
regions that wished to remain attached to Serbia. The mirror image
of the agenda inspiring the HDZ leadership in Zagreb insisted that
historic Croatian state rights could only be achieved by absorbing
Serb minority regions into a unified national state ruled from
Zagreb. The Serb population of Slavonia and Krajina rejected such
subordination. Their will to resist was bolstered by the insensitivity
of Tudjman himself, whose aggressive rhetoric, revival of symbols
associated with Pavelić’s Independent State of Croatia, and purge of
Serbs within the state administration seemed designed to encourage
the community’s worst fears. These fears were promoted by Serbian
nationalist propaganda emanating from Belgrade, which revived
memories of Ustaša terror and held out the promise of association
with a new Yugoslavia where “all Serbs could live in one state,”
that would of course be a Serbian state. Armed resistance was made
possible by the Serb-dominated federal government, which offered
encouragement to the Krajina Serbs, provided arms and munitions,
and brought the JNA to bear to help defend their conquests on the
ground. The result, once the Republic of Serb Krajina had established
control over significant portions of Croatian territory, was a classic
zero-sum conflict, with a strong emotional and mythic content that
made compromise nearly impossible.
Croatia’s turf war was not brought to an end by the ceasefire
arrangement of January 1992. The Belgrade news weekly Nin
described it as a “war without victors,” but in fact the basic issues
that had sparked conflict remained unresolved, and hostility
unabated.133 What is more, the approach to the conflict that the
international community had fallen into almost by default — that
of selective recognition for breakaway republics on the basis of
politically designed criteria without a principled foundation and
without effective guarantees — was a recipe for new disasters.
Secession in Slovenia and Croatia meant the end of Tito’s federation,
and forced the remaining republics that wished to separate from the
Serbia-Montenegro axis that had come to dominate rump Yugoslavia
to choose between unpalatable alternatives. With all communities
determined to avoid the worst case of subordination to a despised
other, and willing to defend their cause in arms, the Pandora’s Box
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of anarchic disassociation had been opened wide.
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CHAPTER 4
THE LAND OF HATE:
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1992-95
War Comes to Bosnia.
Few of the premises that informed conflict management efforts
in Slovenia and Croatia applied to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo
governed a relatively underdeveloped region without the degree
of self-sufficiency enjoyed by the western republics. The Bosnian
“Yugoslavia in miniature” lacked even an approximate ethnic
homogeneity to serve as a foundation for national identity, and,
rightly or wrongly, the Islamic factor was a source of potential
discord. Bosnia also confronted external threats. The departure of
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina brought an end to any kind
of representative Yugoslav federation. Rump Yugoslavia was for
all intents and purposes a Serbian national state, planning to carve
a “greater Serbia” from the flesh of its neighbors.1 Independent
Croatia formally supported Bosnian national integrity, but behind
the scenes Zagreb sponsored a separatist movement among the Croat
population of Herzegovina. With developed and relatively balanced
economies, both Slovenia and Croatia could look forward to the
prospect of independence with confidence. Lacking significant Serb
or Croat minorities, Macedonia was able to declare independence
and negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of the JNA from its territory
during the first months of 1992. These advantages were not accorded
to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo confronted bleak economic
prospects, intense intercommunal rivalry, and an imminent threat
of external aggression without significant international sponsorship
or real friends.
According to the census of 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
population consisted of 44 percent Muslims, 31 percent Serbs,
17 percent Croats, and 5 percent “other” (generally citizens who
had chosen the designation Yugoslav in lieu of affiliation with
a particular ethnic community). The birthrate of the Muslim
community was considerably higher than that of the Croats and
Serbs, and demographic trends pointed toward the emergence
of a Muslim majority within one or two generations.2 Although
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there were compact areas of Croat and Serb settlement, much of
the population lived intermingled. This was particularly true of
the Muslims, traditionally concentrated in cities and medium-sized
towns.3
Although rates of intermarriage were high (particularly between
Serbs and Croats, less so in the case of Muslims), communities
maintained a strong sense of identity. Bosnia-Herzegovina had
a tradition of tolerance based upon the ideal of komšiluk (good
neighborliness), but it was a tradition that reinforced rather than
diluted communal affiliation.4 The history of Bosnia was filled with
ethnic friction — the great Bosnian writer Ivo Andrić once referred
to his country as “the land of hate.” Mistrust between communities
was exploited during the civil war of 1941-45, and many of the worst
atrocities of the period were perpetrated on Bosnian soil. Despite
decades of peaceful cohabitation under Tito, the poisoned legacy of
the war years remained alive. Ethnic mobilizations during 1990-91
reopened fault lines and heightened fear. The radical nationalist wing
of the Bosnian Croat faction made no secret of its desire to affiliate
with an independent Croatia. The Bosnian Serb leadership refused to
accept association with what they perceived to be an aspiring Islamic
state.5 Izetbegović and his entourage were not willing to approve a
partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina that would leave them with a small,
land-locked territory that did not reflect their real weight within the
population. They aimed to preserve a unitary state that the Muslim
community, with its growing demographic weight, could eventually
come to dominate. All sides were uncompromising and prepared to
fight to achieve their goals.
The threat of violence was particularly acute due to BosniaHerzegovina’s special place in Yugoslav military policy. Titoist
strategic culture was rooted in the legacy of World War II partisan
resistance, adapted after 1948 to the threat of invasion from the
Soviet bloc. Mountainous and centrally located, Bosnia-Herzegovina
was structured from 1968 onward as a sanctuary for guerrilla-style
resistance to a would-be invader. Approximately 50 percent of
Tito’s JNA was permanently stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and the republic was the site of over 55 percent of Yugoslavia’s
military industries and munitions depots. Like other Yugoslav
republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina maintained a Territorial Defense
organization, which upon the eruption of hostilities split along
communitarian lines, providing each of Bosnia’s three constituent
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nations with the kernel of an autonomous armed force. Bosnians
were disproportionately represented within the JNA officer corps, at
the end of 1991 an estimated 200,000 citizens were believed to have
had access to arms, and spontaneously organized Defense Leagues
were proliferating.6 When the war began in the spring of 1992,
45 separate paramilitary formations representing all three major
ethnic communities were able to take the field.7 It should have been
obvious that it would be impossible for Bosnia to sever its ties with
Yugoslavia without courting violence. In a diary entry for March 26,
1990, Milošević confidant Borisav Jović had already concluded that
in the event of a breakup “Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot survive as a
sovereign state, nor can a struggle for control of its territory unfold
without loss of blood.”8
As had been the case with the Serb minority in Croatia, though
with less justification (Bosnia initiated no discriminatory measures
against its Serb population), the Serb community inside BosniaHerzegovina was an outspoken opponent of any project for
separation that would leave it a minority within an independent
state. On October 15, 1991, when the representatives of the SDA and
HDZ within the Bosnian parliament pushed through a “declaration
of sovereignty” including a right of secession, Bosnian Serb leader
Radovan Karadžić challenged the deputies with the extraordinary
statement that the declaration represented the “road to Hell” where
“the Muslim nation may disappear altogether.”9 Karadžić was born
in 1945 in Montenegro, and arrived in Sarajevo at age 15, where he
went on to build a successful career as a sports psychologist, including
a stint as advisor for the Sarajevo professional soccer squad. During
the political ferment of 1990 Karadžić briefly supported the creation
of a Bosnian Green Party, before shifting to a nationalist position and
aligning with the newly created Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). The
violent rhetoric that laced his October speech was only too typical.
Visibly enthused by his role in the political limelight, Karadžić
would become a driving force for war in 1992, and uncompromising
proponent of Serb nationalist demands thereafter.10
In September, Karadžić’s SDS sponsored the creation of four Serb
Autonomous Regions (Srpske Autonomne Oblasti or SAOs) within
Bosnia on the model of the Serb Krajina, and on October 26 unveiled
a Parliament of the Serb Nation in Bosnia chaired by Momčilo
Krajišnik.11 A plebiscite on November 10 resulted in an overwhelming
refusal of separation from Yugoslavia, and on December 21 a
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Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Republika Srpska u Bosni i
Hercegovini) was declared into being with the announced intention
of maintaining association with Belgrade. The Croat community
followed the same road. The HDZ originally announced its support
for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in November it mimicked
the Serbs by creating two Croat Autonomous Regions, dubbed the
Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (Hrvatska Zajednica HercegBosna) and Bosanska Posavina. Izetbegović claimed to represent
the ideal of a multicultural Bosnia, but he worked to insure Muslim
domination of Bosnian institutions, and supported the secessionist
aspirations of the Sanjak branch of his movement inside Serbia, the
Muslim National Council of Sanjak (Muslimansko Nacionalno Vjeće
Sandžaka), which organized a referendum on self-determination on
October 25, 1992.
Both the Serb and Croat initiatives were declarations of war
against the ideal of a unitary state. On May 6, 1992, Karadžić
met with Mate Boban, a former clothing store manager who had
displaced the more moderate Stjepan Kljujić at the head of the HDZ
on February 1, 1992, in Graz, Austria to discuss a partition of BosniaHerzegovina to their mutual advantage.12 Collusion between Serbs
and Croats at the expense of the Muslim community would go a
long way toward explaining the logic of the war that would follow.
Karadžić described Bosnia-Herzegovina coldly as “an artificial state
created by the communists.”13 Later in 1992 Boban argued for the
abolition of the Bosnian presidency on the grounds that “today
Bosnia-Herzegovina has practically ceased to exist as a state, and
when there is no state, there is no need for a president.”14
In the last week of February 1992 the United States abandoned
its reticence about the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and opted to
support Bosnian independence. Following the fighting in Croatia,
Washington confronted strong domestic pressure to oppose
Serb aggression, and key leaders were increasingly influenced
by explanations of the sources of the conflict that highlighted
Belgrade’s responsibility. In his memoir, U.S. Ambassador Warren
Zimmermann speaks of the need to resist the “Serbian game plan”
to create an enlarged “Serboslavia.”15 Support for a breakup of
the federation along republican boundaries brought Washington
into alignment with its European allies, and seemed to provide a
convenient premise for managing the Yugoslav problem as a whole.
Urged on by an international community now led by the United
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States, Sarajevo conducted its referendum on independence on
February 29-March 1, 1992.16 The results were ominous. The Muslim
and Croat communities voted overwhelmingly for independence--of
the 63 percent of the electorate that participated, 99.4 percent voted in
support of the proposition — but the Bosnian Serb boycott was also
nearly unanimous. As was the case during the republic-level election
of 1990, final tallies corresponded almost exactly to the proportional
weight of Bosnia’s major ethnic communities. On the basis of this
outcome and in an atmosphere of tension marked by incidents of
violence and provocative rhetoric, the Bosnian government and
its collective presidency, led by Muslim faction leader Izetbegović,
declared independence on March 27. Within little more than a week
the gesture was rewarded by formal recognition on the part of the
EC and the United States. On April 30, Bosnia-Herzegovina became
the 52nd member of the CSCE, and on May 22 it was admitted to the
United Nations.
Acknowledgement of Bosnian independence was offered without
guarantees for the new state’s security or gestures to assuage the
concerns of its Serb and Croat communities. Such guarantees and
gestures were urgently needed. SDS activists determined to resist
separation from Yugoslavia began to erect barriers in Sarajevo in
the first days of March, following a shooting incident at a Serb
wedding celebration.17 Fighting between Croat and Serb militias and
regular forces in the Bosanksa Krajina, Posavina, and eastern Bosnia
erupted shortly thereafter, and immediately after the declaration
of independence skirmishes between Serb militias and local police
forces reinforced by Muslim militias and criminal gangs broke out
in the outskirts of Sarajevo.18 On April 4 Izetbegović threw down
the gauntlet by ordering the mobilization of all reservists and
police forces in Sarajevo, prompting a call from the SDS for Serbs to
evacuate the city. Two days later the shelling of Sarajevo from Serb
artillery emplacements on the surrounding heights was initiated.
In these first, confused weeks of war the government’s ability to
maintain public order collapsed as Serb, Croat, and to a lesser
extent Muslim nationalist factions waged local encounters to secure
positions of advantage and appointed crisis committees to supplant
instances of vested authority. On April 7 the Assembly of Serbian
People in Bosnia-Herzegovina, meeting in Banja Luka, declared
the independence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
— renamed the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) on August 13, 1992
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— and the Serb representatives Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević
resigned from the Bosnian collective presidency. The stage was set
for a struggle pitting the Bosnian government and presidency under
the control of the SDA against the Bosnian Serbs, aided and abetted
from Belgrade. The HDZ publicly supported the government in
Sarajevo, and on April 7 Zagreb accorded Bosnia-Herzegovina
diplomatic recognition, but simultaneously sought to reinforce
the autonomy of Herceg-Bosna with the intent of promoting its
eventual attachment to the Croat domovina.19 That goal was partially
realized on July 3, 1992, when Herceg-Bosna declared itself to be
an independent state with its own flag (identical to the Croatian
national banner) and armed forces.
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s secession meant war. It was a war that,
in its initial stages, the government in Sarajevo was not prepared
to fight, and that the international community that had encouraged
separation lacked the will to contain. At the critical juncture before a
retreat from the precipice became impossible, the only party to raise
a voice in protest were the citizens of Bosnia themselves. On April
5-6, after a week of country-wide demonstrations, tens of thousands
of protestors assembled before the Bosnian Parliament in Sarajevo
to demand new elections and a policy of reconciliation. The crowd
was dispersed on the evening of April 6 by sniper fire, probably
leveled by both SDS and SDA gunmen, with eight killed and over
fifty wounded.20 The young student Suada Dilberović, shot down
by a sniper while attempting to flee from the parliament area across
the Vrbanja Bridge (now renamed in her honor) is conventionally
cited as the first victim of the war. Demonstrators briefly broke in to
the first floor of the parliament building and created a Committee of
National Security pledged to oppose ethnic mobilization, but lacking
official backing they were left to twist in the wind. Isolated and
without resources, the committee was forced to disband on April 9.21
Thus was dispersed, without a gesture of solidarity or word of regret
from the international community that would wax so eloquent in
the years to come over Bosnia’s Calvary, a last effort to revive the
tradition of a civic and multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Marching on the Drina.
Several generations of Yugoslavs grew up with the mythology of
armed resistance to occupation during World War II, reflected in a
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steady diet of partisan films and public ceremonies. These evocations
of heroic struggle were often clumsy, but not insubstantial. Despite
instrumentalization for political purposes, the partisan tradition was
imposing and in some ways ennobling. It was a significant source of
cohesion within Tito’s multinational federation.22
The fighting that swept across Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992
and 1995 became a travesty of that tradition, with entire communities
mobilized behind their most extreme and uncompromising elements
in a disorganized struggle for demeaning ends. Armed with
international recognition, and in view of Serb and Croat assaults,
the Sarajevo government, and the Muslim community for which it
was the most significant institutional representative, could at least
claim a right of self-defense. But Izetbegović also pursued a more
contested agenda — to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitary
state in defiance of the will of its Serb and Croat minorities. Driven
forward by corrupt warlords, imposed upon civilian communities
who would bear the lion’s share of costs without being granted any
real responsibility for shaping the course of events, and passively
observed as a kind of perverse entertainment by the more fortunate
citizens of the developed world, the Bosnian conflict has been
described by numerous commentators as a “post-modern” war. If
the post-modern condition is equated with the absence of meaning
and cynical manipulation, where “war is won by being spun,” the
description is apt.23
All of Bosnia’s national communities began to prepare for war
well prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and with fighting underway
their armed contingents quickly grew into full-fledged armies.
In the spring of 1991 the Izetbegović leadership created a Patriotic
League (Patriotska Liga) as an organ for self-defense, formally
representing Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole but in fact dominated
by the Muslim faction. During the summer the League was
subordinated to a Council for the National Defense of the Muslim
Nation based in Sarajevo.24 At the outset, the Patriotic League had
approximately 35,000 personnel at its disposal, coordinated by
a rudimentary organizational structure.25 The Patriotic League,
territorial defense forces loyal to Sarajevo, and armed police units
combined on July 5, 1992, to form the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Armija Bosne i Hercegovine — ABH) under the command of the
Muslim (with origins in the Sanjak) General Šefer Halilović.
Originally, the ABH high command had a distinct multi-national
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character with the Bosnian Croat Stjepan Šiber as Chief of Staff
and the Bosnian Serb Jovan Divjak as his deputy. Over time, as the
Bosnian Muslim community came under greater pressure and the
prospects of building a viable multinational state came to seem more
remote, the ABH’s Islamic character became more pronounced. Its
units were often raised locally, and deployed to defend their areas of
origin. According to Divjak, in May 1992 the ABH commanded over
75,000 soldiers, and by 1994 had grown to nearly 250,000.26 From the
outset, however, and consistently throughout the years of conflict,
the ABH was poorly armed. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the only
Yugoslav republic where territorial defense forces were effectively
disarmed in the course of 1990. A stock of small arms was extracted
from captured JNA barracks in Travnik, Visoko, Zenica, Tuzla, and
Bihać during the first weeks of war, but the ABH lacked access to
armor, heavy artillery, aircraft, and communications assets. The
shortfall of heavy weapons prevented the ABH from evolving into a
real combined arms force and left it at a considerable disadvantage
confronting better prepared adversaries.
Bosnian Croat military units were formed to help resist Serb
encroachments inside Croatia during 1991. In the first months of
1992 they were attached to a Croat Defense Council (Hrvatsko Vjeće
Odbrane — HVO) with its headquarters in Kiseljak, subordinated
to the leadership of the HDZ and under the command of General
Milivoj Petković. On July 21, 1992, the HVO was made part of the
combined defense forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but collaboration
with the ABH was minimal. From the outset the HVO was directly
controlled by the emerging Croatian Army chain of command, under
the former partisan fighter General Janko Bobetko.27 At the war’s
outbreak the HVO controlled about 20,000 combatants, organized
by municipality, and supported by about 5,000 militiamen attached
to Paraga’s HOS commanded by Blaž Kraljević.28 Friction between
the HVO and the HOS was evident from the start, and eventually
Zagreb would take steps to reassert control over its unruly militia
forces, including the arrest of Paraga, the assassination of military
coordinator Ante Paradžik, and the murder of Kraljević (together
with eight members of his staff) on August 9, 1992. From 1993
onward, the HOS ceased to be a significant military factor.
At the onset of fighting in April 1992, the Serb faction in BosniaHerzegovina was represented by the JNA, a variety of volunteer
militias, Bosnian Serb territorial defense forces, and Interior Ministry
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elements. On May 19, after being denounced by Sarajevo as an army
of occupation, the 5th Corps of the JNA was ordered to withdraw
into rump Yugoslavia, but in a transparent ploy, officers and soldiers
of Bosnian origin, amounting to 80 percent of the total contingent
after a series of planned personnel transfers, were left behind and
integrated in the newly minted Army of the Serb Republic (Vojska
Republike Srpske — VRS).29 Serb forces in Bosnia numbered over
100,000, equipped with approximately 500 tanks, 400 heavy artillery
pieces (over 100 mm.), 48 multiple rocket launchers, 350 120 mm.
mortars, 250 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting
vehicles, 120 fighter-bombers, and 80 light attack and observation
helicopters.30 The VRS possessed an effective General Staff (Glavni
Štab) under Chief of Staff General Manojlo Milovanović, which
would provide a critical advantage in the fighting to come. The
SDS also created an armed militia on the basis of existing territorial
defense assets and volunteer units, armed and organized by the
JNA, numbering about 60,000 by early April 1992, supplemented by
15,000 armed police and supported by paramilitary units penetrating
Bosnia from Serbia proper. These varied units, coordinated by the
JNA command structure and supported by JNA firepower, would
be militarily dominant in the first phase of the war.
On 8 May, simultaneously with a major purge of the JNA high
command, the former JNA officer Ratko Mladić, of Bosnian origin and
distinguished by his service in Dalmatia during 1991, replaced the
moderate Milutin Kukanjac as VRS commander in chief. Mladić was
a relatively little-known figure at the time of his appointment, but he
was popular with his soldiers and regarded as a tough operational
commander with a front line style and swagger. The depredations
of his troops in the Bosnian conflict, and particularly the interview
that he accorded to the BBC on 2 July 1993, during which the Bosnian
general, relaxed and effusive, opined in a racially offensive manner
about an emerging Muslim threat, came closer to revealing the real
man.31 There was never any doubt that the VRS was Mladić’s army,
and his relations with Karadžić were never particularly good —
Mladić’s real loyalty lay with Milošević in Belgrade.32 The VRS did
not receive the kind of overt military support that the HV provided
to the HVO, however. Though it did offer certain kinds of assistance,
the VJ never deployed large combat formations into Bosnia.
Though standards of professionalism improved as the conflict
dragged on, all of the Bosnian formations were make shift armies,
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with major shortcomings that often prevented the accomplishment
of militarily essential tasks. The Muslims’ lack of heavy weaponry
forced them onto the defensive, seeking to maintain the integrity
of some kind of national sanctuary while rallying international
support. The Serbs seized control of large swaths of territory in the
war’s first months, but once the defenses of their opponents had
been bolstered they found themselves overextended, with over
1,000 kilometers of frontline and without sufficient reserves to break
through contested areas by storm. As the smallest of the forces in the
field, the HVO remained dependent upon the support of HV units.
Despite the Serbs’ initial advantages, the military inadequacies of
all forces placed strategies of annihilation beyond reach, and almost
guaranteed that some kind of stalemate would ensue.
Although the underlying issue that motivated the fighting was
the character, or very survival, of the Bosnian state, the campaigns
were waged within local theaters for control of terrain. This meant
securing contested areas for one’s own ethnic faction — hence the
phenomenon of ethnic cleansing whereby military control became
synonymous with terrorist assaults upon local populations intended
to provoke mass flight.33 By the summer of 1993, former Yugoslavia
counted over 4 million refugees and displaced persons.34 Poland’s
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, appointed on October 6, 1992, to head the
UN Expert Commission on Human Rights Violations in BosniaHerzegovina, was correct in remarking that “ethnic cleansing is not
a consequence of this war, but rather its goal.”35
None of the parties to the conflict possessed sufficient forces to
maintain extended fixed fronts or execute large-scale operational
maneuver. Fighting therefore developed around individual battle
zones, often focused on urban complexes encircled by hostile forces
and subjected to artillery fire and harassment by snipers but rarely
taken by assault. After the first chaotic months, when the Bosnian
Serbs enjoyed a short-lived strategic advantage (due to careful
preparation, material superiority, and the fact that the VRS inherited
control over 50 percent of Bosnian territory), all belligerents were
forced to fragment their forces and make do with modest tactical
advances.36 The role played by paramilitary forces was striking,
though all militia formations were integrated into larger operational
plans coordinated by the respective “national” commands. The
Bosnian conflict was a civil war waged by three contending factions
whose mutual relations shifted back and forth from hostility to
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cooperation depending upon the configuration of forces within
individual battle areas. It was a primitive war, characterized by
sieges, limited offensives, and purposeful atrocities. The contest for
territory took on a cultural dimension, marked by the intentional
destruction of historical monuments and cultural artifacts — it
has been estimated that by the end of 1992 up to 70 percent of the
architectural inheritance of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been damaged
or destroyed, including over 300 mosques, 150 Orthodox churches,
and 50 Catholic churches.37 Destruction of the Ivo Andrić monument
in Višegrad by the Bosnian Muslims, the dynamiting of the 16th
century Ferhadija and Arnaudije mosques in Banja Luka by the
Bosnian Serbs on the night of May 5-6, 1992, the Serb shelling of the
Bosnian National Library, the Većnica, in Sarajevo and destruction
of thousands of irreplaceable historical manuscripts on the night
of August 25-26, 1992, immediately preceding the opening of the
London Conference on Former Yugoslavia, the targeting of the
16th century stone bridge (Stari most) in Mostar by Croat artillery in
November 1993 — these are only particularly egregious examples
of the widespread cultural vandalism.38 Many of these atrocities
had an explicitly anti-Muslim character, and were justified as acts
of historical revenge directed against the Ottoman legacy, “the
continuation in an extreme form of a process of de-Islamization that
had begun decades earlier.”39
Despite the confused nature of the fighting, the strategic goals
of the warring factions were clear. The Serb and the Croat factions
aimed at securing compact territories that could be controlled
militarily and eventually accorded autonomy and attached to their
respective homelands. That meant a de facto partition of BosniaHerzegovina between Serbia and Croatia, the agenda vetted by
Tudjman and Milošević, and Boban and Karadžić, in their respective
meetings of March 25 and May 6.40 The absence of honor among
thieves ensured that the project could not unfold to the satisfaction of
the would-be partitioners. But the plan suffered from a more crucial
flaw. Given the traditional distribution of peoples, any attempt at
partition would either condemn a significant part of the Muslim
population to discrimination inside hostile ethnic states, or confine it
within a small, land-locked, and economically nonviable mini-state.
The Muslim party sought to ward off such outcomes at all costs,
by maintaining control of the capital, insisting upon the integrity
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, banking on international recognition as
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a guarantor of survival, and resisting Serb and Croat territorial
encroachments wherever possible.41 At the outset of hostilities,
Sarajevo controlled only about 15 percent of Bosnian territory and
was clearly outgunned. Its status as the legitimate government of a
sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina was nonetheless a significant asset,
and one that would become more meaningful as time went on.
The Bosnian Serbs’ goal was to establish control over a belt
of contiguous territory in the Bosanska Krajina region of western
Bosnia, and in eastern Bosnia, securing linkage with Serbia and
opening an area of access from the confluence of the Drina and the
Sava eastward through Banja Luka toward Knin. Thus constituted,
the “Serb Republic” would be attached to Serbia proper along the
Drina, and divided from Croat and Muslim regions by the Una,
Sava, and Neretva rivers. It would be a single, integrated territory,
possibly with part of a divided Sarajevo as its capital, which could
eventually be joined to what remained of the Yugoslav Federation in
an approximation of a greater Serbia.42
In order to achieve this goal, the Serb faction needed to accomplish
several tasks. The first was to secure control of the frontier with
Serbia along the valley of the Drina, an area of mixed population
with numerous towns with a Muslim majority. In the first weeks
of April Serb paramilitary formations, aided by regular units of
the JNA, pushed into municipalities such as Zvornik, Višegrad,
Bratunac, Srebrenica, and Foča, beating down inadequate defenses
and interning, murdering, terrorizing, and expelling the Muslim
populations. Other towns in the Drina valley, including Goražde,
and Žepa, were placed under siege. The fall of Bijeljina, a small
town in northeastern Bosnia 15 kilometers from the Serbian border
with a population of about 40,000, opened the season of massacres.
Moving into an ethnically mixed community about a third of whose
residents were Muslim, Arkan’s Tigers presided over the slaughter
of hundreds of local residents and the expulsion of survivors before
surrendering the region to JNA contingents complicit with the greater
Serbia agenda.43 The results of the campaign in the Drina valley
were significant, but not decisive. In some cases (Zvornik, Višegrad)
resistance was swept aside in a matter of days. In others (Foča),
where local defenders were more effectively armed and organized,
weeks were required before control could be secured. The Serbs
succeeded in opening a corridor from Zvornik to Serb-controlled
areas surrounding Sarajevo, but in May and June overextended
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VRS forces were pushed out of Srebrenica and besieged in Doboj.
A counteroffensive during the summer rolled back some of these
losses, but in the Srebrenica-Žepa and Višegrad-Goražde-Foča
areas the ABH was able to hold on to local enclaves. Despite their
successes, Serb forces already seemed to lack both the manpower
and the will to force well-defended urban concentrations.
Simultaneous with the assault in eastern Bosnia, and utilizing
similar methods, control was established over much of the Bosanska
Krajina, an area populated primarily by Serbs but with important
Muslim and Croat minorities, contiguous with the Serb-controlled
areas of Croatia in the Kninska Krajina and Slavonia.44 On April 3
the regional center Banja Luka was occupied by the JNA, purged
of Muslim and Croat residents, and transformed into the political
center of a Serb-dominated western Bosnia. Between May-July 1992
in the Prijedor-Sanski Most-Ključ area of western Bosnia the 1st
Krajina Corps of the VRS committed some of the worst atrocities of
the war, systematically “cleansing” the area of Croat and Muslim
minorities.45 Muslim and Croat forces held on to a salient south of
Banja Luka keyed on the town of Jajce, but in the autumn a threepronged VRS offensive, aided by disaccord between Croat and
Muslim defenders, pushed into the city center. After 4 days of heavy
fighting, Jajce fell on October 29.
In May and June Serb forces also attempted to move into the
Bihać region in the extreme northwest corner of Bosnia (sometimes
referred to as the Bihać pocket or Cazinska Krajina), predominantly
Muslim and bounded by the Una River and the Croat-Bosnian
border. Serb forces took Bosanska Krupa and Bosanski Novi on
the Una and entered the Grabez plateau east of Bihać city before
bogging down in the face of coordinated resistance. By December,
the Bihać pocket had been reduced to a small triangular area
completely surrounded by Serb forces, but effectively defended by
perhaps 10,000 combatants in six Muslim brigades organized as the
ABH’s 5th Corps, together with a battalion-sized Bosnian Croat unit
controlled from nearby Zagreb.
Eastern Bosnia and the Bosanska Krajina were linked by the
Posavina region, south of the Sava along the border between Bosnia
and Slavonia. Clashes in Posavina between Serb and Croat forces
erupted on the right bank of the Sava in Bosanski Brod during March.
Control of what would become known as the Posavina or Northern
Corridor, which established geographical contiguity between the
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emerging Serb entities of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and
northern Serbia, was a strategic imperative. Here too the Serbs used
militia units to seize control of areas surrounding the corridor and
expel non-Serb inhabitants, hoping to consolidate their gains by
pushing forward the heavy forces of the JNA. They were, however,
required to ward off offensives south of the Sava launched by the
HV, which in April and May moved through Bosanski Brod into
Derventa and Modriča, temporarily cutting off passage along the
corridor and dividing Serb-controlled areas in Bosnia into two parts.
Subsequent fighting saw some of the largest pitched battles of the
entire war. In October the VRS finally forced HV and HVO forces
out of Bosanski Brod (some argue that the Croat withdrawal was the
result of a collusive bargain according to which Serb forces agreed
simultaneously to withdraw from the Prevlaka peninsula adjacent to
the Gulf of Kotor in southern Croatia), and by December a tenuous
hold on the corridor had been reestablished. The Serbs would
henceforward be required to defend these gains by committing a
significant portion of their reserves.
The Serbs’ ability to open the corridor was a major success,
achieved in the face of numerically superior Croat and Muslim forces
due to greater military professionalism, more effective organization,
and superior firepower. The position remained highly vulnerable
nonetheless, and throughout the war it would be a contested area
whose exposure ensured that Serb war aims remained unsecured.
The Serb failure to take the towns of Gradačac and Orašje, to the
south and north of the corridor west of Brčko town, denied their
position strategic depth.46 The brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing
that preceded military occupation made any claim to control the area
fundamentally illegitimate. Moreover, from a Muslim perspective
Posavina was viewed as a vital link between central Bosnia and
the Danube basin and central Europe — a position critical to the
long-term viability of the Bosnian state that could not be allowed to
remain in the hands of the enemy.
Another important prize remained elusive. On May 2 the Serbs
failed in an attempt to fight their way into the Muslim strongholds
of central Sarajevo, and were forced to fall back and consolidate
positions in the northern and eastern approaches. This left the
Bosnian capital encircled but intact in the hands of the Izetbegović
government. The subsequent contrast between the Bosnian Serbs’
isolation in their village capital of Pale (a resort community with
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only 6,000 residents overlooking the capital from the hills on its
eastern outskirts to which Karadžić withdrew his headquarters in
the spring of 1992) and their rivals’ situation in the historic capital
would serve to undermine the Serb faction’s credibility.
Also on May 2-3, in a bizarre incident all too typical of the
confusion surrounding the onset of war, upon his return to Sarajevo
Airport from the EC Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Lisbon,
Izetbegović was seized and detained as a hostage by the JNA. After
complex negotiations, he was eventually bartered in exchange
for a pledge by the Bosnian government to lift the blockade on
the Lukavica Barracks headquarters of the 2nd Army District in
downtown Sarajevo. Izetbegović was released, but during the
withdrawal of Serb forces from Lukavica Muslim territorial defense
units opened fire, killing a number of officers and soldiers as well
as civilian bystanders.47 In a memoir, ABH commander Halilović
interprets the circumstances as part of a failed coup intended to
replace Izetbegović with a leader (probably Fikret Abdić, who was
present in the city as the events unfolded) willing to ally with the
Serb party as a means to avoid war — an assertion that cannot be
demonstrated conclusively, but that corresponds to what had long
been a current of opinion supportive of cooperation with Bosnian
Serbs within the Muslim leadership.48 The objective consequence of
the incident was quite different. The Serbs’ disregard for standards
of diplomacy, and the Muslims’ violation of the ceasefire accord
at Lukavica, resulted in a significant escalation of hostilities. The
outcome reconfirmed Izetbegović as uncontested leader of the
Muslim faction, reinforced his determination to resist Serb pressure,
and sowed even more seeds of mistrust among Bosnia’s warring
factions.
Despite its failure to partition Sarajevo, and to unseat the
Izetbegović government, the VRS maintained control of artillery
emplacements on Sarajevo’s surrounding heights, from whence it
was able to prosecute the daily bombardments and partial siege of
the city that would become one of the most visible features of the
Bosnian conflict. The strategic logic of the Serb attacks, which after
May 1992 were never coordinated with any kind of systematic effort
to seize control of the city, remains difficult to fathom.49 Sarajevo
was not vital to the Bosnian Serbs’ military goals, and maintaining
the siege consumed a good deal of manpower that could perhaps
have been employed more usefully on other fronts. Divjak estimates
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that the Serbs assigned 29,000 effectives to the siege of Sarajevo to
cover 64 kilometers of front — too small a force to seize and hold an
area where an advantage in armored forces would be neutralized
by the difficulty of maneuver, but a drain on their ability to function
in other theaters.50 Sarajevo was not the only Bosnian city subjected
to besiegement, but it quickly became a focal point of international
attention, and the site for numerous visits by international dignitaries
and celebrities determined to exhibit their humanitarian credentials
— beginning with the highly publicized visit of French President
François Mitterrand on June 28-29. The Serb decision to surrender
control over Sarajevo Airport to the United Nations in the wake of
Mitterrand’s visit on June 29 enabled greater media access to the city
and enhanced its stature as an international cause célèbre. The siege of
Sarajevo served to demonstrate the precariousness of Bosnia’s legally
constituted government, but, like the siege of Dubrovnik during the
previous year, it had a devastating impact upon the credibility of the
Serb cause.
While the Muslim party struggled to hang on in central Bosnia and
Sarajevo, the HVO maintained its positions in the north and pressed
Serb forces out of western Herzegovina. A military cooperation
agreement between Izetbegović and Tudjman concluded in May,
and the rapid consolidation of the ABH from May onward, enabled
Croat and Muslim forces to reinforce their positions in central
Bosnia. On June 15, Croat forces entered Mostar, destroying the
city’s main Orthodox cathedral and 17 mosques while Serb units
withdrew toward Trebinje in eastern Herzegovina. On June 15 the
HVO negotiated a statement of cooperation with the local Muslim
leadership, aptly described by Edgar O’Ballance as “an example of
classic Machiavellian perfidy.”51 Within a week Boban had declared
the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna autonomous, and on
October 25 Mostar was named its capital. The tide of the war had
not turned, however, as the Serb summer counteroffensive made
clear. Along the Croatian border to the north, only the Bihać pocket
remained outside of Serb control.
By the end of 1992 a first phase in the history of the Bosnian
conflict had culminated with the Serb faction dominating nearly
70 percent of the national territory. The HVO, precariously aligned
with Muslim forces, controlled the predominantly Croat areas
of western Herzegovina, while Izetbegović found his authority
reduced to a small area in central Bosnia stretching from Tuzla
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to Kiseljak, Sarajevo, and the handful of exposed eastern Bosnian
enclaves. The territorial gains of the Serb party created the illusion
of success, but in fact each of the belligerents had for the time being
achieved minimal goals. The Serbs had carved out a Bosnian Serb
Republic and established a link between Serb controlled regions
from Belgrade to Knin, but they had not eliminated resistance and
ended the war. The Croats had established a redoubt in Herzegovina,
but their military position was weak and the alliance that they had
established with the Muslim party on the verge of collapse. Despite a
sequence of defeats, the Muslims maintained control of the national
capital, and were building a more capable army that, with the benefit
of interior lines of communication, had demonstrated its capacity
to defend core areas in central Bosnia, and even (in Gradačac,
Bihać, and the Brčko suburbs) to score small tactical successes. The
rough territorial division that this situation defined would remain
basically unaltered until the strategic balance was transformed by
international intervention in 1995.
In January 1993 fighting inside Croatia briefly flared as units of
the HV moved to seize Zadar’s Zemunik airport and the Maslenica
gorge in spite of the integrity of the UN Protected Area and in
defiance of UN protests. The intention was to reconstruct the
Maslenica Bridge, destroyed by the Serbs in November 1991, and
to open traffic along the Adriatic magistrala linking Zagreb to Split.
By the summer of 1993 the Croatians had put a 300-meter pontoon
bridge in place, but in August it was rendered unusable by Serb
shelling. The Maslenica offensive was nonetheless a harbinger of
things to come. It demonstrated Zagreb’s dissatisfaction with the
UN-supervised status quo, and determination to impose change.
In Bosnia, the Serb faction focused its operations during the 1993
campaigning season on efforts to broaden the Posavina Corridor and
consolidate areas of control in the Drina valley. In both cases, limited
successes were achieved. By August, Croat and Muslim defenders
had been pressed southwest of Brčko, and the Serbs’ area of access
widened by some five kilometers. Fighting in the Drina valley was
initiated by the Muslim faction, when on January 7, 1993, the local
commander Naser Orić, only 25 years old but distinguished by his
service as former bodyguard to none other than Slobodan Milošević,
launched a series of raids from within the Srebrenica enclave,
burning villages, massacring civilians, and setting the stage for what
would become a tragic vendetta. The Serbs responded by closing on
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Srebrenica and threatening to seize it, advancing by April 15 to within
several kilometers of the city center. In response to international
pressure the assault was called off, and the status quo preserved,
but the exposure of the eastern Bosnian enclaves had been clearly
demonstrated.52 In May the VRS pushed toward the Žepa enclave,
and in July severed supply lines leading into Goražde. Operations
were subsequently developed toward Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica
on the outskirts of Sarajevo, with the latter falling to a combined
arms offensive including helicopter assault on August 1, threatening
Muslim supply routes into the beleaguered capital, which ran across
the exposed Mount Igman road and through a newly constructed
tunnel passing under the airport. Within days, under international
pressure, the VRS agreed to vacate their threatening positions to
UNPROFOR forces. Much sound and fury accompanied these
operations, but in the larger picture they had very little impact on
the strategic balance. The cumulative burden of protracted military
operations was nonetheless taking its toll on overextended Bosnian
Serb forces, and on September 10, 1993, several Serb units mutinied
in Banja Luka, demanding better treatment and a more efficient
military effort.53
The most significant strategic development of the 1993
campaigning season was the breakdown of the Croat-Muslim
alliance and the emergence of a series of new battle areas in central
Bosnia. Friction between Croat and Muslim forces had been endemic
since the beginning of the conflict. Already in the autumn of 1992,
Croats and Muslims were at odds over the distribution of weapons
from captured JNA casernes, and in October local fighting erupted
in Novi Travnik, Prozor, and Vitež. Central Bosnia as a whole was
an ethnically mixed area where a single ethnic group could rarely
claim a decisive numerical advantage, and Croat and Muslim forces
were often collocated in disputed urban areas, tenuously allied but
subordinate to competing chains of command. The radical wing
of the Croat national movement made no secret of its desire to
bring as much as possible of Bosnia-Herzegovina into association
with Croatia proper — in late January 1993 a Croat member of the
Bosnian presidium, Mile Akmadžić, declared Bosnia-Herzegovina
to be “clinically dead.”54 Earlier in the month, provoked by the desire
to expand control of terrain as a prelude to UN and EU sponsored
peace negotiations, Croat-Muslim fighting erupted in Gornji Vakuf,
a majority Muslim town in the midst of an area designated by
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international negotiators in Geneva to become a Croat controlled
canton. In April the Croat-Muslim contest became a war within
the war, when, sparked by a shooting incident in Zenica, the HVO
abandoned restraint and launched an offensive designed to terrorize
local Muslim populations and seize control of key territory and
transport corridors in central Bosnia.
On April 16, HVO forces perpetrated a deliberate massacre of
the inhabitants of the predominantly Muslim village of Ahmići in
western Bosnia’s Lašva valley, surrounding the area to prevent flight,
moving through the town and systematically killing residents with
small arms fire, burning the village to the ground, and dynamiting the
minaret of the central mosque.55 The atrocity, described in one study
as “the Guernica of the Bosnian conflict,” inaugurated a campaign
of ethnic cleansing.56 By summer the HVO, aided and abetted by HV
formations, was engaged in a struggle for control of the Lašva valley
corridor, with fighting in and around Fojnica, Kiseljak, Vitez, and
Zenica. Government forces, still lacking heavy weaponry but with
a local manpower advantage, stood up to the pressure well, and in
June a Muslim counteroffensive regained Travnik and moved on to
Kakanj, Bugojno and Prozor. Desperate Croat resistance now led to
blind reprisals, culminating in yet another incident of massacre, in
the Muslim village of Stupni Do during October 1993.
Between May 1993 and January 1994 the HVO also prosecuted
a siege of Muslim-controlled east Mostar (the city’s old Ottoman
Quarter), in tandem with the Serb siege of Sarajevo, albeit without
attracting the same kind of international notoriety (though in
February the UN threatened the Croats with sanctions).57 East Mostar
held out, and, like the VRS around Sarajevo, the HVO never dared
to venture an all out assault. During this phase of the war, Serb and
Croats forces sometimes entered into tacit alliances of convenience
in local theaters of operation, but also continued to confront one
another on other fronts.58
Over time, the course of the Croat-Muslim war in central Bosnia
became increasingly favorable for the Muslim faction. From June
1993 onward new ABH commander Rašim Delić injected a note
of self-confidence into Muslim strategic planning, creating the 7th
Muslimski and 17th Krajina Brigades by enlisting highly motivated
refugees from other parts of Bosnia and using them repeatedly
to spearhead assaults. By September the momentum of the Croat
offensive had been reversed, with the ABH once again in control of
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significant parts of central Bosnia and the HVO in disarray, its ability
to survive increasingly dependent upon the direct intervention of
the HV. Strategic decision had not been achieved, however. In
November Croat counterattacks recouped some lost ground, and
at the moment of the February 1994 truce that brought an end to
the fighting, both sides were locked into something like a standoff.
In a larger sense, the contest had only worked to the advantage of
the Bosnian Serb party, which was able to use the strife between its
adversaries to consolidate gains elsewhere — but not, it is worth
noting, to strike decisively at Muslim strongholds and win the war.
The Muslim faction lost ground when disagreement with
Izetbegović over acceptable terms for a negotiated peace settlement
led local strongman Fikret (Babo) Abdić, speaking from Velika
Kladuša inside the Bihać pocket, to declare an Autonomous Province
of Western Bosnia on September 27, 1993. Abdić, the central figure
in the Agrokomerc banking scandal that traumatized Yugoslavia
in 1987, had outpolled Izetbegović in the Bosnian presidential
elections of 1990, but surrendered the position due to political
disagreements with the SDA. He was above all a businessman who
feared the effect of war without end upon the commercial interests
of his western Bosnian fiefdom. Immensely popular locally and with
ties to both Zagreb and Belgrade, Abdić called upon government
troops stationed in the enclave to join his cause, and was successful
in prompting the defection of two full ABH brigades, both raised
from the area of Velika Kladuša. He negotiated ceasefires with
Tudjman and Milošević, and, with a small private army of about
5,000, combatants organized in six brigades managed to fight off
several ABH offensives. In the spring of 1994, however, the Muslim
5th Corps under General Atif Dudaković succeeded in regaining
control of most of the pocket, forcing Abdić back into his stronghold
of Velika Kladuša.59 During the first months of 1994, no less than five
independently commanded military formations were active in the
small territory of the Cazinska Krajina — Abdić’s breakaway Muslim
forces, Dudaković’s 5th Corps of the ABH, the HV, the VRS, and the
Serb Army of the Krajina (supported by Belgrade and operating
from base areas across the border in close cooperation with the
VRS).60 The outbreak of fighting within the Muslim camp, and the
sequence of shifting associations between Croat, Serb, and Muslim
forces, revealed the degeneration of the Bosnian conflict into a series
of confused struggles for local control, with alliances of convenience
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blurring any sense of larger purpose, and with no end in sight.
Hope Is Not a Peace Plan.
On January 6, 1992, Lord Carrington proposed that separate
talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina be opened in the framework of the EC
mediation effort in Croatia, scheduled to shift its venue from The
Hague to Brussels. Two rounds of exploratory discussions were
conducted in Lisbon, Portugal (Portugal having assumed the EC’s
rotating presidency at the turn of the year) under the auspices of
the diplomat José Cutilheiro on February 21-22 and March 7-8. With
the impending Bosnian referendum serving as a spur to action, the
overriding concern of mediators was to block a spiral of conflict.
To that end, a blueprint was proposed that sought to come toward
the minimum goals of all contending parties. Bosnia-Herzegovina
was defined as a unitary state, but with three constituent units,
defined by ethnicity and with territorial integrity — one Bosnia
with three parts (Bosna cela iz tri dela) as some cynics chose to put it.
Three-and-a-half years later, after war had reduced the republic to
ruins, the international community would impose a framework for
peace with the same foundation, but in the spring of 1992 the idea
of cantonization, in effect a kind of soft partition arrangement, was
premature. While accepting the need to negotiate, Izetbegović was
opposed to any concession to the premise of communal division or
federalization. Stjepan Kljujić, who represented the HDZ in the first
Lisbon sessions, was also a champion of Bosnian unity, but upon
departing the discussions he was replaced by the Croat nationalist
Boban. The SDS had supported a partition arrangement in BosniaHerzegovina throughout 1991, but with the exigency, unacceptable
to its negotiating partners, that the Serb community receive control
over up to 70 percent of the national territory.61 In Sarajevo on
March 18-19, with war clouds looming, Cutilheiro managed to
cajole all faction leaders into signing a Statement of Principles for
New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina
that embodied the premise of ethnic compartmentalization, but no
effort was made to define the contours of the subunits in question.62
The fatal issue of control over terrain was simply not addressed
in a diplomatic expedient which Burg and Shoup describe as
characterized by “almost total confusion.”63 In a matter of days the
communal leaders had withdrawn their support, and the Cutilheiro
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plan languished.64
The intensity of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the
spring of 1992 onward took observers by surprise, and provoked
hasty efforts to bring the fighting under control. These efforts were
weakened from the start by constraining assumptions about the
nature of the conflict. The most basic was the assignment of nearly
all responsibility to the Serb faction and to its presumed sponsor in
Belgrade, accused of forwarding a “Serbian project systematically to
create, through violence that included ethnic cleansing, the borders
of a new, ethnically homogenous set of contiguous territories” that
could eventually be incorporated into a greater Serbia.65 The premise
of Serb guilt was articulated in a long list of official pronouncements.
On May 11 the EC’s Council of Ministers assigned responsibility for
the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the JNA and “the authorities
in Belgrade.” One day later the CSCE issued a Declaration on
Bosnia-Herzegovina that condemned Belgrade and the JNA for
“clear, gross, and persistent violations” of CSCE principles and
commitments. On May 15 UN Security Council Resolution No.
752 decried external interference in Bosnian affairs and requested
an immediate ceasefire, and on May 20 the U.S. State Department
urged sanctions as a response to “protracted Serbian aggression.”66
The interpretation was not incorrect in and of itself — the Serb
faction bore heavy responsibility for the course of events. But the
perception of exclusive Serb responsibility quickly came to dominate
interpretations of the entire Yugoslav problem, with unfortunate
side effects. The complexity of underlying issues was obscured by
one-dimensional explanations focused on Serb imperialism, the
obstructionism practiced by competing factions was downplayed or
ignored, and the need to come toward Serb concerns as a part of an
enduring settlement was made more difficult.
The case against the Serb faction was strengthened by the shelling
of a bread line in downtown Sarajevo on May 27, 1992, killing 16
and leaving 140 wounded, and by revelations in July and August
concerning Serb inspired ethnic cleansing and the mistreatment of
prisoners in detention camps.67 These exposés created an ethical
climate that was unpropitious to pragmatic diplomatic bargaining. On
August 13 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
No. 771 condemning violations of international humanitarian law in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and requested that information concerning
such violations be submitted to UN authorities. But growing
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outrage over Serb conduct did not affect the international consensus
opposing military intervention. NATO estimates, perhaps designed
to dampen enthusiasm, indicated that a force of at least 460,000,
including 200,000 Americans, would be required to reverse the Serb
offensive, and neither the U.S. administration of President George
Bush nor its European allies judged that the interests at stake were
sufficient to justify such a commitment.68 Warren Zimmermann,
who served as the last U.S. ambassador in Yugoslavia, suggests
that “the use of force was simply too big a step to consider.”69 As
late as December 1992, NATO reiterated its opposition to troop
deployments in Bosnia-Herzegovina.70 On May 13 UN Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted a Report on BosniaHerzegovina based upon the findings of Undersecretary Marack
Goulding that urged humanitarian assistance but characterized the
situation as “tragic, dangerous, full of violence, and confusing,”
and therefore inappropriate for UN sponsored peace operations.71
Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić spoke to an emergency
session of the Islamic Conference Organization on June 17 to request
intervention in the name of Muslim solidarity, but responses were
noncommittal.
The refusal to consider military means meant that the international
community was not prepared to administer the only remedy that
corresponded to its preferred diagnosis of the Yugoslav pathology.
What it supplied instead was a long series of feeble gestures — UN
resolutions (no less than 54 UN resolutions on the Yugoslav conflict
were issued by December 1993), sanctions, embargos, peacekeepers
where there was no peace to keep, celebrity visits to embattled
Sarajevo, empty threats, and endless mediation — that produced
considerable sound and fury but did little to deter the dynamic of
conflict on the ground.
Even if a large-scale military intervention could have been
mounted, it is not clear that it would have sufficed to bring the
conflict to an end. Belgrade’s aspiration to create a greater Serbia
was a part of the problem, but not the whole. Milošević had taken to
the hustings on behalf of Serb nationalism as a means to consolidate
power, but he had no sincere commitment to the Serbian national
cause. His influence over the Serb entities in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina, though considerable, was not absolute. Zagreb’s
role in the Bosnian conflict, complicated by the priority accorded
to recouping control over the UNPAs inside Croatia, was nearly
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identical to that of Belgrade. James Gow has argued that a lack of
will was the fatal weakness of international mediation in Bosnia,
and he is correct to the extent that a will to act was woefully
lacking.72 But it is also necessary to consider what courses of action
would have contributed to achieving a lasting peace. A settlement
imposed at the Serbs’ expense at the outset might have prevented
an escalation of the conflict, and saved lives, but lacking a larger
concept for reestablishing regional order it would not have resolved
the manifold dilemmas created by Yugoslavia’s disintegration.
In lieu of a decisive intervention, the international community
sought to contain the conflict by isolating the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and reducing its ability to aid and abet a war effort, while
simultaneously supporting a humanitarian relief effort to address
the human dimensions of the tragedy — a policy of “containment
with charity” in the bitter phrase of Susan Woodward.73 The
arms embargo imposed during the war in Croatia in September
1991 was maintained despite concern that it disadvantaged the
Muslim faction. Economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia imposed by the EC in November 1991 were reinforced
on May 30, 1992, by UN Security Council Resolution No. 757,
blocking commercial transactions, freezing credit, and closing down
international air travel. Another UN resolution of April 17, 1993,
deepened the sanctions and tightened controls.
In the early summer of 1992 the UNPROFOR mandate was
extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The original purpose of the
deployments was to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance,
but the mission was steadily expanded to include the protection
of Sarajevo Airport, mounting guard for convoys, oversight of
ceasefires, monitoring of military exclusion zones, and deterrence of
local aggression. In July 1992, at UN request, the Western European
Union and NATO agreed to enforce the economic embargo by
monitoring shipping on the Danube and along the Adriatic coast
(Operation Otranto), and in November the mandate was extended to
include “Stop and Search” missions. On October 9, 1992, the United
States gained approval for UN Security Council Resolution No.
781, imposing a No Fly Zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina that NATO
would eventually agree to enforce. UN Security Council Resolution
No. 816 of March 31, 1993, granted NATO aircraft permission to
shoot down planes violating no-fly restrictions. In December 1992
the UN approved the creation of a third UNPROFOR command in
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Macedonia, to be based along the border between Macedonia and
Serbia and intended as a preventive deployment to deter aggression.
Three hundred fifteen U.S. soldiers joined the contingent in the
summer of 1993 as Operation ABLE SENTRY, the first time ever that
U.S. soldiers were committed to an operation under UN command.
These initiatives deepened the international community’s
engagement, but did not provide effective tools for shaping the
conflict environment. Instead, lack of consensus concerning
priorities, limited mandates, and aversion to risk encouraged
mission creep. When UNPROFOR commander Phillippe Morillon
of France was temporarily detained by outraged citizens demanding
protection during a visit to the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica on
March 11, 1993, he took the personal initiative of declaring the
city a UN “Safe Area.” In June, with UN approval, the designation
was extended to Sarajevo, Goražde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Žepa, and
Bihać. Unfortunately, the term safe area was a euphemism, used
to describe what were in fact encircled and indefensible enclaves,
teeming with displaced persons and with a combined population
of over 1.2 million. In direct contravention of the safe area concept,
several of the enclaves were used by Muslim forces as sanctuaries
for launching raids against Serb-held territories. By assuming
responsibility for their protection, UNPROFOR had “saddled itself
with a responsibility it was not prepared to honor” and extended its
mandate to the breaking point.74
Cumulatively, these measures did little to slow down the war.
Arms, petroleum, and lubricants found their way into the hands of
combatants despite the international embargo. The warring factions
bartered among themselves for needed supplies, especially in the
area of the enclaves. UNPROFOR was frustrated by divisions at the
command level, a lack of intelligence and communications assets
in theater, and restrictive rules of engagement inappropriate for
the kind of peace support functions that it was asked to carry out.
Between April 1992 and May 1994, no less than 77 ceasefires were
negotiating between warring parties, all of which were broken in
short order. Sanctions did serious damage to the Serbian economy,
but also had the effect of strengthening popular affiliation with
Milošević by allowing him to blame Yugoslavia’s misfortunes upon
foreign enemies. Preventive deployment in Macedonia provided
reassurance to Skopje, but given the multiple pressures to which
Belgrade was being subjected there was no real threat to deter. The
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concept of the safe area was a gesture of solidarity with the Muslim
population under assault, but UNPROFOR, and the governments of
the contributing powers that stood behind it, was not prepared to
make good on its promises — only 7,000 of the 34,000 peacekeepers
pledged to defend the safe areas ever arrived in theater.
The diplomatic track originally developed by Lord Carrington
was broadened in August 1992 with the creation of a new mediation
forum under joint EC and UN auspices. A London-based International
Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) sponsored by the EC, UN,
CSCE, and Islamic Conference Organization, and including over 30
national delegations, launched the initiative on August 26-27. The
conference drew up a list of 12 principles to guide the peacemaking
effort, and created a Permanent Committee co-chaired by Lord
David Owen for the EC and Cyrus Vance for the UN, six working
groups to address specific aspects of the crisis, and a secretariat with
seats in Geneva, Switzerland. In a meeting in Geneva on September
3, the Permanent Committee incorporated three representatives
each from the EC and CSCE, representatives of the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council, one representative of the
Islamic Conference Organization, two representatives of countries
bordering the war zone, and Lord Carrington. So constituted, the
ICFY represented a considerable (and cumbersome) bureaucratic
apparatus, established as a permanent forum devoted entirely to the
challenge of peacemaking.
The first major initiative of the ICFY was the so-called VanceOwen Peace Plan, unveiled at a meeting in Geneva on January 3, 1993
where Karadžić, Boban, and Izetbegović represented the Bosnian
factions, and presidents Dobrica Čosić and Tudjman the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia. In retrospect, Vance-Owen
appears as a desperate effort to rescue the idea of a unitary state
by making limited concessions to the premise of ethnic partition.
According to the plan, Bosnia-Herzegovina would be divided into
ten provinces — three Serb, three Muslim, two Croat, and one
Croat-Muslim, plus the “mixed” city of Sarajevo. Each province
would have a governor representing the dominant community
plus two vice governors representing the minority communities.
Considerable local autonomy was accorded to the provinces, and
the central government was intentionally kept weak. The ethnic
factions were asked to surrender weapons within their own “home”
provinces as a step toward demilitarization, and an international
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police force was to be organized to ensure order. The plan had
notable attractions. It addressed Serb aggression by reducing the
extent of the three Serb cantons to 43 percent of the national territory
and keeping them physically divided, thus preventing the emergence
of a consolidated Bosnian Serb area with the potential to affiliate
with neighboring Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina was sustained
as a unitary state, and a context for reversing at least some of the
consequences of ethnic cleansing was put in place. Both Tudjman
and Milošević bought into the plan — the territorial provisions were
generous to the Croat community, and the Serbian leader (who had
probably made the calculation that the plan could never be enforced)
was willing to sacrifice Pale’s maximal demands in exchange for a
lifting of international sanctions against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
Despite its promise, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was not
acceptable to all local actors, and did not generate consensus
within the international community. The Bosnian Serbs rejected
the arrangements out of hand. Izetbegović, with characteristic
indecisiveness, begrudgingly expressed a willingness to consider the
terms, but left no doubt as to his dissatisfaction.75 Most significantly,
the United States refused to support the project on the grounds that
it awarded Serb aggression. The alternative offered by the Clinton
administration, still in the process of defining its approach to the
Bosnian problem and torn by conflicting motives, became known
as “Lift and Strike” — lifting the arms embargo against the Muslim
party in order to allow it to organize a more effective defense (a
policy that demanded collaboration with Croatia to ensure access
for arms transfers) and selective air strikes under NATO auspices
to punish Serb violations.76 In his memoir, David Owen lambastes
what he calls a U.S. policy of “lift and pray” as “outrageous” and a
“nightmare” intended to sabotage the mediation effort in order to
cater to domestic interest groups.77 According to some accounts, a
reading of Stephen Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts had convinced the U.S.
president that engagement of U.S. ground forces in the Bosnian
quagmire was to be avoided at all costs.78 Whether or not Kaplan’s
book was responsible, the judgment was seconded by key figures in
the U.S. security establishment.79 Whatever the motivation, the U.S.
call for a selective end to the arms embargo, coupled with a refusal
to commit troops to the peacekeeping mission where its European
allies were already significantly engaged, created trans-Atlantic
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friction.
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan’s complexity was unavoidable in
view of the tangled issues on the table, but complexity may have
worked against acceptance by making implementation seem so
distant a possibility as not to merit concessions. The refusal of the
international community to pledge significant resources to enforce
the plan in the event of implementation was also a serious draw back.
Most decisive, however, was the continued lack of commitment to a
negotiated outcome on the part of the warring factions themselves.
Only the Croats offered unambiguous support for a plan that
satisfied nearly all of their territorial ambitions. The Muslim faction
remained noncommittal and unenthusiastic, even after the plan was
adjusted to come toward its territorial demands, and the Serbs were
consistently rejectionist. In retrospect it is not clear that, even with
a green light from Pale, the plan could have been enforced on the
ground.
No such green light was forthcoming. Under pressure from his
patron Milošević and Greek president Konstantin Mitsotakis, at
the conclusion of a two day session conducted on May 1-2, 1993,
in Athens, Karadžić agreed to accept the arrangement, pending
approval by the Bosnian Serb parliament in Pale.80 The condition
proved to be decisive — on May 5-6, after a burly debate described
by Laura Silber and Allan Little as a “dark farce,” with opposition led
by Biljana Plavšić and Ratko Mladić, the Bosnian Serb deputies voted
51-2 (with 12 abstentions) to reject the plan.81 A public referendum
subsequently affirmed the result. During the Pale debates, Milošević
cut the sorry figure of a sorcerer’s apprentice unable to control the
forces of aggrieved nationalism that he had helped to conjure up.
His unprincipled diplomacy was now beginning to run against the
tides of the anarchic fragmentation that the willful destruction of
Yugoslavia had provoked.
The Bosnian Serb rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan
corresponded with Vance’s resignation as UN envoy and replacement
by the Norwegian Thorvald Stoltenberg. In August 1993 the ICFY
presented a new Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan that took a step away
from the ideal of a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina by recommending
the creation of a three-part confederation, 51 percent of which would
be controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, 30 percent by the Muslims, and
16 percent by the Bosnian Croats, with the remaining 3 percent
representing the municipalities of Mostar and Sarajevo, to be placed
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under international (EC and UN respectively) control. The plan had
its origins in a June proposal originating in Zagreb and Belgrade,
calling for the transformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a “union
of three republics,” that was approved by Tudjman and Milošević,
albeit with the proviso that the individual units be granted a “right
to self-determination.”82 The project was originally refused by the
Muslim side, but revised to incorporate some of Izetbegović’s key
demands, including an outlet to the Adriatic accorded by the Croat
side, and a corridor of access to the Goražde enclave promised by
the Serbs. On September 20, 1993, on board the HMS Invincible in
the Adriatic, the Serbian and Croatian leaders and Momir Bulatović
of Montenegro, together with Izetbegović, Karadžic, and Boban
representing the Bosnian factions, accepted the Owen-Stoltenberg
proposals in principle, with the condition that plebiscites on selfdetermination could be conducted after a 2-year waiting period. Back
on shore, Izetbegović reconsidered his position, and ultimately opted
to reject the plan after the Bosnian parliament had undermined its
logic by affixing additional conditions as prerequisites for support.
In November 1993, pressured by concern for the humanitarian
consequences of a third winter of war, a French-German initiative,
eventually dubbed the European Union “Action Plan,” (on
November 1, 1993, the European Community was officially renamed
the European Union--EU) sought to revive the Owen-Stoltenberg
approach by increasing pressure on the Muslim faction to accept an
agreement that satisfied most of its territorial demands, and offering
to suspend sanctions against Yugoslavia in exchange for greater
flexibility on territorial issues. In the background of these talks,
secret exchanges under European sponsorship concerning the Serboccupied parts of Croatia were underway in Norway — an exchange
that came to an abrupt halt when Tudjman publicly announced that
concessions to Croatia’s Serb minority would be limited to “local
cultural autonomy.”83 These various efforts were nonstarters, and
by December it was clear that an EU initiative had once again led to
“abject failure.”84
The travail of international mediation in the Bosnian conflict
during 1992-1993 can be attributed to several factors. First and most
fundamental, a will to peace was still absent among the contending
Bosnian factions. The Croat faction was willing to sign on to
agreements that satisfied its territorial demands, but not to make
sacrifices in order to win the acquiescence of its rivals. Commitment
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to prosecute the war in central Bosnia left the HDZ without positive
diplomatic options. The Serb faction defied external pressure and
clung desperately to the territorial gains that it had achieved in the
first months of combat. With its essential goals accomplished and a
strong military position that only an unlikely external intervention
seemed capable of reversing, and in the absence of any coherent
concept for ending the war diplomatically, Pale saw little use for
compromise. In the summer of 1993, with Mostar under siege and
the Muslims’ strategic position temporarily declining, Izetbegović
began to entertain concessions, but only reluctantly. As the
Muslims’ military fortunes improved, willingness to compromise
melted away. All parties to the conflict continued to perceive the
war instrumentally, as a means toward the achievement of political
goals. The “hurting stalemate” of conflict management theory,
where the costs of continued engagement are perceived to outweigh
achievable strategic gains, had not yet been reached.85
The initiatives of the international community were also
inconsistent. The Yugoslavia idea had been sacrificed on the alter of a
putative right of national self-determination, but self-determination
was rejected as a mechanism for conflict resolution in the case of
Bosnia. The varied ICFY peace proposals, based upon the premise that
aggression should not be rewarded by sanctioning the consolidation
of ethnically pure enclaves, recommended reconfiguring BosniaHerzegovina as a kind of Yugoslavia in miniature, a federative
association of cantons or provinces with a weak central government
and civil service defined by ethnic quotas. Such a solution did
not satisfy the core demands of any of the parties to the conflict.
The Serb and Croat factions wanted self-determination and the
right to attach to their national homelands. The Muslims wanted
a unitary state with a strong central government. All parties were
willing to fight for their agendas, and the international community
was not prepared to take decisive steps to impose peace. Though
UNPROFOR deployments grew from 1500 troops in August 1992 to
over 23,000 by 1995, they were never sufficient to the task at hand.
The international embargo intended to prevent arms transfers into
the conflict zone was ineffective. A variety of routes continued to
bring arms and munitions to the contending armies, which managed
to increase the size and sophistication of their arsenals as the conflict
progressed.86 Sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro damaged
the fabric of the national economy and pressed large numbers of
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citizens into poverty, but did not affect the well-being of ruling
elites.87 They had some impact upon Milošević’s decision to support
a negotiated solution, but his own strategic calculation that the war
had served its purpose of helping consolidate power, and now
placed its exercise at risk, would no doubt have been made with or
without the added impetus that sanctions provided. The creation
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
finally charted in May 1993, was in principle a groundbreaking
gesture toward a more exigent international war convention, but
the ICTY was insufficiently funded, understaffed, and pursued its
dossiers too slowly to make a real difference. Humanitarian relief
efforts helped to address the suffering created by years of war, but
a significant portion of official aid was siphoned off by criminal
elements associated with the warring factions and never reached its
intended goal. The most efficient aid programs were conducted by
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and volunteer associations
that avoided official channels and sought to work directly with
individuals in need.
Another reason for lack of progress, as in the Croatian conflict
during 1991-92, was disaccord among the powers. Only the United
States and NATO were in a position to provide decisive leadership.
But the Bush administration was not convinced of U.S. stakes in the
conflict, and, during its first year in office, the Clinton administration
was indecisive, anxious to align with the Muslim cause on
moral grounds, but deterred by the potential costs of unilateral
engagement.88 By opposing the Vance-Owen peace initiative, the
United States ensured its failure, but it was not able to produce a
credible alternative. The Lift and Strike option was contested from
the start, and after an unsuccessful tour of European capitals by
Secretary of State Warren Christopher during May, during which
the U.S. initiative met with near unanimous rejection, it had no
substance as policy at all. Almost by default, the least common
denominator of containment with charity continued to prevail.
An Endgame Strategy.
On February 5, 1994, a mortar shell landed in the Markale market
in Sarajevo, killing 65 and wounding over 200. Ghastly images of
the carnage were broadcast worldwide. Serb sources were quick to
suggest that the Muslims had staged the atrocity to win sympathy,
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and circumstances made it difficult to assign responsibility
definitively. General Michael Rose, commander of the UNPROFOR
for Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated that an analysis of the crater did not
allow conclusions concerning the trajectory of the shell, and Yasushi
Akashi, special envoy of the UN Secretary General, expressed
“certain doubts” about the round’s origin.89 But the act was consistent
with a long-established pattern of Bosnian Serb shelling, and Pale
was immediately condemned in the court of world opinion.90 In
retrospect, by galvanizing the international community and reviving
U.S. determination to lead, the incident seems to have functioned
as a cathartic event, shattering the acquiescence that had hindered
international conflict management efforts in the past.
A first consequence was to energize NATO as a strategic actor.
On February 7, the Atlantic Alliance set a 10-day ultimatum for
the withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons and mortars from a twenty
kilometer “total exclusion zone” around Sarajevo. As an alternative,
the Serbs were instructed to establish nine weapons storage sites
outside the zone, to be controlled by UNPROFOR but accessible in
case of a Bosnian Muslim attack. After complicated negotiations,
the Bosnians Serbs finally agreed to comply with these conditions,
but only begrudgingly and with the support provided by some 400
Russian soldiers moved into Sarajevo from the Russian UNPROFOR
contingent in Croatia’s UNPA-East.91 NATO’s intervention had
forced the Russians hand — Moscow had no desire to cede ground
in Bosnia to an organization that it still regarded as an international
competitor. In principle Russian engagement helped to establish the
peacemaking effort on a broader international foundation, but it also
posed complications by making it necessary to coordinate policy
with Moscow’s agenda.
The Sarajevo crisis arrived at a delicate moment for the Russian
Federation. As Yeltsin’s relations with his parliament disintegrated
during 1992, policy toward the Yugoslav crisis became a more
important source of discord.92 With the conflict in Bosnia heating
up, small numbers of Russian mercenaries, inspired by the 19th
century Pan-Slav tradition and sponsored by ephemeral nationalpatriotic organizations with political connections, made their way
to Yugoslavia to fight for the Serb cause.93 During the latter months
of 1992 and 1993, the debate over relations with Serbia became
more strident. On September 23, 1992, the chair of the parliament’s
Constitutional Commission, Oleg Rumianstev, described policy
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toward Serbia as “a betrayal of Russian interests.”94 Foreign Minister
Kozyrev’s bizarre speech before the CSCE foreign ministers
conference at Stockholm on December 14, 1992, in which he pretended
to support extreme nationalist positions in order to dramatize “the
danger that threatens our course in post-communist Europe,” added
fuel to the fire.95 One of the main shocks offered in the speech was
a condemnation of sanctions against Yugoslavia and the assertion
that Russia would consider “unilateral measures” if they were not
lifted. “In its struggle,” the Russian foreign minister intoned, “the
present government of Serbia can count on the support of great
Russia.”96 This phrase was singled out for special condemnation by
the chair of the parliament’s Committee on International Relations
and Foreign Economic Affairs, Evgenii Ambartsumov, for whom
Kozyrev’s exercise in diplomatic irony sounded suspiciously “like
an ultimatum delivered to the Serbian leadership.”97 For the most
outspoken parliamentary critics, the government’s policy was
“tragic” and a “criminal” mistake that sullied “our traditional
ties with Serbia, Slavic ties and Orthodox ties.”98 Under domestic
pressure, in 1993 Russian diplomacy in former Yugoslavia became
more active. Special envoy Vitalii Churkin, who had made only two
visits to former Yugoslavia in all of 1992, was constantly underway
between the former Yugoslav republics from the first months of 1993
onward. In May 1993, Kozyrev visited Belgrade for the first time in
nearly a year.99
In October 1993 the conflict between president and parliament
was resolved after a fashion when Yeltsin resorted to a cannonade to
disperse his recalcitrant deputies after they had occupied the “White
House” serving as the seat of government in Moscow. Two months
later, in hastily scheduled national elections, the ultra-nationalist,
and rhetorically pro-Serb Liberal Democratic Party led by Vladimir
Zhirinovskii received the highest percentage of votes in balloting
by party list.100 During a visit to Serbia and Montenegro during the
first week of February 1994, Zhirinovskii drenched his audiences in
bombast, adopting the rhetoric of Serb nationalism by intoning that
“Russia and Serbia have only two enemies, Catholicism from the
West and Islam from the East,” and evoking, during public remarks
at Brčko, a Russian “secret weapon” capable of terrorizing the
West.101 Yeltsin’s decision to abandon the pro-Western orientation
that had inspired Balkan policy in the past, and to come toward the
Bosnian Serb position at least symbolically, was an attempt to co-opt
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the popular sentiments that Zhirinoskii’s posing encouraged. Under
the gun of the NATO ultimatum, Yeltsin put his prestige on the line
by directly contacting Milošević and Karadžić and offering Russian
support to encourage compliance. The result seemed to be a triumph
for Russian diplomacy. Russian units were greeted in Bosnia by
cheering crowds, and the pullback of Serb weapons proceeded
smoothly.102 The moral, from a Russian perspective, was clear: “The
Serbs had not yielded to the ultimatum, to the U.S.A., or to the West
as a whole, but they were willing to listen to the opinion of their
traditional Russian partner.”103 Serb nationalist opinion rejoiced that
after 3 years of “disorientation, despair, pain, and dissatisfaction,”
Moscow had realized that “historically tested and friendly relations”
with the Serbs corresponded to “the vital requirements and longterm national and state interests of Russia.”104 There was a good deal
of wishful thinking built into these assessments, but for the time
being Russia’s diplomatic ploy seemed to increase the diplomatic
stakes in the Bosnian crisis considerably.
Partisans of a stronger U.S. role viewed Russia’s initiative as
obstructive, and regretted that, by defusing the Sarajevo crisis
prematurely, it had preempted a more decisive confrontation with
Serb forces. Behind the scenes a major reformulation of U.S-Bosnian
policy was nonetheless underway.105 By the beginning of 1994 the
conflict had begun to impact more viscerally upon substantial
U.S. interests — stability in Europe, the viability of the Atlantic
Alliance, relations with Russia, reputation in the Muslim world,
and America’s stature as global leader. Moreover, the Clinton
administration was looking forward to mid-term elections and had
begun to be concerned about the potential for the Bosnian imbroglio
to damage its standing with the electorate. This combination of
interests was too potent to ignore, and it provoked a concerted effort
to devise an effective strategy for bringing the conflict under control.
According to the emerging U.S. policy framework put together after
the Sarajevo ultimatum, NATO would become the focus of a strategy
of coercive diplomacy aimed specifically at the Serb faction and its
territorial dominance inside Bosnia-Herzegovina, judged to be the
single biggest obstacle to a negotiated peace.
In February-March 1994, building on the momentum of the
Serb withdrawal from the outskirts of Sarajevo, Western pressure
achieved the reopening of Tuzla Airport, with Russian observers
brought in to monitor compliance. Though justified as a means
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to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, the gesture also had
strategic significance — Tuzla was a bastion of support for a unified,
multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it would eventually become
the focus of the U.S. military presence in the region. On February 27,
in line with the strategic reappraisal underway, two NATO aircraft
shot down four Yugoslav Jastreb jet fighters that had trespassed
the no-fly zone near Banja Luka. This was the first combat action
undertaken by the Alliance since its establishment in 1949, and a
harbinger of things to come. On April 10-12, NATO launched a set
of three symbolic air strikes against Serb positions during fighting
in the Goražde enclave, and on April 22, with Goražde still under
siege, committed to ensure the defense of the Žepa, Tuzla, Bihać,
and Srebrenica safe areas.106 A Serb attack against a French armored
vehicle during fighting around Sarajevo provoked a NATO a
response against a derelict Serb tank destroyer inside the exclusion
zone on September 22. The vehicle was selected from a target list
by Yasushi Akashi and the attack was never considered to be more
than a symbolic gesture. Though militarily ineffective (some did not
hesitate to call it pathetic), the action could nonetheless be interpreted
as a signal of resolve. On November 21 NATO aircraft attacked the
Udbina airbase in the Kninska Krajina, from which Serb air strikes
had been launched against Bihać, and did more substantial damage,
even if strikes were limited to the airfields only, and targeted areas
were quickly repaired. These raids were followed on November 23
by strikes against the radar facilities (but not launchers) at three Serb
SAM sites in the Bihać area.
The West’s more assertive military posture was matched by a new
diplomatic approach. In January 1994 representatives of the Muslim
and Bosnian Croat factions came together under U.S. auspices in
the Petersberg conference center near Bonn. Three months later, on
March 18, 1994, a Washington Agreement announced the creation
of a Bosnian Croat-Muslim Federation. This agreement, concluded
between the Croat HDZ and Muslim SDA factions, was the result
of patient prodding from Washington.107 It brought an end to the
year-long war between Croat and Muslim forces in central Bosnia
and Herzegovina, where Muslim forces had scored significant
advances since the preceding summer, and allowed the two factions
to make common cause against the Bosnian Serbs. Neither the HDZ
nor the SDA had changed its nationalist stripes, or abandoned
long-term goals. The Croat faction was won over with promises
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of economic confederation with Croatia, and by the opportunity
to escape from a military stalemate in which it could not hope to
prevail.108 The SDA was attracted by the military advantages of
a ceasefire. In order to insure cooperation, on February 8, 1994,
the Tudjman regime engineered the ouster of hard liner Boban as
HDZ faction chief on behalf of the more accommodating Krešimir
Zubak.109 The Washington Agreement was an arrangement of
convenience that allowed the HDZ and SDA to concentrate upon a
common adversary.110 Despite pledges of good intentions, including
an agreement to combine their respective armed forces in a new
“Federation Army,” the federation did not give rise to common
institutions or a meaningful commitment to cohabitation. It did,
with the assistance of UNPROFOR monitors, allow contending
Muslim and Croat forces in central Bosnia to disengage, and permit
the siege of Mostar to be lifted. Military pressure against Serb
positions was correspondingly increased. Strategically, the accord
created an objective foundation for the U.S. determination to direct
cumulative pressure against the Bosnian Serbs, and ultimately, by
allowing a territorial division within the province that did not work
egregiously to the Muslims’ disadvantage, made the option of a soft
partition easier to contemplate. Ivo Daalder describes it as “the [U.S.]
administration’s first successful Bosnian initiative.”111
In April 1994 a new international negotiating forum known as
the Contact Group was formed to concentrate attention on Bosnian
peace initiatives and create a context for collaboration among the
great powers. The original members were the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Russian Federation.112
The perceived need for the Contact Group was a reflection of the
frustration that combined UN-EU efforts under the ICFY had
engendered over the past year.113 Though the group’s first sessions
gave rise to familiar wrangling over ends and means, in late May
its members met with the Bosnian factions in Talloires, France,
and began to work out the outline of a peace arrangement. Almost
overnight the Contact Group, which provided a mechanism for
engaging Russia more directly in the mediation effort, seemed to
have supplanted the ICFY as a consultative forum and facilitator for
conflict management.
By July the Contact Group had produced a new framework for
peace negotiations, based upon a proposed 51/49 percent territorial
split between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serbs.
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The plan was another attempt to square the circle by maintaining
a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina while granting territorial status and
political identity to its constituent ethnic nations. It was originally
presented on July 6 as a take it or leave it ultimatum, with a 2-week
period for consideration and a promise of punitive action against
recalcitrant parties. The Bosnian Muslim and Croat factions, now
increasingly amenable to Washington’s lead, and calculating that
the Bosnian Serbs would reject the scheme in any case, bought in
to the plan without conditions. The Milošević government, whose
ability to pressure the Bosnian Serbs was considered to be critically
important, supported the concept.114 But the Bosnian Serbs, who
were asked to make territorial concessions but also rewarded with
international recognition and the capacity to retain independent
armed forces, remained recalcitrant. The July 20 deadline was
repeatedly extended as the Serb faction raised new conditions.
Finally, after another overwhelmingly negative popular referendum
conducted at the beginning of August, Pale refused to accept the
terms. Blinded by its territorial conquests and apparently incapable
of thinking strategically, the Bosnian Serb leadership had become
an immovable object blocking any and all negotiated options. The
central strategic challenge for international mediators, in line with
what had become the preferred U.S. approach, now became how to
coerce the Bosnian Serbs to trade land for peace.
Fighting continued as these diplomatic initiatives unfolded. In
March and April, triggered by Muslim raiding into Serb-controlled
territory, a Bosnian Serb offensive pressed toward Goražde,
the largest and best defended of the eastern Bosnian safe areas.
Swollen to a population of over 70,000 including refugees, hosting
the important Podjeba munitions factory complex, and the closest
Muslim-held territory to Serbia proper, the enclave was considered
to be of great strategic importance. By mid-April Goražde was in the
range of Serb artillery fire and appeared to be on the verge of falling.
On April 23 UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi, perhaps concerned
for the fate of UNPROFOR soldiers inside the enclave, refused a
request from NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to use
NATO airpower to force the Serbs back.115 By April 26 Bosnian Serb
forces began to withdraw on their own initiative — General Mladić
was once again hindered by the lack of sufficient infantry to overrun
fixed defenses — and fighting within the enclave came to a halt.116
The precarious situation of the enclaves had been demonstrated yet
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again, however, and mistrust between the UNPROFOR and NATO
command structures was aggravated. In the U.S. perspective, the
perception that only credible counter force would serve to reduce
Serb pretensions was greatly strengthened.
During the summer, violations of the Sarajevo exclusion zone by
both sides multiplied, and in August and September fighting swirled
around the beleaguered city. Bosnian Serb actions, which included
repeated efforts to close Sarajevo airport and the single road leading
out of the city to the UN logistics base in Kiseljak, could be interpreted
as a direct challenge to the UN mandate for Bosnia-Herzegovina,
originally intended to support the delivery of humanitarian
assistance. On several occasions UNPROFOR commander Rose
threatened air strikes against both belligerents to punish violations
of the exclusion zone. Simultaneously, a coordinated Muslim-Croat
offensive retook Kupreš in central Bosnia, and fighting erupted
around Donji Vakuf, Glamoć, and Bosansko Grahovo. In July,
the ABH’s 5th Corps under General Atif Dudaković achieved a
major victory by beating down resistance in the Bihać pocket and
forcing Abdić to withdraw to the Serb-controlled Krajina. Inspired
by success, on October 26 Dudaković launched a drive to break
out from the pocket into central Bosnia, but ran headlong into a
Bosnian Serb counter-offensive that by late November threatened
to overrun Bihać itself. Once again an acrimonious debate erupted
among the Western allies over the feasibility of a NATO air response
in defense of a safe area under siege, with General Rose ultimately
refusing the air strike option as incompatible with his peacekeeping
mandate. The crisis was defused, but not resolved, at the 11th hour
by another voluntary Serb withdrawal. Patience with UNPROFOR’s
self-imposed caution was growing thin, however, and Washington’s
determination to use NATO as a means for forcing Serb compliance
had now fully matured.
Despite a more assertive U.S. posture, as 1995 dawned the
Bosnian conflict remained a troublesome issue in U.S. domestic
policy, and a divisive dilemma for trans-Atlantic relations.
With presidential elections now on the horizon, the Republicancontrolled Congress defied administration policy by voting to lift
the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina
unilaterally. Key European allies were simultaneously signaling
their unwillingness to maintain commitments to UNPROFOR in
the event that the Americans, without ground forces in the theater
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that would be subject to reprisals, should break ranks and supply
arms to one of the belligerents. The U.S. was committed to support
an UNPROFOR pullout with its own forces — a potentially costly
undertaking with all the trappings of an election year nightmare.117
Under the circumstances, the option for decisive engagement
that had ripened over the past year appeared less risky than
futile attempts to maintain the status quo, or abject withdrawal.
Meanwhile, the arrogance of the Serb conquerors seemed to know
no bounds. On February 19, 1995, against a background of pervasive
popular suffering, the gangster Arkan, architect of Serb ethnic
cleansing, married the popular singer Ceca in an ostentatious public
ceremony in Belgrade’s Intercontinental Hotel.118 As the organized
criminal element within the Milošević regime became ever more
blatant, the case for increased international engagement became
more compelling.
The central strategic problem remained how to force Serb
withdrawal from contested territories in order to create a more
equitable balance on the ground. NATO air power could not win
and hold terrain without the support of ground maneuver forces,
the Western allies were not about to undertake a large-scale theater
campaign, and the HVO and ABH were only capable of sustaining
local offensives. But there was a force in the theater ready to take
the field against the Serbs. This was the HV, increasingly competent
operationally, motivated to liberate Croatian territory under Serb
control, and ready to carry the battle into Bosnia if asked. In an
interview of November 18, 1994, Tudjman had signaled his interest
in an internationally supervised division of spoils in Bosnia,
speaking of the need for a “new Congress of Berlin” that would
allow the Serbs to surrender western Bosnia up to the Vrbas River
in exchange for control of the eastern Bosnian enclaves (Žepa,
Srebrenica, and Goražde) and a right to attach the Republika Srpska
to Serbia proper.119 This agenda could easily be combined with the
concept of a military offensive intended to right the strategic balance
and create a foundation for negotiated solutions. In the spring of
1995 the moderate wing of Tudjman’s HDZ, led by Josip Manolić
and Stipe Mesić, broke away in protest against the regime’s growing
authoritarianism and corruption. Eventually the split would lead to
the HDZ’s political effacement, but in the short-term it had the effect
of removing temperate voices opposed to military solutions. With his
communist background, authoritarianism, and crude nationalism
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Tudjman was in most ways a mirror image of Milošević. But transit
rights in Croatia, with its long Adriatic coastline and access to the
Bosnian interior, was vital to the Western conflict management effort,
and the Croatian leadership was anxious to further cooperation
with the West. Over the past year, with U.S. assistance offered both
through official channels and the Virginia based private contractor
Military Professional Resources, Inc. (staffed by an impressive list
of former U.S. military commanders), the HV had been transformed
into a competent armed force.120 It would now be tasked with the
work of what the U.S. diplomat Robert Frasure called the “junk
yard dog” in applying land power as a coercive tool against the Serb
redoubts in Slavonia, Krajina, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.121
In the first days of May 1995 Croatian forces attacked Sector West
of the Republic of Serb Krajina (western Slavonia) in a coordinated
offensive designated Operation FLASH (Bljesak). On May 1 Croatian
forces launched assaults along the Zagreb-Belgrade highway
between Novo Gradiška and Okunčani, and by May 3 Jasenovac,
Pakrac, and Okunčani had fallen, while tens of thousands of Serb
refugees poured across the border into Serbia proper. Resistance by
Serb defenders, betrayed by their political leaders, abandoned by
their military commanders, and left without a hint of support from
Belgrade, was quickly overcome. On May 3, at the noon hour, 11
Orkan missiles were fired from the territory of the Kninska Krajina
against Zagreb, killing one and wounding 40. The military relevance
of the rocket strikes was minor, but once again an egregious act
of violence insured that the Serbs would lose the battle of public
opinion. During Operation Flash the HV demonstrated its ability
to achieve decisive operational success. Perhaps more importantly,
the much-ballyhooed Serb autonomous region was exposed as a
house of cards, corroded from within by corruption and incapable
of defending itself.122 Croatia’s precipitous action was criticized
internationally, but it was a first step toward coercing a Serb
drawback as a prerequisite for a negotiated settlement.
In late May NATO aircraft launched several attacks against
Bosnian Serb targets to enforce a ceasefire in the Sarajevo exclusion
zone. In retaliation, Pale seized approximately 400 UN peacekeepers
as hostages. Some of these hostages were chained to potential targets
in the guise of human shields, albeit only for the time required to
take photographs that would subsequently make the tour of the
world. The images served to make the point that should air strikes
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continue, UN personnel were vulnerable. They were an effective
instrument of intimidation and propaganda. The action was a
profound humiliation, the nadir of frustration for the entire UN
peacekeeping effort, but it also became a catalyst for more decisive
intervention. On June 3 the defense ministers of fourteen memberstates of the EU and NATO agreed to create a Rapid Reaction Force
to protect UNPROFOR contingents from further harassment, and
at the end of July the British-French led force was redeployed from
bases in central Bosnia to Mount Igman, at a critical juncture of the
Sarajevo front.
On July 11 and 25, the Bosnian Serbs upped the ante by seizing
the UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Žepa, in the former case pushing
aside a small force of 429 Dutch Blue Helmets and massacring over
8,000 prisoners in the worst single atrocity of the entire Bosnian
conflict (and in all of Europe since the Second World War).123 The
Serb attack on Srebrenica was not unprovoked — the enclave had
not been demilitarized and was used as a base for staging raids
against Serb villages during which atrocities were committed.
The bloodbath of July 1995 was the culmination of a long-running
vendetta, but it was not just another in a long line of atrocities. The
premeditated nature of the massacre, the extent of the killing, and
the arrogant demeanor of the conquerors combined to make it a
unique, and uniquely horrible, event, and an appropriate symbol for
the degenerate nature of the Serb national agenda as it was pursued
during the Bosnian war.
Once again, Serb aggression was abetted by operational confusion
on the part of UNPROFOR. The UNPROFOR command was not
willing to approve timely NATO air attacks on the Srebrenica front,
and the limited strikes launched on July 11 were too little and too
late.124 The small Dutch UNPROFOR contingent, after verifying the
Serb attack, came under fire from Muslim positions while attempting
to report to its headquarters. Incapable of resisting a major combined
arms offensive, confused about responsibility, and unaware of
the intent of Serb commanders, the Dutch opted not to conduct a
suicidal resistance, and withdrew from the city to their operational
base at Potočari, some six kilometers to the north, followed by a
desperate throng of refugees. In view of the aftermath, the lack of
meaningful resistance might appear craven, but there was little that
the handful of peacekeepers on hand, or pinprick air strikes, could
have done to prevent the Srebrenica massacre.125 The international
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community, which had originally pledged 7,000 peacekeepers to
Srebrenica, had never taken measures to ensure that its safe areas
were safe in fact as well as in name. Following Srebrenica, the Žepa
enclave, defended by a grand total of 68 Ukrainian Blue Helmets, fell
in a matter of days.
The larger enclave of Goražde appeared to be next in line, but
the limits of Western acquiescence had now been reached. The
seizure of the enclaves was in line with the U.S. effort to rationalize
areas of control as a foundation for peace negotiations, but totally
unacceptable in view of the consequences. At a session of July 26 in
Brussels, the North Atlantic Council pledged “prompt and efficient”
action in the event that Goražde was attacked. Already overstretched
following their offensives against Srebrenica and Žepa, the Bosnian
Serb forces held back. The West’s response would not be launched
from within the indefensible enclaves of eastern Bosnia, but rather in
a theater were Pale was much more exposed.
In July and August a large-scale HV offensive, codenamed
Operation STORM (Oluja), overran the entire Republic of Serb
Krajina, seizing the capital Knin and driving the remnants of its
armed forces across the border in disarray.126 On July 30 HVO
and HV units moved against the villages of Grahovo and Glamoč,
placing themselves within artillery range of Knin and cutting the
road attaching the city to the Serb controlled hinterland. A frantic
diplomatic effort aimed at forestalling a test of arms followed,
but to no avail. The United States had laid the groundwork for
the operation, and, though it remained publicly noncommittal, it
did nothing to constrain Zagreb. Milošević, who had urged Babić
and Martić to come to terms with Zagreb for more than a year,
privately assured Tudjman that Serbia would not respond.127 The
Bosnian Serbs, under severe military pressure, were in no position
to react, and UNPROFOR forces in place did not even think about
the option of resistance. With overwhelming force on hand and in
the absence of effective diplomatic or military constraint, Tudjman
used hastily assembled, UN sponsored negotiations in Geneva as a
forum for articulating unilateral demands.128 On August 4, 25 HV
brigades rolled into the Krajina and broke what resistance could
be mustered in a matter of hours. The consequences of the military
operations were not excessive given the scope of the undertaking
— Croatian sources cite 174 killed and 1,430 wounded on the part
of the HV, against perhaps several thousand Serbs killed. But the
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worst was yet to come. From August 3 onward, a line of refugees
over 40 kilometers long formed at the frontier crossing leading
into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and eventually upwards of 180,000 Serbs
would flee the province under duress, the worst single incident of
ethnic cleansing in the entire sequence of Yugoslav wars. Among
the 9,000 or so Serbs that remained, hundreds, mostly defenseless
senior citizens, were murdered by Croat Special Forces in the weeks
to come. Thousands of homes, some of them, ironically, belonging
to Croat refugees who had fled the province in 1991 (if not marked
by the initials HK, signifying Hrvatska Kuča — Croatian Home),
were burned.129 On August 27 Tudjman celebrated his victory with
a shameful speech at the Knin castle, mocking the Krajina Serbs as
“those ones that disappeared in 3 or 4 days, without taking time
to gather their underwear,” and cursing the pathetic refugees as
“a malignant tumor in the heart of Croatia, destroying the Croat
national essence.”130
The Croatian junkyard dog was a compromising ally, but the
successes achieved by Operation Storm opened up prospects for a
decisive turnaround in former Yugoslavia. Coordinated offensives
by Croatian and Muslim forces into the Bosanska Krajina followed
the fall of Knin, and in a matter of weeks the territorial stalemate
that had prevailed since the summer of 1992 was broken. On August
28 another gratuitous shelling incident in Sarajevo provided the
Western Alliance with its own casus belli, and on August 30 NATO
initiated a bombing campaign, designated Operation DELIBERATE
FORCE, focused on disrupting Bosnian Serb communication assets
and breaking the siege of Sarajevo. The raids were substantial — in
2 weeks of concentrated attacks, NATO aircraft flew 3,315 sorties
and 750 attack missions directed against 56 target complexes.131
Assisted by the strikes, Muslim and Croat ground forces were able
to accelerate their advance. As a result, the 51/49 percent territorial
division that was at the foundation of the Contact Group’s peace plan
came to be mirrored by realities on the ground. Decisive intervention
inspired by the United States and spearheaded by NATO air power
had restored a regional balance of power, and in so doing created an
objective foundation for a negotiated peace.132
Military action was paralleled by a U.S. led diplomatic initiative.133
An outline of the U.S. “Endgame Strategy” was presented to key
European allies and the Russian Federation by a high-level delegation
led by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake during a whirlwind
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tour through London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Sochi (a Russian Black Sea
resort), Madrid, and Ankara in the second week of August. The plan
proposed a comprehensive settlement for the Bosnian crisis that
included maintaining a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina with a capital
at Sarajevo, that would be internally divided between “entities”
representing the Croat-Muslim federation and the Republika Srpska
defined territorially according to the Contact Group plan. The project
was made in the United States but welcomed by the allies, no doubt
overjoyed to ride behind forceful American leadership. Moscow’s
public reactions were harshly critical — a parliamentary resolution
condemned the “genocide” being perpetrated against the Serbs, and
Yeltsin remarked that NATO actions in the Balkans could “ignite
the flames of war in Europe.”134 But Russia had failed in the effort
to impose constraint, and its protests had no visible effect. Yeltsin
sought to restore his damaged credibility by offering to sponsor a
summit conference bringing Yugoslav leaders together in Moscow,
but the session was not looked upon favorably in Washington and
was never convened.135 In the original itinerary for Lake’s tour of
Europe, Russia was not even placed on the agenda.136
The next step was to sell the project to Balkan regional leaders,
a task assigned to the forceful Richard Holbrooke, uninvolved in
the genesis of the project but respected for his toughness. Between
August and November, Holbrooke led a team of U.S. diplomats on
a diplomatic shuttle between Balkan capitals that was successful
in clarifying details of the project to the interested parties, and
eventually, with the help of a good deal of head banging, bringing
them on board.137
On 5 October Clinton was able to announce a 60-day
ceasefire, to be accompanied by the creation of a NATO-led Peace
Implementation Force (IFOR). The stage was now set for the
proximity talks conducted under strict U.S. supervision at Dayton,
Ohio from November 1-21. No leniency was granted to the warring
factions. Though present during the deliberations, the Bosnian Croat
and Serb delegates were not permitted to function as direct parties in
the talks — their interests were represented by Zagreb and Belgrade.
Remarkably, at the 11th hour Milošević intervened personally to
break a logjam by agreeing to assign all of Sarajevo and a portion
of the outlying hills, including districts that the Serb faction had
controlled from the outset of fighting, to the Muslims.138 The critical
issue of control over the Brčko choke point, which could not be
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resolved by consensus, was placed into the hands of international
arbitrators. When all else failed, strong-arm tactics were an option—
Izetbegović had to be physically coaxed by U.S. negotiators to
sign the document acknowledging the existence of the Republika
Srpska.139 Such methods were crude but effective. The Dayton
Peace Accord was initialed at the conclusion of the conference, and
formally signed in Paris on December 14. During the Paris sessions
a leftover issue from the Serbian-Croatian conflict was resolved by
the accord concluded on November 12 in the Slavonian town of
Erdut, establishing mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of eastern
Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem back to Croatian sovereignty,
a process that was completed without incident in the course of 1996
Dayton was the result of a purposeful U.S. strategy of coercive
diplomacy put into place from early 1994 onward. The elements of
the strategy, which included interlinked economic, military, and
diplomatic tracks, included the maintenance of sanctions against
Belgrade as a means for turning Milošević away from the project
for a greater Serbia that had inspired the war’s first phase, covert
arming of the ABH, support for a build up of the HV, the Washington
Agreement brokering a limited but strategically significant CroatMuslim accord, the threat of air strikes as a means of channeling
Serb behavior, limited air strikes as a form of punishment, and
eventually a decisive application of air power to trip the military
balance in tandem with the ground offensives launched by Croat
and Muslim forces. Economic means were used to soften Belgrade’s
resolve and deter any temptation to intervene. Military means were
used to break the Serb party’s territorial dominance inside Bosnia
and create a balance on the ground propitious to a negotiated
outcome (Washington also exerted pressure on its Muslim and
Croat protégés to limit offensive operations outside of Banja Luka
once a viable strategic balance had been achieved). The combination
of U.S. air power and the ground offensive undertaken by a regional
ally achieved a decisive strategic result without engaging U.S. forces
in ground combat, and would eventually be touted as a model for
intervention in other regional contingencies. The key to the U.S.
diplomatic strategy, ironically after years of berating the Bosnian
Serb leadership and insisting that ethnic cleansing would not
be rewarded, consisted of series of concessions to the Serb party
— courting Milošević with a pledge to lift sanctions in exchange
for bringing around intransigents in Pale, and a new willingness
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to entertain Bosnian Serb strategic goals, including control over a
geographically contiguous territory constituting nearly half of the
country (considerably more than the Serb faction would have been
accorded under the terms of the Vance-Owen plan, for example) and
recognition of the Republika Srpska as a legitimate international
entity. Finally, the United States agreed to underwrite a negotiated
peace with its own armed forces. The United States had brokered
peace by redrawing the strategic balance inside Bosnia, committing
itself to overseeing the peace process, and accepting a soft-partition
arrangement that addressed the minimal conditions of all parties.
These concessions were critical to the ability of the international
community to sell Dayton to the contending factions. They would
come to haunt the project as the task of peacemaking gave way to
peace building. Imposing peace was well within the capacity of
a unified and purposeful West inspired by American leadership.
Sustaining a process of reconciliation between embittered and
resentful rivals would prove to be an entirely different kind of
challenge.
The Dayton Peace Process.
The Dayton Accord offered an agenda for peace, not a finished
architecture. It is therefore most useful to speak of a Dayton approach
to peace-building, multilateral but subject to strong U.S. influence
and with complementary civilian and military components. The
most striking aspect of the accord was the sharp division of labor
between its military and civilian sectors, the former led by NATO
and the latter by the UN-sponsored High Representative charged
with overseeing civilian implementation. At Dayton, the United
States was insistent about avoiding the kind of paralyzing reliance
upon UN direction that had discredited UNPROFOR, and the
Dayton Accord explicitly denied any responsibility in the military
sector to the Office of the High Representative, stating that the High
Representative “shall have no authority over the IFOR and shall
not in any way interfere in the conduct of military operations.”140
In order to make the accord more palatable in the United States,
IFOR’s original mandate was limited to 1 year, a polite fiction that
the architects of the project could hardly have taken seriously.
Politically, the Dayton Accord formalized the same tradeoff
between state sovereignty and the federative principle that had
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characterized Western peace plans since 1992. In principle, the new
Bosnia-Herzegovina was a unitary state. In fact, it was subject to a
soft partition, divided between the Bosnian Federation (Croat and
Muslim) covering 51 percent of the territory and the Republika
Srpska covering 49 percent. The central government, with its seat at
Sarajevo, consisted of a rotating presidency, a bicameral parliament,
and a constitutional court. Its effective authority was limited to the
conduct of foreign affairs, international commerce, and fiscal policy.
By way of contrast, the Bosnian Federation and the Republika
Srpska (referred to in the Dayton context as the entities) were
accorded considerable prerogatives — to grant citizenship, maintain
armed forces, and pursue “special parallel relationships” with third
parties (i.e., Croatia and Yugoslavia) so long as these relationships
did not jeopardize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BosniaHerzegovina. Indicted war criminals were barred from holding
any military or elective office (a clause inserted with the specific
intention of blocking access to leadership positions for the Bosnian
Serbs Karadžić and Mladić). The people of Bosnia-Herzegovina
were in principle accorded the right to move freely throughout the
entire national territory, and the goal of resettling refugees in their
places of origin was cited.
The success story of the Dayton process came in the military
sector. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, conducted from the autumn
of 1995 under the command of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR) with a 57,000 strong Implementation Force
including nearly 20,000 Americans, was effective in enforcing a
cession of hostilities and providing a safe and secure environment
for the peace process to unfold. The IFOR was specifically tasked
to separate hostile forces; mark and monitor a four-kilometer wide
Zone of Separation (ZOS) between the two Bosnian entities; affect
territorial adjustments by specifying inter-ethnic boundaries and
overseeing the turnover of transferred territories; patrol the ZOS
and supervise the withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons into
garrisons and cantonment areas; ensure the withdrawal from the
theater of foreign forces (in particular international Islamic units
supporting the Muslim faction); and enforce compliance with other
aspects of the treaty. The IFOR’s mandate was limited, and the
limits were rigorously respected — a consequence of U.S. concern
with mission creep that contributed to the peacekeeping effort’s
credibility, but also reduced its effectiveness.
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IFOR got off to a slow start with deployment delays (and
corresponding cost overruns) occasioned by severe weather
conditions (slowing the construction of a crucial bridge over the
Sava), conflicting priorities (European rail refused to prioritize rail
traffic bound for Bosnia during the holiday season and a French rail
strike blocked the transfer of heavy freight cars bound for Bosnia),
and the planning constraints imposed by the Dayton time lines
(which necessitated heavier than intended reliance upon airlift in
place of ground transport). Despite these problems, by February
1996 IFOR was deployed in four countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Hungary, and Italy), and its mission was well underway.
IFOR’s first commander, U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith,
characterized the purpose of the mission as to ensure “an absence
of war and an environment in which peace has a chance.”141 In these
admittedly narrow terms, IFOR’s performance can be described
as an outstanding success. The ZOS and inter-entity boundaries
were established without major incident, and the zone effectively
patrolled by ground, air, and static post observation. POW exchanges
were completed on schedule despite considerable acrimony on
all sides. The cantonment of heavy weapons and repositioning of
forces within entity boundaries was concluded within the Dayton
time line, the positioning of weapons in unauthorized locations and
establishment of illegal check points was banned, and foreign forces
were withdrawn from the theater. IFOR also made contributions in
repairing bridges, roads, and airports, and numerous other civic
projects (surveys, repair of power generation and distribution
systems, medical care, etc.). It encompassed a significant civil
affairs mission including the publication (inside the U.S. sector) of
a trilingual newspaper entitled Herald of Peace, and numerous other
activities designed to further reconciliation. On IFOR’s watch the
possibility for armed confrontation between opposing factions was
reduced to practically zero. Bosnia’s cemeteries ceased to fill up with
victims, and the prerequisites for a lasting peace were established.
These were impressive achievements by any standard.
Some military tasks remained elusive or subjects of controversy.
An arms control regime was negotiated on the Dayton time table in
June 1996 using the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement
as a model. According to the agreement, each of the armed factions
agreed to accept fixed limits on five categories of weaponry — tanks,
armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters, heavy artillery (over
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75 mm.), and combat aircraft—according to an agreed ratio of
apportionment. The goal of the agreement was to maintain a stable
strategic balance, but implementation proved to be difficult, and
all sides continued to engage, with varied degrees of success, in a
competition to maintain their military capacity behind the scenes.142
The U.S. approach to the problem included a Train and Equip Mission
on behalf of the Croats and Muslims, intended to provide the armed
forces of the federation with the wherewithal to stand up to the
forces of the Serb Republic and “to prevent war by creating a military
balance in Bosnia” according to James Pardew, the State Department
official originally assigned to head the program.143 Simultaneous
with the arms control process designed to reduce overall levels of
armaments, the United States committed to providing federation
forces with consignments of rifles, machine guns, radios, and heavy
weapons including 45 M60 A3 tanks, 80 M113 Armored Personnel
Carriers, 15 UH-1H helicopters, and 840 AT-4s. Turkey agreed to
provide on the ground training, and some Arab states promised
financial support. But the program was plagued by problems from
the start. The federation proceeded slowly toward the creation of a
functioning Muslim-Croat ministry of defense (a joint ministry was
established in June 1996 but remained little more than a façade),
and Islamic influence upon the Izetbegović clan remained a source
of concern. The United States withheld a consignment of arms on
shipboard off the Croatian coast for nearly a month in OctoberNovember 1996 until its demands for the dismissal of Bosnian
Deputy Minister of Defense Hasan Čengić, accused of maintaining
ties to Iran, were acted upon.144 Key U.S. allies expressed unanimous
opposition to the program. “These arms are a recipe for war,” argued
an anonymous Western European ambassador. “Maybe not this year
or the next, but one day American-made tanks will be rolling across
Bosnia’s plain, and what will Washington do then?”145
For the time being such Cassandra-like prophesies remained
barren, and the frictions and frustrations associated with IFOR’s
peacekeeping mission were far outweighed by positive contributions.
NATO’s IFOR mission was extended for an additional 18 months in
December 1996 under a reduced but still potent Stabilization Force
(SFOR), and in 1998 SFOR’s mandate was extended indefinitely.
Cumulatively, international engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina
since 1995 has represented a groundbreaking exercise in multilateral
peacekeeping that deserves careful assessment.
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To begin, it should be noted that the original designation of
an implementation force has some significance. The oft-reiterated
purpose of the mission was to implement an already existing
political settlement and defend a ceasefire in place. It would be
incorrect, however, to perceive Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR as
an exercise in classic peacekeeping. NATO forces insisted upon
full prerogative to use decisive force whenever it was deemed
necessary by the command authority, without the need to turn to
the UN hierarchy for approval. The heart and soul of the original
deployments was the U.S. First Armored Division, a unit clearly
superior to any other force in the theater and determined to override
local obstruction. The real operational concept of Joint Endeavor was
to enter with intimidating power and force consent, a concept more
in line with peace enforcement via intimidation and compulsion than
peacekeeping. The concept was effective. Neither IFOR nor SFOR
has been challenged militarily, and they have suffered remarkably
few casualties.146
Though approved by the UN Security Council, the operation
was completely subordinated to NATO under the overall command
of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR — during
the IFOR mandate U.S. Army General George Joulwan). As such
it provided a model for the use of a regional security organization
as the leading force in a peace operation conducted under UN
auspices.147 It also provided a trial by fire for something resembling
NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. In July 1993
U.S. Senator Richard Lugar famously remarked that in the post-cold
war period NATO needed to go “out of area or out of business.”148
The CJTF concept was developed as a means for making out of area
non-Article Five missions feasible, as well as strengthening the
Alliance’s European pillar by widening the area of responsibility
for the European allies.149 As combinations of forces drawn from
NATO and non-NATO member states, subordinated to a NATO
headquarters in a limited duration peacekeeping mission, IFOR
and SFOR demonstrated the potential for this kind of operation. In
Bosnia, NATO began the process of “redesigning itself for selective
intervention missions,” a significant recasting of the purpose of the
Alliance.150
Joint Endeavor imposed special responsibilities upon Britain and
France, which together with the United States were assigned control
of territorial sectors inside Bosnia: a northern sector covered by two
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brigades of the U.S. First Armored Division with its headquarters
near Tuzla and including the Posavina corridor; a southwestern
sector covered by the UK including Bihać and Banja Luka; and
a southeastern sector covered by France including Sarajevo and
Goražde. IFOR placed French forces under direct NATO command
for the first time since 1966 and at the outset their participation
seemed to indicate an evolution of French defense policy toward
acceptance of the NATO framework as the core of European security
planning.151
IFOR and SFOR have also presided over large multilateral
coalitions with more than forty participating states, many of them
also associated with NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. A
significant part of the mission was staged out of southern Hungary,
not long before an integral part of the Warsaw Pact. Overall,
the implications of international participation in the NATO-led
peacekeeping effort were considerable. “The wide participation
in the implementation force,” suggested U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Perry, “is a symbol of the new Europe. The effort will define
how security in Europe is going to be handled for decades to come.
In effect, we will be defining what post-cold war Europe is all about
and how its security will be assured.”152
IFOR and SFOR likewise provided a working model for security
cooperation between Russia and the West that was all the more
positive in light of the sparring over Balkan policy that preceded it.
The Western intervention that set the stage for Dayton was presented
as a fait accompli that a weakened Russian Federation, lacking strong
leadership and preoccupied with its own military engagement in
Chechnya, was powerless to resist. Moscow was left with no choice
but to involve itself in the Dayton process in order to retain at least
a symbolic presence in a region where it has important interests
at stake. It did so by negotiating a special agreement allowing a
Russian brigade to attach to IFOR in the U.S. sector subordinated
directly to the U.S. (rather than NATO) chain of command.153 The
pro-government Izvestiia mocked Russia’s willingness to enforce an
accord that it had originally criticized as “Operation Fig Leaf,” and
Russia’s independent press interpreted the outcome as a humiliating
defeat.154 But Moscow had at least limited losses by finding a way
to engage in the peacekeeping process on its own terms. On the
ground, Russian-American military collaboration in Bosnia proved
encouraging. To pose Russian military engagement in the Balkans
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as a model for future cooperation may be overly optimistic given the
special circumstances that pertain, but it may at least be described as
a good example.155
How the example evolves will in some measure be determined by
the long-term success or failure of Western engagement. By 1997 the
specifically military tasks assigned to NATO peacekeepers had been
accomplished. Simultaneously, the process of political reconciliation
and nation-building for which a ceasefire was intended to be a
prerequisite was visibly in disarray. IFOR and SFOR had succeeded
in imposing a truce and blocking a renewal of hostilities, but the
Dayton process as a whole had failed to create the prerequisites for a
self-sustaining peace — a failure that was reflected by the indefinite
extension of the SFOR mandate. As a framework for peace building,
the Dayton Accord was seriously flawed.
The nature of the flaws was no mystery. Acceptance of a
quasi-partition arrangement to smooth the way toward a ceasefire
had the perverse effect of reinforcing nationalist extremism. The
Croat, Muslim, and Serb communities retained independently
controlled armed forces, and remained under the direction of the
same uncompromising leaders that had waged the war. Elections
conducted under the supervision of the High Representative and
the OSCE in 1996 reinforced the nationalist element in all three
camps, giving new legitimacy to tribunes of exclusion such as the
Serb Momčilo Krajišnik and the Croat Dario Kordić.156 The same
process was at work within Izetbegović’s SDA, whose Islamic
character became more pronounced once the constraints of military
campaigning were lifted. The purge of the moderate Haris Silajdžić
and his followers from party offices was one of many indications of
this evolution. The Serb exodus from the Sarajevo suburbs, which
saw the overnight departure of over 90 percent of the community
once Serb forces were withdrawn (of approximately 6,000 Serbs
once resident in the Vogošca district only some 600 are estimated
to have remained, and of over 17,000 in Ilidža fewer than 100),
was in some ways imposed by the Serb side as a matter of policy
(IFOR allowed the exodus to be conducted with the aide of Serb
army trucks), but it was also encouraged by Islamic extremists and
included several stoning incidents. Political consolidation in postDayton Bosnia was allowed to go forward within the divided ethnic
communities. Institutions of central governance were hemmed in by
ethnic counter-mobilizations, constrained by intrusive international
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oversight, and effectively marginalized.
The same kind of ambiguities applied to the Bosnian Federation,
which was revealed to be a forced marriage of convenience to
which neither party maintained any real allegiance.157 The divided
city of Mostar was the living symbol of the federation’s infirmity.
The city was subjected to EU administration beginning in July
1994, and mandated to unite its Croat and Muslim sectors into a
multiethnic administration. EU direction brought improvements
in infrastructure and living conditions, but the city was not
united. The Rome Accord of February 1996, generated under U.S.
pressure, imposed a weak truce upon the feuding Croat and Muslim
authorities, who repeatedly provoked incidents along the city’s
de facto ethnic dividing line, but only at the cost of shrinking the
already small common area in the city center and after a humiliating
confrontation with rioters in which EU administrator Hans Koschnik
(who would subsequently resign his post in frustration) was briefly
held hostage.158 With its Old Bridge still broken in mid-span, postDayton Mostar offered an ironically appropriate postcard image for
what had become an incorrigibly divided society.159
Other unresolved issues also blocked progress. The Dayton
process called for the status of the Posavina Corridor and the
disputed town of Brčko to be fixed by an arbitration committee, but
both sides regarded the issue as a vital interest and a final decision
was repeatedly postponed.160 Transparent inter-entity boundaries
and refugee return were key goals, but the creation of “ethnically
pure” enclaves had been a major war aim of all belligerents, and
progress toward reversing the consequences of years of ethnic
cleansing was negligible. Police and mob violence were used by all
sides to force out the unwanted, and special efforts were made to
frustrate internationally sponsored pilot projects for refugee return
in places such as Travnik, Jajce, and Stolac. The mayor of Jajce, to
cite one example, was driven from office by Croat extremists after
agreeing to the return of 200 Muslim refugees. In Bosnian villages
of Gajevi and Jusići (located adjacent to the Posavina Corridor and
therefore of strategic significance) in November 1996, hundreds of
Muslims attempting an organized return to their former homes
were blocked and fired upon by Serb police. IFOR troops intervened
and halted the ingress until applications for return were verified,
but when the process resumed in February and March 1997, it
was frustrated by further episodes of mob violence.161 The refugee
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problem was further exacerbated by the war-ravaged physical
environment. Many of the homes to which refugees aspired to return
were little more than burned out shells, without access to water,
electricity, or public services. There was also the spiritual burden
of the war, which virtually forced returning refugees to assume the
role of colons and adapt an exclusionary ethnic affiliation that many
preferred to reject, and often made resettlement an impossible choice
even if physical circumstances permitted. UN High Commissioner
Carlos Westendorp would later describe the reluctance of the
international community to push harder for refugee return as its
single largest failure in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina.162 Several
million land mines were scattered over Bosnia-Herzegovina at the
conclusion of hostilities, and though mine marking and removal
was initiated under Dayton and major transportation arteries were
cleared, the size of the task was daunting. De-mining was technically
not designated as an IFOR tasking--a National Mine Agency was
created to address the problem under international sponsorship
— but progress continued to depend upon the stability underwritten
by an international military presence.
The Dayton process depended upon economic reconstruction and
development to reinforce popular support for the peace process, but
efforts to generate growth in the wake of the conflict were broadly
unsuccessful.163 Several years into the process per capita income was
estimated to be at 25 percent of pre-war levels. Nearly half of the
pre-war population of 4.6 million counted as refugees or internally
displaced persons. Bosnia’s total population was estimated at
3.5 million, a 23 percent reduction from the prewar level, with
unemployment of over 60 percent. The legacy of physical destruction
left behind by the war was immense: industrial production was
reduced by 90 percent, with 80 percent of power generators
destroyed or out of operation, 40 percent of bridges destroyed, and
60 percent of housing, 50 percent of schools, and 30 percent of health
care facilities damaged. Donor conferences hosted by the EU and
World Bank managed to meet targets for development assistance,
but the sums in question were only a drop in the bucket. Weak
governance and the disruption of normal economic activity were
exploited by the organized criminal elements that had mushroomed
in the course of the war, and the criminalization of basic economic
activity (as was the case throughout former Yugoslavia and indeed
much of the post-communist Balkans) soon became another barrier
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to recovery.164
The ICTY was not formally associated with the Dayton process,
but the Dayton Accord mandated signatories to “cooperate” with
its work, which was generally viewed as an integral part of the
peace building effort. The assumption was that without some
kind of retribution for those responsible for the worst atrocities of
the war, Bosnia would never be able to clear the slate and engage
in a process of reconciliation.165 The premise can be challenged.
Revenge is a powerful motive, but it may contribute to polarization
was well as renewed empathy, particularly when the results are
not judged to be equitable by all concerned. To achieve maximum
effect, the judgments of the tribunal needed to be swift, credible, and
fair. But the tribunal itself was granted no authority to arrest, the
responsibility for which devolved upon the international military
contingents active in Bosnia and the entities themselves. As a result,
only a small minority of more than eighty indicted suspects were
apprehended and brought to The Hague under the IFOR and first
SFOR mandates. Critics immediately labeled the tribunal an exercise
in hypocrisy, created in order to deflect public criticism at a moment
when the Western conflict management effort was going badly,
maintained as a means for placing pressure upon the factions, and
ultimately transformed into a self-perpetuating institution with a
momentum and vested interests of its own.166
An Ambiguous Peace.
Between 1992-95 the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed
hundreds of thousands of casualties. Millions were driven from
their homes and consigned to the status of displaced persons
and refugees.167 Unrelenting hate propaganda, systematic ethnic
cleansing, recurrent massacre, and widespread cultural vandalism
make the Bosnian tragedy a narrative of rare inhumanity. Fought
out in the heart of Europe, under the scrutiny of an intensely curious
(though often curiously insensate) international media, the conflict
and its aftermath dominated the international security agenda
for years. At Dayton the United States and its allies succeeded in
imposing a fragile truce upon the warring factions, but failed to
construct a viable framework for peace building. Eight years after
the end of hostilities Bosnia-Herzegovina remains occupied by a
NATO-led peacekeeping force, with the goal of a self-sustaining
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peace still apparently out of reach.
The task of facilitating a resolution of the Bosnian conflict was
always tremendously difficult. The complex and emotional nature of
the issues at stake, the important role played by poorly disciplined
irregular forces, the ill-will with which local actors entered into
negotiations, and the pervasiveness of war propaganda and
disinformation combined to make the conflict particularly opaque
and intractable. Despite these challenges, international mediation
during the conflict must be characterized as a failure. The international
community did not foresee the consequences of disassembling
Yugoslavia in the absence of arrangements for resolving the many
issues of citizenship and identity that the elimination of federal
institutions was bound to create. Recognition of a sovereign BosniaHerzegovina without guarantees for its security was a recipe for
disaster. Subsequent efforts to end the fighting were hampered by
the inadequacy of international institutions, lack of accord among
the major powers, and reluctance to contemplate decisive military
measures when peace enforcement had become the only viable
mechanism for conflict resolution. Much of the mediation effort
was reactive and crisis-driven, lacking the inspiration of a larger
strategic concept and insensitive to the ways in which the war
fit into emerging regional and global security frameworks. U.S.
diplomacy was to some extent paralyzed by disagreements about
the nature of post-cold war world order and the way in which
regional conflicts such as that in the Balkans should affect strategic
priorities absent any kind of clear and present danger to hard U.S.
interests — a dispute which in some ways has yet to be resolved.
The Dayton Accord that eventually brought the conflict to a close
was a triumph of U.S. statecraft, but it was obtained at the cost of
a series of compromises and concessions (a willingness to cut deals
with autocrats such as Tudjman and Milošević, recognition of the
Republika Srpska despite its abysmal war record, soft partition as a
foundation for domestic order in post-Dayton Bosnia) that risked to
make effective post-conflict peace building more difficult.
The first and most obvious victim was Bosnia-Herzegovina
itself, and the ideal of multiculturalism that many presumed it to
embody.168 Dayton may have been envisioned, as Rahda Kumar
suggests, as “an interim solution offering a breathing space for
rationality to return as fear ebbed,” but it was in essence a soft
partition arrangement, and historical precedent indicates that “the
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process of partition has inexorably drawn communities further
apart.”169 The primary purpose of the accord was to impose peace,
and the result “resembled an armistice between warring states more
than a social compact for the rebuilding of Bosnia.”170 Though the
Dayton institutions may yet permit Bosnia-Herzegovina to reclaim
some of its traditional stature as an arena for cultural interaction and
ethnic cohabitation, experience to date has been mixed.
The Balkan region as a whole also suffered from the inadequacies
of the Dayton process. The fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
successfully contained within the boundaries of the republic, but the
impact of the war upon the region was profound. A major failure
of the Dayton Accord was the degree to which it focused almost
exclusively upon solutions for Bosnia and ignored the waves of
instability that the conflict had stirred up in surrounding areas. The
economic consequences of the war undermined prospects for postcommunist transition in much of Southeastern Europe. Dayton had
the objective effect of reinforcing Milošević, whose irresponsible
policies remained a threat to regional order. It did little to address
the extreme fragility of the various statelets and regions aspiring
to statehood — Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and the Bosnian
entities themselves — that had emerged in the southern Balkans
as a result of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Revealingly, an effort to
place the Kosovo problem on the Dayton agenda was rejected as an
unnecessary source of complications.
Dayton also failed to resolve Washington’s Balkan dilemmas.
The United States was drawn into the Bosnian conflict against
its best judgment. In the end it played a decisive role in shaping
the outcome, but its commitment to security management and
peacekeeping responsibilities did not rest upon a solid foundation.
Domestic critics castigated the administration for committing the
United States to a “geopolitical backwater” where vital national
interests were not at stake, and pushed for hard partition as a
prelude to disengagement.171 Washington was vital to the viability of
the Dayton project but not unconditionally committed to its success.
As a result, soon after the conclusion of the accord familiar frictions
over burden sharing and political direction between the United
States and its European allies reappeared.172
The Dayton Accord brought an end to the fighting in BosniaHerzegovina, and this was no small accomplishment. It did not
succeed in providing a viable concept for rebuilding the state,
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recasting regional order, or blocking the spiral of conflict to which
the disintegration of multinational Yugoslavia continued to give rise.
The consequences of these failings would soon make themselves
felt.
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CHAPTER 5
WAR AND REVENGE IN KOSOVO, 1998-99
Kosova-Republic.
The inability of the Dayton negotiators to place the peace process
in Bosnia within a strategic framework for the region as a whole
proved to be a major failing. Yugoslavia’s fragmentation had not
yet run its course, and in the absence of a comprehensive settlement
new challenges to the territorial status quo were certain to arise. One
of these challenges, launched following the Dayton Accord in the
Serbian province of Kosovo, would culminate, after several years of
escalating tension, in a fourth Balkan war.
Few crises have been more consistently predicted than the one
that erupted in Kosovo during the winter of 1997-98. Milošević had
set off the process leading to the disintegration of the Yugoslav
federation by abolishing Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and subjecting
the Kosovar Albanian majority to a demeaning occupation. The
situation was untenable, and the observation that in Yugoslavia
“everything started with Kosovo and everything will finish with
Kosovo” quickly became a commonplace.1 After Dayton, when
United Nations’ sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro were
lifted without any reference to the situation in the province, support
for radical alternatives grew. Given a tradition of Kosovar Albanian
uprisings stretching back over several centuries, a turn to armed
resistance was inevitable.
Kosovo’s symbolic significance in Serbian national mythology,
heavily Albanian demographic balance, and abject poverty made it
a trouble spot from the moment of incorporation into the Serbian
dynastic state in 1913. Albanians fought against Serbs during both
20th century world wars, and the province was only reintegrated
into Titoist Yugoslavia at the end of the Second World War after
the suppression of local resistance.2 For two decades after the war
Kosovo was subject to intrusive police controls under the authority
of the Serb communist Aleksandar Ranković. The ouster of Ranković
in 1966, after revelations of abuse of office, cleared the way for
more open expressions of dissent that were not long in arriving.
Tito reacted to protest demonstrations in 1968 with a policy of
liberalization, permitting the display of the Albanian national flag
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as a Kosovar emblem, restructuring the University of Priština as a
predominantly Albanian institution, channeling investment into
the area in a vain attempt to close the development gap, and in the
1974 constitution granting Kosovo virtually full self-administration.
These were hopeful initiatives, but expanded autonomy, paralleled
by the elevation of a new, ethnically Albanian provincial leadership,
created opportunities for provocations against the Serb minority.3
Discrimination against Kosovar Serbs was never remotely as severe
as what would eventually be depicted in the Serbian media, and
presumed by the public, but it was deeply resented.4
In 1981, demonstrations by Kosovar Albanian students at the
University of Priština spilled over into a general uprising.5 The
underlying cause of unrest was the failure of Yugoslav social policy
to address the dilemmas of underdevelopment and discrimination.6
Politically, the Kosovar Albanian response took the form of a classic
ethnic mobilization. The leading slogan of the 1981 demonstrations
became “Kosova-Republic,” expressing the demand that Kosovo
be elevated to the status of a seventh Yugoslav republic — an
administrative transformation that would have granted Yugoslav
Albanians the status of a constituent nation, including a notional
right of secession.7 The Albanian rising was the first major challenge
to Yugoslav institutions of the post-Tito era, and it was put down
harshly, with mass arrests and administrative reprisals against real
and suspected sympathizers.8
The repression of 1981 created a generation of Kosovar Albanian
resistors for whom Yugoslavia itself had become the enemy. In the
mid-1980s a so-called Enverist faction (named for Albanian dictator
Enver Hoxha) coalesced around a Marxist-Leninist position favoring
armed struggle and a war of national liberation. In retrospect it
appears that the movement’s Marxist orientation was opportunistic.
Beneath the radical veneer a group of militant nationalists,
committed to a tactic of political violence in pursuit of the goal of
a greater Albania, and with financial support from the Kosovar
Albanian diaspora in Western Europe, was in the process of forming.
Friction between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians provided a constant
backdrop to the long agony of Yugoslav federalism during the 1980s,
and under Serb occupation from 1989 onward Kosovo became a
cauldron of injustice and anger, a vivid example of the dilemma of
frustrated nationalism in a context of intercultural diversity that lies
at the basis of the entire Balkan regional dilemma.9
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The Kosovo Liberation Army.
From 1989 resistance to Serb domination was led by the Pariseducated university professor Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic
League of Kosovo (LDK). Rugova and a handful of associates,
including the intellectuals Rexhep Qosja, Fehmi Agani, and Bujar
Bukoshi, created the LDK in the wake of Milošević’s abrogation
of Kosovo autonomy with the explicit goal of forwarding national
independence. On July 2, 1990, the Kosovo Assembly formally
declared the province to be “an independent and equal entity within
the framework of the Yugoslav federation,” and was immediately
dissolved and condemned as illegal by the Federal Presidency.10
Several days later, on July 5, the group reconvened underground
as the “Assembly of Kosova.” Eventually, on September 21, 1991,
it would declare the “Republic of Kosova” to be “a sovereign and
independent state.” This action was confirmed by a referendum
conducted in defiance of Serbian authority from September 2630 in which 87 percent of eligible voters were claimed to have
participated, with 99.87 percent voting in support.11 As the dominant
force within the shadow government, the LDK promoted a strategy
of nonviolent resistance that acknowledged Kosovo’s weakness and
exposure by refusing direct confrontations with the authorities,
but simultaneously strove to signal the Kosovar Albanians’ refusal
to bend to the hegemony of Belgrade, denying the legitimacy of
federal institutions, refusing participation in Yugoslav elections,
and seeking to build up alternative national institutions run by the
Kosovar Albanian majority. In elections of March 1992, once again
conducted underground in defiance of a Serbian ban, Rugova was
chosen president and his LDK, with 74.4 percent of the vote, won
a clear majority in a self-proclaimed national parliament. Working
within Kosovo’s traditional clan structure, Rugova was successful
in deflecting calls for more active resistance, and in March 1998 he
was re-elected as shadow president. His party’s emphasis upon the
moral force of the Kosovar Albanian national cause was perhaps too
successful — relative calm may have encouraged the illusion that
the status quo in Kosovo was in some way sustainable, and made
preventive action to head off a crisis seem less urgent. Rugova was
however entirely unsuccessful in obtaining meaningful concessions
from Milošević, who for his part was subjected to little pressure
from the West to be more accommodating. Late in 1992, against the
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background of war in Croatia, President George Bush addressed
a one sentence “Christmas Warning” cable to Milošević and his
top military commanders, asserting that “in the event of conflict
in Kosovo caused by Serbian actions, the United States will be
prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and
in Serbia proper.”12 In view of Washington’s reluctance to intervene
in the conflict underway in Croatia, the statement, issued by a lame
duck administration without reference to specific circumstances,
may well have been taken with a grain of salt. Throughout the
1990s international pressure did not significantly affect Belgrade’s
determination to repress Kosovar Albanian national aspirations.
The suppression of Kosovo autonomy, the imposition of Rugova’s
nonviolent approach, and the preoccupation of the international
community with the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
created a political vacuum that militants were quick to fill. In 1993 a
so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged from the radical
wing of the Kosovo national movement as a focus for active resistance.
The KLA combined Enverist radicals with their roots in the political
contestation of the 1980s and Kosovar Albanians who had fought
together with Croat and Muslim formations in Croatia and Bosnia or
had been alienated by Milošević’s strong-arm tactics, with Kosovo’s
native kaçak tradition of local resistance to central authority.13 The
rise of the KLA was a product of cumulating frustration with the
inability of Rugova’s strategy to achieve results, underlined by
the failure of the Dayton peace conference to address the Kosovo
dilemma in any meaningful way.14 Its lowest common denominator
was armed struggle, and in February 1996, with a core of about
150 militants, the organization launched a campaign of violence
with a series of shootings and bomb attacks, in Priština, Vučitrn,
Kosovska Mitrovica, Peć, Suva Reka, Podujevo, and elsewhere,
against Serbian police stations, military casernes, post offices, and
Kosovar Albanians suspected of collaboration with the oppressor.
On January 16, 1997, in a symbolically significant incident, an auto
bomb attack seriously wounded the new rector of what was now
the Serb-administered University of Priština, Radivoje Papović. By
October 1997 more than 30 Serbs and Kosovar Albanians had fallen
victim to assaults, the central regions of Donji Prekaz and Drenica
had become KLA controlled sanctuaries, and The New York Times
was speaking of an organization “ready to wage a secessionist war
that could plunge this country [the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]
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into a crisis rivaling the conflict in Bosnia.”15 On November 28,
1997, the shadowy organization revealed itself publicly when three
masked and uniformed fighters appeared in Lhausa and spoke
briefly, before the cameras of Tirana television, at the funeral of KLA
activist Halit Gecaj, a victim of the Serbian police.
The KLA’s strength at the beginning of 1998 was estimated
at around 500 active members, organized in small, mobile cells
and often acting in groups of three to five rebels. The occasional
violence perpetrated by the organization would probably not have
become a major threat, had it not been for two precipitating events.
The first was the collapse of the Albanian government in the spring
of 1997 following the implosion of a state sponsored pyramid
investment scheme. In the ensuing riots military casernes were
looted and perhaps as many as a million light arms distributed to the
population at large.16 The tradition of bearing arms has deep roots
among the Gheg clans of northern Albania and Kosovo, and many
of the weapons found their way into the hands of KLA fighters,
smuggled across the difficult terrain dividing Albania from Kosovo,
or via western Macedonia. The second precipitating event was the
decision by Yugoslav authorities to launch a campaign to suppress
armed resistance. A police action on January 22, 1998, failed in the
attempt to arrest Adem Jashari, the head of a powerful clan in the
Drenica region whose defiance of authority was as much a part of
the kaçak tradition as it was of KLA grand strategy, but who had
become a symbol of local independence. An armed assault against
the Jashari clan’s redoubt in Donji Prekaz followed on March 5,
leaving 58 dead in its wake including 18 women and 10 children
under the age of 17.17 The bloodbath had the predictable effect of
galvanizing resentment, and in its wake the KLA mushroomed,
according to some, possibly exaggerated estimates coming over the
next several months to control as many as 20,000 armed fighters, and
over 40 percent of the province’s territory. In the narrow confines of
Kosovo, however, its lightly armed militants were no match for the
disciplined military forces of a modern state. Belgrade seems to have
allowed the KLA to over extend and expose itself. In June 1998, the
Yugoslav Army launched a counter offensive, massing over 40,000
troops operating with tanks, helicopters, heavy artillery, and mortar
fire, that gathered momentum as it progressed and by late summer
seemed to be on the verge of breaking organized resistance once and
for all.18
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Despite every possible warning, the major Western powers were
unprepared for the flare up when it actually occurred. Throughout
the 1990s Kosovo had been what Tim Judah calls “the place that the
diplomats knew they should do something about, but were not sure
what and anyway had more important things to do.”19 Numerous
plans for compromise, including a partition arrangement that
would have assigned a northeastern corridor to Serbia and allowed
the remainder of the province to opt for either independence or
attachment to Albanian, were developed during the 1990s, but
none were consistently pursued.20 Opportunities for preventive
diplomacy were allowed to slip away, and international conflict
management efforts were belated and reactive. The one serious
attempt to address the situation in Kosovo preemptively was
undertaken by the Rome-based Catholic religious order Sant’Egidio,
which made some progress in developing an agenda for educational
reform, useful in its own terms but insufficient to reverse a dynamic
of confrontation.21
During 1997, as the KLA began to surface, the primary concern
of U.S. policymakers was the need to cultivate Milošević’s support
for the ouster of the hardline leadership of the Republika Srpska,
perceived to be blocking implementation of the Dayton Accord.
Milošević was rewarded for cooperation by diplomatic concessions
including approval for direct charter flights to the United States by
the Yugoslav national airline, the reopening of a Yugoslav consulate
in the United States, and an increase in the number of Yugoslavs
allowed to participate in UN activities in New York. When U.S.
special representative Robert Gelbard came to Belgrade on February
23, 1998, to announce these blessings, he added the observation that
the KLA was “without any questions a terrorist group.” In his public
remarks, the U.S. emissary went out of his way to reiterate the point,
stating that “having worked for years on counterterrorist activity, I
know very well that to look at a terrorist group, to define it, you rip
away the rhetoric and just look at actions. And the actions of this
group speak for themselves.” 22 Terrorist organizations had a specific
status as pariahs in U.S. law, and declaratory policy was unequivocal
— no tolerance, no compromise, no mercy. Although in private
Gelbard conveyed to Milošević U.S. displeasure with Serbian heavy
handedness and urged restraint, Washington seemed to be implying
that the Kosovo problem would be left to the discretion of Belgrade,
albeit within the bounds of prudence.
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The Serbian blitz against the KLA was launched within a week
of Gelbard’s remarks, and the escalation of violence from February
1998 onward presented Western policymakers with a different kind
of dilemma. The severity of Serbian reactions, which included the
destruction of villages, execution of prisoners, and terrorization of
the local population, was judged to be disproportionate.23 In the
immediate aftermath of the Serbian offensive influential voices
in the U.S. media were raised calling for “a decisive international
response,” and, as the extent of violations became clear, sympathy
for the Kosovar Albanian position became stronger.24 Washington
shifted direction to take account of these reactions. On March 4,
Gelbard ascribed “overwhelming responsibility” to the government
of Yugoslavia and described Serbian aggression as something “that
will not be tolerated by the United States.”25 During a visit to London
on March 7, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright urged “immediate
action against the regime in Belgrade to ensure that it pays a price for
the damage it has already done,” and on March 13 National Security
Advisor Sandy Berger specified that Milošević would be receiving
the “escalating message . . . that the international community will
not tolerate violent suppression of the Kosovans.”26
Unfortunately, the KLA was a problem in its own right.
The KLA was not a unitary movement with clear lines of internal
authority. It was directed by a faceless leadership whose international
allegiances were suspect and long-term aspirations unclear. As the
political expression of a chronically divided society, the KLA was
split along clan lines, between regional sub-groupings, and between
émigré and internal lines of responsibility. The conflict in Kosovo
also had significant implications for the Albanian Question as a
whole. By 1998 former Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha, once the
darling of the West for his outspoken anti-communism and publicly
supportive of Rugova’s LDK while in power, but persona non grata
since the collapse of his corrupt personalist regime in the spring
of 1997, had become one of the KLA’s most visible supporters.27
Berisha’s political base lay in the Gheg regions of northern Albania,
and the primarily Gheg Kosovar Albanian national movement was
a logical ally in his continuing struggle against the predominantly
Tosk leadership of new Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano. On the
regional level, the KLA’s political agenda could hardly have been
more provocative: independence for Kosovo grown from the barrel
of a gun as the first step toward the creation of a greater Albania
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including all or part of Albania proper, Serbia (Preševo, Bujanovac,
Medvedja), Montenegro (Dukagjin, Plav, Rozaj), the Republic
of Macedonia (Tetovo, Gostivar), and Greece (Chamuria). For
Washington, whose regional policy had been constructed around
the rubric to “restore stability,” this was the agenda from hell. The
KLA was launching an assault on the fragile equilibrium of the postDayton order in the entire southern Balkans that threatened to make
Kosovo “the tinderbox of a general Balkan war.”28
There was, of course, an Albanian Question to be considered,
and the goal of a greater Albanian was not necessarily unacceptable
in its own terms.29 What was unpalatable were the means to which
the KLA had resorted. To embrace the cause of the KLA in the midst
of an ongoing armed struggle would set an unfortunate precedent
for other frustrated separatist or irredentist movements tempted by
a resort to arms. The logic of ethnic division that the KLA program
espoused contrasted with the goal of reintegration inspiring the
Dayton process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Any progress toward
independence threatened to subvert the neighboring Republic
of Macedonia, with an Albanian minority constituting up to 30
percent of the population, concentrated in western Macedonia in
districts physically contiguous with Kosovo, and with close links
to the Kosovar Albanians reaching back to the days of shared
citizenship inside federal Yugoslavia. Not least, support for the
insurrection risked to set the stage for what might become an armed
confrontation with Milošević’s Serbia. Despite these risks, the
Clinton administration stepped forward to revive the rhetoric of the
1992 Christmas Warning and present Belgrade with a stark choice
between backing down or confrontation with the United States and
its allies.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States
launched on September 11, 2001, the challenge of terrorism
has taken on a new weight in U.S. national security policy, and
sympathy for organizations such as the KLA, which use irregular
forces and violence against civilians to promote strategies of armed
resistance in complex regional contingencies, has been reduced
to practically nil. In his defense before the International Criminal
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, Milošević has
emphasized the terrorist character of the KLA, including references
to the organization’s contacts with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda
terror network and the engagement in Kosovo of al-Qaeda militants
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trained in Afghanistan.30 Reading history backward in this manner
has its risks — U.S. policy during the Kosovo crisis was focused
upon the implications of the conflict itself, not necessarily its larger
ramifications or the weight of what may have been perceived as a
marginal engagement by what were at that point omnipresent alQaeda operatives. The extremist character of the KLA, and its ties
to international terror networks with a powerful anti-American
commitment, nonetheless call attention to the contradictions of
Western policy during the genesis of an intervention that would
eventually be portrayed as a moral crusade, but that in fact was
driven by an ambiguous choice between unpalatable options.
Five Minutes to Midnight.
The Western powers were not anxious to engage in Kosovo,
but as Yugoslav reprisals continued, a hands-off attitude was
judged to be unsustainable. The severity of Serbian repression was
destabilizing. By the autumn, military operations had produced
over 200,000 internally displaced persons, and threatened to
provoke a humanitarian disaster should fighting be prolonged
through the winter months.31 The West had justified its intervention
in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the premise that forceful ethnic cleansing
was unacceptable in modern Europe. Inaction in the face of the
events in Kosovo seemed to risk invalidating the raison d’être of
its considerable Balkan engagement. In addition, the KLA was a
reality that could not be ignored. Under siege, large segments of
the Kosovar Albanian population flocked to its banner, calling into
question Rugova’s ability to represent his nation, and raising the
specter (perhaps encouraged by faulty intelligence estimates) of a
national insurrection sweeping out of control.
During the first weeks of the Serbian crackdown the premises of
Washington’s approach to the problem were recast. Castigation of
the KLA as terrorist was quietly set aside, though the organization’s
maximal agenda was not endorsed. Simultaneously, the antiSerbian edge of Western policy was reasserted. Serbian repression
was criticized and already on occasion interpreted not merely as an
exaggerated reaction to a domestic insurgency, but as a campaign
with genocidal intent directed against the Kosovar Albanian
population as a whole. Nonetheless, efforts were made to maintain
some kind of balance between the parties to conflict. During the
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early stages of the fighting Washington sought to distance itself
from both belligerents, to encourage dialogue between the Yugoslav
government and Rugova’s LDK, and to contain the fighting within
the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — moderate goals
that could eventually be combined in the framework of a coherent
policy response.
U.S. policy in the first phase of the crisis was built upon the
assumptions that the KLA agenda for national independence
was unacceptable, and Serbian repression disproportionate. The
presumption that only domestic issues were at stake was rejected
in light of massive human rights abuses and their implications for
stability in the region, and the pursuit of a military solution on the
part of both belligerents was condemned as a recipe for frustration.
The preferred alternative was a diplomatic solution, including
legal adjudication of human rights abuses mediated through the
good offices of the West.32 Rugova’s LDK was considered the most
legitimate representative of the Kosovar Albanians, and Washington
placed considerable pressure on the organization (with only limited
success), to build a more broadly based advisory board and distance
itself from KLA extremism.33
On the Serbian side, there was no one to turn to other than the
familiar devil Milošević, who once again assumed center stage as
his country’s primary interlocutor with the West. Though the terms
of a solution were in principle to be left to the interested parties to
determine, Washington made no secret of its preference for what
Gelbard described on March 26, 1998, as “some form of enhanced
status for Kosovo, within the borders of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.”34 Belgrade was characteristically defiant, and on April
23, 1998, the Milošević regime conducted a popular referendum in
which 94.7 percent of the electorate rejected international mediation.
Despite Serbian intransigence, however, the approach to the conflict
articulated by Washington during the fighting of spring 1998 would
be maintained with a great deal of consistency through the twists
and turns that followed.
Concern for the spillover effects of the Kosovo conflict was
greatest in neighboring Albania and Macedonia, and it was here
that Western containment efforts were concentrated. Since 1992,
the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia
(UNPREDEP), made up primarily of U.S. and Scandinavian units
deployed along the Macedonian-Serbian border, had been kept in
232

place with the intent of monitoring any attempted Serbian move
southward. When the normal extension of the UNPREDEP mandate
was discussed in the UN Security Council in November 1997,
however, the United States bowed to pressure from the Russian
Federation and agreed to terminate the deployments after a final
extension of nine months. Moscow’s opposition was based upon the
argument that progress toward stabilization in Bosnia-Herzegovina
had made preventive deployments less necessary, but it also rested
upon a calculated concern over the implications of a long term U.S.
military presence in the area, and for the generally anti-Serb tenor of
Western policy.
Faced with the need to find alternatives, Washington introduced
a post-UNPREDEP package that included efforts to improve
the combat readiness of Macedonian forces through expanded
security assistance (the United States unilaterally increased its own
security assistance allotment for Macedonia from $2 million to $8
million annually), and an expanded Partnership for Peace (PfP)
individual partnership program, including an intensified agenda of
joint exercises, strengthened military to military contacts, and the
possibility of expanding Macedonia’s Krivolak firing range into a
permanent PfP center for peacekeeping training. This program was
being discussed at the moment when large-scale violence erupted
in Kosovo in February 1998, making the continued relevance of
preventive deployments obvious to all. At the end of August 1998
the UNPREDEP mandate was renewed by consensus. The feuding
over renewal had nonetheless revealed contrasting priorities
within the international community, and did not bode well for the
prospects of cooperation in the event of a crisis. Moreover, the issue
of containing the Kosovo conflict at the Macedonian frontier, a task
for which UNPREDEP was not equipped, was left unresolved.
In May 1998, with the situation becoming more explosive by the
day, a NATO survey team undertook a preliminary study to estimate
the feasibility of a preventive deployment in Albania. In April 1998,
Belgrade and Tirana began to exchange accusations over the Kosovo
problem, with Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano speaking of
Serb responsibility for “pathological and traditional violence,” and
Yugoslav UN ambassador Vladislav Jovanović accusing Tirana
of giving support to the KLA.35 Blocking weapons trafficking and
preventing the KLA from using Albania as a sanctuary seemed
to be goals worth pursuing, but the NATO study concluded that
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upwards of 20,000 soldiers, combined with a major effort to build
transportation corridors and ensure supply lines in an isolated and
underdeveloped area, would be required to control the border. On
the basis of these estimates NATO ruled out the option.36 In a short
time it would be required to make a much greater contribution of
soldiers and material, and to fight a major war, in an effort to resolve
the problems that preventive measures were intended to head off.
The Western effort to contain the Kosovo conflict in its early
phases was spelled out by the May 28, 1998, Declaration on Kosovo
issued at the NATO ministerial in Luxembourg.37 The measures
recommended included: (1) expanded PfP assistance to help the
national armed forces of both Macedonia and Albania secure their
frontiers; (2) a NATO-PfP joint exercise to be conducted in Macedonia
during September 1998; (3) the establishment of a PfP partnership
cell in Tirana and the conduct of a small PfP-led exercise during
August; (4) the opening, beginning in July, of a permanent NATO
naval facility at the Albanian port of Durrës; and (5) a commitment
to expand UN and OSCE surveillance in the region. These measures
were sufficient to prevent a short-term expansion of the conflict
beyond the borders of Kosovo, but not to dampen the brush fire that
was now blazing within the troubled province itself.38
Diplomatic alternatives were pursued through both bilateral and
multilateral channels. At the first signs of trouble, the six-member
International Contact Group was brought back to center stage as
a vehicle for coordinating Balkan policy. In a statement of March
9, 1998, the Contact Group condemned “the use of excessive force
by Serbian police against civilians” as well as “terrorist actions by
the Kosovo Liberation Army” and outlined a series of measures
intended to encourage dialogue.39 Similar language appeared in UN
Security Council Resolution 1160, promulgated on March 31, which
condemned excessive use of force against civilians, imposed an arms
embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and concluded
with the vague threat of “additional measures” in the absence of
progress toward a settlement.40 The North Atlantic Council (NAC)
issued its first statement on the problem on March 5, 1998, expressing
“profound concern” and pledging engagement to prevent escalation
and “promote security and stability.”41 At the end of May, the
NATO ministerial in Luxembourg defined the situation in Kosovo
as “unacceptable,” and in June the EU foreign ministers agreed,
together with the United States, to impose a ban on investments
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and to freeze Serbian foreign assets.42 The ICTY was accorded the
authority to investigate and prosecute violations in Kosovo, and
during July its head prosecutor, Louise Arbour, announced that the
situation in the province met the standards of an “armed conflict”
where the laws of war would apply.
The United States weighed in diplomatically through its
ambassador to Macedonia Christopher Hill, who took the lead
in coordinating diplomatic communication inside Kosovo with
representatives of the KLA and LDK. Special envoy Holbrooke was
also brought back into the limelight as a channel to the leadership
in Belgrade. At a May 15 meeting between Milošević and Rugova
organized under Holbrooke’s auspices, Belgrade formally committed
itself to discussions with representatives of the Kosovar Albanian
community.43 Urged on by Washington, on June 12 the International
Contact Group, joined by the foreign ministers of Canada and Japan,
drew up a ten-point program, including calls for: (1) an immediate
cease-fire; (2) international monitoring; (3) access for the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and international NGOs; and (4)
dialogue between Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians under the
auspices of international mediators.44 The negotiations led nowhere,
however, and the momentum of the Serbian offensive unfolding on
the ground was not discernibly slowed.
The missing ingredient appeared to be coercion. In its efforts
to build a united front of opposition to the Serbian crackdown,
Washington was successful in creating a façade of unity among key
Western allies around the lowest common denominator of respect for
international humanitarian law. Soon, however, military action as a
means to compel Serbian compliance was being evoked. On June 1516, 1 day prior to a scheduled visit by Milošević to Moscow, NATO
conducted an exercise in the skies over Macedonia and Albania
entitled Operation DETERMINED FALCON, demonstrating its
capacity to react with air power to provocations on the ground.
NATO foreign ministers also announced the scheduling of PfP
exercises in Albania for August and September. During a summer
visit to Moscow German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel upped the
ante by remarking that in the event that the situation in Kosovo did
not improve military intervention might be necessary, noting that
it was already “five minutes to midnight.”45 On June 16, following
talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and on the basis of a
commitment “on the necessity of preservation of the territorial
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integrity and respect of sovereignty of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia,” Milošević agreed to grant access to the province to
150 international observers organized under OSCE auspices as the
Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM).46 At this point a
combination of diplomatic pressure and threats of force seemed to
be bearing fruit.
Appearances were deceiving, and it quickly became apparent
that in the case of Kosovo a military option would be highly
disputatious. Whatever the violations for which it was responsible,
Yugoslavia was a sovereign state engaged in putting down an
armed insurrection on what was acknowledged as its own territory.
External intervention on behalf of an armed secessionist movement
would create a disturbing precedent. Any kind of military strikes
against Serbia would inevitably contribute to the campaign of the
KLA, an effect that Washington and its allies were anxious to avoid.
And there were significant sources of dissension. Russia, clinging
to its historical role as protector of the Serbs in an effort to salvage
some leverage in the region, rejected the military option point
blank, refused to sanction air strikes against Yugoslavia in UN or
OSCE forums, and warned of “serious international consequences”
should NATO act without a formal international mandate.47 NATO
asserted a right to intervene regardless, on the basis of existing UN
resolutions and in a case of urgent humanitarian necessity, but
it was not internally united. Behind the scenes numerous allies,
including Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain,
expressed reluctance to engage the Alliance without approval from
a mandating authority.48
The orchestrated campaign of coercive diplomacy reached its
culmination in the autumn. On September 23 the UN Security
Council (with China abstaining) passed Resolution 1199 describing
the situation in the province as a “threat to peace and security in
the region” that demanded “immediate action” on behalf of peace,
and calling for a ceasefire, withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from
Kosovo, free access for the international community, and the return
of refugees and internally displaced persons.49 On the following day,
NATO defense ministers meeting in Villamoura, Portugal, issued
Activation Warnings for two different kinds of military responses,
described as Limited Air Response (short term, punishing retaliation
aimed at fixed targets such as headquarters, communication relays,
and ammunition drops) and Phased Air Campaign (a five-phase air
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operation moving from the suppression of Yugoslav air defenses
through attacks against major force components). These options
rested upon an extensive NATO planning effort that had been
underway since June 1998, and that had produced a palette of no
less than 40 air campaign variants.50 Western policy had now shifted
toward compellence, with NATO in the role of enforcer.
On October 1 the NAC issued an Activation Request for both
limited and phased air options, and at U.S. urging, NATO began
the process of decision on the issuance of Activation Orders
(ACTORDs). Several days later a long-awaited report from UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan was sharply critical of the “wanton
killing and destruction” in Kosovo, and in its wake Holbrooke
presented Milošević with an ultimatum demanding an immediate
pullback.51 In an address to the Cleveland Council on World Affairs
on October 9, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott provided a
rationale for the use of force by defining the situation in Kosovo
as “a clear and present danger to our vital national interests.”52 On
October 13, confronting what appeared to be an imminent threat of
attack, Serbian President Milan Milutinović announced acceptance
in principle of a compromise, including a pullback of heavy weapons
and major force contingents, return to normal peacetime police
monitoring, and a pledge of proportionate response to provocation.53
The NAC, pushed forward by Secretary General Solana, nonetheless
went ahead with its ACTORD decision, accompanied by a 96-hour
“pause” to allow Belgrade to demonstrate good intentions. An
agreement signed by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanović
and OSCE representative Bronislav Geremek on October 16
permitted the creation of a 2000-member OSCE Kosovo Verification
Mission (KVM), which was endorsed by the UN Security Council 1
week later, and the launching of a NATO air surveillance mission to
monitor compliance.54 Belgrade dragged its feet on disengagement,
but under pressure eventually accepted NATO’s conditions intact.55
On October 27 the NAC finally suspended its programmed air
strikes. The relevant ACTORDs were not cancelled, however, with
NATO reserving the right to execute them at a later date if necessary.
Several weeks later a Kosovo Verification Coordination Center was
established in order to reinforce “liaison, planning, coordination and
information exchange” with NATO.56 Coercive diplomacy, ratcheted
up to the point of an imminent threat of air attack, seemed to have
pushed Milošević to his breaking point.
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The exercise in coercion placed considerable strain on the
Western Alliance. The kind of friction inherent in the use of
NATO in an intrusive peace enforcement capacity was made
clear in the days immediately following Belgrade’s concessions
by the revelation of what was presented as a serious breach of
security. NATO staff officer and French Major Pierre-Henri Bunel
was accused of passing targeting data for eventual air strikes on
to Belgrade, an action interpreted by some as the product of “a
dominant climate within French military circles of sympathy for the
Serbian cause” born of empathy for a traditional ally.57 The speaker
of the Russian parliament Gennadi Seleznev stated bluntly that
in the event of military action against Belgrade he would initiate
legislation to withdraw from the Permanent Joint Council defining a
special relationship between Russia and NATO. The issue of NATO
intervention was the first significant foreign policy decision for the
new German governing coalition of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, both, in their youth, selfproclaimed pacifists and opponents of NATO. While committing to
respect alliance commitments, Berlin asserted the right to repose the
issue in the future, and was particularly insistent about the need to
keep diplomatic options open.58 Perhaps most significant in the longterm, a joint Anglo-French declaration on European defense signed
in Saint Malo, France, on December 4, 1998, reflected disgruntlement
with Washington’s forcing inside the Alliance by urging the EU to
create “the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible
military forces, the means to use them and readiness to do so in
order to respond to international crises.”59 This was a first step in the
direction of an autonomous European Security and Defense Policy
separate and distinct from that defined by the Atlantic Alliance.
In retrospect it is clear that the Western conflict management
effort in Kosovo was belated and ineffective. It was also seriously
confused about ends and means. During most of the 1990s,
Rugova’s adherence to a policy of nonviolence gave the Kosovar
Albanian faction considerable moral authority and provided space
for proactive policies designed to soften Serbian repression in the
context of an overall regional settlement. By the time that the issue
was pushed onto the international agenda during 1998 hopes for a
negotiated outcome had all but evaporated, and between Kosovar
Albanian extremism and Serbian brutality, there was very little to
choose. A decade of conflict and broadening Western engagement
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had made the Balkans too seminal a region to allow for a do-nothing
option. The Serbian side was uniformly perceived as being primarily
responsible, Western patience with Milošević and his cynical
maneuvering had long since grown thin, and further toleration for
Serbian defiance was not judged to be desirable. But the precedent of
terrorist violence and armed secession being established by the KLA
was disturbing. Lodged between a rock and a hard place, during the
first phase of the Kosovo crisis U.S. diplomacy sought to impose a
weak compromise through the threat of coercion. In very short order,
the limitations of the approach would become painfully clear.
War and Revenge.
The Holbrooke-Milošević accord was concluded a full 8 months
after the Serbian campaign of repression had been launched. By the
time that crisis diplomacy was cranked up to confront the problem,
large swaths of Kosovo had already been devastated by war, some
750 Kosovar Albanians killed, and over 200,000 internally displaced
persons set on the road to nowhere. Under the circumstances, and
given the effort that had been expended to assemble an apparatus
of coercion, the accord itself was remarkably tepid. Yugoslav
authorities agreed to pull their special military units out of the
province, but the withdrawal came after the KLA infrastructure had
been reduced to tatters and at the onset of the winter season where
serious campaigning would be much more difficult. The Serbs
were permitted to maintain police and military levels equivalent
to those in place under what had been a virtual martial law regime
prior to February 1998. Compliance was to be monitored by the
2,000 unarmed members of the KVM, assisted by an air verification
mission coordinated by NATO and designated as Operation EAGLE
EYE.60 The modest contingent of observers threatened no one,
and had itself to be protected by a 1,500 member extraction force,
dubbed Operation DETERMINED GUARANTOR, led by the French
and based in Macedonia.61 The accord included pledges by the
Serbs to engage in good faith negotiations with Kosovar Albanian
representatives aimed at reestablishing local self-government with
a 3-year time frame for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy, a
general amnesty for resistance fighters, cooperation with the work of
the UN war crimes tribunal to identify responsibility for violations
of the laws of war, the convening of elections for the autumn of 1999,
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and a program to facilitate the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons. These guidelines were by no means punitive
— Belgrade could have lived with them without any fear of loss of
control within the province.
There were at least two wild cards standing in the way of a
peaceful settlement. The first was the KLA itself, in no way a party
to the October accord, and committed to continue its campaign of
armed resistance despite setbacks. The second was the determination
of the authorities in Belgrade to press their advantage and put paid
to Kosovar Albanian resistance when the opportunity presented
itself. The KLA had accumulated a good deal of international
sympathy in its unequal struggle with the Yugoslav authorities
and was anxious to make use of it. Milošević had watched closely
as NATO struggled with the “appalling and unenviable choice” to
intervene, and was aware that alliance cohesion was weak.62 The
October accord did not effectively constrain either party to the
conflict, and the small KVM contingent that moved slowly into
place lacked the means to demand respect. By January 1999 only
800 of the 2,000 observers originally pledged had arrived, and when
the mission was withdrawn in March, it had not grown beyond
1,400.63 As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community had
moved to address symptoms rather than underlying problems. A
different approach might have provided for a more robust presence
of alliance ground forces adjacent to Kosovo as a mechanism for
intimidation, or even worked to secure Belgrade’s approval for
a full-fledged international protectorate inside the province that
would have assured its continued attachment to Yugoslavia. Such
solutions were rejected by the Clinton administration, which sought
to minimalize U.S. exposure and placed its bets on bluff. Without
mechanisms to enforce respect for the accord, whether to prevent
the Kosovar Albanians from exploiting partial Serbian compliance to
their own advantage, or to block Serbian reprisals in the face of new
provocations, the October bargain was condemned to failure.
Predictably, as Serbian forces pulled back as agreed, KLA
fighters moved forward to occupy the vacated terrain. Soon sporadic
fighting had resumed. In December, Serbian “training exercises”
near Podujevo, undertaken without prior notification to the OSCE,
developed into larger scale offensive operations against KLA units
in clear violation of the October understanding. The seminal event
in the new escalation occurred on January 15, 1999, in the village
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of Račak in the rebellious Drenica region, where a Serbian punitive
action left 45 civilians dead, including two women and a 12-year-old
boy.
The question of what exactly happened in Račak has been hotly
contested. The version of events announced to the world in the
immediate aftermath of the killing suggested that Serbian units in
pursuit of a small KLA contingent occupied the village and massacred
its inhabitants as an admonition to those tempted to offer sanctuary
to the guerrillas.64 One of the first international observers to arrive
on the scene was the former U.S. ambassador William Walker, now
serving as head of the OSCE KVM force. Upon viewing the corpses
of the victims, Walker flew into a rage, accusing the Serbian side
of conducting a willful massacre, and announcing his convictions
via telephone to U.S. leaders.65 There was some impropriety in
Walker’s communication with American decisionmakers in view
of his primary responsibility to the OSCE, but it is the substance of
his report, and the political uses to which it was put, that is, most
vividly disputed. Broadcast around the world, Walker’s judgment
went far to condition public sentiment for an eventual military
campaign against Serbia. Within days, the U.S. Department of
State would condemn the event as a “massacre of civilians by Serb
security forces,” while NATO Secretary General Solana spoke of “a
flagrant violation of international humanitarian law.”66 Subsequent
international investigations of the incident have however failed
to produce forensic evidence that would indicate that a massacre
occurred, and suggest that it remains possible (as Serb observers had
argued at the time) that the cadavers displayed at Račak were those
of fallen resistance fighters and innocent bystanders killed in the
fighting, gathered together from over a wider area by villagers under
KLA direction, and presented as victims of a purposeful massacre
with the express purpose of swaying international sentiment against
the Serbs.67
Whether or not the events at Račak were intentionally manipulated
or misrepresented to strengthen the case for Western intervention,
they cast discredit on Serbian forces and increased pressure for an
international response. On January 15, with the fighting at Račak
underway, the U.S. National Security Council defined its goals in the
crisis as to “promote regional stability and protect our investment in
Bosnia; prevent the resumption of hostilities in Kosovo and renewed
humanitarian crisis; [and] preserve U.S. and NATO credibility.”68
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General Wesley Clark echoed this conclusion in his evaluation of the
impact of Račak by suggesting that in the wake of the killing “NATO’s
credibility was on the line.”69 All of the U.S. goals were placed at risk
by the disintegration in course, and least of all could the Alliance
allow the perception that it had once again, as in Bosnia, become
complacent in view of a policy of massacre. Meeting in London on
January 29, ministers representing the International Contact Group
cut to the chase by demanding that representatives of Yugoslavia and
the Kosovar Albanians come together under international auspices
for proximity talks at the French châteaux of Rambouillet, located in
the environs of Paris.70 On January 30 the NAC issued a statement
lending its support to the Contact Group initiative and threatening
a forceful response in the event of non-compliance. It also granted
NATO Secretary General Solana full authority to approve air strikes
against targets within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia if events
so merited — an important derogation of responsibility that in effect
negated the possibility for a single-member veto to block action.71
The stage was once again set for an exercise in coercive diplomacy
that was intended to conclude with a Western-imposed peace plan.
The plan itself, drawn up by the Contact Group and closely
modeled on the Dayton Accord, consisted of a framework agreement
establishing guidelines for a peace process, accompanied by a
number of annexes treating specific aspects of implementation.72
The key security and civilian implementation annexes were the
source of considerable behind the scenes squabbling among the
Western allies, with differences emerging over the familiar issue
of a UN mandate, the role of NATO (whose representatives
were banned from the Rambouillet sessions by the French hosts),
distribution of responsibility between the security component of an
implementation mission and its civilian component, and the extent
of U.S. participation in a proposed Kosovo occupation force. The
Rambouillet sessions were underway for a full week before final
texts had been agreed upon. This was not necessarily a critical lapse
in view of the fact that the program was not intended as a working
text open to discussion — it was presented as an ultimatum to take
or leave under threat of reprisals. But the differences between the
allies over the substance of the agreement did not bode well.73
In its final form the Rambouillet accord called for an immediate
cession of hostilities; the partial withdrawal and demilitarization
of all armed forces inside Kosovo; guarantees of civil rights; and
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a peace settlement that would grant Kosovo expanded autonomy
within Yugoslavia in the short term, and allow a binding
referendum on the province’s final status after 5 years. The security
annex provided for the occupation of the province by a NATOled international force, based upon a status of forces contract that
would also provide for a right of access to the entire territory of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. To the surprise and chagrin
of the mediators present, these terms were not accepted by either
of the parties to the negotiations. The Serbian delegation, without
high level representatives and totally dependent upon approval
from Belgrade, accepted the plan in outline but raised numerous
objections to various aspects of implementation. Milošević was
clearly anxious to avoid any agreement that would allow for the
deployment of NATO forces on Yugoslav territory.74 The Kosovar
Albanian delegation, uncomfortably combining representatives of
the KLA and LDK, and headed by KLA hard liner Hashim Thači,
objected to any arrangement that would leave Kosovo a part of
Yugoslavia, even for an interim period.75 The intransigence of the
parties was a diplomatic embarrassment that seemed to indicate the
limits of Western leverage.
Faced with a potential failure that would compromise the entire
mediation effort, the original 23 February deadline for an accord
was extended and a new round of talks scheduled for March 15 in
the Kleber Center in Paris. During the intervening weeks, Western
efforts were directed almost entirely toward bringing Thači and the
Albanian delegation around. The winning argument appears to
have been that without the Kosovar Albanians on board, punitive
military strikes against Serbia would have to be suspended.
Holbrooke visited Belgrade on March 10 and conveyed the message
that without Serbian compliance, military action was inevitable. At
the second round of talks at the Kleber Center from March 15-19, the
Kosovar Albanian delegation delivered its promised signature, while
the Serbs demurred and called for continued dialogue.76 The United
States offered 28,000 NATO peacekeepers, including 4,000 U.S.
soldiers, to supervise a negotiated settlement, but the real focus of
the American effort was to win over the KLA as a means to sanction
punitive strikes against Serbia.77 Upon departure from Paris after
the conclusion of the sessions on March 19, the Serbian delegation
denounced the terms of the accord as a Western ultimatum in
violation of international law.78 Simultaneously, Serbian forces began
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to mass in and around Kosovo in what appeared to be preparations
for a confrontation.79
The Rambouillet proximity talks had failed to produce a
negotiated accord, but they were successful in creating a pretext for
military action. Immediately upon the departure of the Yugoslav
delegation, the machine of war was set into motion. On March 19
the KVM was withdrawn from Kosovo, and on March 21 Holbrooke
arrived in Belgrade to deliver a final admonition to Milošević, who
dutifully refused to receive him. On March 23 Solana directed the
SACEUR, U.S. General Wesley Clark, to begin air operations against
Yugoslavia. One day later, in the mist and rain of an early Balkan
spring, Operation ALLIED FORCE was launched.
The decision to resort to force in Kosovo remains controversial,
in part because Serbian motives during the events leading up to
hostilities can only be inferred. Western goals were clearly stated
and unquestionably defensible, but the means chosen to pursue them
were debatable. NATO had launched an attack against a sovereign
state engaged in suppressing a domestic insurgency without a
convincing international mandate. During the year preceding the
attack, approximately 2,000 people had died as a result of violence
associated with the uprising in the province — tragic, but far from
the “genocidal” violence that some denounced. The UN High
Commissioner for Refugees established that some 250,000 Kosovar
Albanians had chosen to leave their homes under duress — likewise
tragic, but hardly a humanitarian disaster of unprecedented
dimensions.80 The legitimacy of NATO’s appeal to urgent
humanitarian necessity as a justification for action was therefore
open to question.81 The Rambouillet plan contained conditions
(freedom of operation for NATO forces throughout the entire
territory of Yugoslavia and the designation of a binding referendum
on Kosovo’s final status that would almost certainly result in a
choice for independence) that would have been difficult for any
government in Belgrade to accept.82 It was moreover presented as
an ultimatum under threat of force, in contravention of international
legal precepts, which do not recognize agreements concluded as a
result of coercion. By intervening against one party to a civil dispute,
NATO adopted an objectively partisan stance that belied its own
rhetoric of neutrality. The most detailed Western account of U.S.
decisionmaking during the crisis argues baldly that the purpose of
Rambouillet was not to promote a diplomatic accord, but rather “to
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create a consensus in Washington and among the NATO allies that
force would have to be used.”83 For its many critiques, by precluding
diplomatic options and precipitating events before the threat of force
could be made credible, Rambouillet became “a text book example
of how not to conduct diplomacy.”84
It remains the case that Serbia’s aggressive approach to the
Kosovo problem was clearly a problem. Fighting over the past year
had already created a wave of refugees that threatened to throw
neighboring states into chaos, and the situation only promised
to grow worse. NATO’s initiative could therefore reasonably be
portrayed as a legitimate reaction to a “pending humanitarian
catastrophe” created by the willful policies of a defiant Belgrade.85
Though the air war option may not have been an optimal response
in purely military terms, it was the only response that was politically
feasible, and some kind of riposte was absolutely necessary. Even at
lower levels of violence, Belgrade’s provocations were a challenge
to NATO, the anchor for U.S. forward presence in Europe and the
keystone of the continent’s security architecture. In October 1998
coercive diplomacy had been tried and failed. Now it was the turn
of coercion pure and simple.
Operation ALLIED FORCE.
The military confrontation between NATO and Yugoslavia
opened with significant strategic miscalculations on both sides.
Allied terms for conflict termination were defined at the outset
of the contest and adhered to with great consistency thereafter: an
end to violence and military operations in Kosovo, withdrawal
of Serbian military and police forces, acceptance of a NATO-led
international monitoring force, return of refugees and internally
displaced persons, and commitment to a political framework on
the basis of the Rambouillet accord, including expanded autonomy
for a democratic Kosovo inside the Yugoslav federation. This was
a “Serbs out, NATO in, refugees back” scenario that the Alliance
would stick with to the bitter end. Political goals were linked to a
military strategy that focused upon the use of air power to suppress
defenses and allow unhindered NATO operations in Yugoslav air
space, isolate the Yugoslav Third Army inside Kosovo and degrade
its combat capacity, and coerce acceptance of NATO peace terms.
In the words of U.S. President Clinton, in his address to the nation
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announcing the commencement of air operations, NATO forces
were tasked to “demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition
to aggression,” deter Milošević from “escalating his attacks on
helpless civilians,” and “damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war
against Kosovo by seriously diminishing its military capabilities.”86
In the wake of the Kosovo conflict, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant
General Michael Short, Commander of Allied Air Forces Southern
Europe and the U.S. 16th Air Force headquartered in Aviano, Italy,
during the campaign, criticized his political masters for failing to
develop “clear political objectives” to guide military commanders.87
Short’s assertion is in some ways unfair — in Kosovo, the political
end state that military force was intended to facilitate was articulated
about as clearly as circumstances permitted. What was less than
clear were the appropriate means for achieving stated objectives.
Key NATO allies were uncomfortable from the start with the
resort to air attacks to coerce a fellow European state. The Clinton
administration was convinced that limited bombing strikes would
suffice to force Serbian compliance, but loath to follow the logic of
coercion to the end of unconstrained warfare, possibly including
conventional ground combat operations.88 As a result, NATO made
a conscious decision to go to war with one hand tied behind its back.
U.S. decisionmakers were particularly concerned with the fragility
of public support for a protracted war in the Balkans, and for the
impact of a costly and indecisive contest upon alliance cohesion.
In the summer of 1998 alliance planners developed a full range
of military options for contingencies in Kosovo, but U.S. political
leaders publicly ruled out any commitment of ground forces in a
“nonpermissive” environment.89 According to a study prepared by
the RAND Corporation on behalf of the U.S. Army, ground options
were never seriously considered during the planning process. The
report states unequivocally that: “from mid-1998 onward, not only
was this option [ground operations] shelved, no serious contingency
planning for air-land operations was undertaken. The exclusive
planning focus was on air and missile strikes.”90 In his March 24
address Clinton announced peremptorily that “I do not intend to
put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”91 On that foundation,
limited air strikes were initiated on the basis of what would soon
prove to be the unfounded assumption that several days of bombing
would suffice to convince Milošević that capitulation was his best
option. On the evening of March 24, speaking to a national television
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audience, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was forthright in
declaring to the U.S. public, but also to its adversaries in a theater
of war, that “I don’t see this as a long-term operation.”92 The United
States aspired to stage a punitive action, not to wage war in the
classic sense. The “whole purpose of the NATO effort,” in the words
of General Clark, “was to empower diplomacy.”93 As a consequence,
its military operations unfolded under rules of engagement that
have been described as “uncompromisingly restrictive.”94
During the air war in Kosovo, allied combat commanders were
instructed to avoid casualties at all costs.95 NATO air attacks were
never entirely successful in suppressing layered and redundant Serb
air defense systems, including the threat of radar-guided surface to air
missiles, and to reduce risk, during most of the campaign air strikes
were launched from above a medium altitude ceiling of 5,000 meters.
These precautions made it possible to limit losses, and during the
campaign only two NATO aircraft were downed by hostile fire, but
the price was decreased operational efficiency, and at least one wellpublicized incident where the difficulties of visual discrimination
from high altitude led to a tragic targeting error. Misgivings on
the part of some alliance members and the lack of a valid mandate
made NATO particularly sensitive to the issue of collateral damage,
imposing restrictions on the kinds of targets that commanders were
allowed to attack, and creating opportunities for sanctuary that
Serbian forces were able to exploit. Procedures for target approval
involving all of the NATO allies, thrown together hastily after the
initiation of hostilities, proved to be especially cumbersome and led
to what the chair of the NATO Military Committee, German General
Klaus Naumann, would later call “a lowest-common-denominator
approach” to target selection.96 The assumption that punitive strikes
would do the job, difficulties in suppressing air defenses, politically
imposed conditions dictating minimal losses, restrictive rules of
engagement, and the inevitable constraints associated with coalition
warfare, excluded reliance upon preferred U.S. Air Force doctrine,
recommending the application of overwhelming force against a full
spectrum of targets from the outset of a campaign.97
Working within these constraints, the SACEUR developed plans
for a three-phase air campaign. In Phase I, antiaircraft defenses and
command posts would be targeted. Phase II was to extend attacks to
strategic infrastructure beyond the 44th parallel. In Phase III Belgrade
itself would come under attack. The plan actually implemented
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on March 24 envisioned strikes against a modest total of 50 preapproved targets, and presumed that 2 to 4 days of bombing would
suffice to provide Milošević with a face-saving pretext to pull out
after having offered token resistance. Unfortunately, it quickly
became apparent that the Serbian leader had no such intention, and
that the intensity of the campaign as it had been planned would not
be sufficient to achieve U.S. goals.
What followed in the first weeks of the campaign, in the words
of one critic, was a “chaotic, unscripted, and confused” effort to
adapt to the unforeseen.98 General Clark spelled out the alternative
to a strategy of intimidation in a briefing on March 25, arguing
for the need “to systematically and progressively attack, disrupt,
degrade, devastate . . . and destroy” Serbia’s ability to wage war.99
This represented a significant escalation of military goals that many
allied political leaders were not prepared for. It was not until the
NATO summit in Washington on April 23 that the Alliance formally
approved an intensification of the air operation by expanding the
target set to military-industrial infrastructure and other strategic
targets, and committing to the deployment of additional aircraft. By
this point, hopes for a short war had long since been discarded.
Yugoslav miscalculations were even more severe. Milošević may
well have been surprised when NATO mustered the will to launch
its original attack. Upon the initiation of hostilities his strategy
became to hunker down and limit damage, seek to disrupt the allied
war effort asymmetrically, and hope for friction within the Alliance
to create pressure for a compromise peace. The Serbian population
predictably rallied behind its leadership with the nation under attack.
Large demonstrations expressing scorn for NATO’s air war were
organized in Belgrade and other urban centers, the wrecked fuselage
of a downed F-117 “Stealth” fighter was prominently displayed as a
trophy, and citizens paraded in the streets with small targets pinned
to their lapels to symbolize defiance. Anti-war sentiment was also
manifested in Western Europe — using NATO as an instrument
for waging war against a neutral European state was an inherently
risky undertaking, and one that was bound to stir up resentment. In
4 days of bombing raids against Iraq in December 1998 (Operation
DESERT FOX) conducted mainly by the United States and the United
Kingdom, punitive air attacks were used to demonstrate political
will but without seeking any kind of decisive strategic result.
Milošević may have convinced himself that a similar demonstration
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was what the West had in mind in the case of Yugoslavia, and that
by weathering the initial storm, while banking on declining allied
cohesion as the war effort became more demanding, his position in a
negotiated settlement would be strengthened.100
Most dramatically, the campaign of ethnic cleansing within
Kosovo was radically expanded. Within days of the first air strikes,
tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians fled from their homes in a
ghastly exodus that would quickly reach near biblical proportions.
By the end of the war, according to the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, 848,100 refugees had left the province — approximately
40 percent of the total population. The majority of these hapless
victims were pushed across the border into Montenegro, Macedonia,
or Albania, where makeshift camps were hastily set up to care for
them. Though it would later be claimed that the problem had been
foreseen, the internationally community was clearly unprepared for
a wave of refugees of this dimension.101
Western sources, citing classified intelligence reports, have
argued that the massive ethnic cleansing was carefully planned and
had already been set in motion, under the designation Operation
HORSESHOE, in the days prior to March 24.102 This explanation
was made public by the office of German Defense Minister Rudolf
Scharping in the first days of the conflict, and it has served ever since
to deflect criticism that the Alliance’s military action had provoked
the very humanitarian disaster its was intended to head off. In light
of the Bosnian precedent, it was hard not to believe the worst of
the Serbian leadership. “In Kosovo,” wrote J. Bryan Hehir in the
midst of the conflict, “prefigured by the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia,
the world . . . knows exactly what is happening, and we know who
is responsible.”103 Milošević had an obvious motive. The flood
of refugees disrupted alliance planning, and forced a significant
commitment of resources to emergency relief. Had he been able to
break Alliance will and negotiate a ceasefire with the refugees still
dispersed outside the borders of Kosovo, Milošević would have
affected a decisive shift in the demographic balance within the
disputed province to Serbia’s advantage. But the Western powers also
had a strong vested interest in justifying their decision to intervene
on the basis of preplanned and egregious Serbian transgressions that
they were not in a position to control. Indeed, some commentators
have questioned whether an operational plan dubbed “Horseshoe”
ever existed except as a product of Western disinformation.104 During
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his trial in The Hague, Milošević has challenged the existence of the
plan by noting that the Western sources describing it rendered the
term “Horseshoe” with the Croatian potkovica rather than the more
common Serb variant potkova.105 This was a linguistically dubious
assertion, that was perhaps intended to impress the judges more
than fellow Serbs, but the ICTY proceeded on its own behalf to
exclude documents outlining plans for Operation HORSESHOE as
potential forgeries.
Without access to Serbian archival sources that could presumably
shed a more definitive light on the issue, the assumption of
premeditation and careful planning does not correspond to what
we know about how the expulsions actually occurred. Rather than
unfolding in a coordinated and systematic manner, there were
widespread regional variations. Some communities were expelled
en masse while others were barely affected. Local reprisals and the
undisciplined comportment of soldiers seeking to wreck revenge
upon communities judged responsible for the NATO attacks played
an important role in individual cases. As in Bosnia, ill-disciplined
paramilitary forces were responsible for some of the worst abuses.
Though it is impossible to relieve Milošević of ultimate responsibility,
many of the refugees fled out of simple fear of being caught up in a
war zone. Tim Judah comes closest to our actual knowledge of events
when he suggests that “haphazard expulsion plans . . . coupled with .
. . the ‘we’ll f . . . them’ attitude, plus fighting, terror, and lack of food
and all the other circumstances of the war led to the exodus.”106
What is beyond dispute is that by provoking the exodus,
whether purposively or haphazardly, Milošević had cast down
a gauntlet that the Western Alliance could not fail to pick up,
solidifying public opinion in support of the war effort and virtually
ensuring his own eventual defeat. Televised images of the teaming
refugee encampments became an enduring symbol of the war, and
galvanized international sentiment in much the same way that the
shelling of Sarajevo had done several years earlier. The impact of
these events was magnified in the short term by undocumented but
widely dispersed reports of massacres. Subsequent investigations
failed to substantiate the rumors, but their effect was considerable,
and the spectacle of mass flight was undeniable and damning.
Yugoslavia had purchased a short-term disruption of the allied
campaign by casting itself as a pariah. In consequence support for
the allied war effort was strengthened, Serbian hopes to achieve
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substantial support from the Russian Federation were shattered,
and alliance cohesion was reinforced.
During Operation ALLIED FORCE combined air operations
were carried out by 14 allied states, in what was, by far, the largest
and most sustained combat operation in NATO history. At the
outset, 214 U.S. aircraft and 130 allied aircraft were readied at
European bases, augmented by B-2s operating from the continental
United States. By June the total number of U.S. aircraft operating in
the theater had grown to 731, while the allied contribution had more
than doubled to over 300. The Combined Air Operations Center
controlled operations from its base with the 5th Tactical Air Force in
Vicenza, Italy.
Between March 24 and June 10, in 78 days of around-the-clock
operations, NATO pilots flew nearly 38,000 sorties, including
over 14,000 strike missions. U.S. aircraft flew about two-thirds of
the sorties, and dominated key functions such as reconnaissance,
suppression of air defenses, and strikes with precision guided
munitions. Strike operations were mainly carried out by land-based
aircraft, but Navy carrier-based aviation, Marine shore-based and
sea-based aircraft, and cruise missile ships and submarines also
played a role. The high proportion of support to strike sorties was a
product of the special circumstances of a limited air campaign in a
difficult theater — protective air patrols in multiple locations were
organized as a matter of course, distances between targets and air
bases required numerous tanker support sorties, and intensive use
was made of reconnaissance and early warning and control aircraft.
Remarkably, only two aircraft failed to return to base, and there were
no allied combat fatalities.107 Approximately 500 noncombatants
died as a result of errant attacks, a regrettable outcome, but in view
of the intensity and duration of the campaign also a tribute to the
care taken to limit collateral damage to the extent possible.108 The
intensive use of precision strike systems, which accounted for over
half of munitions expended, was critical in this regard. Nonetheless,
a number of highly publicized incidents of accidental strikes against
civilians (including a refugee truck convoy), the deliberate targeting
of civilian infrastructure, the decision to allow strikes to be launched
only from above 5,000 meters, decreasing accuracy but reducing
pilot risk, and the environmental damage caused in Yugoslavia
and neighboring countries by oil and chemical spills generated
considerable controversy.109
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Despite the escalating intensity of attacks, NATO’s goals of
suppressing air defenses, reducing Serb combat capacity, and
compelling acceptance of peace terms remained elusive. The
Yugoslav command and control network was well protected and
redundant.110 Poor weather, typical for the region in the spring
season, and difficult terrain, made the acquisition and identification
of targets a challenge. Considerable energy was drawn into
humanitarian assistance operations in the face of the refugee crisis
(Operation ALLIED HARBOR), a commitment that would last for
the duration of the conflict and beyond.111 Units of the Serbian Third
Army deployed inside Kosovo, including some 40,000 soldiers
and 300 tanks, dispersed into smaller units, hid during the day,
maneuvered at night, and successfully limited vulnerability.112
By April the neat strategy of compellence on the basis of which
operations had commenced had given way to a war of attrition, with
the allied coalition seeking desperately for politically acceptable and
operationally feasible means to up the ante. As the war became more
protracted, political pressure inevitably grew.
Frustration over the lack of initial success gave rise to a clash of
perspectives between SACEUR Clark and Air Force General Short.
Short expressed disgruntlement with the incremental character
of the air campaign, and urged attacks against the “head of the
snake” including governmental offices in Belgrade and strategic
infrastructure. Clark did not oppose this line of thought, but he
was concerned about the impact on alliance cohesion. The SACEUR
believed that efforts to break Milošević’s will through strategic
bombing needed to be complemented by efforts to deny him the
means to act by attacking Serbian ground forces, the “top priority
of the campaign” because it struck at the enemy’s real center of
gravity.113 His conviction was if anything reinforced by pressure
from the North Atlantic Council to focus strikes against the
Yugoslav Third Army inside Kosovo as a means to provoke military
withdrawal. This meant a serious commitment to degrade Serbian
forces deployed inside Kosovo — a waste of air assets in “tank
plinking” in Short’s dismissive jargon.114 In retrospect, Clark’s hope
that air power could be used significantly to degrade Serbian forces
inside Kosovo may have been overly optimistic. Estimates published
during the campaign claimed that up to a third of Serbian heavy
armaments positioned in Kosovo were destroyed by allied bombing,
but subsequent evaluations make it clear that the real extent of
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attrition was considerably less.115
In the end, the approaches favored by Clark and Short would
be tried simultaneously. On April 3, NATO missiles destroyed the
Yugoslav and Serbian Interior Ministries in downtown Belgrade.
Thereafter, the Serbian capital would remain under intermittent
attack. Attacks on bridges, refineries, industrial complexes, and
the national energy grid followed. On April 23, NATO attacked
the Serbian state television building in Belgrade, killing 11 civilian
employees. The attack was justified on the grounds that the facility
was used to disseminate war propaganda, but it was an unusual
step that has become the most criticized of all NATO initiatives
during the war.116 The decision to attack national infrastructure, in
a campaign where the greatest military alliance in the history of the
world found itself at war with a small and isolated Balkan state with
11 million residents and a level of military spending at about onetwentieth that of its adversary, was without question an unusual
one. Its impact upon the Serbian people, who had never been
consulted about the decisions that led to war, and upon the longterm economic well-being of Serbia and the entire Balkan subregion,
was profoundly negative. Given the decision to rule out ground
operations, however, this was arguably the only military option
available to achieve the Alliance’s stated goals.
Targeting the capital was not without risks. On May 7 NATO
strike aircraft, misled by a breakdown in the process of identifying
and validating targets, attacked the embassy of the People’s Republic
of China in downtown Belgrade, killing three and wounding twenty.
The Alliance immediately apologized for what it called a “terrible
mistake,” and on May 9 President Clinton wrote to Chinese President
Jiang Zemin to offer regrets.117 Protestations of good intent were to
no avail. In the days following the bombing, the Chinese denounced
the action as “a gross violation of China’s sovereignty,” while
mobs in Beijing and other Chinese cities raided and ransacked U.S.
government offices with the implicit support of their government.118
Beijing has consistently rejected official explanations of the incident
and clung to the assertion that the embassy was targeted purposively
in order to “send a message.” Though Sino-American relations have
weathered the storm, the impact of the incident was profound, a
form of collateral damage for which the allied coalition was in no
way prepared.
Despite alliance friction, systematic attacks against infrastructure
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and the promise of national ruin should the campaign be allowed
to drag on indefinitely placed significant, cumulating pressure on
decisionmakers in Belgrade. Efforts to degrade Serb forces inside
Kosovo made considerably less progress. In response, and at the
SACEUR’s urging, discussion of a ground war option continued
to surface despite consistent declaimers by spokespersons for the
Clinton administration.
On March 26 General Clark requested the deployment of U.S.
Army Apache helicopters to basing areas in Macedonia as a means
for launching deep strikes against Serbian ground forces deployed
in Kosovo.119 The request was controversial, and in fact the Army,
Air Force, and Marine Corps all expressed nonconcurrence with
the deployment of Apaches without an accompanying ground
maneuver force, a requirement according to Army doctrine but
contrary to the U.S. desire to avoid ground operations in the Kosovo
case. The National Security Council overrode such opposition, and
President Clinton approved the request on April 3. Already on
March 29, however, overwhelmed by refugees and concerned with
the implications of serving as a staging post for combat operations,
Skopje refused to grant consent to basing rights. As a result the
Army’s Task Force Hawk was reassigned to Tirana’s Rinas airport,
which was already hosting humanitarian aid operations (NATO’s
Operation ALLIED HARBOR and the U.S. Operation SHINING
HOPE) and lacked the infrastructure required to host it effectively.
After an intensive material buildup that absorbed over 25 percent
of the airlift devoted to the campaign as a whole, including the
deployment of 6,200 troops and 26,000 tons of equipment as force
protection assets and for infrastructure support, more than three
times initial estimates, 22 Apaches were finally deployed as an
Army Aviation Brigade Combat Team by April 24. From the start,
resistance to their use in a nonconventional combat environment
was intense. The “no casualties” constraint was not consistent with
the nature of the mission to which the Apaches were to be assigned,
potential collateral damage from Apache strikes risked alienating
allied and public opinion, the cost-benefit ratio for tank hunting
under difficult operational circumstances was viewed by some
as unpromising, the lack of an accompanying ground maneuver
element was unconventional, and qualms about the potential for
the use of the Apaches to become a step toward a larger ground
campaign were strong.120 The crash of an Apache during a mission
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rehearsal on April 26, and a subsequent training accident on May
5 during which two Apache crew members died, threatened to
turn a deployment that was initiated to considerable fanfare into a
public relations nightmare. In the end the Apaches were withdrawn
without ever going into action.121
Efforts to plan for the eventuality of more extensive ground
operations ran head long into both political and logistical
constraints. U.S. and NATO planners were not authorized to
conduct traditional campaign planning for ground operations, and
no land component commander was ever designated during the
campaign. Once it became clear that air operations were not having
the desired effect, ground options were considered, but only in a
series of “assessments” that lacked the rigor of the formal planning
process.122 Moreover, approaching the theater posed critical logistical
challenges. The most logical line of operations ran from the Greek
port of Thessalonica up the valley of the Vardar (Axios), to Skopje.
Use of the corridor, however, was problematic. Polls indicated that
well over 90 percent of Greek citizens opposed the war, and the
government of Constantine Simitis in Athens, though willing, was
hard pressed to maintain solidarity with the Alliance. Macedonia
was not comfortable supporting a campaign waged on the side of
the KLA in view its own restive Albanian minority. As a result, both
Greece and Macedonia resisted allowing their national territories
to be used as staging areas for combat operations. Belgrade was
exposed to an attack from the north staged out of Hungary, but
such a venture would have represented a considerable escalation
that NATO was not prepared to accept.123 It was also unpopular in
Hungary, which sought to fulfill its commitments as a new member
of the Alliance (formal accession had occurred only 1 week prior
to the initiation of hostilities), but feared for the well-being of the
sizable Magyar minority in Yugoslavia’s Vojvodina region. The
only other option was to move across Albania, through relentless
terrain nearly devoid of infrastructure, along a single lane highway
traversing dozens of inadequate bridges and other obstacles. This
was an option that U.S. planners were willing to contemplate, but it
demanded a time-consuming commitment to prepare the ground.
By the time discussion of a ground option began in earnest, the
window of opportunity for initiating operations prior to the onset
of winter weather conditions had practically closed.124 Political
constraints were also a factor. The Clinton administration feared the
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consequences of a land war, and, among the NATO allies, only the
United Kingdom spoke out publicly in favor of a ground campaign
in the event that other options fell short.125
In the final weeks of Operation ALLIED FORCE a local offensive
staged by KLA units under loose allied supervision along the
Albanian-Kosovo border in the Mount Pastrik area, designated as
Operation ARROW and intended to open a route of access toward
Priština and enable the KLA to link up with sympathizers in the
interior, had the effect of drawing Serbian heavy forces into the
open and exposing them to air attack, including B-52 strikes. Some
observers have interpreted these actions as a significant contribution
to the cumulating pressure that would eventually cause Milošević
to bow to the will of his opponents, but they were of limited scope
and culminated with the repulse of KLA forces to near their starting
positions.126 Subsequent searches found no trace of destroyed VJ
equipment.127 The KLA lacked the weight to become a decisive force
in the campaign and was not in a position to sustain operations
against the better equipped Yugoslav Army.
Concern for the increased exposure of ground assets may
nonetheless have been one factor among many that eventually
motivated Belgrade to opt for a negotiated solution. The presence
of the Apache force as the potential spearhead of a ground invasion,
planning efforts aimed at preparing a ground offensive, and highly
visible attempts to prepare Western publics for such an option, could
not but have had some impact upon Milošević and his advisors. The
threat of ground operations, though unrealized, helped set the stage
for conflict termination.
Military efforts were paralleled from the start by intense
diplomatic activity. In public pronouncements, NATO remained
unyielding concerning its conditions for a cessation of combat
operations. Privately, concern for the possibility that operations
might have to be prolonged through the winter gave impetus to the
diplomatic track. Milošević had demonstrated his capacity to take
punishment and maintain the cohesion of his armed forces. The
deadline for a commitment to ground operations before the onset of
winter was fast approaching. Without a quick end to hostilities, the
physical survival of the hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanian
refugees clinging to existence in makeshift camps was at risk. And
with a critical mass of Kosovar Albanians eliminated or scattered to
the winds, the goal of the Serbianization of Kosovo would be close
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to realization. Under these conditions, Serbian acceptance of allied
conditions would look more like victory than defeat.
The effort that would eventually open the door to a negotiated
settlement was spearheaded, surprisingly but not incongruously, by
the Russian Federation. From the onset of the Kosovo crisis, Moscow
had used its limited leverage in an attempt to keep Western responses
within a diplomatic framework. On March 31, 1998, it approved UN
Security Council Resolution No. 1160, but conditioned support
by insisting upon the elimination of any reference to a “threat to
international peace and stability” that could justify international
military action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In June, after
considerable debate, Moscow agreed to the ten-point program
drawn up by the Contact Group calling for a ceasefire, international
monitoring, and a negotiated settlement, as a means to encourage
moderation. At a June 16 summit in Moscow, Yeltsin told Milošević
“unequivocally” that Yugoslavia could not rely on Russian support
if it did not heed Russian council, and pressure from Moscow was
useful in convincing Serbia to grant access to the Kosovo Diplomatic
Observer Mission.128 But any talk of military pressure as a means to
coerce compliance remained anathema. Russia’s approval for UN
Security Council Resolution No. 1199 on September 23, 1998, was
conditioned by the assertion that the resolution did not condone a
resort to force. In early October, the Kremlin warned that it would
use the veto to block any resolution authorizing use of force by the
United Nations in Kosovo.129 Given this background, the launching
of Operation ALLIED FORCE could be construed as a challenge to
Russia’s self-perception as a great power with special interests in the
Balkan region.
The tone for initial Russian reactions was set by Prime Minister
Evgenii Primakov, who on March 23 requested that his flight, en
route to Washington for a biannual meeting with U.S. Vice President
Al Gore, be turned around in mid-air when he learned that military
action against Serbia was imminent. The dramatic action was
popular with the Russian public, but it was a gesture of futility.
Russia’s ambassador to the UN Sergei Lavrov condemned NATO’s
“unacceptable aggression” at an emergency session of the Security
Council, and on March 26 Russia cosponsored (with Belarus and
India) a UN draft resolution that demanded an end to air strikes and
return to diplomacy.130 The resolution was only supported by three of
the fifteen Security Council members (Russia, China, and Namibia),
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and NATO’s determination to pursue the military effort remained
unshaken.131 At the end of March, Russia sent several intelligence
gathering ships into the Mediterranean to monitor the conflict,
a gesture of independence that was suspect in NATO circles but
peripheral to the course of the war.132 Primakov also paid a visit to
Milošević in Belgrade, but his diplomatic initiative was rejected out
of hand by the Alliance.133 In early April Yeltsin publicly remarked
that continued military operations could lead to a new world war,
Moscow suspended all relations with NATO, and editorial opinion
railed against the United States as a “new Goliath” for whom “force
is the only criterion of truth.”134 But verbal excess was no substitute
for effective policy. Russia’s opposition to the NATO war effort left it
isolated, and the Kremlin, consistent with its approach to the Balkan
dilemma from the origins of the conflict, was not prepared to risk its
relationship with the West on behalf of a putative Serbian ally.
A turning point arrived on April 14, when Yeltsin appointed
former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as special Russian
peace envoy in the region, undercutting Primakov’s initiatives
and leading in short order to his dismissal from office and political
marginalization.135
Chernomyrdin
immediately
abandoned
Primakov’s anti-Western rhetoric, made clear to Belgrade that it
could not count upon open-ended Russian support, and assiduously
worked toward a compromise arrangement that would increase
Russia’s diplomatic leverage, offer Belgrade face-saving concessions,
and if possible bring the bombing to an end.
A diplomatic bargain became increasingly attractive to
the Alliance as the pursuit of a military solution became more
protracted. German Foreign Minister Fischer and National Security
Advisor Michael Sterner took a first step in this direction in midApril, traveling to Moscow and returning on the same day upon
which Chernomyrdin assumed the post of special envoy with a
six-point program that sought to bring peace negotiations back
under the aegis of the UN, and attract Belgrade by offering a 24hour bombing pause as a prelude to a ceasefire.136 The program was
rejected by the Alliance, but it had posed the challenge of engaging
Russia in international mediation efforts. On April 25, the final
day of NATO’s muted 50th anniversary summit in Washington,
DC, Clinton responded to a phone call from Yeltsin by proposing
that Chernomyrdin be brought into a joint mediation effort with
U.S. counterparts. Two days later U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
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Strobe Talbott was in Moscow to consult with Chernomyrdin and
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov concerning the terms of a
possible accord.137 In the first week of May Chernomyrdin arrived
in Washington, where, in discussions with American officials, it
was determined that he join with Talbott in representing NATO
and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari on behalf of the EU as a
negotiating team.138 On May 6 the foreign ministers of the G-8
outlined a direction for these initiatives in a political declaration
calling for a negotiated solution balancing “a substantial autonomy
for Kosovo in respect of the Rambouillet accord and the principle of
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.”139
Between mid-May and early June, a series of meetings between
Ahtisaari, Talbott, and Chernomyrdin became the forum within
which a coordinated Western peace initiative was forged.140 The
third of these sessions was held in Joseph Stalin’s infamous retreat
in the Moscow suburb of Kuntsevo, where despite the intimidating
setting it was the U.S. envoy who laid down the law that any
negotiated agreement would have to fit within the outline of NATO’s
conditions for peace.141 When Chernomyrdin traveled to Belgrade
for talks with Milošević on May 27, he was able to insist in good
faith that a modest inflection of NATO conditions as an incentive for
cooperation was the best that the Serbs could hope for. In the peace
proposal finally accepted by Milošević on June 3, these inflections
were indeed modest, but not insignificant.142 Yugoslavia was forced
to surrender physical control of the disputed province, but Belgrade
could claim to have defended Serb honor and assured that Kosovo
would remain, even under NATO occupation, an integral part of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. With Milošević’s accord, on June 9 a
Military Technical Agreement defining the terms of a ceasefire was
initialed, and on June 10 the agreement was incorporated into UN
Security Council Resolution No. 1244, which brought a formal end
to the war.143 Simultaneously, NATO air strikes were suspended.144
Operation ALLIED FORCE had been waged to a successful
conclusion, though not in the way that those who conceived it had
originally intended.
Why had Milošević caved in? The question is significant, but not
easy to answer given our present level of knowledge. In a careful
analysis of the problem, Stephen Hosmer places primary emphasis
upon the cumulative effect of the allied bombing campaign, and
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particularly attacks against “dual use” targets, including electrical
grids and water facilities.145 The efficiency of the air campaign, and
the spectacle of the progressive destruction of much of the country’s
critical infrastructure, was no doubt compelling.146 Whether it
justifies maintaining the option of including such targets in future
U.S. war plans, as Hosmer urges, is perhaps an open question. Nor
is it clear that the attacks against infrastructure were ultimately
decisive. The possibility of a ground offensive, aimed at affecting
a forced entry in order to occupy and liberate Kosovo, must also
have been a factor in the Serbian strongman’s calculations. Fear of
isolation, once the Russians had made clear that there were limits
to their patience, may also have been a relevant concern. Without
Russia in its corner, Belgrade had few positive alternatives. The
indictment of Milošević and four other top Yugoslav officials by the
ICTY at the end of May, imposed by the Tribunal in spite of concerns
in Washington that by consigning the leadership to pariah status
their willingness to compromise might be reduced, has also been
cited as a pointed symbolic gesture that brought home the possible
personal consequences of continued defiance.147 Not least, the bitter
pill of capitulation was sweetened by Western concessions. NATO’s
desire to bring the campaign to an end before tensions within the
Alliance built up to the breaking point motivated a softening of the
Rambouillet terms that may in the end have made them palatable,
though just barely, to beleaguered Yugoslavia. Finally, the Serbian
leadership may have concluded that once the bombing campaign
was brought to a halt, and with continued Russian backing, it could
deflect the peace process toward a more positive outcome. Milošević
had already completed a massive expulsion of Kosovar Albanians
that would have worked to his advantage should it have been
allowed to stand. A Russian zone of occupation in occupied Kosovo
might also have become the foundation for a partition arrangement
that would at least give Belgrade something to show for its efforts,
and validate the leadership’s claim to have stood up for the national
cause.
The Aftermath: Victory or Compromise?
NATO was quick to claim that Belgrade had capitulated, and that
the peace settlement fully corresponded to its own conditions for a
ceasefire. In his address to the nation on Kosovo delivered upon the
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cessation of hostilities on June 9, President Clinton asserted that “the
demands of an outraged and united international community have
been met” and hailed “a victory for a safer world, for our democratic
values, and for a stronger America.” Clinton also pledged to “finish
the job” by engaging in an effort to build peace in the war torn
province, an effort that the complex nature of the peace agreement
itself risked to compromise.148 For despite the allies’ justified
satisfaction, Milošević had not surrendered unconditionally. The
Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari agenda was significantly different from
that which had inspired the original Rambouillet accord, and
provided the Serbian party with some prerogative to defend its
interests even in the wake of military defeat.
First, the entire process of conflict management had been brought
back under the aegis of the UN. The plan eliminated Rambouillet’s
call for a binding referendum on independence after five years.
Any determination of Kosovo’s final status would now have to be
approved by the UN Security Council, where Russia exercised the
right of veto. Annex B of the Rambouillet accord granted NATO
forces the right to operate throughout the entire territory of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That right was reduced by the
Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari project to Kosovo alone. The Kosovo
Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) sanctioned by the project was now to be
placed under joint NATO-UN auspices, and the OSCE was granted
significant authority as the civil component of the international
presence in the province. Supervision of refugee return would also
be conducted under the auspices of the UN, rather than NATO. In
the interim, the text reiterated that Kosovo was considered to be an
integral part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
By working to represent Serbian interests, Russia had secured
for itself the familiar role of great power sponsor, and achieved its
minimum goal of maintaining leverage over the direction of the
peace process. The encroachment was noted in Western capitals
with concern. In the short term, resistance to Russian intrusion
was manifested in an absolute refusal to accede to the request for
a separate Russian occupation zone inside Kosovo, on the grounds
that Russian sympathy for the Serbian position could lead toward
a de facto partition of the province. “The danger,” in the words of
General Clark, “was that the Russian would gain a separate sector
that they would turn into a separate mission favoring the Serbs.”149
Frustrated by its inability to obtain control of an occupation zone,
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on June 11-12 Moscow sent an expanded airborne company
(approximately 200 paratroopers) on short notice from Bijelina in
Bosnia-Herzegovina across the Drina to occupy Priština’s Slatina
airport in advance of the arrival of the British-led KFOR contingent.
The operation seems to have been inspired by Chief of the General
Staff General Anatolii Kvashnin, who used direct access to Yeltsin to
win approval for the operation, which was initiated without Foreign
Minister Ivanov or Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin being informed.
The intent was to reinforce the original deployment via air, bringing
several thousand soldiers to bear at a critical point in order to make a
defiant statement concerning Russia’s regional role and to expand its
strategic options.150 Clark, perceiving “the future of NATO” to be at
stake, argued for the need to use U.S. Apache helicopters to interdict
the arriving force by blocking runways.151 British Lieutenant General
Michael Jackson, commander of the Allied Command Europe Rapid
Reaction Corps, challenged these prescriptions, insisting, in a headto-head confrontation, that “I’m not starting World War III for
you.”152 Such pyrotechnics were both unfortunate and unnecessary.
The Russian plan had neglected the need for over flight permission
from Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, which was promptly refused,
leaving the small contingent at Slatina isolated and at the mercy of
arriving KFOR units. Having made its point in a manner of speaking,
and aware of its forces’ exposure, the Kremlin was more than happy
to beat a diplomatic retreat.153 The episode nonetheless made clear
the fragility of Russia’s engagement with the Western peacemaking
effort, the dissatisfaction of influential elements within the security
establishment with a subordinate role, and the determination of
NATO to keep the reins firmly in its own hands.
NATO won the war in Kosovo.154 Yugoslavia was shattered by
the cumulative effect of air strikes that it was powerless to resist.
Milošević’s forces were compelled to withdraw from the province,
which was immediately occupied by KFOR. Hundreds of thousands
of Kosovar Albanian refugees were permitted to return to their
homes, and the humanitarian disaster so feared at the outset was
headed off with thousands, or tens of thousands, of lives spared as a
consequence. The conflict itself was contained, and in the short-term
its impact upon the surrounding region was not allowed to escalate
out of control. NATO affirmed its capacity to stand united under
adversary, and to fight and prevail. Its 50th anniversary summit,
held in April 1999 at a low point in the military campaign, approved
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a new strategic concept that championed out of area peace support
operations, and reconfirmed a commitment to build a new NATO
as the centerpiece of Europe’s post-cold war security architecture.
In purely military terms, and despite the unresolved debates over
strategic choices, its pursuit of the war effort was exemplary, as the
outcome, combined with the absence of any NATO combat fatalities,
dramatically attests.
In was not clear that NATO had positioned itself effectively to
win the peace. Despite his miscalculations and blunders, Milošević
remained in power. In the end air power proved sufficient to compel
Serbian withdrawal, but it had only opened the door for an important
commitment of ground forces, designated as Operation JOINT
GUARDIAN, with a challenging mission before them. The allies
had committed themselves to administer what had in effect become
another Balkan protectorate, at great expense and for the foreseeable
future. After insisting upon the rapid withdrawal of the entire
Yugoslav military and police apparatus that had been responsible for
maintaining public order in the past, KFOR was left alone to manage
a seething cauldron of resentments. In the initial phase of the war,
NATO’s air war had patently failed to prevent Serbian atrocities
directed against the Kosovar Albanians. One year after the initiation
of the KFOR mission, only about a third of the approximately
200,000 Serbs who lived in the province prior to the bombing
campaign were estimated to remain, many of them withdrawn into
an enclave adjacent to the Serbian border in the north. The victory
of the Kosovar Albanians had led in short order to a campaign of
reverse ethnic cleansing, that also affected Kosovo’s Roma, Turkish,
and Goranci minorities, and made a mockery of allied intentions to
recreate an authentically multicultural environment.155 The KLA
was formally disbanded in September 1999, with a small remnant of
5,000 members (3,000 active, 2,000 reserve) converted into a Kosovo
Protection Corps charged with missions such as disaster relief,
search and rescue, and the reconstruction of infrastructure (but not,
formally at least, with policing responsibilities). The hard core of the
organization remained intact nonetheless, apparently undeterred
from the pursuit of its maximalist agenda for a greater Albania.
NATO hoped to use Operation ALLIED FORCE to illustrate its
new security concept sanctioning out of area operations to promote
regional stability. But the trauma associated with the war, combined
with the costs and risks associated with an open-ended deployment
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of ground forces, made it more likely that the operation would be
regarded as an exceptional case rather than as a model. The final
status toward which Kosovo was moving remained ambiguous, with
prospects for either full independence or reintegration into a tolerant
and multicultural Serbia increasingly distant. One distinguished
American commentator, remarking on the contradictions between
NATO’s purported goals and the campaign’s discernable outcome,
described the war against Yugoslavia, as an act of policy, as “a
perfect failure.”156
The secondary effects of the conflict were also significant. The
accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was a
military blunder and a diplomatic embarrassment of the first order
that Beijing did not hesitate to exploit.157 The stand off with the
Russian company in Priština was ominous. The downing of major
bridges across the Danube conjured up images of the devastation
of World War II, something that all Europeans had pledged never
to allow again, and by blocking commercial navigation imposed
a heavy burden on the entire regional economy. The imbalance of
forces in the theater, and the virtual absence of allied casualties,
was noted by some ethicists as the reflection of a resort to “violence
which moralizes itself as justice and which is unrestrained by
consequences” that had transformed “the expectations that govern
the morality of war” itself.158 Ironically, military effectiveness may
have contributed to undermining America’s image as a benign
arbiter whose power was set in the service of humanitarian goals.
Serbia had been driven into a black hole, from which it will have
to be lifted at Western expense if a healthy Balkan regional order is
ever to be recreated. U.S. relations with the European allies were also
strained — although NATO had prevailed in the conflict, the long
term effects upon alliance cohesion were potentially quite negative.
The inevitable complications of coalition warfare, and striking
military capabilities gap between the United States and its European
allies, led some to question whether the Alliance could ever be an
effective instrument for waging war.159 Europe read the lessons in its
own way, and in the wake of the conflict the EU moved with a new
sense of purpose to forward its project for an autonomous European
Security and Defense Policy, a long-term commitment to strategic
independence with serious implications for the transatlantic bargain
that has always stood at NATO’s foundation.
Even short, victorious wars can give rise to ambiguous outcomes
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and unintended consequences. Operation ALLIED FORCE was a
success in military-operational terms, but it was fought as a limited
war and concluded with a tactical compromise. It provides what
may be a typical case study of what Wesley Clark describes as
“modern war,” waged for the ambiguous goals of “regional stability
and humanitarian assistance,” where “adversaries are not major and
the issues at stake do not threaten the immediate national survival
of the great powers.”160 Such conflicts will rarely receive full and
unambiguous national commitment and support, and they have and
will continue to present military planners with special challenges
and responsibility. Although victory, in conventional military terms,
may be nearly a foregone conclusion, strategies for winning modern
wars must be coupled with equally robust strategies for winning
the peace. Such strategies will need to include intrusive preventive
diplomacy, effective coalition building and burden sharing, access to
a wide range of military capabilities spanning the entire spectrum of
conflict, and a long-term commitment to post-conflict peace building.
The absence of such integrated strategies has been a chronic failing
of Western diplomacy throughout the protracted Balkan crisis. The
West’s Kosovo engagement represented yet another opportunity
to move beyond reactive, crisis driven responses toward a more
complex and effective approach — an opportunity that might yet be
seized.
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CHAPTER 6
GREECE, TURKEY, CYPRUS
Brother Enemies.
Greece and Turkey are integral parts of Southeastern Europe and
both played active roles as regional powers during the turbulence
of the 1990s. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Athens strove
to maintain some degree of solidarity with the Orthodox Christian
peoples of the region including Serbia, while Ankara aligned with
Muslim communities under siege.1 Both tended to view the other’s
search for influence as threatening — Balkan engagement was often
interpreted as the manifestation of a grand strategy of encirclement.2
The more extreme interpretations of this ilk were intended primarily
for public consumption, however. Rhetoric aside, Greek and Turkish
authorities took pains to keep their regional policies aligned with the
Western powers, and to avoid being dragged into confrontation.
In the best of all possible worlds, Greece and Turkey would
be pillars of stability amidst the turbulence of the Balkans and
the eastern Mediterranean. Both states enjoy privileged access to
European institutions. Levels of well-being lag behind the standards
of the most advanced European states, but in the regional context
Greece and Turkey are in leadership roles. Athens and Ankara have
powerful state traditions with strong cultural foundations, and
multiple assets that could be brought to bear to promote regional
development. These assets have to some extent been squandered
due to the inability of Greeks and Turks to move beyond a history
of enmity. For much of the post-war period Athens and Ankara
have been archrivals whose antagonism has approached the level
of preoccupation. Rather than contributing to a resolution of the
southeastern European security dilemma, Greece and Turkey have
been among its main progenitors.
Greek-Turkish rivalry is unusual in that the protagonists are very
unevenly matched. Greece is a small Balkan state with a population
of 10.5 million. Turkey has a more complex Eurasian character, with
a large and rapidly growing population of over 65 million. Greece is
a member of both NATO and the EU, and relations with institutional
Europe dominate its international agenda. Turkey is also a NATO
member, and a candidate for EU membership, but it has a long
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Asian frontier and a difficult geostrategic situation “at the center of
a crescent-shaped wedge of territory stretching from Kazakhstan to
the Gulf and Suez and finally to the North African coast, containing
the most volatile collection of states in the world.”3 Greek security
policy is focused on local challenges. Turkey is an aspiring mid-level
power with prospects that match its ambitions. Ankara has assumed
significant commitments in the Caucasus and Central Asian regions
since the break up of the USSR. Relations with neighboring Iraq
and Syria are troubled, and ties to the Arab world as a whole have
been damaged by an emerging strategic link to Israel.4 Greece is
reasonably stable domestically, while Turkey continues to struggle
with the rise of political Islam, a sharp economic downturn, and the
demands of its Kurdish minority.5
Greece and Turkey maintain high levels of readiness and
burdensome military expenditures. At the end of the 1990s Turkey
devoted 3.8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product to defense
spending and Greece 4.7 percent (against a NATO average of 2.2
percent), and both sides had initiated ambitious force modernization
programs. There is nonetheless little doubt that Turkey has the
wherewithal to prevail in a direct confrontation. Turkish GDP is
approximately 1.5 times that of Greece, and militarily it enjoys
something like a 4-1 ratio of superiority with 594,000 soldiers in arms
(477,000 in land forces, 63,000 in the air force, and 54,000 in marine
forces) compared to a Greek force of 168,700 (116,000 on land, 33,000
in the air, and 19,700 at sea). Greek policy toward Turkey, and the
burden of preparedness that has been associated with it, has been
dominated by the need to deter a powerful and potentially hostile
neighbor.
Unresolved tensions impact negatively upon Ankara’s foreign
policy agenda as well. Turkey’s long-standing goal of accession to
the EU has repeatedly been sacrificed to the pursuit of its rivalry with
Greece. In view of the challenges that it confronts on other fronts,
eternal bickering with Athens might well be portrayed as a luxury,
if not an extravagance. Rivalry persists all the same, irrespective of
the constant ministrations of NATO, the good will of innumerable
mediators and profferers of good offices, the objective needs of the
conflict-torn Balkan region, and the best interests of almost all those
involved.
There are at least two reasons why this is so. First, though it
is sometimes concerned as much with symbol as with substance,
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Greek-Turkish rivalry is deeply rooted and complex. The underlying
issues that propel animosity are neither trivial nor straightforward,
and they defy facile solutions. Second, the rivalry is set in a larger
spatial and temporal context. Greek-Turkish relations are often
discussed on the basis of “ancient hatred” assumptions that
emphasize their timeless character — what Henry Kissinger has
called the “atavistic bitterness” and “primeval hatred of Greeks and
Turks.”6 But the relationship is also dynamic. It has been marked by
periods of détente as well as fits of tension, and is at present very
much conditioned by circumstances specific to the post-cold war
period, including the dynamic of regional instability produced by
the Balkan crisis of the 1990s.
The dawn of a new millennium has seen movement towards
Greek-Turkish rapprochement that is a source of promise for the
entire region. But decades of rivalry and complex unresolved
issues cannot be swept off the table overnight. The Greek-Turkish
relationship remains a key to peace building in southeastern Europe
that must be carefully monitored and, to the extent possible, shaped
to encourage compromise solutions that allow both parties to
realize their potential as neighbors, partners, and forces for regional
stability.
Historical and Cultural Dimensions.
Greek national identity rests upon three pillars: the legacy of
Hellenism, the Byzantine and Orthodox Christian heritage, and the
national revival of the modern period. The classical legacy is timeless,
and in some sense universal. The Byzantine Empire was Greek in
language and in spirit, and its collapse in the face of the Ottoman
assault is almost universally regarded as an epic tragedy and the
prelude to a dark age of cultural effacement, the Turkokratia or age
of Turkish domination. Modern Greek nationalism is a product of
the 19th century national revival, waged as a bitter struggle against
Ottoman overlordship. The first Greek national state, created in
1830, only represented about one-third of the Hellenic people of
the Balkans. Thereafter, modern Greece was constructed piece by
piece, as the consequence of a long sequence of wars, diplomatic
maneuvers, and uprisings forwarding enosis, or union with the
Motherland, inspired by the Megali Idea (Great Idea) of uniting all
the Hellenic peoples of the eastern Mediterranean in a single state.
281

This process was coterminous with the long decline of Ottoman
civilization. In Turkish national memory, it is linked with a gradual
loss of great power status and cultural preeminence. For the Turks,
Byronic Pan-Hellenism is considered to have been little more
than a convenient justification for great power meddling in the
affairs of the empire, an attempt that would culminate at the end
of the First World War in an effort to incorporate former Ottoman
territories into the European colonial system. The modern Turkish
Republic is regarded as the product of a successful effort to resist
dismemberment, led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and associated
with the assertion of a specifically Turkish national idea.
The tragic culmination of the Megali Idea coincided with that
assertion. The division of the Ottoman Empire envisioned by the
Versailles peacemakers included a partition of Anatolia, with the
projected creation of a Kurdish national state in the east, and a 5-year
mandate granted to a Greek expeditionary force in Smyrna (Izmir),
center of the ancient Hellenic communities of the western coastal
areas.7 These plans were challenged by Kemal, who drew upon his
military connections to build up an independent armed force and
rally a Turkish national movement out of the reach of the allies in
Ankara. In 1922 the Greek expeditionary force imprudently opted to
advance on Kemal’s headquarters, pillaging Turkish communities
along its route. Decisively defeated on the Sakarya River, it was
driven back into Smyrna in disarray. The occupation of the city
degenerated into violence, including massacres of the Greek and
Armenian populations and a conflagration that destroyed much of
the old harbor area. The remnant of the Greek expeditionary force
was withdrawn by sea. Without protection, Greek communities
in Turkish held territory throughout Anatolia were subjected to
harassment and reprisals.8
The Treaty of Lausanne brought an end to the conflict in 1923
by sanctioning state sponsored ethnic cleansing — over 1.5 million
Greek and Turkish citizens were required to relocate across the
newly drawn border as part of an organized transfer of populations.
Though it is sometimes presented as a solution, the forced migrations
only exacerbated relations between communities in the long run. For
the Turks, the events of 1919-23 are commemorated as the War of
National Independence, whose outcome ensured the consolidation
of a viable Turkish national state. For the Greeks they are the
“catastrophe,” a cataclysmic defeat that brought a violent end to the
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millennial Hellenistic civilization of Asia Minor. Like other countries
whose national idea rests upon a cult of martyrdom derived from a
long and only partially realized struggle for independence, modern
Greek national identity has been culturally constructed around a
myth of resistance to a barbaric, alien, and permanently menacing
other. In the case of Turkey, national identity has been defined
against the foil of rivalry with an eternal Greek enemy, always
ready to take advantage of Turkish weakness, and simultaneously
resented and scorned.9
Outside the context of this mythic structure, of course, GreekTurkish relations have been subject to greater nuance. The peace of
Lausanne was followed by a phase of rapprochement under Turkish
President Kemal and Greek Prime Minister Elefthérios Venizélos,
architects of war in 1919 but now seeking to prioritize domestic
reform. The policy survived its architects, and Greek-Turkish
feuding was not a significant factor in international relations from
1930-55.10
It was only with the rise of anti-British national agitation on the
island of Cyprus in the mid-1950s that Greek-Turkish rivalry made a
comeback. In the post-World War II period, both Greece and Turkish
had become modernizing societies subject to traumatic social change
including rapid urbanization, progress toward universal literacy,
and the rise of mass political cultures where the evocation of an
invented national tradition displayed against the foil of the despised
rival played well in public forums. On both sides, political elites
manipulated national sentiments to further their quest for power, in
the process conjuring up a strategic rivalry that would take on a life
of its own.
The Wine Dark Sea.
The core of Greek-Turkish rivalry has been the struggle for control
of Homer’s wine dark sea, the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean.
It is by any measure a vital interest for both sides. For Greece,
the sea constitutes an essential part of the nation, attaching the
Greek mainland to major islands and island groups. For Turkey,
the Aegean covers the north-south maritime artery linking the
Dardanelles to the Mediterranean coast including the port of Izmir,
and the air corridors providing access for civil aviation toward the
west. Today, the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean have assumed
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additional geostrategic significance as the western pole of an
emerging commercial axis stretching east and southward toward
the Caspian Sea and the Persian-Arabian Gulf. Marcia Christoff
Kurop argues that “the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf
form a single entity with Turkey and Egypt providing a continental
and maritime bridge between Europe and the Middle East.”11 For
Margarita Mathiopoulos, the Aegean is “a geopolitical region of
vital interest” as “NATO’s corridor of stability between Europe, the
Middle East, and the former Soviet Asian territories.”12
In the recent past stability has been in short supply. By imposing
population transfers and delineating spheres of influence, the
Lausanne treaty created a kind of equilibrium in the region. That
equilibrium began to unravel with the emergence of the Cyprus
question in the 1950s, which reposed the issue of strategic control
over maritime space. By the 1970s a long list of points of discord had
emerged that defy resolution to this day.
1. Sovereignty and the Militarization of Strategic Islands.
There are approximately 3,000 Greek islands in the Aegean Sea,
of which only about 130 are inhabited. At Lausanne in 1923 and in
the 1947 Treaty of Paris, which transferred the Dodecanese island
group from Italy to Greece, Athens agreed to keep only lightly
armed security forces on western Aegean islands and to refrain
from the construction of fortifications. The militarization of selected
islands was nonetheless begun in 1964, and by the 1970s over
25,000 Greek soldiers were stationed in the Dodecanese adjacent to
Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, on Lemnos, Samothrace, and smaller
islands near the entrance to the Dardanelles, and on certain central
Aegean islands.
Greece has argued according to the clausala rebus sic stantibus that
the Montreux Straits Convention of 1936 lifts the demilitarized status
of islands adjacent to the Dardanelles; that Turkey is not a signatory
to the 1947 Treaty of Paris and that therefore the Dodecanese can be
armed; and that, especially in the wake of the Cyprus occupation of
1974 and the creation of a 4th Aegean Army unattached to NATO
on the eastern coast of the Turkish mainland with its headquarters
in Izmir in 1975, Greece perceives a Turkish threat to which it
may legitimately react in self-defense under Article 51 of the UN
Charter. Turkey has responded that the demilitarization of eastern
Aegean islands is a condition of Greek sovereignty; that no essential
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change in circumstance has occurred; that the Paris treaty also
applies to nonsignatories; that the Montreux Convention does not
change the status of Lemnos and adjacent islands; and that there
was no prior Turkish threat motivating Greek actions--Ankara
has only undertaken countermeasures in the face of severe Greek
provocation. These issues remain unresolved, and the militarized
islands are points of constant friction.
The problem is complemented by disputes over sovereignty. The
maritime frontier between the Dodecanese group and the Turkish
coast was precisely delineated in a 1932 agreement between Italy
and Turkey, but since April 1996 Ankara has posed concerns about
“gray zones” of undetermined sovereignty further to the north,
where the terms of the 1923 Lausanne agreement are less specific, as
well as in the Sea of Crete. The Turkish demand for adjudication has
been portrayed as a maneuver to obtain leverage with an eye upon
a future comprehensive resolution of Aegean issues, but it also has a
strategic dimension.13
2. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.
The Aegean seabed became an object of contention following the
discovery of oil deposits off the island of Thasos in 1974. Bilateral
negotiations began in 1981 but were broken off at Greek initiative in
1987. Turkey responded by initiating seismic activities and drilling
in disputed areas, giving rise to a sharp crisis in the spring of that
year. Since 1987 the issue has become less acute, due in part to the
modest extent of the resources in question, but it is far from having
been resolved. Athens argues that (a) the islands facing the Turkish
mainland are a part of Greece, and Greek lands must be considered
to be an integral whole; (b) the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the
continental shelf specifies that islands possess continental shelves;
and (c) the continental shelf border between Turkey and the adjacent
Greek islands must be based on the equidistance principle measured
from the nearest Turkish coast. If applied, these premises would
give Greece effective control over nearly all the Aegean Sea, leaving
only a narrow coastal strip for Turkey.
In response, Ankara has argued that (a) islands located on
the natural prolongation of a continental land mass do not have
continental shelves of their own; (b) the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention disallows consolidation of Aegean islands with
continental Greece by forbidding an “archipelago regime” or
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“national integrity” principle; (c) there is no rule of law or logic that
dictates an “equidistance principle” between small islands and a
large adjacent land mass, and (d) the Treaty of Lausanne mandates a
balance permitting each side to utilize the sea on an equitable basis.
A broad range of factors specific to the character of the Aegean,
including its semi-closed character, the Greek archipelago regime,
the distribution of natural resources, mutual security interests,
and lines of communication must be considered in delimiting a
continental shelf. Turkey’s ideal solution would impose a line of
division allowing it to exploit a significant part of the eastern half
of the seabed. Ankara has, however, consistently refused Greek
requests to bring the issue before the International Court of Justice.
It has preferred to seek a bilateral agreement, perhaps less due to the
merits of the legal case than of fear for the potential implications of
a court ruling for other unresolved disputes, notably its differences
with Syria and Iraq over control of the waters of the Euphrates.14
3. Territorial Waters.
At Lausanne, territorial waters in the Aegean were extended
for only three miles. In 1936, Greece unilaterally expanded its
territorial waters to six miles, and following World War II Turkey
reciprocated. Today, with the six-mile limit as standard, Greece
possesses 48.86 percent of the Aegean and Turkey possesses 7.47
percent, leaving 48.85 percent as international waters. The 1985 Law
of the Sea Treaty, which Turkey has refused to sign, allows a 12-mile
extension of territorial waters, the extension that Turkey applies
to its Mediterranean and Black Sea coastlines. In 1995 the Greek
parliament asserted its right to enforce a 12-mile limit in the Aegean,
a gesture that Ankara promptly labeled a casus belli. Although the
Turkish response was aggressive, Greece’s original claim was clearly
provocatory. The imposition of a 12-mile limit would bring together
Greek territorial waters between the Cyclades and Dodecanese
archipelagos, giving Athens hypothetical control over a vital northsouth line of communication, as well as maritime access to the Black
Sea.
The issue is nonetheless more symbolic than real. The extent of
effective control that a 12-mile limit would bring is not necessarily all
that great. International law does not permit interdiction of peaceful
commercial traffic, or even the passage of warships, except in cases
of strong tension or open conflict. A 12-mile extension is moreover
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opposed by almost every other power with naval interests in the
Aegean, and not least the major NATO powers. If the issue persists,
it is in some measure because of its implications for the related
problem of national airspace.
4. Airspace Control.
International law and the Chicago convention of 1944 require that
the extent of national airspace correspond to the extent of territorial
waters. Since 1931 Greece has asserted a national airspace limit of ten
miles, valid for both continental Greece and the Greek archipelago,
despite its formal adherence to six-mile territorial waters. From
1974 onward, Turkey has protested against this incongruity, and
reinforced its position by systematically conducting over-flights in the
four-mile gray zone. These interventions are regularly challenged by
Greek aviation, leading to instances of mock combat and occasional
clashes. Disputes over airspace have given rise to other sources of
tension, including differences over air corridors in the IstanbulAthens flight region, international flight routing, terminal areas, and
military flight issues such as early-warning borders, command and
control areas, and flight maneuvers. The argument directly affects
flight borders for two NATO commands, the south-central NATO
headquarters in Izmir (Izmir also hosts Turkey’s 6th Allied Tactical
Air Force) and the 7th Tactical Air Force in Larisa, Greece.
5. Treatment of Minorities.
Greece and Turkey have been chronically at odds over the
treatment accorded to their respective minorities. Despite the
population transfers carried out under the terms of the Lausanne
treaty, a sizable Turkish minority remained in western Thrace (in
1923 the Muslim population of western Thrace was estimated at
130,000, out of a total regional population of 190,000) together with
a Greek population of over 100,000 in Istanbul, as well as smaller
minorities of 7,000 and 1,200, respectively, on the Turkish islands
of Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Gokceada (Imbros). Lausanne made
specific reference to these “Muslim and non-Muslim” minorities
and guaranteed them the right to maintain autonomous religious,
cultural, and educational institutions.
The Greek side is fond of pointing out that the Greek population
of Istanbul has been reduced today to under 10,000, and that only
250 Greeks remain on Gokceada and 100 on Bozcaada, while the
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Muslim population of western Thrace has remained fairly stable at
around 120,000. Ankara retorts that a natural rate of increase would
have more than doubled the population of western Thrace were
it not for mass migration provoked by a Greek policy of denial of
identity and systematic repression. The numbers are disputed, and
the climate of hostility that infects Greek-Turkish relations allows
little space for flexibility.15
Athens has reacted to international criticism of its policy in
western Thrace by offering a number of concessions including
educational incentives and limited self-government, but it refuses
to designate the minority in question as Turkish, clinging instead to
the “Muslim” designation used in the text of the Lausanne treaty.
According to Greek sources, about half of the community are of
Turkish descent, 35 percent are Bulgarian speaking Pomaks (Muslim
Slavs), and 15 percent are Muslim Roma. The concerned peoples
have a long list of grievances that includes the expropriation of land
by the Greek state, denial of citizenship to individuals returning
from trips abroad, educational discrimination, refusal of the right
of election for local religious leaders or Muftis (in 1990 Greece
suspended the election of local Muftis in favor of appointment
by the state), and electoral gerrymandering aimed at denying the
Turkish minority fair representation.16 The status of the Greek
minority and Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul remain sore points
with Greek public opinion, and, as an ethnically Turkish region
that is territorially contiguous with Turkey proper, western Thrace
is militarily exposed and a point of potential leverage in the larger
Greek-Turkish strategic competition.
The precedent most often cited to evoke a Turkish threat to
western Thrace is that of Cyprus, where a Turkish expeditionary
force, in defiance of international opinion, has maintained control
of an ethnically Turkish enclave on an island with a majority Greek
population for over a quarter century. The Cyprus problem is
importantly affected by disputes over sovereignty in the Aegean,
but is has a distinct character and great symbolic weight. Cyprus
has become the most polarized, embittered, and intractable of all the
issues that continue to set Greeks and Turks at odds.
The Green Line.
The beautiful island of Cyprus, mythical birthplace of Aphrodite,
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has an important location some 80 kilometers off of Turkey’s southern
Mediterranean coast and a complex history that reflects its strategic
importance. Culturally and socially, like the larger Balkan region of
which it is in fact a part, it has been subjected to waves of external
influence, including periods of Byzantine, Venetian, Hellenic, Turkic,
and British predominance. From 1571-1878 the island was part of the
Ottoman Empire, but at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 it was leased
to Britain for use as a naval basing area. Cyprus was annexed by
London in 1918 and declared a crown colony in 1925.
The population of Cyprus today is around 830,000, divided
between a Greek majority representing about 80 percent of the total
and a Turkish minority representing 18 percent. These communities
traditionally lived interspersed throughout the island, which included
numerous mixed villages. The anti-colonial movement launched
in the 1950s, however, was simultaneously a Greek nationalist
movement that sought to link the call for independence to the goal of
enosis, or attachment to Greece. Turkish Cypriot leaders responded
with a call for taksim, or partition. These divergent political agendas
quickly became the source of intercommunal friction.
In August 1955 the United Kingdom, which sought to resist
Cypriote self-determination but whose personnel on the island were
coming under attack, attempted to address the problem by convening
a conference bringing together representatives of Greece and Turkey
in London. At the conference, Britain offered an arrangement for
partial self-government under British sovereignty that was not
fully acceptable to either party. Perhaps more importantly, with
deliberations in progress a bomb exploded at the Turkish consulate
in Thessalonica (in the immediate vicinity of the house in which
Atatürk was born). This act of terrorism was eventually discovered
to have been a Turkish provocation, responsibility for which became
one of the items in the bill of indictment brought against then Prime
Minister Adnan Menderes that would lead to his execution by
hanging in September 1961, after his government was overturned by
a military putsch. The immediate consequence was a series of antiGreek pogroms in Izmir and Istanbul, where over 2,000 Greeks were
killed and many more driven from the city as refugees.17 In a pattern
that would repeat itself in former Yugoslavia decades later, these
bloody proceeding polarized public opinion and contributed to a
process of ethnic mobilization that would make rational resolution
of disputes nearly impossible.
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Between 1956-60 the tone of Cypriot politics was set by the
terrorist anti-British agitation of the National Organization of
Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) led by Georgios Grivas, a retired army
colonel with extreme right-wing political affiliations. After a British
expeditionary force of over 30,000 soldiers proved insufficient
to control the violence, London moved toward an agenda for
separation. A February 1959 Zurich agreement between Greece and
Turkey defined a formula for independence that was formalized in a
Treaty of Guarantee signed in London in 1960. The treaty identified
Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom as guaranteeing powers
with the right to intervene, severally or unilaterally, in defense of
its provisions, and drew up basic articles for a constitutional order.
According to the terms, the U.K. would retain two military base areas
(which it still maintains), while Greece and Turkey were permitted
to garrison 950 and 650 soldiers respectively on the island. The
constitution specifically forbade attachment to another state (placing
Cyprus alongside Austria as the only countries in the world whose
sovereignty has been thus circumscribed). It also defined a powersharing arrangement inspired by the premises of ethnic quotas
and balancing, according to which a Greek Cypriot would serve as
president and a Turkish Cypriot as vice president, with four Greek
Cypriot and three Turkish Cypriot ministers. Thirty percent of the
seats in the House of Representatives were reserved for the Turkish
Cypriot minority, 40 percent of commissions in the National Guard,
and 30 percent of positions in the police force and civil service. The
president and vice-president were each accorded the right to veto
legislation, and separate communal municipalities were established
in the five largest Cypriot towns. These arrangements sought
to reassure the Turkish Cypriot minority by granting it limited
autonomy and disproportionate representation within key national
bodies. In August 1960 the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios III
became the first president, and the Turkish Cypriot Fazıl Küçük the
first vice-president, of an independent Republic of Cyprus.18
The Cypriot constitution was flawed, and it quickly proved
to be nonviable in practice. Makarios launched the crisis that
undermined his country’s fragile equilibriums on November 30,
1963, after repeated deadlocks over matters of policy, by proposing
13 amendments designed to curtail many of the special advantages
accorded to the Turkish Cypriot minority. Within a matter of weeks
communal strife exploded in the capital of Nicosia, driven forward
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by the harassment of Turkish Cypriots at the hands of Greek
extremists, including efforts to ethnically cleanse whole districts by
using intimidation and coercion to force residents from their homes.
In reaction the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from all governmental
institutions and began to establish armed enclaves as nodal points
for self-defense. These events have been interpreted by some as the
product of a Greek Cypriot strategic design, known as the Akritas
Plan, intended to place the Turkish Cypriot community on the
defensive and provoke a collapse of the constitutional order.19 In
1964 a UN multilateral peacekeeping force (the UN Force in Cyprus
— UNFICYP) arrived on the island to police a 180-kilometer long
“Green Line” separating Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations
driven by ethnic mobilization into protected areas and communal
redoubts. UNFICYP has remained in place to this day, at an
estimated cumulative cost of over $3 billion.20
These events were decisive. As was the intention of their
perpetrators, the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriot irregulars
shattered the foundation of trust that was required to allow national
institutions to function. The same kind of dynamic would be set
to work by the Serbs and Croats of Yugoslavia years later, with
comparable results. Reliance upon UN peacekeepers was both an
admission that the island’s problems were not resolvable in their
own terms, and (as in Croatia during 1992-95) a panacea that made
the ethnic separation provoked by violence appear to be tolerable.
The Makarios government was discredited, and outside powers were
quick to move into the emerging power vacuum. In the immediate
aftermath of the communal violence of 1963-64, a Turkish military
contingent was deployed in strategic positions on the north of the
island, occupying the Nicosia-Kyrenia highway linking the capital
to the northern coast. By 1967 Greek forces stationed on Cyprus had
been expanded to over 10,000. In these threatening circumstances,
consistent with a general pattern of post-colonial realignment in
strategically sensitive areas and motivated by concern over the
implications of the conflict for NATO, the United States stepped
forward to take over the role of the U.K. as great power sponsor and
crisis manager. In both 1964 and 1967 Turkey threatened invasion
to restore order and protect its co-nationals, but was dissuaded by
vigorous admonition from Washington.21
In 1968 intercommunal talks began, mediated by U.S. envoy
Cyrus Vance with Rauf Denktaş representing the Turkish Cypriot
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community and Glavkos Clerides the Greek Cypriots. Denktaş
and Clerides had grown up together in Nicosia as neighbors and
schoolmates. Once risen to prominence as the legal voices of their
respective ethnic constituencies, their personal relationship, and
rivalry, would become an important part of the Cypriot puzzle.
Negotiations arrived at a deadlock in 1971, but were resumed under
UN auspices in 1972. Despite some will to compromise, a consensual
middle ground proved to be elusive. Meanwhile, international events
added new complications. The increasing intensity of cold war
competition in the eastern Mediterranean made the U.S. distrustful
of the nonaligned orientation and left-wing supporters of the
Makarios regime — Henry Kissinger famously dubbed the Cypriot
Archbishop “the Castro of the Mediterranean.” The 1968 military
coup in Athens, which placed power in the hands of an outspokenly
anti-communist group of colonels, seemed to strengthen the Western
posture in the region, but the colonels’ lack of popular legitimacy
and aggressive nationalism would soon become problems in their
own right. In 1971, for the second time in a decade, the Turkish
military seized control in Ankara. Though democratic institutions
were eventually restored, Turkish elites felt constrained to reinforce
their position by rebuilding domestic support. The government led
by the social democrat Bülent Ecevit, which acceded to power in
1973, had a strong nationalist orientation and was particularly loath
to give ground on the Cyprus question. These varied events created
a volatile context that the Cyprus dilemma constantly threatened to
set ablaze.
In November 1973 a student rebellion against the Greek junta was
shattered by an army-led massacre of demonstrators in the heart of
Athens. Simultaneously, Georgios Papadopoulos was ousted as
leader of the ruling junta and replaced by Brigadier General Dimitrios
Ioannides. Under domestic pressure, Ioannides turned to Grivas and
his nationalist allies in Cyprus, hoping to restore the position of the
junta through a dramatic gesture by attaching the island to Greece
through a coup de main. On July 15, 1974, Greek National Guard and
regular military contingents seized power in Cyprus, but failed in
the attempt to abduct and murder Makarios, now viewed as an
impediment to the agenda for enosis. Forewarned by allies at his
sanctuary in the isolated Troodos Monastery, the Archbishop made
a narrow escape, and was spirited away to London with British
assistance.
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In Makarios’ absence the Cypriot presidency fell into the hands of
former EOKA gunman Nikos Sampson, and intercommunal violence
exploded. In reaction, and on the basis of what can be described as
a legitimate desire to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority in a
moment of extreme peril, on July 19 a Turkish expeditionary force
set sail from Mercin. Once landed on Cyprus, Turkish forces seized
a narrow stretch of the northern coast, but in the face of resistance
from Cypriot National Guard and Greek army forces, they were not
able to penetrate inland and secure control of Nicosia airport.22 On
July 22 an UN-sponsored cease-fire was imposed, and on July 24,
after the Greek armed forces refused to obey Ioannides’ desperate
order for an all-out attack on Turkey, the junta collapsed in Athens.
Power was temporarily placed in the hands of a coalition of civilian
leaders directed by Konstantinos Karamanlis. Karamanlis was
not responsible for the Greek provocation on Cyprus, and he was
anxious to reverse the course of events. But the miserable failure of
Ioannides’ adventure had let the genie of communal mobilization
out of the bottle and opened the door to a Turkish occupation of the
northern part of the island.
Greece’s military fiasco on Cyprus was followed by a diplomatic
farce in Geneva. In a hastily organized forum on the shore of Lake
Leman, Ankara presented demands for a Cypriot federation that
would grant co-equal status to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities. The disorganized Greek government was not in
a position to react effectively, and a distracted U.S. (with the
administration of President Richard M. Nixon preoccupied by the
Watergate crisis) chose not to force the issue.23 After articulating
its demands, and winning time for its forces to regroup, Ankara
ordered a new offensive on Cyprus. On August 14 the Turkish
“Peace Force” broke out of its beachhead on the northern coast to
the east and west, eventually seizing control over nearly 40 percent
of the island’s territory. The advance culminated a process of ethnic
cleansing that would leave about 230,000 Cypriots (including
180,000 Greek Cypriots) uprooted. In 1975, at a Vienna conference
conducted under UN auspices, both sides agreed to a “voluntary”
separation of populations, leaving the Turkish Cypriots assembled
under Ankara’s protection in the north, and the Greek Cypriots
pressed below the Green Line in the south. The fate of the island
was mirrored within Nicosia, which was also divided by a hastily
thrown up wooden barrier into Greek and Turkish Cypriot zones.
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Cyprus had been subjected to a de facto partition that would prove
to be enduring. On February 11, 1975, a Turkish Federated State of
Cyprus, with Denktaş as president, was declared into being. The
name selected seemed to hold out the promise of reassociation
with the Greek Cypriot republic in the south, but in 1983 Denktaş
renamed his satrapy the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) and declared full independence. To date, the Turkish
Republic is the only state in the world that has accorded the TRNC
diplomatic recognition.
Christopher Hitchens has argued that the essence of the Cyprus
tragedy from 1960 onward was “the exploitation of outside powers
of internal differences that were genuine in themselves” with the
purpose “to suborn the independence of the island.”24 Hitchen’s
thesis may be disputed, but there is little doubt that in the cold war
context within which they unfolded Cypriot events were interpreted
in view of an overriding Western interest in preserving the unity
of NATO. For a time Washington sought to placate both sides,
suborning Cyprus to a Western-oriented government in Athens that
would block the emergence of an independent-minded, nonaligned,
and left-leaning regime of the sort that Makarios seemed to aspire to,
while simultaneously offering autonomy to a Turkish enclave in the
north. The U.S.-sponsored Acheson Plan of the mid-1960s moved in
this direction by proposing a division of the island between a Greek
Cypriot republic in the south oriented toward Greece, and two
Turkish Cypriot cantons defended by a Turkish military base in the
north. In 1974, however, the United States had little choice but to bow
to Ankara’s military fait accompli in the hopes that ethnic partition
might provide a new ground for stability. Between December
1975 and September 1978 the United States cut off military aid to
Ankara in protest against the occupation, but, while the gesture
had a viscerally negative impact upon U.S.-Turkish relations, it had
no discernable effect upon Turkish policy. And, as Ankara has not
failed to underline ever since, after 1974 the situation on the island
was calm. The first Turkish incursion could be justified under the
terms of the Treaty of Guarantee. The second offensive went beyond
reasonable bounds in asserting control over more than a third of
the island, but the Turkish Peace Force had done the work of the
junkyard dog by imposing what appeared to be a sustainable status
quo that did not affect strategic equilibriums in the Mediterranean.
The 1974 resolution rested upon a combination of enosis and
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taksim that provided some advantage to all sides. Athens’ defeat on
the island was humiliating, but Greece had emerged in a position to
cultivate special relations with an ethnically homogenous Republic
of Cyprus. Ankara had warded off the worst-case scenario of a
successful Greek coup, reinforced its military position, and ensured
that the Turkish Cypriot community would remain dependent upon
Turkish sponsorship. The United States avoided a direct GreekTurkish clash and removed the Cyprus imbroglio from its strategic
agenda. Or so it hoped. In fact nothing had been permanently
resolved, and the Cyprus question remained an open wound that
would continue to poison efforts to craft an enduring Greek-Turkish
rapprochement.
Greek-Turkish Relations after the Cold War.
The contours of the Cyprus problem changed remarkably little in
the decades following the Turkish occupation. The TRNC controlled
37 percent of the island’s territory and 18 percent of its population,
almost uniquely of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot extraction, and
was permanently occupied by approximately 35,000 soldiers of the
Turkish 3rd Army. Turkey also maintained a dominant position
within the TRNC’s police force, militia, and secret services. Isolated
internationally, the TRNC was for all intents and purposes a Turkish
protectorate. To the south, across the Green Line patrolled by 1200
UNFICYP peacekeepers, lay the predominantly Greek Cypriot
Republic of Cyprus, internationally recognized as the legitimate
government of the island but with no effective authority inside the
Turkish zone. The Republic of Cyprus flourished economically while
the Turkish occupied areas stagnated — by the early 1990s average
per capita income in the Republic of Cyprus was far higher than that
of the Turkish zone, and also exceeded that of the Turkish Republic
and of Greece itself.25 The record of initiatives aimed at overcoming
the impasse, pursued over the years by UN Secretary Generals,
U.S. presidents, and multilateral negotiating forums, reads like an
encyclopedia of diplomacy, but little of substance was achieved. The
Cyprus problem, like the poor, seemed destined always to be with
us.
The perception of stasis was misleading. During the cold war
decades, Greek-Turkish competition was constrained by a number
of domestic and international factors. Athens and Ankara were
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aware that they shared a common interest in helping to contain
Soviet power, and both were dependent upon association with the
Atlantic Alliance for basic security guarantees. Though forced to
cater to nationalistic self-other images rooted in popular perception
and prejudice, it was clear that a resort to force would not serve
respective national interests. Greek-Turkish rivalry played out
in the shadow of the superpowers and, like many other cold war
conflicts with implications for the East-West strategic balance, was
constrained by the exigencies of competitive bipolarity.
The end of the Cold War removed many of these constraints, and
for a moment seemed to transform a chronic but contained rivalry
into a potentially more volatile and dangerous one. The changed
configuration of power in the “arc of crisis” along the southern flank
of the Russian Federation complicated Turkey’s strategic agenda,
encouraging a more assertive foreign policy and stimulating Greek
concern. In the new geopolitics of the post-Cold War, Turkey’s
relevance as a pro-Western strategic ally in the greater Middle East
was enhanced, likewise exacerbating Greek fears. The strategic
stakes were also heightened by the eastern Mediterranean’s status as
a potential terminal for east-west pipeline routes.26 Balkan instability
and international intervention raised the issue of strategic control
in the region, viewed as the focus for “a multi-regional strategic
calculus incorporating southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and
the Caucasus.”27 Greece and Turkey lay at the center of this calculus,
and their bilateral relationship was inevitably affected by it.
Greek-Turkish relations during the 1990s were also affected
by tension between Turkey and Europe. Ankara concluded an EC
Accession Agreement (the Ankara Agreement) as long ago as 1963,
supplemented in 1972 by an Additional Protocol.28 In 1987 it applied
in due form for full membership, and on March 6, 1995, initialed a
Customs Union agreement.29 According to Ozlan Sanberk, Turkey’s
permanent representative to the EU, these gestures confirmed
Turkey’s “traditional goal which is to align itself with Europe,”
a precondition for modernization and democratization and
“strategically necessary to the defense and security of the West.”30
With the Warsaw Pact in disarray, the strategic necessity was
apparently less strongly felt by the European powers, and after 1989,
despite the pedigree of its application and generally more evolved
relationships with European institutions, Turkey was pushed to
the back of the line for EC accession formed by the emerging post296

communist states. In its July 1997 blueprint for enlargement entitled
Agenda 2000 the European Commission eliminated Turkey from
its list of candidate members “for the foreseeable future,” and the
European Council’s Luxembourg session on December 13, 1997,
did not include Turkey in its list of candidate states.31 The rejection
was partly motivated by a pragmatic awareness of developmental
and demographic imbalances — Turkey has a rapidly growing
population and its GDP per capita is only about half the EU average.
It was encouraged by a sincere concern for Ankara’s less than
adequate human rights record, and particularly the dirty war in
progress in southeastern Anatolia against Abdullah Öcalan’s Kurdish
Workers Party (PKK). But it was bitterly felt in Turkey, where the
EU decision reinforced the conviction that a line was being drawn
between a European “Christians’ Club” and the lands of the East,
still perceived in Orientalist fashion as the domain of backwardness
and cultural exotica.32 Greece, as a consistent opponent of Turkish
association with Europe that regularly used its veto within the EU to
block cooperation, became an obvious target for resentment.
Turkey’s differences with the EU, and consequent alienation
from the West, gave impetus to a search for alternative cultural
affiliations and diplomatic alignments. The quest was encouraged
by a protracted domestic crisis, provoked by a series of emerging
challenges to Turkey’s traditional Kemalist consensus.33 Kemal’s
original vision for the Turkish Republic included rejection of
the Ottoman imperial tradition on behalf of a unitary Turkish
national state, centralized political direction under the aegis of the
progressive officer corps, strict secularism, a Listian philosophy of
economic protectionism, and a pro-Western strategic orientation.34
These sureties have not, and could not have, survived Turkey’s
confrontation with the challenges of modernization. The decision by
Kemal’s ruling Republican People’s Party to surrender its monopoly
of power after World War II partially dismantled the authoritarian
foundations of the project by opening the political spectrum to a
wider range of contending forces, though the armed forces were
always on hand to crack down on egregious dissent. Turgut Özal’s
economic reforms of the 1980s struck a further blow by exposing
the country to global market forces. The disappearance of the Soviet
Union after 1991, and with it a centuries-old common border with an
expansive Russia to the north, weakened another pillar of Kemalism
by opening new areas of concern in the Caucasus and post-Soviet
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Central Asia, and calling into question the necessity of a strictly proWestern international orientation. The electoral victory of Necmettin
Erbakan’s Islamic Welfare Party in December 1995, and Erbakan’s
appointment as Prime Minister in January 1996, seemed to complete
the assault by challenging the Kemalist commitment to secularism.
The “silent coup” that led to Erbakan’s resignation under military
pressure in June 1997 and the subsequent outlawing of the Islamic
Welfare Party by the Turkish Constitutional Court represented
a Kemalist reassertion of sorts.35 In August 1998 new army chief
Huseyin Kivrikoğlu left no doubt as to the armed forces intentions,
denouncing the “dark forces of fundamentalism” and asserting that
“those who seek to undermine the secular state will continue to face
the Turkish armed forces as they did before.”36 Repression did little
to address the underlying sources of popular affiliation with Islamic
alternatives, however, and the intrusive role of the military only
served to highlight yet again the gap between the Turkish political
model and democratic norms as understood in the West.
These developments were accompanied by a new interest in
Turkey’s Ottoman past, regarded not as a model to emulate but
rather as a neglected source of national identity and pride.37 For
centuries the Ottoman Turks were the ruling elite of a great power
presiding over an autonomous geopolitical space, not supplicants
speaking from a peripheral extension of the “real” Europe. The
Kemalist assertion of a European vocation contradicted this
tradition, but was not entirely successful in replacing it. The impact
of the Balkan conflict, where the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar
Albanians were widely viewed as victims of campaigns of genocide
that were tolerated if not surreptitiously encouraged by the West;
the outcome of the Gulf War, where Turkey was perceived to have
made important sacrifices on behalf of the allied coalition and to
have been rewarded with the creation of a Kurdish autonomous
area in northern Iraq capable of providing sanctuary for insurgents;
and the EU’s apparent hostility to Turkey’s European aspirations
all contributed to the crystallization of a sharper and less beholden
Turkish national idea. These perspectives identified an alternative to
Turkey’s European orientation in the attempt to become “a regional
center in the emerging Eurasian political reality and a bridge between
Europe and the region to its east and southeast.”38
Political and cultural friction was accompanied by enhanced
strategic competition. The eastern Mediterranean’s cold war status
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as the southern flank of the NATO-Warsaw Pact stand off was
undermined by the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the stakes in
the region were heightened rather than reduced as a result of new
strategic alignments. Ironically, the importance of the Greek-Turkish
relationship was enhanced at the same time that efforts to sustain
it became more difficult. NATO’s engagement in the Balkans as
“the sheriff in Europe’s wild southeast” further complicated the
picture by placing the legitimacy of the Alliance itself at risk.39
Athens looked on with concern as Turkey aligned itself with Israel,
established diplomatic relations and special military arrangements
with emerging post-Yugoslav states including Macedonia and
Albania, took up the cause of the Bosnian Muslims against Serbia,
and agreed to participate in Balkan peacekeeping missions. Concern
with Turkey’s superior military potential, combined with the
perception of an ambitious Turkish Balkan policy inspired by the
premises of neo-Ottomanism, created an enhanced perception of
threat that led Greece toward a military build up and a stronger
regional diplomatic posture.40 These gestures were reciprocated
by Ankara, constrained by popular opinion, including potent
lobbies representing citizens of Bosnian and Albanian descent
(about 10 percent of Turkey’s population is of Balkan descent) to
react to Balkan atrocities, and convinced of the need to counter
real or imagined Greek provocations. The Aegean feud and the
Greek-Turkish relationship thus became entangled with the Balkan
conflict, relations between Turkey and the EU, energy politics in the
Caspian basin, and a number of other issues specific to the post-cold
war security environment.41
The most intractable issue remained Cyprus. In 1992, UN
Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali launched a diplomatic
initiative designated as the “Set of Ideas,” intended to provide a
comprehensive formula for moving beyond the post-1974 stalemate.
These proposals, which corresponded to the spirit of the U.S.sponsored Nimitz Plan of the 1970s and General Secretary Javier
Perez de Cuéllar’s Proximity Talks of the 1980s, recommended the
creation of a Cypriot Republic with a single international personality
and citizenship, but with broadly autonomous federal units in the
north and south. 42
The Set of Ideas suggested reducing the northern zone from 38
to 28 percent of the island’s territory by returning to Greek Cypriot
control the Varosha district of Famagusta, the northern citrus
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growing area of Morphou, and 34 other villages. The autonomous
units were to receive equal powers, with safeguards to prevent
impingement by federal authorities, whose responsibilities would
be limited to foreign affairs, defense, federal juridical and policing
matters, central banking, customs and immigration, posts and
telecommunications, patents and trade marks, and health and
environmental issues. Politically, the hope was to resurrect the
principle of proportional representation, with a Greek Cypriot
president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president and a bicameral
legislature with 50/50 percent representation in the upper house
and 70/30 percent in the lower house.
The framework was to be accompanied by a series of confidencebuilding measures, including the transfer of Varosha to UN control
and its gradual opening to commerce involving both communities,
the reopening of Nicosia airport under the auspices of the UN and
the International Civil Aviation Authority with freedom of access
for both sides, and the relaxation of the Greek Cypriot embargo
on the north. The President of the Republic of Cyprus Georgios
Vassilou accepted the Set of Ideas as a “basis for discussion,” but in
the end dialogue broke down around the core issues of sovereignty
and restitution. President Denktaş demanded prior recognition of
the TRNC as a condition for entering negotiations, formal equality
between the autonomous areas including a rotating presidency,
separate communal elections, strict equality of representation in all
governmental institutions, and a rule of consensus for all decisions
by the Council of Ministers. The Greek Cypriots wanted to elevate
the “Three Freedoms” of movement, residence, and property rights
to a more prominent position in the negotiations — principles
that the Turkish Cypriots argued could eventually revive intercommunal violence. In February 1993, after edging out Vassiliou
in a hotly contested election, the new president of the Republic of
Cyprus Glavkos Clerides rejected the Set of Ideas as a basis for a
settlement.
The United States picked up the torch in the wake of the UN’s
failure, presiding over the signature of a brief document at NATO’s
Madrid summit in July 1997, in which Greece and Turkey declared
that they would respect “vital interests” in the Aegean and pledged
to resolve disputes peacefully.43 The gesture kick started UNsponsored negotiations, which resumed, led by U.S. special envoy
to Cyprus Richard Holbrooke, in the summer of 1997 at Troutbeck,
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New York, and subsequently in Montreux, Switzerland.44 These
initiatives were quickly sidetracked, this time by Turkey’s reaction
to the release of the EU’s Agenda 2000. The failure of the Set of
Ideas, and subsequent U.S. proposals, left many convinced that
international diplomacy on the Cyprus question had arrived at the
end of the road.
Already in 1990 President Vassiliou had opened a door leading in
another direction by filing a formal application to bring the Republic
of Cyprus into the EU. Accession was a legitimate aspiration in
view of the republic’s economic achievements, but it was widely
considered to be impossible without a settlement between north and
south. Vassiliou’s real intention was probably to win negotiating
leverage, and to encourage the EU to become more active in
facilitating the diplomatic process. In 1995, however, in part as a
result of Greek pressure (Athens insisted upon accession negotiations
as a precondition for supporting the EU-Turkey Customs Union), in
part as a consequence of annoyance with Turkish Cypriot diplomatic
intransigence, and in part due to a desire to discipline Ankara for its
refusal to address European concern over human rights abuses and
respect for democratic norms, the Republic of Cyprus was accepted
as a candidate for accession by the EU Council of Ministers. In
April 1998 negotiations on accession were formally opened. These
negotiations were described by the EU as a possible catalyst for a
permanent solution to the Cyprus question, but their immediate
impact seemed to push in the opposite direction. Denktaş reacted
with an uncompromising refusal to represent the TRNC in the talks,
accompanied by a threat to support annexation of the north by
Turkey in the event that EU membership should become a reality.
In the course of 1998, Turkey and the TRNC proceeded to establish
a joint economic area and put into place the institutional structures
that would make annexation a possibility.
The friction provoked by the EU accession agenda was paralleled
by military tensions. In 1994 Greece and the Republic of Cyprus
announced a Unified Defense Doctrine intended to create a common
defense area bringing the island inside the Greek national defensive
umbrella. Under the terms of the agreement, Greece and the Republic
of Cyprus conducted joint military exercises and opened a naval and
air station, named “Andreas Papandreou” in honor of the recently
deceased Greek premier, on the southwest coast near the tourist
resort area of Paphos. When fully operational, the facility would
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allow Greek tactical aviation to extend its range over a significant
section of Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. As such, it was bitterly
opposed by Ankara. On June 16, 1998, in the midst of a European
summit in Cardiff, Wales with the Cyprus problem on the agenda,
four Greek F-16 warplanes and two C-130 transports visited the
base as part of a military exercise. The result was another flare up of
Greek-Turkish tension.45
In 1996, the Republic of Cyprus announced the purchase of four
systems of Russian-made S-300 (SA-10 in the NATO designation)
surface-to-air missiles, each equipped with 12 missiles with a range
of 160 kilometers.46 The purchase, if brought to fruition, would
have served several purposes. The missile systems would give a
more credible defensive capacity to the Republic of Cyprus, which
at present lacks an air force. They could also protect the Andreas
Papandreou facility. Less tangibly, deployment would to some extent
salve the frustration felt by Greek Cypriots at the lack of progress
toward regularizing the status of the island. “The missile crisis,”
wrote Niels Kadritzke, was “rooted in the fears of men and women
who feel themselves to have been abandoned by the entire world.”47
Turkey, however, condemned the move as an act of aggression
that “poses a direct threat to Turkish security,” and announced its
intention to attack the sites should deployment commence.48 Taken
aback, the Clerides government offered to suspend the purchase
in exchange for the revival of a 1979 agreement, never honored on
the ground, calling for a demilitarization of the entire island. Not
surprisingly, the offer was abruptly refused. The Turkish ultimatum
made deployment a high-risk undertaking, but Clerides confronted
considerable domestic pressure in support of the purchase. In the
midst of the controversy the Cypriot Minister of Defense Iannakis
Omirou publicly characterized the deployments as critical to Greek
Cypriot security, and threatened to resign should they be delayed or
cancelled. Twenty percent of the Greek Cypriot electorate backed a
“Front of Refusal” committed to the reunification of the island under
Greek hegemony and strongly supportive of deployment, and many
moderate Greek Cypriots were convinced that the demilitarization
of Cyprus would amount to the accreditation of forced partition.
Despite these pressures, in December 1998 Clerides backed
away from the commitment to deploy. The retreat was linked to the
suggestion that the Greek island of Crete could serve as an alternative
venue — a suggestion that Ankara promptly labeled as unacceptable
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as well. Turkish intransigence, accompanied by military threats,
had been sufficient to block the Greek Cypriot initiative, but at the
price of reinforced hostility and new sensitivity to the undesirable
consequences of an unfavorable military balance.
In the background of these disputes, several incidents threatened
to push Greek-Turkish relations to the point of armed confrontation.
In December 1995, a Turkish freighter ran aground on the small
rocky islet of Imia (Kardak, in Turkish), in the Dodecanese group
adjacent to the Bodrun Peninsula and the island of Kos. Greek
vessels assisted in rescuing the crew, but in the process asserted
sovereignty over the terrain. Turkey responded with counterclaims,
by implication challenging Greek sovereignty over thousands of
small Aegean islets in what would soon be designated as gray
zones.49 Blown out of all proportion by the respective national
media, and adopted on both sides as a point of national honor, the
incident came close to provoking open hostilities. Strong diplomatic
pressure, including direct telephone calls to Ankara and Athens by
U.S. President Clinton and NATO Secretary General Solana, was
required to reverse the course of events, in a scenario that could be
replayed in any number of other settings at almost any moment.50
In August 1996 border incidents provoked by an organized attempt
by Greek Cypriot demonstrators to force a symbolic breaching of
the Green Line resulted in the deaths of two demonstrators — a
warning that the status quo on the island could unexpectedly come
under assault. The end of the Cold War and attendant reductions in
East-West tension seemed to have done little to calm the waves of
the Aegean dispute.
Earthquake Diplomacy.
Given the various issues that had kept Athens and Ankara at
odds for decades, and the new strategic frictions associated with the
post-cold war period, the Greek-Turkish rapprochement that set in
from the late 1990s onward came as a surprise to many. Of course,
voices for reconciliation had never been lacking, and the exigencies
of modernization made many of the disputes around which GreekTurkish rivalry revolves appear increasingly irrelevant. U.S.
pressure for compromise was an important factor in encouraging
new thinking, but hardly a new one. In retrospect, the Imia-Kardak
incident may have served as a kind of catharsis by demonstrating
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how volatile and potentially destructive undiluted strategic rivalry
had become.51 Most fundamentally, however, momentum toward
reconciliation was a product of independent strategic reevaluations
motivated by changing perceptions of national interest.
In Greece, the election of Constantine Simitis to replace the
recently decreased Andreas Papandreou during 1995 set the stage
for a redefinition of priorities. Papandreou’s burly populism rested
upon a typically Balkan frustrated nationalism, often expressed in
superficial anti-Americanism or anti-Turkish posturing. Simitis was
more attuned to the Western and European vocation of modern
Greece, and determined to make the sacrifices necessary to meet the
criteria for joining the EU’s unified currency zone. Eternal bickering
with Turkey left Greece exposed in the face of an inherently more
powerful neighbor, and imposed a burden of military expenditure
that the country could ill-afford. Simitis seems to have concluded
that engaging the Turks in a common European framework would
in the long-term create a more propitious context for the pursuit of
Greek national interests.
In line with these conclusions, Simitis began his tenure as prime
minister in 1996 with proposals for the creation of a joint commission
under EU auspices to ameliorate Greek-Turkish relations. Following
the Imia-Kardak crisis, Simitis struck a novel tone by publicly
thanking the United States for its successful mediation effort, rather
than resorting to the more familiar expedient of complaining about
purported pro-Turkish bias. One year later, Greece quietly backed
away from its support for the deployment of Russian S-300s in the
Republic of Cyprus. During NATO’s air war against Yugoslavia
Athens remained aligned with Ankara and loyal to alliance
obligations despite the strong anti-war sentiments of the Greek
public.52 Resistance from the populist wing of Simitis’ ruling party
diluted the impact of some of these gestures in the short-term, but
fresh winds were blowing.53
Ankara reciprocated Athens’ interest in improved relations on the
basis of a comparable redefinition of national interests and priorities.
The electoral breakthrough of the Islamic-oriented Welfare Party,
which won control of the mayor’s office in six of Turkey’s largest
cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, in the municipal elections of
March 1994, became the country’s leading party in December 1995
elections with 21.4 percent of the vote, and in June 1996 entered the
national government, came as a shock to the political establishment.
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Widening economic disparities, chronic political instability, and
the unresolved armed struggle against the PKK were creating an
atmosphere of crisis that the Welfare Party was well positioned
to exploit.54 Growing disrespect for the political class was also a
factor. The Welfare Party was able to enter the government June
1996 in alliance with Tansu Çiller’s True Path Party in part because
Çiller needed their support to ward off an impending corruption
investigation. In November 1996 a high ranking police commander
and member of parliament were killed in an automobile accident
together with a notorious gangster involved in drug trafficking
and arms transfers, giving rise to what would become known as
the Susurluk (Yüksekova) affair, revealing endemic corruption
reaching to the highest levels. The gradual expulsion of Erbakan
and the Welfare Party between February and June 1997 temporarily
suppressed the phenomenon of political Islam, but did little to
restore public confidence, resolve a crisis of governance, or improve
Turkey’s democratic credentials. The most pressing issues on
Ankara’s domestic and international agendas, one might well
conclude, had increasingly little to do with the logic of an outmoded,
obsessive, and counterproductive rivalry with Greece.
After the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Accord, which partially
ended Serbia’s isolation and brought an end to violent assaults
against the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Balkan policies
of both Athens and Ankara also became more congruent. Greece
gradually backed away from its unfortunate decision to contest the
legitimacy of the Republic of Macedonia, regularized relations with
Skopje, and resolved outstanding disputes with the unique exception
of the republic’s official name.55 Athens continued to impose the
use of the designation Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM), on the grounds that the name Macedonia was part of
the Hellenistic heritage and that its use by a foreign state implied
territorial revindications against Greece, but over time the issue has
declined in salience. As the Balkan conflict progressed. Turkey still
provided rhetorical support for Turkish and Muslim communities,
but shied away from the kind of intrusive regional role that Greece
had originally feared. The costly rivalry over Aegean issues was
also pushed to the sideline — only the most improbable worst-case
scenarios, it was increasingly recognized, could produce a realistic
Aegean threat. In Southeastern Europe both parties had common
goals — support for international efforts to promote regional stability
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and insure that Balkan conflict would not become a source of tension
in their bilateral relations. Informal contacts and encouragement
from the Greek foreign ministry helped prepare the Serbian
opposition to supplant Milošević after his defeat in September 2000
elections, a gesture that worked in the interests of the region as a
whole.56 Both Greece and Turkey expanded political, economic,
and military assistance to a number of Balkan states, increased their
level of investment in the region, and become active participants in
regional peace operations. Their relationship in the Balkan region
remained competitive, but was no longer antagonistic.
A first step toward actualizing a process of rapprochement was
taken on July 8, 1997, when Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem met
with his Greek counterpart Theodoros Pangalos under the auspices
of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during a NATO summit
in Madrid, and signed a joint declaration on fundamental principles
for the conduct of bilateral relations. The two parties agreed to
pursue good neighborly relations, respect each other’s legitimate
interests in the Aegean, and work to resolve disputes without
resorting to threats of force.57 Greece and Turkey went on to agree
in 1997 to participate in the Southeast European Defense Ministerial
process, leading to the establishment of a South-Eastern European
brigade in 1998 with a Turkish general as its first commander and a
Greek officer in charge of political-military activities. Reconciliatory
gestures undertaken beneath the watchful eye of the U.S. big brother
were nothing new, but this time the spirit of reconciliation seemed to
rest upon a stronger foundation.
Rapprochement was pushed forward by cathartic events. The
first, ironically, began with all the trappings of a major crisis. In early
October 1998 Turkey moved to drive PKK leader Öcalan from his
refuge in neighboring Syria by massing troops and equipment along
the border. With the bulk of its forces deployed against Israel in the
west, Damascus was badly exposed. Under the threat of a Turkish
incursion, it agreed to Öcalan’s immediate expulsion, and promised
to cease all further support for the PKK. After being refused asylum
by Russia, Greece, and Italy, Öcalan ended a brief international
odyssey in Nairobi, Kenya, where on February 16, 1999, Turkish
Special Forces took him into custody while under Greek escort. At
the trial in which he was condemned to death (though the sentence
was not been carried out), and from incarceration, Öcalan called upon
his followers to turn away from armed struggle, and in April 2002
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the PKK opted to reconstitute itself as the Congress for Freedom and
Democracy in Kurdistan, and pledged to abjure clandestine activity
on behalf of legal, political means.58 The outcome was a singular
success for the Turkish authorities, one that held out the overdue
promise of a more constructive engagement with modern Turkey’s
ethnic and cultural diversity.
Ankara’s belligerence in regard to Syria represented precisely
the kind of coercive use of military power that Greece had always
warned against, and Öcalan’s capture in Kenya while under Greek
protection was widely regarded as a national humiliation. Athens
role during the Öcalan affair, however, was ambiguous. Rather than
trumpet the PKK’s cause as a means to provoke the Turks, it refused
its leader asylum, and may even have been partly complicit in his
capture. Foreign Minister Pangalos, notorious for his anti-Turkish
rhetoric, was forced to resign in the wake of the affair and was
replaced by Georgios Papandreou, son of the late prime minister
but one of the most adamant proponents of dialogue with Ankara in
the Greek political spectrum. In the end, the entire episode became a
spur to communication. Shortly after Öcalan’s detention Papandreou
paid a state visit to Ankara, and in early July met his counterpart
Cem in New York, where they pledged their governments to
cooperate in the fight against terrorism. Henceforward joint work
by Papandreou and Cem would be a driving force behind enhanced
bilateral cooperation.
On July 17, 1999, a massive earthquake, measuring 7.4 on the
Richter scale and centered near the Turkish industrial port of İzmit,
within commuting distance of Istanbul on the Sea of Marmara, took
nearly 20,000 lives and left 25,000 homeless. The event exposed
widespread graft in the construction industry, and relief efforts
were plagued by corruption, indifference, and political division
(some state officials, for example, refused to accept humanitarian
assistance from Islamic sources). Amid a sea of suffering, Greece’s
Special Disaster Unit stood out as one of the first and most effective
rescue teams on the scene. On September 7 a lesser quake struck the
Athens region, and the Turks did their best to reciprocate, offering
generous assistance despite their own urgent domestic needs. Longterm assistance programs and substantial relief donations followed
emergency efforts. Unstinting solidarity, graphically depicted by the
respective national media, created an emotional climate supportive
of the rapprochement that both governments sought to foster —
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Papandreou spoke pointedly of the “new climate” of relations that
cooperation in time of need had created.59
The tragic events of August and September gave rise to a flurry
of negotiations, dubbed “earthquake diplomacy,” that considerably
improved the prospects for Greek-Turkish relations. In the 2 years
that followed the earthquake summer of 1999, Athens and Ankara
concluded a series of accords aimed at fighting organized crime
and narcotics trafficking, preventing illegal migration, promoting
tourism, protecting the environment, and enhancing cultural and
economic cooperation. Both sides announced the intention to reduce
defense spending and cut back on military procurement. In April
2001 an agreement was concluded to clear land mines placed along
the Greek-Turkish frontier at the Evros River in Thrace (bringing both
countries into compliance with the Ottawa Treaty banning the use of
anti-personnel mines and removing the inconsistency of an internal
NATO border defended by such means). Plans were made to conduct
small national military exercises in the Aegean during the summer,
and joint exercises, to be held on Greek and Turkish territory, were
scheduled under the NATO umbrella. Numerous economic accords
were concluded, including an agreement to cooperate in organizing
transit of energy resources from the Caspian basin, reinforced by
meetings between members of the business community. Between
May 2000 and May 2001 trade, cooperative business ventures, and
investment more than doubled. On the highest political level, the
Greek prime minister was able to conduct a first ever-state visit to
Ankara, and in the realm of popular diplomacy the incidence of
citizen contacts, sporting contests, and cultural interaction increased
dramatically. Perhaps most significantly, Greece agreed to lift its
opposition to Turkish accession to the EU, with Papandreou stating
unambiguously that; “Greece believes if Turkey is willing to submit
to the rigor of the process of candidacy … then it should be accepted
into the European Union.”60 Against this background, in December
1999 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was able to launch a new
round of proximity talks on the Cyprus question.
The results of earthquake diplomacy were impressive, but
also discrete. In order to facilitate progress, Cem and Papandreou
concentrated on soft issues where common ground was clearly
identifiable. Almost none of the hard points of confrontation that
had divided Greece and Turkey for decades, whether Aegean
concerns, treatment of minorities, perceptions of strategic exposure,
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or the Cyprus conundrum, were substantively addressed. Both
countries were required to deal with potent domestic lobbies that
opposed concessions, including at least part of the powerful Turkish
military hierarchy and the national-populist wing of the Greek
political spectrum. Despite defense cut backs, and a major Turkish
economic downturn during 2001, military expenditures remained
high, and Turkey’s military procurement program was a source of
special Greek concern. Expanded military cooperation was real, but
also limited. Greece and Turkey participated successfully in NATO’s
Dynamic Mix exercise conducted on Greek territory, but a follow up
exercise on Turkish territory code-named Destined Glory had to be
cut short when Greece withdrew its forces after Ankara insisted that
the Hellenic Air Force could not over fly demilitarized Greek Aegean
islands while entering Turkish air space. Earthquake diplomacy had
dramatically affected the atmospherics of Greek-Turkish relations,
but not necessarily, or at least not yet, the substance.
A Last Chance?
The major exception to improved Greek-Turkish relations
remained the Cypriote stalemate. Over several decades, the
concerned parties had learned to live with imposed division. From
a Western perspective, a diplomatic resolution was considered
desirable, but not essential so long as war was avoided and existing
equilibriums within NATO and the eastern Mediterranean were
maintained. Turkey and the TRNC consistently argued that
enforced separation had helped the respective communities defend
and preserve their identities — the situation was stable, and any
attempt to impose reintegration risked reanimating inter-communal
violence. Greece and the Greek Cypriots lamented partition,
but their vision was increasingly turned outward, toward closer
integration with Europe and prospects for economic development.
The status quo offered benefits to all concerned, one reason why the
post-1974 arrangements could endure for so long. By the late 1990s,
however, trends had been set to work that inexorably undermined
these arrangements. The status quo was becoming “unsustainable
and irrelevant to any effort towards meaningful peace-building in
Cyprus.”61
The proximity talks launched under UN auspices by Kofi Annan
in December 1999 sought to break the stalemate by developing an
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agenda for a bicommunal and bizonal federation that would maintain
a façade of unity but concede considerable autonomy to separate
Greek and Turkish zones. According the Annan’s program Cyprus
was to become a unitary state composed of two distinct federal
entities with substantial prerogatives — a solution not dissimilar to
that which the Dayton Accord proposed for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Despite some progress in addressing details of the plan, however,
Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş could not be moved from his
long-standing position that any negotiated settlement must be
preceded by acknowledgement of the TRNC’s sovereignty. After
five rounds of talks, in November 2000 the Turkish Cypriot leader
announced that the TRNC was pulling out unilaterally. His statement
was issued in Ankara and with Turkish support, a discordant note
amidst the symphony of reconciliation being conducted by foreign
ministers Cem and Papandreou in the background.
Denktaş’s decision to back away from the proximity talks
reflected the conviction that reunification was dangerous and
undesirable. From the Turkish Cypriot perspective, the concept of a
bizonal and bicommunal federation had always been considered to
be critically flawed. Any formula for unity that did not acknowledge
the independence of the north, and guarantee sovereignty with
limitations on movement, investment, and property restitution,
was perceived to risk returning Turkish Cypriots to the status of
an exposed minority living on the brink of a precipice. During the
proximity talks, Denktaş insisted that the demand for recasting
Cyprus as a confederation of fully sovereign states and nations was
non-negotiable. There was method in the madness — intransigence
blocked progress, and time was perceived to work against prospects
for compromise. All diplomatic alternatives to partition rested
upon the attempt to resurrect a common Cypriot identity as a
foundation for reconciliation. On both sides of the island, however,
that identity was at risk.62 Association with the EU would inevitably
draw Greek Cypriots closer to Greece and an enlarging Europe
— Denktaş’ description of the probable outcome as “enosis through
the EU” was altogether plausible.63 Within the TRNC, the continuing
emigration of the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population, combined
with a steady influx of immigrants from Anatolia, provided an
enlarged popular base for projects to reduce the north to the status
of a Turkish province. According to Alpay Durduran, head of the
Turkish Cypriot opposition party Yeni Kibris (New Cyprus), over
310

40,000 Turkish Cypriots have left the island permanently since 1974.
The 80,000 indigenous Turkish Cypriots who remain make up almost
exactly half of the TRNC’s population of 160,000 as recorded by the
1997 census.64 The autochthonous population provides the political
base for opposition to Denktaş and his pro-Turkish agenda. The
opposition supports the UN concept of a bicommunal and bizonal
federation as a prerequisite for association with the EU.65 But it risks
becoming a minority in its own land.
Ankara’s strategic concerns were heightened by the EU’s
decision to initiate a process of accession for the Republic of Cyprus.
The EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999 included the island
as a candidate for membership and reiterated that the process
would move forward on its own merits whether or not a negotiated
solution to the division of the island had been achieved, on the sole
condition that the Greek Cypriot side not be held responsible for the
failure of negotiations. The process of accession was programmed to
begin at the end of 2002, with 2004 as a target date for admission. In
economic terms the Republic of Cyprus was an attractive candidate,
but the EU’s hand was to some extent forced by Greek threats to
block the entire enlargement process should its Cypriot ally be left
out. Turkey argued in response that the 1960 agreement on which the
independence of Cyprus was founded precludes membership in any
international organization of which both Greece and Turkey are not
members, and vigorously opposed EU candidacy. In December 1996
Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan responded to an earlier version of
the EU enlargement agenda by declaring that “the South of Cyprus
cannot join the EU without the permission of Turkey: if it does so,
the integration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus into
Turkey will be carried out as quickly as possible.”66 During 1997 an
Association Council between Turkey and the TRNC was created as
a vehicle to facilitate such a step. Turkey’s position on the question
remained consistent despite its rapprochement with Greece. It
evoked the possibility of war in the event that accession was
affected, and left virtually no room for retreat.67 Speaking before the
European Council’s Foreign Relations Committee on June 20, 2001,
Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz reiterated that Turkey would
offer “no compromises” on the island of Cyprus, “never accept” the
consignment of Turkish Cypriots to the status of a minority, and
“never accept the EU membership of Cyprus in this condition.”68
For EU representatives hostile to Turkish membership, Ankara’s
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militancy might have been considered a blessing in disguise. An
attempt to annex the TRNC would place Turkey’s aspirations for
accession into limbo for the foreseeable future.69 Anything short of
a negotiated outcome, however, would have dire consequences for
Greek-Turkish relations, the people of Cyprus, and the Balkans as a
whole. The EU’s hope was that the accession agenda could serve as
a catalyst for a negotiated solution, but it also had the potential to
become a “time-bomb likely to wreck all chances of a settlement on
the island.”70
By walking out on the negotiations at the end of 2000, Denktaş
sought to sabotage prospects for compromise and to concentrate
upon confirming sovereignty under the protective arm of Ankara.
In the short-term Turkey was supportive, in part because of the
personal convictions of leaders such as Ecevit, in part because the
government’s options were constrained by nationalist opinion and
the parliamentary role of nationalist parties, and in part because the
all powerful Turkish National Security Council attached strategic
value to military access to the island as a foundation for defense
policy along the Mediterranean littoral and in southern Anatolia.71
Confronting the imminent possibility of exclusion from Europe,
however, voices in the Turkish media, business elite, and political
class were quick to call attention to the extent that “the unresolved
Cyprus problem stood in the way of Turkey’s larger strategic
interests in moving toward the West,” and argued that in an issue of
decisive national importance the Cyprus tail should not be “wagging
the Turkish dog.”72 In fact the Turkish leadership was divided and of
two minds. The Cyprus issue had brought to a head a long-standing
dichotomy within elite perception, between partisans of resolute
modernization, democratization, and a European orientation, and
champions of more traditional values, a controlled society under
the tutelage of the Kemalist military establishment, and a special
geostrategic role for Turkey as Eurasian power prioritizing regional
interests and strategic association with the United States.73
Under pressure from proponents of compromise, in January
2002 Denktaş agreed to attend a new round of negotiations, to
be conducted on UN controlled territory in Nicosia under the
direction of Kofi Annan’s special advisor to Cyprus Alvaro de Soto.
For Denktaş and Clerides, respectively aged 78 and 83, no further
opportunity to resolve the Cyprus conundrum was likely to present
itself. Described as “the last chance for Cyprus to reach a settlement”
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by the Foreign Minister of the TRNC, Tahsin Ertugruloğlu, the talks
nonetheless progressed haltingly.74 Initial negotiating positions
were distressingly familiar. The Greek Cypriot government
forwarded the concept of a bi-communal federal state with a
constitution that accords the Turkish Cypriot minority substantial
institutional representation and protections, including a bicameral
legislature with the Turkish Cypriot community assigned 50 percent
representation in the upper house, and procedures for substantive
self-government for a Turkish Cypriot federal province. Security
would be guaranteed by the demilitarization of the island, including
the disbanding of the Cypriot National Guard, the withdrawal of
foreign national military contingents, and the continued presence of
a UN peacekeeping force. Turkish Cypriot counterproposals called
for the creation of a confederation of separate, sovereign, and equal
states, a lifting of the economic embargo against the north, and the
continued presence of Turkish troops as a security guarantor. These
alternatives were mutually exclusive, and without external pressure
it seemed unlikely that the new round of negotiations would
conclude any more positively than its predecessors.75
The target date for resolution of the problem was the December
12-13, 2002, EU summit in Copenhagen, where formal invitations for
a first round of EU enlargement were to be issued. With negotiations
between the Cypriote factions stalled, in part due to Denktaş’s
absence from the process while undergoing open heart surgery, Kofi
Annan made a final effort to promote a settlement on November
12, 2002, issuing a 150-page document reconfirming a peace plan
aimed at reuniting the island as a sovereign country with a single
international personality and two equal “cantons” on the Swiss
model in “indissoluble partnership.” The proposal, which basically
spelled out the terms of Annan’s long-standing negotiating posture
in greater detail, included provisions for a federal government
consisting of a six-member Presidential Council with representation
proportional to the population of the two sides, a 10-month rotating
Presidency and Vice Presidency, a National Parliament with two
chambers (a 48-seat Senate divided 50-50 between Greek and Turkish
communities, and a 48-seat lower chamber with proportional
representation), and a Supreme Court with three judges from each
part of the country and three non-Cypriots.76 Greek foreign minister
Papandreou was quick to praise the proposal as the prelude to an
“historic moment,” but reactions from the Cypriot factions were
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tepid.77 The Greek Cypriot community expressed concern with
procedures for adjudicating property rights, and the status accorded
to immigrants from Anatolia in the north, while Denktaş remained
defiant of EU-determined time lines and insistent on the core issue
of sovereignty.78
Ankara’s position, still judged to be the critical factor in
encouraging Turkish Cypriot compliance, was complicated by the
resounding victory in parliamentary elections of November 3, 2002,
with 34 percent of the popular vote and control over 363 seats in
Turkey’s 550 member parliament, of the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. The
AKP was the latest incarnation of the phenomenon of political
Islam in contemporary Turkey. After the banning of its immediate
predecessors, the Welfare and Justice parties, which had openly
declared their Islamic orientation in defiance of constitutional
provisions imposing secularism in the political arena, the AKP
changed tactics by publicly downplaying an implied Islamic
heritage and insisting upon its strictly secular character and respect
for democratic institutions. In terms of domestic development, the
AKP’s victory offered a major opportunity — if Turkey could accept
and co-opt a party of Islamic orientation within its secular state
structure, and demonstrate “that democracy can function properly
in a Muslim environment,” it would be taking a large step toward
political stabilization at home and the refurbishing of its credentials
as a model for democratic development in the Islamic world as a
hole.79 As far as the Cyprus question was concerned, in line with its
commitment to moderation, the AKP leadership took pains to assert
continuity in foreign policy questions and placed public pressure
upon Denktaş to come toward the UN agenda for a negotiated
solution.80
In the end EU remonstrance, UN diplomacy, and encouragement
from Ankara did not suffice to move the Turkish Cypriot leader
away from the rejectionist posture that he has maintained over
several decades. At Copenhagen in December 2002 the EU extended
formal invitations to ten candidates for association, including the
Republic of Cyprus, with a target date of 2004.81 Accession for the
Balkan states Romania and Bulgaria was also targeted for 2007.
No breakthrough on the Cyprus question was achieved, however.
Negotiations were continued subsequent to the deadline, but several
months later Denktaş unambiguously rejected the Annan Plan in its
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current configuration.82 The issue of the status of the TRNC against
the background of the Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the EU was
thus put off yet again — the EU strategy of linking reunification
and accession had apparently failed. Simultaneously, the EU
refused Ankara’s request for a firm date for opening negotiations on
Turkey’s own accession process, making due with a soft compromise
that fixed December 2004 as a possible date for the opening of
negotiations dependent on an evaluation of Turkey’s progress in
democratization, including a reduction of the military’s role in the
political process and improved human rights standards.83 The New
York Times, in line with U.S. policy strongly supportive of the Turkish
accession agenda, lamented that the EU had “fumbled its chance to
make an enormous contribution toward integrating Turkey into the
West.”84 The new government in Ankara sought to put the best face
on the decision, however, and reiterated its commitment to pursue
Turkey’s European vocation.
The unresolved Cyprus Question, and prospect that in 2004 the
Republic of Cyprus may join the EU without having regularized its
relations with the north, is a significant barrier to progress in Turkey’s
relations with Greece and the EU, and to stabilization in the entire
southeastern European region.85 One may argue that over time the
issue has become more of an annoyance than a problem, that GreekTurkish rapprochement makes the prospect of armed hostility over
Cyprus highly unlikely, that the status quo which has endured for
38 years is not inherently unacceptable, and that even the worst case
prospect of a Turkish annexation of the TRNC would not change
the situation on the ground in a dramatic way. If Ankara is serious
about blazing a trail to the EU, however, it will have no choice but
to work toward some kind of negotiated outcome. Prolongation of
the status quo, particularly in view of deeply entrenched European
skepticism, will make Turkish accession nearly impossible.86
Continued international pressure encouraging negotiations is
therefore absolutely necessary. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
has done his best to facilitate a solution, but lacking a will to
compromise on the part of the negotiating partners the UN’s ability
to force a settlement in limited. The U.S. has consistently urged a
negotiated alternative, but has also been anxious to cultivate Turkey
as a strategic ally and may not chose to bring decisive influence to
bear if it feels that the problem can be contained at low cost. The EU
has much to offer, but in order to make use of its leverage Brussels
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will have to make the prospect of Turkish accession more substantial
than it has been willing to do to date. These are critical issues that
will continue to demand careful attention. Despite failure to resolve
the issue at the EU’s Copenhagen summit, the complex and obscure
Cypriot negotiations remain a key to the strategically vital effort
to “set Turkey firmly on a European path,” and build a stronger
foundation for association between Europe and the Balkan region
as a whole.87
Conclusion.
Despite their disagreements, Greece and Turkey weathered the
storms of the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s without resorting to arms.
Western observers repeatedly expressed the fear that Athens and
Ankara might be drawn into the fighting against their will or best
judgment, but in the end such concerns were overblown.88 GreekTurkish rivalry did not abate, but during the Yugoslav crisis, it
culminated as a guerre manqueé.
Domestically, Greece has evolved toward a fully integrated
member of the European family — progress that successful hosting
of the 2004 Olympic Games could help to reinforce. A wave of
populist demagoguery and nationalist extremism such as that
stirred up by the Macedonian Question during the early 1990s
appears increasingly archaic and unlikely to recur. In Turkey, a
harsh economic downturn has substantially discredited virtually all
established political parties and created an objective need for new
direction. The AKP’s sweeping victory at the polls in November
2002 represented a political earthquake parallel to the destructive
1999 tremors that proved such a spur to rapprochement with
Greece. If the AKP can succeed in bringing the voice of Turkey’s
disinherited into the political process in a constructive way, revive
popular confidence in the institutions of governance, and sustain
its commitment to secularism and moderation, Turkey’s long-term
national interests will be well served.
At the dawn of the new millennium, Athens and Ankara launched
into a process of rapprochement with the potential to produce
considerable mutual benefit. If the dynamic of reconciliation can be
sustained, both of the parties and the entire southeastern European
sub-region will be winners. Expanding economic interaction will
help to revive regional markets, Turkey’s European aspirations
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will be forwarded at a realistic pace, the benefits of association
with NATO and the EU will become more broadly accessible,
democratization will be given new impetus, the Islamist factor, in
regional politics and in Turkish domestic affairs, will be channeled
in positive directions, and potential flash points and sources of
conflict eliminated. Despite the progress of recent years, however,
the corner has not yet been turned. Turkey continues to struggle
with economic crisis and political instability, the national-populist
faction of the Greek political spectrum is still a force to be reckoned
with, strategic rivalry in the Aegean remains alive, and the Cyprus
dilemma, if it is not managed intelligently, has the potential to upset
quite a number of apple carts.
The Greek-Turkish relationship is an integral part of the Balkan
security dilemma. As in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, Western
involvement will be a critical factor in determining whether the
relationship continues to evolve in a positive direction. Unfortunately,
that involvement cannot be taken for granted. NATO has been a
sturdy deterrent to Greek-Turkish conflict in the past. Whether it
will be able to accomplish that role in the future remains to be seen.
The United States, when it has put its shoulder to the grindstone, has
succeeded in managing regional conflict, but continued success will
only be achieved at the price of sustained engagement. Institutional
Europe remains a pole of attraction, but it must make the prospect of
accession realistic if the promise of a Europe “whole and at peace”
is to be extended to its troubled southeastern marches. There is
still much at stake, and complacency is inappropriate. Athens and
Ankara did not allow themselves to be drawn into the Balkan wars
of the 1990s, but the Balkan subregion could yet be caught up in the
Greek-Turkish imbroglio. In the contemporary Europe, as the Soviet
diplomat Maxim Litvinov asserted during the crisis of the 1930s,
peace remains indivisible.
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CHAPTER 7
THE BALKANS BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE
The War of Yugoslav Succession.
The Kosovo conflict was the latest in a series of four wars
occasioned by the purposeful destruction of the Yugoslav federation.
Though waged sequentially and in different geographical areas
(Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia) they are best
regarded as a single, protracted conflict with a consistent logic—the
reallocation of territory and populations among the fragments of
former Yugoslavia. Collusive bargaining among the leaders of
Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, abetted by international support for
the secessionist intentions of the western republics, set the stage
for the deconstruction of the federation, but not all issues could be
regulated peacefully. The drôle de guerre in Slovenia gave way to less
tractable conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belgrade’s
attempt to seize control of a greater Serbia was checked, parties
driven onto the defensive in the first phase of the fighting won time
to rally their forces, ethnic mobilization created new patterns of
confrontation, and open-ended warfare was the result.
The war of Yugoslav succession had a destructive impact
throughout the region, but burdens were not distributed evenly.
The Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, who had combined to form the first
Yugoslavia, emerged from the mayhem with independent states and
reasonable prospects. The Slovenes broke away at low cost, and have
been successful in consolidating a new regime and affiliating with
institutional Europe.1 Croatia’s “thousand-year dream” of statehood
was also secured, though the cost was considerably higher. The
Serb revolt in Krajina and Slavonia was defeated, but the Croatian
economy, ravaged by years of warfare and corrupt governance, has
yet to recover. Though Serbia achieved independence, its aspiration
to create a greater Serbia where “all Serbs would live in one state”
was beaten back across the board. The expulsion of Serb minorities
from the Krajina, Slavonia, and Kosovo, the surrender of hopes to
absorb the Republika Srpska, the rise of a secessionist movement
in Montenegro, the ruin occasioned by alliance bombing, and an
enduring stigma of responsibility all bear witness to the extent of
Belgrade’s defeat. The smaller and more ethnically mixed republics,
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whose stability was most dependent upon the Yugoslav context,
also paid a heavy toll. Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged from the
Dayton process as a ward of the international community, plagued
by swelling criminality, declining living standards, and poisoned
intercommunal relations. Kosovo has been irretrievably polarized,
and is likely to remain a de facto international protectorate for the
foreseeable future. The Republic of Macedonia is a fragile polity with
clouded prospects, challenged to integrate a disaffected Albanian
population that could yet provide the spark for a new Balkan war.
Outside the borders of former Yugoslavia, neighboring states such as
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, and Albania have also
suffered as a result of the cumulative effect of international embargos,
the collapse of regional markets, and the varied debilitating effects
of protracted warfare.2 Greek-Turkish relations have weathered the
storms of the 1990s, but the rapprochement underway is still at risk
against a background of continuing regional disorder. None of the
Yugoslav successor states, with the partial exception of Slovenia,
have achieved levels of well being, or prospects of integration with
a greater Europe, comparable to those once enjoyed by the despised
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.
It is difficult to draw a definitive assessment of the war of
Yugoslav succession, because it is not yet clear that it has come to
an end. The peace accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are
precarious. The Albanian Question in the southern Balkans remains
unresolved, and the region contains numerous other potential flash
points where tensions could erupt at any moment. New security
problems have spun off from a decade of warfare, including a
proliferation of weak states with impoverished populations and
corrupt governments, prone to exploitation by international criminal
networks as staging areas for various trafficking operations. Most
of all, no convincing framework for reassembling a viable regional
order has been put in place. International engagement in the Balkan
wars of the 1990s was tentative, reactive, and often short-sighted.
Lack of commitment to seeing the job through has been exposed
by chronic squabbling over responsibility, and more recently by
calls for U.S. military disengagement. Without a larger vision for
recasting regional order, and a sustained commitment on the part
of the international community, the Balkans’ progress from war to
peace will remain reversible.
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After Kosovo.
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo imposed a kind of order upon
the contested province, but did little to address the dilemmas of
identity and development out of which the conflict between Serbs
and Albanians had sprung. There was nonetheless a sense in
which the Kosovo conflict could be regarded as a turning point.
Yugoslavia’s military defeat brought an end to a phase of Serbian
national assertion that had been a basic source of regional instability.
With Serbia neutralized, and the major conflicts of the past decade
contained by the presence of international peacekeepers, prospects
for enduring peace were considerably improved. The successor
states of former Yugoslavia, after years of debilitating warfare, were
increasingly constrained to abandon ethnic politics and visions of
territorial aggrandizement, accept the necessity of good-neighborly
relations, and face up to the demands of domestic reform. Solutions
to regional dilemmas that looked beyond the construct of warfare
have become realistic in a way that was not the case in the past. The
Balkan region has not yet been tamed, but in the years since the
Kosovo conflict it has witnessed a number of positive developments
that hold out hope for a less tumultuous future.
1. NATO Comes to Kosovo.
The responsibility for administering Kosovo under UN
Resolution No. 1244, which temporarily suspended Yugoslav
authority in the province, was placed in the hands of a UN Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) originally led by Special Representative of
the UN Secretary General Bernard Kouchner, and a NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR) commanded by the German General Klaus
Reinhardt charged with a peace support mission. KFOR quickly
evolved into an extraordinarily complex command with over
40,000 troops representing 39 participating nations deployed in
Kosovo, Macedonia, Albanian, and Greece. It was tasked with
deterring further aggression on the part of Serbia, guaranteeing the
personal security of the local population, demilitarizing the KLA,
collaborating with UNMIK in an integrated peace building effort,
and providing humanitarian assistance within the limits imposed by
other responsibilities.3 These are imposing tasks, and since its initial
deployment KFOR has sustained relatively consistent force levels of
around 38,000.4
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As was the case with IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the purely
military domain essential tasks were accomplished with alacrity.5
In the short-term, Serbian retaliation against KFOR was not really
a threat, and after the fall of the Milošević regime in October 2000
the likelihood of any such action in defiance of NATO was virtually
nonexistent. The integrity of the province was adequately insured
by the deterrent effect of KFOR’s simple presence. Cooperation with
UNMIK was organized effectively, though interactions with the
hundreds of nongovernmental relief organizations that were soon
active in the province was predictably challenging. Humanitarian
efforts, including assistance to refugee returns, reconstruction of
infrastructure, and mine clearance, proceeded efficiently and were
much appreciated. Despite its best efforts, however, KFOR was not
able to prevent a new wave of intimidation, revenge killing, and
ethnic cleansing targeting what remained of Kosovo’s Serb and
other minorities.6 By the winter of 1999-2000, much of the remaining
Serb community had withdrawn into the divided city of Mitrovica
and adjacent territories north of the Ibar River, which became a focal
point for ethnic tension, including occasional rioting.7 The KLA
was partially disarmed and formally disbanded, but the Kosovo
Protection Corps, led by former JNA and KLA commander Agim
Çeku, has provided a degree of organizational continuity. Çeku is
on record stating that the Kosovar Albanians continue to maintain
an underground military organization capable of acting when
circumstances demand.8 His organization has been implicated in
cooperation with criminal networks that have made Kosovo a major
transit point for drug trafficking.9
After the formal disbanding of the KLA, the radical wing of the
Kosovar Albanian movement divided into two rival formations--the
Democratic Party of Kosovo led by Hashim Thaçi, and the Alliance
for the Future of Kosovo led by former KLA general Ramush
Haradinaj. Armed with the prestige of victory, the KLA offshoots
looked forward with confidence to Kosovo’s first independent local
elections on October 27, 2000. They did not count on the disillusioning
effect of widespread corruption, racketeering, and inefficient local
administration, as well, perhaps, on a backlash occasioned by the
traumas of the war. Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK, judged to be virtually
defunct after Rugova’s meetings with Milošević in Belgrade during
the first phase of the allied bombing campaign, swept to victory with
58 percent of the vote, compared to 27 percent for the Democratic
328

Party and 8 percent for the Alliance.10 Parliamentary elections in
November 2001 affirmed this distribution of support, and on March
4, 2002, 114 days after the elections and following considerable
factional strife, Kosovo’s parliament confirmed a new government
on the basis of a statute defining shared responsibilities with
UNMIK (which was empowered to prorogue the parliament in case
of disagreements).11 Rugova was appointed President and Bajram
Rexhepi from the Democratic Party Prime Minister. A ten-member
cabinet was structured to reflect a power sharing arrangement, with
four seats for the LDK, two each for Thaçi’s Democratic Party and
Haradinaj’s Alliance, and one each for minority formations, the Serb
coalition Povratak (Return) and a Muslim party.12
Once again, the civilian side of international administration in
Kosovo has proven to be more problematic than the military side.
The challenges of reconstruction, democratization, and development
are inherently more difficult than those of peacekeeping.13 Moreover,
UNMIK administers Kosovo on the basis of a studied ambiguity—
the presumption that the province is still part of something called
Yugoslavia, or Serbia-Montenegro, awaiting a decision as to final
status. Under present circumstances, this ambiguity can be sustained
only so long as KFOR remains on call. The large majority of Kosovo
Albanians (who must approve any decision on final status) support
independence. Enthusiasm for attachment to a greater Albania
is muted—the Republic of Albania is too troubled and politically
distinct to be an attractive partner.14 The idea of a greater Kosovo
incorporating contiguous parts of Macedonia, Montenegro, and
southern Serbia inhabited by Albanian majorities is doubtless more
attractive, but can probably only be achieved at the cost of another
war. Federative association with Serbia and Montenegro, including
broad autonomy for Kosovo and perhaps some border adjustments
to bring Serb majority areas in the north into Serbia proper, would
be a win-win solution that the current leadership in Belgrade
might be willing to accept, but is not likely to find favor in Priştina.
Incompatible goals make compromise solutions unattainable and
virtually condemn UNMIK to continue sustaining the ambiguous
status quo.15
2. NATO Stays in Bosnia.
The role of SFOR and the High Commissioner in BosniaHerzegovina is equally troubled. After five years of international
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supervision, there has of course been some progress in promoting
reconstruction and reconciliation. External actors such as Serbia and
Croatia no longer encourage confrontation. New political, juridical,
and police authorities have been established, freedom of movement
guaranteed, and some infrastructure repaired. The role of nationalist
extremists in the political process has been constrained though not
eliminated, the Bosnian Muslims have spurned the siren song of
Islamic extremism, and pressure for partition arrangements has been
dampened.16 In view of such progress, SFOR has been able to draw
down force levels, from approximately 60,000 in December 1995, to
32,000 in December 1996, to 22,000 in October 1999, and to 18,000 in
the spring of 2002, with further reductions possible.
The question nonetheless must be posed whether international
oversight can ever be terminated unless enduring problems,
including the consolidation of national institutions, securing of public
order, mine clearance, refugee return, and the capture of indicted
war criminals, are more effectively addressed.17 Ethnically based
political parties remain influential within all three communities.
The local economy has never recovered from the strains of war,
and is burdened by high unemployment, endemic corruption, and
an accumulated debt of over $3.2 billion. The International Crisis
Group estimates that in every year since 1996 over 50,000 citizens
have emigrated from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the majority youthful
and well educated. Progress towards reconciliation between
Bosnia’s ethnic communities has been halting, and the prospect
of a renewal of ethnic strife in the absence of an international
peacekeeping force cannot be discounted.18 The intrusive role of the
High Commissioner, supported by the coercive potential of SFOR
and the tutelage of an army of NGOs, has helped to smooth over
some of the flaws in the Dayton process, but not allowed sufficient
autonomy for the Bosnians to begin to manage their own affairs and
to build the foundation of a self-sustaining peace.19
The case of the Republika Srpska is particularly revealing in
this regard. In September 1996 Karadžić was forced to surrender
the presidency to his wartime ally, Biljana Plavšić. Despite her
abysmal record as a tribune of Serb nationalism, Plavšić was
won over to cooperation with the West in opposition to the
unrepentantly nationalist Momčilo Krajišnik, shifting the capital
from the nationalist redoubt of Pale to Banja Luka and agreeing to
work cooperatively with Bosnian national institutions. The Bosnian
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elections of November 1997, which gave a narrow victory to a
coalition of parties opposed to the SDS organized by Plavšić and
allowed the moderate Milorad Dodik to form a new government in
the Republika Srpska, seemed like a triumph for SFOR and the High
Commissioner. In September 1998 elections, however, Plavšić was
roundly beaten for the presidency by the radical nationalist Nikola
Poplašen, a self-styled Chetnik who enjoyed parading during the
war with an unkempt beard and a knife in his belt. After several
months of confrontation, in May 1999 High Commissioner Carlos
Westendorp simply dismissed Poplašen despite the fact that he
had come to office through an uncontested democratic election.
Such harsh measures, criticized by some as the work of “a kind of
protectorate that refuses to say its name,” may be legitimate in view
of the destructive nature of the political forces in question, but the
need for administrative arbitrariness on the part of the occupying
authorities to hold the line against extremism inevitably posed the
question of what might happen in their absence.20
Without the reassurance provided by international peacekeepers,
the eruption of local violence or republic-level conflict sparked by
ethnic rivalry is well within the range of possibility. Precipitous
or disorderly disengagement by the U.S. or the international
community would therefore be a high-risk undertaking. Partition
as an alternative to the Dayton bargain has always had its
champions, but has never been supported by U.S. policy—partition
arrangements would perhaps look too much like capitulation to be
considered politically acceptable.21 For the time being, it appears
that the status quo can be sustained, and halting progress toward
what might eventually become a self-sustaining peace maintained,
only at the cost of an open-ended engagement by NATO or EU led
peacekeepers.22
3. The KLA Comes to Preševo.
Despite the slow pace of progress, there are realistic prospects
for an eventual disengagement of the international community
from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The same cannot be said for Kosovo,
where even the most optimistic assessments acknowledge that a
robust peacekeeping force remains essential to preserving stability.
KFOR helps to contain communal tension within Kosovo itself, but
it is perhaps even more important as a mechanism for deterring the
Albanian nationalist agenda, driven by a militant core of the former
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KLA that has sought to use the province as a sanctuary for exporting
insurrection.
In the spring of 2000, the Albanian uprising that the KLA had
launched inside Kosovo in 1997 spread into southern Serbia’s Preševo
valley. The valley overlaps with the five kilometer-wide buffer area,
or Ground Safety Zone, set up by KFOR after its occupation of
Kosovo where Yugoslav Army and police forces were not allowed
to penetrate. The region’s population of over 70,000 is almost
entirely Albanian, and the area is sometimes referred to as western
Kosovo in Albanian nationalist discourse. The Preševo valley is an
important line of north-south communication including the main
road attaching Belgrade to Skopje. It also plays a significant role as a
smuggling route. From January 2000 a shadowy so-called Liberation
Army of Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja (LAPBM), sustained by
militants based across the border with Kosovo in the area controlled
by the U.S.-led Multinational Brigade East, launched a campaign of
intimidation against Serb police and local authorities in the Preševo
valley. The policy of assassination, as in Kosovo in previous years,
seems to have been aimed at provoking reprisals and encouraging
international intervention as a foundation for establishing de facto
Albanian control.
Whatever residual sympathy for the plight of the Kosovar
Albanians might have been in play, Western chancelleries had
no interest in further fragmentation in the southern Balkans.
Fortuitously, the fall of Milošević in the autumn of 2000 provided
an opportunity to address the problem without expanding KFOR’s
mandate, by negotiating with the new regime in Belgrade to permit
Serbian police and security forces, under careful observation,
to reenter the area. With Yugoslav forces carrying the bulk of
responsibility, from the end of 2000 onward the Albanian insurgency
in the Preševo valley was brought under control, culminating with a
negotiated ceasefire on March 13, 2001. The irony of NATO appealing
for Serbian assistance to reduce a KLA-led insurrection within little
more than a year of the allied bombing campaign was striking, but
not unfathomable. The change of regime in Belgrade had altered the
dynamics of power in the region. During the Kosovo conflict, it was
the capacity of Milošević’s Belgrade to export disruption that lay
at the center of Western concerns. In Preševo, the potential role of
a post-Milošević Serbia as a factor for stability was brought to the
fore.23
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The battle for the Preševo valley was not sustained, but incidents
in the area continue, and the demonstration of an unbroken will
to fight on the part of a radical fringe of the former KLA is not
encouraging. While UNMIK struggles to put Kosovo back on its
feet, the unresolved Albanian national question constantly threatens
to reverse whatever halting progress has been made.24
4. War Comes to Macedonia.
Instability in Kosovo inevitably affected the fragile relationship
between Slavs and Albanians in neighboring Macedonia. Lacking a
recent or reliable census, it is only possible to speculate concerning
the precise balance of populations—the 1994 census placed the
Albanian minority at about 23 percent of the population and the
Slavic majority at 66 percent—442,000 Albanians against 1.3 million
Slavs plus numerous other smaller minority communities including
Turks, Serbs, Roma, and Vlachs. According to some Albanian
estimates, however, the Albanian community now constitutes
over 40 percent of the population, with a rate of increase that will
make it a majority within a generation. In either case, Macedonian
Albanians constitute a large and growing community, concentrated
in northern and western districts, but also present in large numbers
in major cities including Skopje, where about one-third of the 600,000
residents are Albanian.
Macedonia was the only Yugoslav republic to move toward
independence without bloodshed. Its declaration of independence
on September 8, 1991, came as a result of negotiations with Belgrade
and was followed, on March 26, 1992, by a peaceful withdrawal of
all Yugoslav armed forces based in the province. On January 8, 1992,
the Titoist and Yugoslav loyalist Kiro Gligorov was elected president
of the new Republic of Macedonia, an independent state for the first
time in its long and troubled, though often illustrious, history.
The smooth transition to independence was deceptive. Macedonia
was an impoverished, ethnically complex, and unstable state with
difficult relations with most of its neighbors. Bulgaria became the
first state to recognize Macedonian sovereignty, but it refused to
acknowledge the existence of a distinct Macedonian identity or
language—for a century and more Bulgarian nationalism has been
constructed around the assertion that Slavic Macedonians are in fact
Bulgarians cut off from their homeland by the foibles of history.25
Recognition from the UN followed in April 1993, and from the
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U.S. on 9 February 1994, but in deference to Greek protests, under
the provisional title the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM). Skopje had been granted a right of self-determination,
but not the right to choose its own name! Athens argued that the
name Macedonia was part of the Hellenic heritage that could not be
usurped by outsiders, and suggested that its use implied territorial
demands against Greece’s own Macedonian region. It further
protested against the use of the Star of Vergina (a symbol associated
with Alexander the Great) on the new Macedonian flag, the
appearance of an image of the White Tower of Thessalonica on some
Macedonian banknotes, and phrases in the Macedonian constitution
implying a right to represent the interests of Macedonians resident
outside the republic. On February 16, 1994, immediately following
U.S. recognition, Greece initiated an economic embargo against its
neighbor, closing the Greek consulate at Skopje, sealing the border,
and preventing access to the port of Thessalonica. The notion that
Macedonia was in some meaningful sense a threat to Greece was
ludicrous, but the issue was whipped to fever pitch by demagogic
politicians courting nationalist opinion, culminating with a huge
anti-Skopje demonstration of over a million people in Thessalonica
on March 31, 1994. In the spring of 1994 Serbia also mobilized
troops along its border with Macedonia, sections of which are
imprecisely delineated and contested.26 In was against precisely
this kind of threat that a small UNPROFOR contingent (renamed
the UN Preventive Deployment or UNPREDEP in March 1995) was
authorized to deploy in Macedonia in December 1992. Peacekeeping
forces provided some reassurance to Skopje, but the 1,156 American
and Scandinavian soldiers in place in the spring of 1994 were hardly
an adequate deterrent.27
External pressure reinforced domestic instability. After
independence, Skopje made a sincere but only partly successful
effort to integrate the Albanian minority into a true multinational
state. Albanian parties were brought into parliament and governing
coalitions, but the Albanian minority remained subject to economic
discrimination, and was underrepresented in the armed forces, police,
and civil service. Although relations between Slavic and Albanian
Macedonians were not traditionally embittered in the manner of
relations between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, interethnic tensions
were a fact of life.28 The Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity
(PDP) was constrained to become more demanding as popular
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agitation for change expanded, embracing demands for the creation
of an Albanian language university in Tetovo, broader integration
into national institutions, and a redrafting of the preamble to the
Macedonian constitution that would give Albanians equal status as
a constituent nationality. On October 3, 1995, Gligorov’s motorcade
was attacked by a car bomb while passing before the Hotel Bristol in
the heart of Skopje. The chauffer was killed and the president, age
79, suffered serious wounds including the loss of an eye. Subsequent
evidence has implicated the Serbian secret services in the attack, but
at the time of the event it was speculated to be an act of Albanian
terrorism.29 Administrative elections in the autumn of 1996 saw large
gains for the more extreme Albanian national parties in Tetovo and
Gostivar, and by 1997 Macedonian Albanians were being drawn
into the same web of intrigue that was bringing the KLA to life in
Kosovo.
Meeting in Priština on July 22, 2000, representatives of the
Albanian national movement made no secret of how they saw their
struggle evolving. The program approved by the conference asserted
that “a part of the nation still remains under the yoke of the oppressor
in Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro . . . the Albanian peoples of
Kosovo must orient themselves toward independence and form a
state that will include all of the occupied territories where Albanians
are in a majority.”30 After the autumn 2000 elections, with space for
political work inside Kosovo constrained by the shifting popular
mood and the heavy hands of KFOR and UNMIK, KLA leaders
seem to have opted to look across the border. Once again Western
observers were caught by surprise, and international mediators
forced to run to catch up with a cycle of violence.31 In the last
months of 2000 several attacks against Macedonian policemen were
reclaimed by an organization styling itself the National Liberation
Army (NLA), rendered in Albanian with the same acronym (UÇK)
used to designate the KLA.32 Described by Duncan Perry as “an
offshoot of the Kosovo Liberation Army” composed of several
thousand “hardened warriors who learned their trade fighting Serbs
in Kosovo,” the NLA represented a Macedonian variant of the same
Albanian nationalist movement that had already surfaced in Kosovo
and the Preševo valley.33
In January 2001 a small group of NLA militants assaulted a
police station in the village of Tanuševci, located near the border
with Kosovo, adjacent to the Preševo valley, and about 20 miles
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north of Skopje. The action may not have been intended as the
beginning of a military campaign—Tanuševci was a refuge on KLA
smuggling routes, and the original violence could have been aimed
at protecting traffickers from police interference.34 On February 25,
however, after national attention had been drawn to the site, up to
250 NLA fighters dressed in black seized control of the village. The
Macedonian authorities cordoned off the town but did not venture
to retake it. Soon fighting had expanded throughout the entire area.35
In March the NLA upped the ante by launching an attack against
Tetovo, Macedonia’s second largest city with 170,000 residents, 75
percent of them Albanian (according to the census of 1994). The
guerrillas, operating out of the imposing Šar Planina mountain
range, moved into the surrounding hills, raised the Albanian flag on
the Kale (an ancient Ottoman fortress on the outskirts of the city), and
brought the city center under mortar fire. On March 26 Macedonian
forces stormed the Albanian positions, only to find that their enemy
had fled—or rather melted away into the hills without a trace.36 A
familiar pattern seemed to be emerging, with fighting escalating,
thousands of refuges fleeing the war zones, government forces
reliant upon heavy weapons and firepower incapable of pinning
down and destroyed a more agile opponent, and the international
community anguished over a situation with the potential to shatter
regional stability.
Under siege, Skopje immediately closed its 140-kilometer border
with Kosovo, and Foreign Minister Srjan Kerim flew to Brussels and
called upon NATO to intensify border patrols. Officials criticized
NATO for its inability to contain the NLA, and bridled under
instructions to reign in their military response, but lacked confidence
in the capacity of the small and poorly prepared Macedonian armed
forces to master the problem without external assistance.37 Reliable
light infantry forces capable of taking positions by assault were
sorely lacking. As an alternative, Skopje relied on air power, heavy
weaponry, and rocket fire to attack occupied areas, affecting massive
damage and often driving local residents into the arms of the NLA
without achieving militarily significant effects. In April fighting
spread to the northeastern town of Kumanovo, where water mains
serving the civilian population were severed, and in June NLA
fighters occupied the Albanian village of Aričinovo, ten kilometers
from Skopje and adjacent to the country’s only international airport
and oil refinery. During May a government of national unity was
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pulled together in the capital, combining two Macedonian Slavic
parties and two Albanian parties (the Social Democratic Alliance
of Macedonia, IMRO-DPMNU, the PDP, and Arben Xhaferi’s
Democratic Party of Albanians), but it was weak and anything
but united. The Albanian parties represented in the government
supported national unity, but condemned disproportionate use of
force against the insurrection and pushed a program for expanded
Albanian rights that clashed with the priorities of the government.
The NLA, represented by its self-styled leader and former KLA
activist Ali Ahmeti, claimed to oppose secession and limited its
demands to a series of reforms—changes in the preamble of the
constitution recognizing Albanians as a “co-founding” ethnicity,
designation of Albanian as an official language, sponsorship for the
University of Tetovo, administrative autonomy in Albanian majority
areas, and proportional representation in public administration.38
The moderation of the agenda did not slow down the momentum of
armed struggle. By June the Macedonian regime appeared to be on
the verge of collapse.
Under these circumstances, the international community
mobilized, belatedly but effectively, to head off the worst. During
May, despite pledges to avoid all contacts with “terrorists,” OSCE
representative Robert Frowick coordinated a series of meetings
between Macedonia’s Albanian parties and the NLA in Kosovo with
the goal of defining an arrangement that the Albanian community
as a whole could accept.39 Subsequently, the EU’s new high
representative for foreign and security policy, Javiar Solana, laid
the groundwork for a diplomatic option during a series of shuttle
missions. In June KFOR soldiers were brought into the theater to
escort some 350 NLA fighters away from their threatening forward
position at Aričinovo. Macedonian authorities were outraged, and
rioting erupted in the capital protesting NATO’s purported role as
the NLA’s protector, but Skopje had no real independent option.40
During June and July former French Defense Minister François
Leotard on behalf of the EU, Ambassador James Pardew on behalf
of the United States, and special envoy Peter Feith on behalf of
NATO hammered out the terms of a diplomatic settlement that was
signed by the four parties constituting Macedonia’s national unity
government at the lake resort of Ohrid on August 13.41
The Ohrid Framework Agreement, like the Dayton Accord, gave
something to all sides, but made no one happy. The NLA agreed
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to observe an armistice, surrender its weapons to international
authorities, and disband as a forum for armed struggle. The
voluntary handover of light arms subsequently organized by NATO
as Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST resulted in the collection of
a grand total of 3,875 weapons—from an arsenal of hundreds of
thousands believed to remain in stashes under the control of NLA
militants. In exchange, the Macedonian authorities agreed to begin
a process of institutional reform that would come toward the goal of
greater autonomy for the Albanian minority by granting it the status
of a constituent nation, introducing bilingualism, and forwarding
proportional representation. Implementing these pledges in the face
of domestic opposition did not promise to be easy, and it may be
presumed that even if realized they will not correspond to the larger,
long-term aspirations of the Albanian national movement.42
The Ohrid Agreement was imposed by international mediators
and sustained by an international military presence. On September
26 an OSCE Monitoring Mission involving 125 monitors was
chartered to observe compliance, to be accompanied by a Germanled NATO protection force, with only 1,000 troops too small to
intimidate, but sufficient to signal resolve, designated as Operation
AMBER FOX.43 Plans called for an EU force to succeed the NATO
deployment, autonomous but drawing on NATO assets and
attached to the NATO chain of command, a commitment described
by French President Jacques Chirac as the “first reasonable but
ambitious step toward a European defense policy.”44 Though its
architects might prefer to ignore it, Ohrid transformed Macedonia
into yet another Balkan protectorate—this time a protectorate lite.45
The agreement has been praised as a new framework for Balkan
conflict management—preemptive engagement by the international
community, a viable compromise that offers positive incentives
for all parties, and discrete monitoring that leaves the essential
responsibility for post-conflict peace building in the hands of local
actors. In its wake, Macedonia has had some success in attracting
sorely needed international financial assistance.46
The fruits of the Ohrid Agreement arrived 1 year after its
conclusion, when national elections brought a new ruling coalition
to power. In these elections, Ljubčo Georgievski’s IMRO, with its
rhetorically nationalist orientation, was roundly defeated by the
left-center Social Democratic League behind Branko Crvenkovski.
Perhaps more surprisingly, the Albanian Democratic Party and its
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leader Arben Xhaferi, committed to an incongruous alliance with
IMRO in the outgoing government, was bested by the new Albanian
Democratic Union for Integration, led by none other than former
NLA leader Ahmeti. The extent of the victories was impressive.
In Macedonia’s 120 seat parliament, the Social Democratic League
was projected to control an absolute majority of 62 seats against 34
for IMRO, and Ahmeti’s Democratic Union 17 seats against only 5
for the Democratic Party.47 Though the Social Democrats were in a
position to govern independently, the exigencies of implementing
the Ohrid reforms made it imperative that they secure an agreement
with a representative of the Albanian minority.
The outcome offers a precious opportunity to further an agenda
for reconciliation. While accusations of corruption and collusion with
the Slavic parties undermined Xhaferi, as the leader of Macedonia’s
Albanian insurrection Ahmeti accumulated tremendous popular
support. In the year following the uprising, he has become an
outspoken proponent of compromise solutions keyed to reform,
which the Slavic majority would be well-advised to accept. On
the other hand, suspicion within the Slavic community of the kind
of Albanian militancy that the “terrorist” Ahmeti is perceived to
have sponsored is deeply-rooted. Crvenkovski’s success is in part
a function of popular disillusionment with corrupt governance
and clientelism—real problems that will, however, be extremely
difficult to address. And Macedonian remains a fragile state with a
poorly functioning economy and high unemployment. The NLA has
been replaced by another shadowy guerrilla organization dubbed
the Albanian National Army (Armata Kombetare Shqiptare) with an
agenda for continuing armed struggle.48 Disaffection among the
Slavic majority, provoked by economic hardship but manifested
as national intolerance, is likewise a wild card that will have to be
carefully monitored. The elections leave the country at the very
beginning of what will inevitably be a long and untidy process of
economic recovery, state building, and ethnic reconciliation. If this
process is to be brought to fruition it will “require, for the foreseeable
future, a visible Western presence and generous support.”49
5. Tudjman in Hell.
Croatia’s reconquest of the Krajina during 1995 and subsequent
absorption of eastern Slavonia was a triumph for Franjo Tudjman’s
narrow vision of Croatian state rights. Following these events,
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the “father of the nation” toured the country in a so-called peace
train trumpeting Croatian virtue to popular acclaim, and his HDZ
was reconfirmed in power in national elections. In June 1997
Tudjman himself easily won a third term as president. The victories
culminated a phase of national mobilization, but also set the stage for
change. By bringing the affront of occupation to an end, driving out
the Serb population of the Krajina, and concluding the “Homeland
War” (Domovinski rat) that had hitherto dominated the politics
of independent Croatia, the events of 1995 allowed the Croatian
electorate to devote more attention to real and present domestic
difficulties.
Despite official triumphalism, all was not well. The quasiauthoritarian rule of Tudjman’s HDZ had been accompanied by
declining living standards, high unemployment lingering close to 25
percent, and insider privatization that placed the bulk of Croatia’s
economic assets in the hands of “a criminal elite sacking national
resources.”50 Tudjman was used by the Western powers as an ally of
convenience in the struggle with Milošević’s Serbia, but never really
respected, and his country had few reliable allies. Despite a virtual
state monopoly of the mass media, and repressive policies toward
political dissent, a more effective opposition was sure to emerge as
the strictures of national mobilization declined.
Tudjman died of cancer on December 10, 1999, after more than a
month in a coma, in the midst of a parliamentary election campaign.
The seriousness of his condition had not been revealed, and news
of his passing, sprung upon a population and political elite illprepared to receive it, necessitated early presidential elections and
opened the door to regime change. On January 3, 2000, a six-party
reformist coalition cruised to victory, winning 95 of 151 seats in the
lower house of the Croatian parliament against only 46 for the HDZ
and bringing Ivica Račan of the Social Democratic Party (heir to
the Yugoslav League of Communists of Croatia) to office as Prime
Minister.51 One month later, Tudjman’s former foreign minister
Mate Granić carried only 22 percent of the vote in the first round of
voting in the presidential contest. The 7 February runoff produced
a new surprise when Stipe Mesić, representing the small Croatian
Peoples’ Party but familiar to the electorate due to his role as chair
of the Federal Presidency during the agony of Yugoslavia at the
beginning of the 1990s, prevailed over the favored Dragiša Budiša.
The new leadership wasted no time in attacking the Tudjman
340

legacy, arresting some of the more notoriously corrupt state officials,
asserting a willingness to cooperate with the work of the ICTY,
washing its hands of efforts to attach Herceg-Bosna to Croatia, and
pledging sweeping administrative and economic reforms.
The voters’ repudiation of Tudjman and the HDZ was a
significant event that made possible a turn away from the archaic
nationalism of the past decade toward more forward looking efforts
to reattach Croatia to natural markets in the southeastern European
subregion and realign with contemporary European standards of
democracy and human rights. But the challenge of reform was made
considerably more difficult by the legacy of war. Zagreb joined
NATO’s Partnership for Peace in May 2000, but it was clear that
membership in the Alliance would be a long-term goal at best. The
EU praised the new Croatia’s potential as a leader in the post-conflict
Balkans, but put off Croatian prospects for association. Economic
performance continued to stagnate absent structural reforms that
were sure to carry a high social price, and foreign aid and assistance
remained modest. Friction within the ruling coalition slowed down
the reform agenda, and popular dissatisfaction with lack of progress
in improving living standards grew.52 The HDZ has made modest
gains in recent elections, and remains a factor in national politics,
with an agenda that could set Croatia’s realignment toward Europe
reeling backward.53
A political cartoon appearing in the Croatian feuilleton Feral
Tribune after Milošević’s incarceration in The Hague shows a
relaxed Franjo Tudjman sitting in Hell, pointing a mocking finger at
his Serbian counterpart under lock and key, proclaiming the World
War II slogan, bolje grob nego rob (better death than slavery). Though
it is unlikely that Tudjman would ever have been dragged before
an international tribunal, he was at least as complicit in the violent
breakup of Yugoslavia and responsible for the degradation of his
homeland as was Milošević. Discrediting the primitive nationalism
of the HDZ and placing Croatia back on its feet economically are
important prerequisites for reestablishing a stable regional order.
Aiding in that task should be a priority for the West.
6. The Serbian Revolution.
The best news to emerge from the Balkans in the wake of
the Kosovo conflict was unquestionably the fall of the Milošević
regime. Perhaps deceived by conventional wisdom suggesting
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that his popular support had been strengthened by intransigence
during the air campaign, Milošević himself made the decision to
force through a constitutional amendment allowing him to stand in
popular elections for the post of president of Yugoslavia, which had
previously been appointed by parliament, in the autumn of 2000.
The gesture was unnecessary—Milošević’s term of office as Serbian
president was scheduled to expire in July 2001, and some kind of
arrangement allowing him to perpetuate power would eventually
have been required, but there was no imminent pressure to act. In
the presidential contest, to general astonishment, in a five-man race
held on September 24, Milošević was defeated in the first round as
opposition leader Vojislav Koštunica, representing a Democratic
Opposition coalition, captured slightly more than 50 percent of the
vote.
What followed was high drama. Back to the wall, Milošević
refused to recognize the validity of the result. After some hesitation,
the pro-regime Federal Elections Commission ruled that Koštunica
had not crossed the 50 percent bar, and mandated a runoff election
on October 8. The Democratic Opposition refused this ploy,
declined to participate in a run off, and called for popular defiance.
It succeeded in mobilizing a movement of contestation engaging a
broad cross section of Serbian society, and culminating in a general
strike. The high point of the mobilization arrived on October 5, with
a nation-wide march on Belgrade that united hundreds of thousands
of citizens in columns that swept aside police roadblocks and
eventually stormed the federal parliament building.54 On October
6 Milošević threw in the towel. Besieged in his residence in the
elite Belgrade suburb of Dedinje, he formally accepted the results
of the elections and recognized Koštunica as the democratically
elected president of Yugoslavia. After 13 years of exercising power,
the Serbian strongman who had masterminded the dissolution
of Yugoslavia, presided over its war of succession, and emerged
apparently unscathed from the NATO bombing campaign, had been
swept away by crowds in the streets.
The reasons for Milošević’s defeat are not difficult to identify.
His electoral base had always been relatively narrow, built upon
the support of pensioners in search of security, rural and southern
Serbia, and economically troubled small and medium sized towns.
Already in 1996 the Zajedno (Unity) coalition led by Zoran Djindjić
and Vuk Drašković succeeded in winning an impressive victory in
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local elections, securing majorities in 14 of Serbia’s largest cities and
towns. Milošević refused to acknowledge the results, and 88 days
of uninterrupted street demonstrations followed, concluding with
the surrender of the authorities and validation of election outcomes,
including recognition of Djindjić as elected mayor of Belgrade.55 The
Zajedno coalition could not stand the strains of victory, and by 1997
it had disbanded amidst partisan quarreling. Milošević’s political
weakness had been demonstrated nonetheless, and the sense of
exposure may have encouraged him to maintain a hard-line stance
during the Kosovo crisis. Serbia’s defeat in Kosovo, coming on top
of years of corrupt governance, economic decline, and international
isolation, was the final straw. During his years in power Milošević
had repeatedly mobilized the forces of order to defend himself against
popular ire. At the decisive moment on October 5, there was no one
left to fight for him—the army, led by General Nebojša Pavković, and
the police forces, opted to defer to the mobilized populace. Serbia’s
revolution was disciplined, democratic, and essentially bloodless, an
unambiguous manifestation of popular will.56 In this it resembled
many of the central European anti-communist uprisings of 1989, of
which it is sometimes said to represent the culmination.57
The Serbian revolution concluded with parliamentary elections
on December 23, 2000, where the Democratic Opposition of Serbia,
now an 18-party coalition united behind Djindjić as its candidate
for prime minister, carried two-thirds of the popular vote. With a
democratic foundation in place, Serbia confronted the massive task
of constructing what Koštunica called “a state without rivers of
blood for borders, a good, efficient, democratic, European state, one
that is free inside and free abroad, that is independent, with a normal
economy, industry, banking system, social and health care, and
media.”58 The task was not made easier by chronic political division.
Djindjić as Prime Minister of Serbia and Koštunica as President of
Yugoslavia, the two most important leaders in the new regime, were
contrasting personalities whose agendas did not coincide. Dealing
with the Milošević legacy quickly proved to be both a challenging
and a dangerous occupation. The assassination of Djindjić on March
12, 2003, apparently at the hands of organized criminal figures
integrated into the Milošević government the prime minister was
seeking to neutralize, made the dangers clear, and provided a tragic
example of the instability that continues to haunt Serbia’s future.59
Serbia lies at the heart of the Balkans, and possesses a powerful
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state tradition and considerable economic assets. Its revival will be
essential to any effort to restore regional stability. Not surprisingly,
the Western powers embraced the Serbian revolution and moved
expeditiously to bring an end to the quasi-isolation imposed upon
the Milošević regime. In short order Yugoslavia was able to eliminate
the sanctions maintained by the United States and EU, restore
membership in the UN and the OSCE, and join the Stability Pact
for Southeastern Europe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the Council of
Europe.
Belgrade was also able to come to an agreement concerning a
new framework for relations with Montenegro. From assuming
power in November 1997 onward Montenegrin president Milo
Djukanović had pushed relentlessly for a referendum that would
allow Montenegro to proclaim itself an independent state. In the
aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, when support for Montenegro
appeared to be a convenient way to keep the pressure on Milošević,
Western chancelleries tended to stand in Djukanović’s corner, though
the agenda for separation was never unambiguously embraced. On
November 2, 1999, Podgorica went so far as to introduce the Deutsche
Mark as the official currency of Montenegro, creating the foundations
of a state within a state. Secession would no doubt have worked in
the interests of Djukanović and his entourage, suspect of reaping
huge profits from the criminal trafficking for which Montenegro
had become notorious.60 The advantages of independence were less
obvious to Montenegro’s 650,000 impoverished citizens, and despite
Podgorica’s best efforts securing a clear majority for independence
in a fairly conducted national referendum never seems to have been
within reach. In national elections of April 22, 2001, touted as a
referendum on independence, Djukanović’s Victory for Montenegro
coalition carried 42 percent of the vote and 35 seats in the national
parliament, but was nearly overtaken by a Together for Yugoslavia
opposition bloc that won 41 percent of the vote and 33 seats. On
March 14, 2002, urged on by EU mediator Javier Solana, Koštunica
and Djukanović met in Belgrade and agreed to disband the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and create a new union provisionally entitled
Serbia-Montenegro.61 The issue of Montenegrin separatism was
not definitively laid to rest—the arrangement included provisions
for reviewing the status of the union after 3 years, including the
possibility of a referendum on continued association.62 Djukanović
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continues to assert that a majority of Montenegrins support
independence, and invoke the possibility of “civil strife on a scale
that could destabilize both Montenegro and its neighbors” should
their desires be left unfulfilled indefinitely.63 But the destabilizing
gesture of unilateral secession has at least been headed off, allowing
the government in Belgrade to concentrate its energies on domestic
reform.64
Despite the priority attached to consolidating the Koštunica
leadership, following the fall of Milošević Belgrade was immediately
bombarded with demands on the part of the ICTY and the
international community to surrender indicted war criminals, the
most important of whom was now the deposed leader himself.
These demands quickly became politically destabilizing. On April 1,
2001, after a daylong standoff at the Milošević residence, the former
president was taken into custody by Yugoslav authorities. On June
28, 2001 (Vidovdan!), he was extradited to The Hague, and on June
29 became the first head of state ever to be arraigned before an
international tribunal. Though supportive of cooperation with The
Hague tribunal in general terms, Koštunica opposed the extradition
as unconstitutional, and argued that only a domestic trial would
allow Serbs to come to terms with the crimes of the past decade.
Djindjić overrode his principled opposition on pragmatic grounds,
yielding to a U.S. ultimatum asserting that if Milošević was not
surrendered immediately contributions to the Internal Aid Donors’
Conference scheduled for June 29 would not be forthcoming.65 The
Milošević trial opened in February 2002 to a good deal of fanfare,
with the former tyrant unrepentantly denouncing the tribunal as a
legal travesty and exercise in victors’ justice.66
For a time, Milošević’s perorations before the tribunal were the
talk of Serbia. His condemnations of the ICTY as illegal and inspired
by an anti-Serbian bias were widely shared and had considerable
resonance. In the end, however, the game became stale. Out of
power, Milošević had lost the aura of omnipotence that had made
him so potent as a ruler. He was not a convincing representative
of the Serbian national idea, which he had, in fact, repeatedly
betrayed. The phase of national mobilization was now over, and the
preoccupations of the Serbian people had moved on to managing
the consequences of a decade of war and isolation. The Milošević
trial in The Hague was of interest for what it revealed about the
evolution of international law, but in some ways irrelevant to the
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course of Serbia’s long march back to international respectability.
Insistent demands from The Hague to surrender suspects and
accept war guilt nonetheless had the potential to disrupt the fragile
governing coalition, and there was unquestionably an element of
truth in Koštunica’s argument that only a domestic process, perhaps
modeled upon South Africa’s Truth and Justice Commission, could
make a meaningful contribution to national reconciliation.
7. Europe and the Balkans.
On June 10, 1999, at the initiative of the European Union, more
than 40 partner countries and nongovernmental organizations
meeting in Cologne, Germany approved a founding document
for the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.67 The project was
launched as a cooperative initiative under the general direction of
Special Coordinator Bodo Hombach at Sarajevo on July 30, 1999.
The idea for the Pact dated to 1998, but was lent impetus by the
Kosovo conflict, which reinforced awareness of Europe’s ineffective
diplomacy in the region. The Stability Pact’s founding document
pledged support for all the countries of Southeastern Europe “in
their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights
and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole
region,” and held out the promise of eventual integration with EuroAtlantic institutions.68 It was widely hailed as a belated effort to
move away from reactive crisis response toward a comprehensive,
long-term conflict prevention strategy capable of grappling with
underlying sources of instability.
The Stability Pact is a framework agreement among partners
committed to developing a common strategy for stability and growth,
and a multilateral initiative in which governments, international
organizations, financial institutions, and nongovernmental
organizations pool their resources in a common cause. It works under
the direction of the Special Coordinator and a small staff based in
Brussels, through a Regional Table sub-divided into three Working
Tables devoted to Democratization and Human Rights (Table 1),
Economic Reconstruction (Table II), and Security Issues (Table III).
During the 3 years of its existence the Regional Table has pursued a
wide range of useful initiatives, but its most basic responsibility has
been to promote economic recovery, operating on the basis of the
recommendations of the World Bank’s March 2000 strategy paper
The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe.69 The
346

program seeks to combine short-term efforts to address the lingering
effects of war through humanitarian relief and reconstruction
programs, with a long-term commitment to transformation including
democratization, sustainable development, and nation building. It
also aspires to set standards—donor contributions are conditioned
by demands for structural reform on the part of recipient countries.
The Stability Pact is still a work in progress, but it is not too
soon to conclude that its contributions to economic recovery have
been disappointing. The amount of assistance generated by the Pact
has simply been too small to roll back the development gap that
increasingly divides the southeastern European subregion from
neighboring areas in Central and Western Europe. Foreign direct
investment and development assistance to the Balkan states through
the entire decade of the 1990 only reached about one-half the per
capita level that was provided to the more prosperous Visegrad
countries of Central Europe. Since the creation of the Stability Pact,
the scale of assistance has not dramatically changed.
Though non-European powers, including the United States,
Canada, and Japan, have been associated with the Stability Pact
since its inauguration, the EU has provided the bulk of funding
for the initiative, which can be perceived as a part of a larger effort
to address the Balkan regional dilemma by bringing Southeastern
Europe in from the cold under the tutelage of the traditional
European powers. The “Europeanization” of the Balkans, including
“extending the cross-border monetary, trade, and investment
arrangements that already operate within the EU across Europe’s
southeastern periphery,” is often posed as a logical solution for
a peripheral region that is nonetheless an integral part of Europe
geographically and culturally.70 In the United States, redefining the
Balkan dilemma as a “European problem” sometimes becomes a
prelude for arguments urging disengagement, but from a regional
perspective there is no choice to be made.71 The contemporary
Balkans has already been subordinated to European and EuroAtlantic direction. The only question that remains is how effective
that direction will be in helping the region to emerge from its
current degraded situation. Unfortunately, evolving U.S. priorities,
the nature of the European integration process, and the international
community’s track record during a decade and more of Balkan
conflict, warn against exaggerated expectations.
Following the collapse of European communist regimes in 1989,
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the EC was quick to offer the new democratic states of Central and
Eastern Europe associated status, but cautious about opening its
doors to new members. In December 1991, the first Association or
Europe Agreements with post-communist states sought to promote
commercial exchange and “political dialogue,” but these agreements
did not constitute a commitment to membership. The Copenhagen
session of the European Council in June 1993 made eastern
enlargement a practical possibility, but also conditioned eligibility
upon the ability of an associated country “to assume the obligations
of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions
required.”72 The conditions in question were stringent, and certainly
well beyond the capacity of the states of Southeastern Europe. The
European Commission sought to coordinate economic assistance to
Central and Eastern Europe by launching the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Operation PHARE
in November and December 1989. It also embraced the cause of
democratization through projects in support of parliamentary reform,
human rights monitoring, the development of an independent media,
and the promotion of democratic trade unionism.73 The majority of
these programs were directed toward the Visegrad countries and
the former Soviet Union rather than the Balkan states, however.
It was not until 1997-98 that the European Council developed a
project for Accession Partnerships, and the project disadvantaged
the southeastern European area from the start. The attempt to draw
up lists of “ins and pre-ins” among accession candidates upon which
the EU’s Agenda 2000 was based excluded the Balkan region almost
entirely.74 By 2000 it had been discarded in favor of an approach
basing eligibility upon bilateral discussions and individual merit.
The Copenhagen summit of November 2002 confirmed accession
for Slovenia and the Republic of Cyprus in 2004, tentatively looked
forward to the possibility of accession for Romania and Bulgaria in
2007, and agreed to open accession talks with Turkey in December
2004 pending progress in a process of reform. The EU had belatedly
extended its enlargement process to include the Balkans, but the core
of the region constituted by the majority of Yugoslav successor states
remained without prospects for accession in the near future.
There was some logic to the EU’s reluctance. The chaos
engendered by open-ended warfare and generally poor economic
performance virtually precluded the majority of Balkan states from
eligibility. The alternative to accession was positive association, but
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here, too, institutionalized Europe was slow to react to the special
needs of a region in turmoil. After the failure of EC mediation in the
first stage of the Yugoslav crisis, Europe ceased to play a dynamic
role in regional conflict management, and, up to the 1995 Dayton
Accord, it failed to produce any kind of uniform Balkan policy at
all. In February 1996, chagrined by its effacement at Dayton, the
EU’s General Affairs Council initiated a Regional Approach in the
Balkans, intended to supplement OSCE efforts under the Dayton
Accord by offering financial and economic assistance and trade
and cooperation agreements. It would await the watershed of the
Kosovo crisis, however, before a more consistent approach took
form. The Vienna European Council of December 1998 set the stage
by calling for a common European strategy in the region, a call that
would eventually be realized with the inauguration of the Stability
Pact and its associated Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).
The SAP program was focused upon the negotiation of
Stabilization and Association Agreements designed to grant
contractual relations to the Balkan states heretofore left out of the
European process altogether (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as of 1999).
Modeled on the Association (Europe) Agreements of the 1990s “but
with a greater emphasis on regional cooperation, democratization,
the development of civil society, and institution building,” the
Stabilization and Association Agreements and Process have become
important levers of influence in European attempts to shape the
Balkan regional environment.75 Relations between the EU and
individual Balkan states have remained considerably diverse
nonetheless, and chronic instability continues to discourage deeper
engagement and frustrate recovery. European priorities have also
evolved, away from the humanitarian focus characteristic of the
war years culminating with the Kosovo conflict, toward heightened
concern for émigré flows and criminal trafficking—issues that are
likely to dictate increased closure rather than inclusion. Conditioned,
asymmetric association such as defined by the SAP program is a
perfectly valid approach to integrating Balkan states into a larger
European process that they are not yet ready to join as full partners,
but it is not likely to bring the region the kind of benefits that are
urgently needed if new bouts of instability are to be headed off.
Europeanization is a valid and inevitable aspiration for the region,
but it will not be a panacea for its many problems.
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A variety of regionally based initiatives also seek to encourage
closer coordination between the Balkan states themselves. Among
these initiatives are the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) whose
11 members include Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey,
the Central European Initiative (CEI) with 16 members including
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia,
Romania, and Slovenia; the South East European Cooperative Initiative
(SECI) bringing together Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey;
and the South East Europe Co-operation Process (SEECP) including
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey, with
Croatia as an observer.76 These are clearly beneficial undertakings,
complementary in nature, often coordinated with the work of the
Stability Pact, and paralleled by a wide range of dynamic bilateral
relationships. They are, however, condemned to work with severely
limited resources.77 Regional cooperation is also emerging in the
military sector. In 1999, eight Balkan countries combined to establish
a Multinational Peace Force South Eastern Europe which has evolved
into a brigade sized force of 4,000 soldiers capable of participating in
OSCE-mandated, NATO-led conflict prevention and peace support
operations.78 These various cooperative initiatives are mutually
reinforcing and an important—indeed essential—complement to
international efforts to build regional stability.
8. NATO and the Balkans.
NATO was created as a balancing alliance in response to the
threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. From its origins,
however, the Alliance’s commitment to collective defense was
attached to the goal of building a security system within which the
democracies of postwar Europe could learn to interact peacefully
among themselves.79 In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch spoke of the Alliance
as a security community where war as a means of resolving disputes
between states was becoming unthinkable.80 And the benefits of
security community did not lie in the military realm alone--the
hard security guarantees provided by the Alliance encouraged a
broader process of political, social, and economic integration that
generated considerable collective benefits.81 NATO has always had a
dual character, as a defensive military alliance, but also as a political
forum institutionalizing dialogue and cooperation.
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The Alliance’s post-cold war evolution has accentuated its
character as a political agent. By redefining its mission and
opening its doors to new members NATO has aspired, in the
words of former Secretary General Javier Solana, to create “a new
Alliance, far removed in purpose and structure from its Cold War
ancestor,” inspired by the premise of “cooperative security” and
capable of serving as the centerpiece of an emerging European
and Eurasian collective security regime.82 From 1991 forward the
Alliance has reduced and reconfigured its nuclear and conventional
forces, transformed decisionmaking procedures to achieve greater
transparency and balance, created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council and Partnership for Peace (PfP) process as means to engage
the post-communist states of central and eastern Europe, actively
pursued a process of enlargement, recast its security concept to
encourage mutual security and out of area peace support missions,
and institutionalized special relationships with the Russian
Federation and Ukraine. Its self-proclaimed goal is no longer simply
to deter aggression, but rather to help construct “a just and lasting
peaceful order in Europe.”83
Engagement in the Balkans has been an important test of
these ambitious new commitments. The test has been successfully
withstood, but not without problems. During the first years of the
Balkan conflict, the NATO powers expressed a broad consensus
in opposition to large-scale military involvement.84 As the
conflict expanded, it became more difficult to defend a policy of
nonintervention—Europe’s premier security forum could not stand
aside indefinitely while a major European region was consumed by
war without eventually sacrificing all credibility. Military engagement
in the Bosnian conflict was belated but effective. Intervention in
Kosovo was precipitous, and resulted in a war that probably did
not need to be fought, but did create a context for bringing at least
a trace of stability to the disputed province. In Macedonia the
Alliance’s role was more discrete, but no less essential. In addition
to these ongoing peace support missions, and potentially more
important in the long-term, the PfP and its Membership Action Plan
have been enthusiastically embraced by a number of Balkan states,
and Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria (together with Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Slovakia in Central Europe) have been awarded full
membership in the second round of enlargement. The Alliance also
remains the single most important peace broker in the continuing
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rivalry between Greece and Turkey. Together with the EU, NATO
has become a major point of orientation for the reform-oriented
regimes of the new Southeastern Europe and an irreplaceable source
of stability for the region as a whole.85
At the April 1999 Washington Summit, NATO launched a South
East Europe Initiative (SEEI). The intention was to build on existing
forms of cooperation and extend them to countries not yet engaged
in the PfP process (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yugoslavia
during 1999), with the goal of promoting regional cooperation
and long-term security and stability. In October 2000 a South East
Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group was created to develop
regional approaches to key security issues, and in May 2001, at the
initiative of Romania, the SEEI presided over the drafting of a South
East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges
and Opportunities (SEECAP) agreed to by all southeastern European
Foreign Ministers.86 The SEECAP is an action-oriented document
that identifies security challenges in the political, military, economic,
social, and environmental realms and specifies cooperative
mechanisms for addressing them. Under the aegis of SEEI, and on
the basis the SEECAP recommendations, NATO has developed
a demanding work agenda encouraging military modernization
and security cooperation among regional partners. The Alliance’s
engagement in this process is a hopeful sign—but as yet no more
than that. Peace building in the Balkans is a long-term project that
will require a serious commitment on the part of all NATO allies,
including the United States, for some time to come. Whether that
commitment will be forthcoming, with the result that the benefits
of a Deutschian security community will eventually be extended
to all of the new democracies of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern
Europe, remains to be seen.
********
The Balkan region has arrived at the end of a decade-long cycle of
violence. Though observers have become conditioned to expect the
worst, recent years have seen a number of promising developments.
The ouster of Milošević, and the political defeat of the HDZ, has made
it possible to consign the war of Yugoslav succession to the past. All
of the states of the region have democratically elected governments
anxious to move forward by focusing on economic growth, regional
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cooperation, and closer relations with an enlarging Europe. The
detritus of war, in the form of shattered infrastructure, ruined lives,
and the poisoned spirits of alienated communities, nonetheless
remains in place. Some of these problems are being addressed by
NATO-led peace support missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo,
and Macedonia. Progress toward Greek-Turkish rapprochement,
also actively promoted in the NATO context, holds out great promise
for the entire region. The international community has sustained a
substantial commitment to peace building in the Balkans, and a host
of international and regionally based initiatives are underway to
promote development and understanding.87
Promising trends do not mean that the region has turned the
corner. Progress toward democratic consolidation has been real,
but it is reversible. The foundations for a self-sustaining peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia have not yet been
established. Poor economic performance, rampant criminality, and
social disillusionment encouraging migration are serious dilemmas
for the region as a whole. Changed priorities after the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States have lowered
the profile of the Balkan region in international affairs, and called
international commitments that are vital to stability into question. If
such trends are not reversed, and they will only be reversed as the
result of renewed determination and purposeful action, a variant of
the Eastern Question could be called back into life, with Southeastern
Europe, excluded from the European mainstream, once again
representing a chronic source of friction and violence.
Humanitarian Intervention and the Law of War.
The Balkan wars of the 1990s challenged the capacity of
international law and institutions to address the problem of violence
in the international system, in regard both to interstate conflict and
cases of humanitarian abuse perpetrated by domestic authorities.
The intensive media coverage extended to Balkan conflicts,
the involvement of the international community in the conflict
management effort, the high visibility of humanitarian violations,
and the new field for activism apparently opened up by the end of
cold war bipolarity combined to make the conflict a particularly
fertile ground for efforts to expand the modern war convention.88
The extent to which those efforts do or do not succeed will represent
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an important part of the legacy of the wars of Yugoslav succession.
Attempts to broaden the capacity of international instances
to punish violations of legal or humanitarian norms rest upon a
universalistic presumption—that in an increasingly interdependent
international system common values must come to take precedence
over the egoistic concerns of individual units. The goal is sometimes
described as a shift from a “Westphalian” order, based upon the
autonomy of nation-states in an anarchic system without effective
supranational authority, toward an international society where at
least some of the elements of domestic order pertain to the conduct
of inter-state relations as well. International reactions to the wars of
Yugoslav succession embodied this argument in at least three ways.
First, Western interventions were justified in the name of a doctrine
of humanitarian intervention asserting that, in cases of massive
crimes against humanity, international instances and responsible
national actors are obliged to respond, if need be, in defiance of the
presumption of sovereignty.89 Second, armed intervention and peace
enforcement strategies were sanctioned as a legitimate use of force
under the rubric of humanitarian war.90 Third, the law of war was
broadened to encompass a growing body of international humanitarian
law that demands more intrusive monitoring of national behavior,
including the convocation of tribunals to prosecute violators.91
In the wake of the bloodletting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
relevance of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention was widely
asserted. NATO’s war in Kosovo was formally justified as a
humanitarian war, where the intervening powers were presumed
to resort to arms, not in respect of national interest, but in response
to intolerable ethical violations. The ICTY has been in existence for
nearly a decade and is mandated to impose legal accountability for
humanitarian abuses. The Hague is now the site of history’s first
international prison, and home to the first head of state ever placed
on trial by an international tribunal on criminal charges. Inspired and
influenced by these initiatives, a permanent International Criminal
Court (ICC) has been ratified by the UN, to take up its functions in
The Hague during 2003.92
These are meaningful initiatives, but whether they will add
up to a substantial extension of the international war convention
remains unclear. Many of the states that were the most adamant
champions of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention in the specific
circumstances of the Yugoslav conflict have since cooled to the
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idea. War is not a humanitarian institution—the resort to arms may
occasionally be just, or justifiable, but it is seldom humane. The ICTY
is a contested institution, and the ICC lacks the support of many of
the world’s most significant national actors, including China, the
Russian Federation, and the United States. As the Yugoslav wars of
the 1990s fade into the past, the emotional reactions that galvanized
opinion will begin to pale as well. Many of the conceptual and legal
innovations that were applied during the Yugoslav conflict remain
insufficiently institutionalized, and few rest upon a substantial
international consensus.
NATO intervention during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
not formally sanctioned on the basis of a doctrine of humanitarian
intervention. The use of force against the Serb faction (and occasional
threats of a resort to force against the Croat and Muslim factions)
came in response to violations of UN guidelines, and at UN request.
In the Kosovo conflict, however, NATO intervention was not based
upon any kind of convincing mandate from the UN or other relevant
instance. Rather, a right to resort to force was asserted unilaterally by
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana in a letter to the North Atlantic
Council dated October 9, 1998, on the basis of an interpretation of UN
Security Council Resolution No. 1999, which defined the situation in
Kosovo as “a danger for peace and security in the region” and cited
the imminent danger of “a humanitarian disaster.” The circumstance
of humanitarian necessity, according to Solana, provided NATO
with “a legitimate basis for threatening the use of force, and, if
necessary, a resort to force.”93 At the beginning of the bombing
campaign, the notion would be elevated by British Prime Minister
Tony Blair into an ethnical imperative to “act to save thousands of
innocent men, women and children from humanitarian catastrophe,”
grandiloquently described as a “new internationalism where the
brutal repression of whole ethnic groups would not be tolerated.”94
Blair’s new internationalism implied a significant revision of classic
just war theory, which demands right authority as a prerequisite for
a resort to coercion. In cases of urgent humanitarian necessity, it was
suggested, legal premises defining right authority, at least as they
have been understood by the modern, or Westphalian tradition of
International Law, could be overridden and responsible nations or
international organizations self-empowered to fight in a just cause.
As Blair put it in a speech before the Economic Club of Chicago on
April 22, 1999, a “doctrine of international community” had “shifted
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the balance between human rights and state sovereignty.”95 For the
neo-Kantian Jürgen Habermas, the war in Kosovo had encouraged
“a leap away from classical international law understood as a law of
states toward the cosmopolitan law of a society of world citizens.”96
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is compelling, but
will not be convincing until several basic issues are resolved. The
first is the issue of institutionalization. Ad hoc operations, such as that
undertaken by NATO in Kosovo, do not rest upon a sound legal
foundation. Article 2 paragraph 4 of the UN Charter forbids recourse
to force by states with only two exceptions: (1) Self-Defense as
referenced in Article 51 of the Charter (the same premise is mentioned
in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty); and (2) Collective Security
measures under the auspices of the Security Council as defined in
Chapter VII. NATO demonstrated its sensitivity to the issue during
the Kosovo conflict by tying its actions to earlier UN Resolutions,
but by any measure the campaign’s legality was suspect.97 In order
to make a doctrine of humanitarian intervention more credible,
international institutions and the collective security regime presided
over by the UN will have to be considerably strengthened.98 The UN
Charter should ideally be rewritten to sanction such interventions,
and consistent procedures for identifying violations developed.
Likewise, in the spirit of consistent institutionalization, it would be
best if some kind of formally constituted intervention force, such as
that recommended by former UN Secretary General Boutros BoutrosGhalli in his 1992 Agenda for Peace, could be placed at the disposition
of the UN as an instrument of enforcement.99 Such procedures would
represent significant steps away from the Westphalian premise of
state sovereignty toward more robust world governance. For that
very reason, they are unlikely to be undertaken.
The issue of standards represents another dilemma. When do
humanitarian violations create a situation of urgent necessity
sufficient to justify a resort to arms? During the Balkan conflicts of the
1990s, decisions to intervene were often accompanied by a conscious
exaggeration of the extent of abuses in order shape elite opinion and
win public support. The use of the accusation of genocide has been
particularly notable in this regard. Serbia’s repression of the Kosovar
Albanians was initiated on the basis of accusations of genocide in
progress against the province’s Serb minority.100 During the run
up to the outbreak of war in the spring of 1991 all three of BosniaHerzegovina’s communal factions raised the charge of genocide
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against their rivals.101 Croatian commentators accused Serb forces
of perpetrating genocide during their 1991 campaigns in Croatia.102
During the Bosnian conflict the Muslim community was repeatedly
described as the victim of genocide.103 In the winter of 1998-1999,
when the victims of the fighting in progress in Kosovo numbered in
the thousands, the charge was leveled against the Serbian authorities
once again. As a result of the mass expulsion (but not necessarily
systematic mass killing) of Kosovar Albanians during the war, it has
found its way into the indictment against Milošević drawn up by
the ICTY.104 Unavoidably tied to the unprecedented crimes of the
World War II holocaust, the term genocide provides a “high yield
source of hatred,” and is therefore, along with other charges directed
against putative opponents, liable to abuse as an “indecent tool of
propaganda.”105
Determining when humanitarian abuses become liable to sanction
will often demand an essentially subjective judgment based upon
imperfect knowledge. In an age of instantaneous information, where
public perception often is conditioned decisively by sensational
media images and reporting, the risk that excessive emotionalism
built upon compelling language may misconstrue events, and
therefore create an irresistible momentum to “do something” before
chains of causality are clear, is very real. Armed conflicts do not
always produce unambiguous distinctions between victims and
victimizers. Systematic monitoring by impartial observers and lucid
adjudication of evidence are the only means to move beyond such
uncertainty. At present, international instances are far from having
the means, or the requisite moral authority, to accomplish such tasks
reliably.
A doctrine of humanitarian intervention must also come to terms
with the issue of commitment. Nations have traditionally crafted
international policy on the basis of a discourse of interest. Though
humanitarian concerns are not entirely foreign to this discourse,
they are seldom at its essence. When interests are not deemed to be
vital, a commitment of lives and treasure can seldom be sustained.
During the war of Yugoslav succession, the uncertain commitment
of the Western powers was repeatedly demonstrated. The West
pursued a containment policy for 3 long years while over 200,000
Yugoslavs were cut down in wars and massacres. In Kosovo, NATO
was willing to go to war on behalf of the Kosovar Albanians, but
not to risk mass casualties.106 The administration of George W. Bush
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came to office in January 2001 to a chorus of calls from influential
supporters urging U.S. disengagement on the grounds that vital
national interests were not at stake. The Balkan case makes clear that
humanitarian motivation by itself will seldom provide the kind of
sustained commitment that effective intervention demands.
The case for humanitarian intervention presumes that
organized violence can be mobilized as an instrument of justice
in complex regional contingencies within the confines of the test
of proportionality. The very character of modern war calls this
presumption into doubt.
Wesley Clark’s account of Operation ALLIED FORCE is
imbued with the conviction of fighting in a just cause, but his
analysis leaves no doubt that in order to prevail in armed conflict
belligerents must respect the laws of warfare and pursue victory
uncompromisingly. In limited wars intended to provide “regional
stability and humanitarian assistance,” where there is arguably a
substitute for victory, the result will often have more in common
with imperial policing actions than classic armed conflict between
peer competitors.107 The difficulty of mobilizing and sustaining
public support pushes inexorably toward a reliance upon air power
in order to reduce or eliminate casualties among one’s own forces,
while maximizing damage to enemy infrastructure. In Kosovo,
according to Michael Ignatieff, “the political leaders of NATO talked
the language of ultimate commitment and practiced the warfare of
minimum risk.”108 Reluctance to contemplate a ground incursion
even in the face of truly massive humanitarian abuses, reliance upon
medium altitude bombing with its unavoidable complement of
collateral damage, attempts to assassinate the opposing leadership
from the air, and attacks upon “dual use” infrastructure intended at
least in part, in the spirit of Giulio Douhet, to break the enemy’s will,
were a consequence of that choice.109 The structure of modern war, as
defined by Clark, strains at the limits of the test of proportionality.110
Moreover, according to Ignatieff, a zero casualties imperative
imposed upon commanders by civilian authority “transforms the
expectations that govern the morality of war.”111 The honor of the
combatant—the ethical context that distinguishes warfare from
crime—has always rested upon the assumption of reciprocal risk
in service of a cause. If that contract is broken, Ignatieff insists, war
becomes little more than a kind of chastisement.112
The capacity to wage war with minimum risk makes the
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decision to resort to force easier to make. If not carefully monitored,
such capacity may lead to precipitous and unconsidered actions,
discourage the pursuit of diplomatic alternatives, and undermine
the just war criterion of last resort. On the eve of Croatia’s Operation
STORM in the summer of 1995, confident of U.S. support, Tudjman
used international negotiations as a pretext to buy time for last minute
preparations. The Rambouillet negotiations have been portrayed as
little more than a ploy intended to justify a resort to force. Such
circumstances will recur should the presumption of a right to
humanitarian intervention become imbedded in the operational
code of the great powers. War without the risk of consequences
likewise makes the temptation to use humanitarian pretexts harder
to resist. The obvious danger is the transformation of an agenda
based upon an assertion of universal human rights into a disguised
form of hegemonism—Hedley Bull, for example, has noted the
continuity between the theme of humanitarian intervention and the
missionary and colonial traditions.113 “The concept of humanitarian
war,” writes Danilo Zolo, “restores to states an indiscriminate ius
ad bellum, voids the ‘pacifistic’ functions of international law, and
discredits the cosmopolitan ideal of the universal citizen.”114 If these
critiques are credited, the more widespread acknowledgement of a
thesis of humanitarian war can be interpreted as a step backward for
the international war convention.
The ICTY, created in May 1993 by the UN Security Council on the
basis of Chapter I of the UN Charter, with a mandate retrospective to
1991, is the most ambitious dimension of efforts to use the Yugoslav
wars as a context for expanding the oversight of the international
community in regard to war and conflict. The wars in BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo were the first armed conflicts in history
fought in the presence of an international tribunal judged competent
to judge crimes committed.
The effort to move judicial means toward the center of the
war convention is a 20th century innovation. In the early modern
centuries, the European traditions of pacifism and international law
(Erasmus, Grotius, Crucé, the Duc de Sully, the Abbé Saint-Pierre,
Penn, Vattel, Rousseau, Kant) emphasized interstate relations and
political organization as the foundations of lasting peace.115 The
Versailles peacemakers’ attempt to put the Kaiser, together with
other German leaders (the surrender of 90 individuals was requested)
on trial before an international tribunal with judges representing
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the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan,
was unprecedented. But Holland refused the Kaiser’s extradition,
Germany declined to surrender anyone, and in the end little came of
the project. A more significant precedent was established at the end
of the Second World War. The London Accord of August 6, 1945,
created the Nuremberg Tribunal on behalf of the victorious nations
of the war, and 1 year later an International Military Tribunal for
the Far East was created in Tokyo. The Tokyo tribunal conducted
two years of hearings before 11 judges designated by U.S. General
Douglas MacArthur. All 28 of the accused that were placed before the
court were convicted, and seven executed. The Nuremberg process
began on November 25, 1945, with 22 accused placed before U.S.,
British, French, and Soviet judges. One year later it concluded with
three not guilty verdicts, condemnations to prison terms of varied
lengths, and ten death sentences that were carried out immediately.
Though it is often described as a continuation of the Nuremberg
tradition, the ICTY rests upon a different set of premises. The
Nuremberg Tribunal’s charter specifically cited the “sovereign
legislative power of the countries to which the German Reich
unconditionally surrendered” as the basis for its authority. The
ICTY is not a military tribunal, and Article 16 of its statute calls for
action completely independent of any government.116 A priority
for the authorities at Nuremberg, noted in the opening address of
Justice Robert H. Jackson citing “the privilege of opening the first
trial in history for crimes against the peace of the world,” though
they also took account of war crimes (jus in bello) and crimes against
humanity, was legal responsibility for instigating war (crimes
against peace in the tradition of jus ad bellum).117 The Hague Tribunal
has focused almost exclusively upon crimes against humanity, and
represents a conscious assault against state sovereignty on behalf of
universal norms—though it should be noted that unlike the ICTY,
the ICC includes the Nuremberg criterion of crimes against peace
in its statute. Nuremberg and Tokyo did not establish ongoing
traditions—after the processes were concluded the idea of an
international criminal tribunal lay dormant until the 1990s.
The ICTY’s legitimacy has been challenged on legal grounds
(notably by Slobodan Milošević in the deposition at the outset of
his trial).118 Does the Security Council have the authority to appoint
a court under Chapter VII of the Charter, and to remove juridical
authority from sovereign states? These decisions, after lengthy
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review, were made by the ICTY itself, on its own behalf and in
its own favor, in the Miroslav Tadić case.119 The decisions may be
contested, but they are substantial.
The issue of the Tribunal’s autonomy is perhaps more troubling.
The absence of any multilateral accord as a basis for the Tribunal
(as opposed to the ICC) makes it a sort of subsidiary of the
Security Council, which cannot be considered either impartial or
universal. The same may be said of the Procurator General, who
is directly appointed by the Security Council. Although Article 29
of the Tribunal’s Statute obligates all state members of the UN to
collaborate with its work, the real circle of collaborators has been
quite narrow. Article 32 of the Statute specifies that revenues must
derive from the UN’s general operating funds, but already in 1993 a
special fund for the ICTY was established on the basis of voluntary
contributions. The Tribunal is in practice financially dependent upon
a small number of Western powers led by the United States.
The Tribunal’s procedures have also exposed it to the charges of
bias and selective prosecution. Justice has been neither swift, sure,
or equitable. Coercive detainment of indicted defendants was not
initiated until the summer of 1997, and has proceeded irregularly
and with numerous glitches. On July 10, 1997, British commandos
in Prijedor approached Simo Drljača, a local police chief whose
area of responsibility during 1992 included the Omarska, Keraterm,
and Trnopolje prison camps, in mock Red Cross vehicles, a blatant
violation of Red Cross neutrality. Drljača was killed in the resultant
shoot out. On August 25, 1999, Momir Talić, former commander in
chief of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, was arrested on
the basis of a secret warrant after he was baited to travel to Vienna
as an invited guest of the OSCE. Irregular procedures such as these,
inconsistency in enforcement of warrants, inability to bring in most
wanted suspects including Karadžić and Mladić, and difficulties
of prosecution lacking broad-based corroborative testimony, have
cast considerable discredit upon the ICTY. In the nine years that it
has been in existence, at a cost of over $400 million, 67 defendants
have appeared before the court, 31 of whom have been tried. Eleven
defendants are currently on trial, and approximately 30 indictees are
still at large. The majority of indictees have been Serbs. The number
of Croat and Bosnian Muslims on the list is considerably smaller,
and only at the end of February 2003 were four Kosovar Albanians,
all former members of the KLA, and the ABH Commander in
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Srebrenica, Nasim Oric´, accused of perpetuating atrocities against
Serb villages in Bosnia, made subject to indictment.” At its current
pace, the work of the Tribunal is likely to stretch over the better
part of the next decade, at escalating cost, and with only the tip of
the iceberg of abuses subjected to scrutiny. This is too slow, partial,
and contested a result to represent a standard of justice, contribute
meaningfully to reconciliation, or provide effective admonition to
other world leaders contemplating aggression.120
There are clearly a large number of guilty parties in the dock
at The Hague, who merit exemplary punishment. The premise
of legal accountability in regards to the law of war is in principle
admirable—if such accountability could be enforced reliably and
fairly the international war convention would make a significant
step forward. This will perhaps be the challenge confronting the
ICC. The experience of the ICTY calls attention to how difficult the
challenge is likely to be.
War in the Balkans: A Balance Sheet.
The wars of the 1990s were post-Yugoslav conflicts, born of
the failure of the long cherished but now discredited South Slav
idea. They were fought between communities with a history of
antagonism, but also between peoples with a lingua franca, common
history, and shared experience as fellow citizens. All were marked
by the particular ruthlessness of civil war. None, with the possible
exception of the Slovenian case, have been definitively resolved.
Despite its many flaws, the Yugoslav federation offered a positive
context for resolving the challenge of cultural diversity by sustaining
a common space within which ethnic communities could coexist
with reasonable guarantees of equity and balance. After a decade
of warfare, no positive alternative has appeared to take its place.
The chimera of the ethnically pure national state, still pursued by
champions of partition arrangements in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia,
and elsewhere, cannot be the foundation for a sustainable political
order in a culturally complex area such as former Yugoslavia. This
is so even in the wake of the substantial social engineering affected
by policies of ethnic cleansing over the last decade. If the process of
anarchic fragmentation that has destroyed former Yugoslavia is ever
to be reversed, some formula for reconciliation and re-association
will have to be found.
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The collapse of Yugoslavia has given rise to a complex mix of
fragile new states and quasi-state entities. Slovenia, Croatia, and
Serbia-Montenegro, the original founders of the Yugoslav federation,
have considerable national potential. Ljubljana is well positioned to
complete its association with institutional Europe. Belgrade and
Zagreb, although they confront difficult economic circumstances
that if unchecked could reanimate defensive nationalism, have the
resources to follow the same path. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo,
and Macedonia are international protectorates in all but name,
and will likely remain so for some time. An independent Kosovo,
or Montenegro, would have virtually no prospect for balanced
development apart from reliance upon international assistance
and criminal trafficking. Neighboring Albania is a virtual failed
state, heavily dependent upon the support of the international
community. In the contemporary Balkans the challenges of state and
nation building are an integral part of post-conflict peace building
that cannot be avoided.
The war of Yugoslav succession was also a Balkan war, waged
over issues of identity and turf that have always been pronounced
in a region marked by civilizational fault lines, weak states, and
frustrated nationalism. The end of the cold war system, including
the demise of the Yugoslav federation, the collapse of communist
regimes in Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria, and the disappearance
of the Soviet Union, shattered geopolitical equilibriums in all of
Southeastern Europe. The wars of the 1990s reestablished regional
balance in some cases, but generated new sources of conflict in others.
The Macedonian and Albanian questions in the southern Balkans, in
particular, are likely to remain sources of chronic instability. Other
unresolved issues of identity and allegiance, including the fate of
multistate nations such as the Serbs, Magyars, and Roma, could also
become sources of tension. Recasting regional order has always been
a prerequisite for effective conflict management. It is a challenge
with which major regional actors, and the international community,
are just beginning to come to grips.
The Yugoslav conflict posed world order concerns as well. It
was one of the most protracted and destructive armed conflicts
of the 1990s, and was in many ways a typical example of modern
medium intensity warfare provoked by regional instability. Viewed
as a case study, the Yugoslav model includes the disintegration of a
failed state under the weight of economic dysfunction, a breakdown
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of domestic order exacerbated by ethnic tension and communal
rivalry, armed conflict propelled by locally organized militias and
paramilitary forces, war waged purposively against defenseless
civilians with the aim of provoking terror and mass flight, the
discrete involvement of major powers as sponsors for regional allies,
and the frustrated attempts of the international community, often
driven by sensational media coverage, to come to terms with the
problem in an environment where vital interests and compelling
motives were seldom in play.121 The Balkan wars were post-cold
war conflicts where the hand of the superpowers was not present
to impose moderation—the fate of Yugoslavia bears witness to the
potential for loss of control engendered by the end of bipolarity. It
also poses the question of how medium intensity regional conflict
will be managed in the future; by whom, with what means, and on
behalf of what ends.
In this regard, three lessons emerge from an evaluation of
international engagement in the Balkan conflict. First, there can be
no such thing as partial or limited intervention. If the international
community is unwilling, or unable, to stand aside and let regional
conflicts run their course, it must be prepared to engage for the long
haul. Interventions bring responsibility, place the reputations of the
intervening parties at stake, and entail complex obligations to friends
and allies that cannot be shirked, or frivolously abandoned, without
cost. Second, in cases of incipient armed conflict where political means
have been exhausted, decisive, preemptive military intervention
followed by a serious commitment to peace operations should be
the preferred option. Making such determinations, of course, is more
easily said than done, but it is a mark of the kind of statecraft that
should characterize international leadership. In retrospect it seems
clear that unambiguous international admonitions backed by a
credible threat of force could have blocked Slovenian and Croatian
secession in 1991 and throttled the Serb project at its origins. At the
time, however, the international community was not united, the
consequences of inattention were not clear, and the path of least
resistance—an ultimately futile containment policy—was preferred.
Finally, peace operations in complex regional contingencies should if
at all possible be multilateral, and ideally sanctioned under the aegis
of the UN working through responsible regional organizations. The
special military capabilities of the U.S. armed forces will make them
a preferred, or in some cases essential component of many such
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contingencies. This imposes the responsibility of choosing areas for
intervention carefully—on the basis of a hard-minded evaluation
of national interest as well as humanitarian concerns. The United
States should seek to avoid unilateral initiatives—its interests
will be best served by coordination with allies and reliance upon
established multilateral security forums such as NATO. The sacrifice
of autonomy that such reliance entails will be tempered by the fact
that few regional contingencies will pose imminent threats to vital
national interests, and more than compensated by the wider range
of perspectives brought to bear in decisionmaking and the force
multiplier effect of coalition operations.
Changes in the international security environment following
the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of September 11,
2001, have impacted upon the Balkan region in contradictory ways.
For America, the preoccupations with the former Yugoslavia evident
during the 1990s have virtually disappeared. Well before September
11 spokespersons associated with the administration of President
George W. Bush had articulated a desire to reduce or eliminate the
U.S. military presence in the region, and though opinion within
the administration remains divided, an agenda for disengagement
is still on the table. The new responsibilities associated with the
U.S.-led global War on Terrorism makes the burden of protracted
peacekeeping responsibilities ever more difficult to bear. U.S. allies
already provide 85 percent of the peacekeepers on the ground in
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, and that percentage is likely to
rise along with the role of Europe as the leading force behind the
conflict management effort. At the same time, the ramifications of
the War on Terrorism have increased the strategic salience of the
corridor linking the eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caucasus,
Caspian Sea, and Central Asia. As a partial result Romania and
Bulgaria have been accepted a future NATO members, incentive to
achieve some kind of compromise solution to the Cyprus problem
has been increased, and the already considerable strategic weight
of the centrally located Turkish Republic has grown even greater.
The recent arrest of al-Qaeda operatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and discovery that Bosnia continues to serve as a transit point for
international terror organizations, has called attention to the capacity
of the region to generate new sources of instability.122 When Bulgaria
and Romania join NATO, the Euro-Atlantic community will have
an even stronger motivation to ensure that the region does not once
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again become a theater of war. Under these circumstances, and
given the heavy stake that the United States has accumulated after
a decade of engagement, the national interest will best be served by
a continued commitment to stand shoulder to shoulder with our
allies in order to see current peace support operations through to a
successful conclusion.123
After years of nearly unabated violence, the peoples of
Southeastern Europe confront the monumental task of constructing
peace. Military engagement remains an important part of that effort.
In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, some kind of international
constabulary is essential to deter conflict and ensure the kind of safe
and secure environment needed in order for peace building efforts
to go forward. But there are no military solutions to the region’s
most pressing problems—these must be addressed in the political,
economic, and cultural domains. What has been most sorely lacking,
and what the international community can still help to provide,
is the vision of a destination or end state—a regional framework
capable of promoting development, encouraging reconciliation, and
sustaining peace. The Stability Pact program, an expanding EU role,
and the new dynamic of regional cooperation are helpful steps in this
direction—but solutions will not burst upon the scene overnight. The
gradual phasing out of international supervision, promotion of soft
border regimes, flexible patterns of association within multinational
polities such as Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia that
avoid harsh partition schemes, positive association with European
institutions and the European idea, and expanded regional
cooperation—all initiatives that international instances and local
actors are aggressively forwarding—will need be part of the mix.
If these goals can be identified, embraced, and effectively pursued,
the likelihood that it will eventually be necessary to analyze a fifth
Balkan war will be reduced.
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